Political Theory

Re: Inalienability of the self

gotlucky — Mon, 23 Jul 2012 19:17:48 GMT

Autolykos:

Except they don't all originate from the NAP. You yourself say so here:

gotlucky:

But some libertarians, such as Rothbard and Kinsella, make an exception regarding the body. They have different reasons, but they both say that title to the body is the one exception to the rule of title-transfer theory of contracts. One way or the other, the title is inalienable, even if you want it to be [alienable]. So now that we have looked at how reciprocity applies to all these other main principles of libertarianism, let's look at how reciprocity applies to the body. [Emphasis added.]

The basis for that exception needs to be explained. Either it's derivable as a conclusion from premises like the non-aggression principle, or it isn't, in which case it's an additional premise.

I was using the word originate in the sense of derive, not when the term was first used. I can see the confusion, so I'll stick to the clearer term "derive". These libertarian concepts do derive from the NAP, even if some libertarians just accept these principles as separate premises. I didn't really care to get into why Rothbard or Kinsella make the exception because we've been going around in circles regarding that point for several pages in different threads. The point I am making now is that these principles do come from the NAP.

Let's look at homesteading as an example. A lot of libertarians just take homesteading as a separate principle. But why do we take it as a principle in the first place? I think this is because libertarians instinctually recognize the reciprocal aspects of the homesteading principle.

Suppose 10 people are stranded on an island with one apple tree, and it is the only food source on the island. Now suppose one of these people picks an apple and then claims the apple tree as his, and the others may not use the tree. Are we going to believe that these other 9 people are going to respect a claim like that? Of course not. This one food source is so essential to their survival, that these people will not respect claims regarding ownership of this tree, even if one of the people runs faster than the others and manages to pick an apple first.

But let's take a more realistic example, where these 10 people are stranded on an island that does not have this limitation. If this island is full of food sources, apple trees or deer or whatever, then people can respect other's claims. We all start to make claims of ownership to various things on the island. I might claim the apple tree as mine, and you might claim a banana tree.

Now, what is homesteading? Homesteading is the rule of first use. Why not second use? Why not say that no use can ever constitute ownership? Why do we like this idea of first use? Because of the reciprocal aspect of the claims. If I claim the apple tree, I am not going to say, "Okay, if you pick an apple first, I'll pick one second, therefore I will be the legitimate owner." Instead, I say, "Okay, I've been using the apple tree, it's mine. I'm claiming it as my own."

And the reason we prefer first use is because we don't like the idea of people calling "shotgun" over things they see but haven't used. If we get to the island, and I start claiming everything as mine, the other 9 people are most certainly not going to respect these claims. But if I actually use something on the island, people become more willing to respect my claims. And this is where homesteading is reciprocal: If you respect my claims to own something by using it first, I will do the same for you.

If you catch a fish, I'm going to respect that as yours. I'm not going to just take it the moment you turn your back. I will respect your claims. Now, maybe the other 9 people might be reluctant to respect my claim regarding the entire apple tree, but that is beside the point. If there were hundreds of apple trees, and I claim one in particular, they might not care. The example doesn't even have to be a tree. It could be shelter. If I build a small hut and claim it as my own, I expect the other 9 people to respect that. And when the other 9 people are building huts of their own, they expect me to respect their huts. They "homestead" the land under their huts, and they expect the rest of us to respect that claim. They don't expect us to say, "Well, we actually only respect claims of second use, so whoever manages to take it from you now will be the owner."

The first use claim is reciprocal because it is a claim. I make a claim, and you make a claim. That is all. I expect you to respect mine, and you expect me to respect yours. This is the idea of homesteading and property. If a libertarian wants to just accept homesteading as a principle separate from the NAP, so be it. But that doesn't change the fact that it is derived from it. Don't let the fact that it is an intuitive rule confuse the fact that it comes from reciprocity.

Autolykos:

A is still physically able to complain. You (and presumably B) just don't think it's legitimate for him to do so. But really it's more like you consider any use of force by A against B in that situation is illegitimate.

I think it's pretty obvious that I'm not talking about physical complaining. Later in my post, I even put "legally" in parentheses after "complain". I am merely explaining the idea of estoppel...

Autolykos:

Where exactly have we established property? The post you linked to doesn't establish it, as far as I can tell. I don't see where else you (let alone "we") have done so.

It establishes it. Property originates with claims of ownership. I claim this, you claim that. We have property. I expect you to respect my claims, and you expect the same of me. This is the origin of property. Now, there are disputes about property, and that is the realm of law. You and I might dispute who really owns the apple tree, but there is no property if no one recognizes property claims. That's the Marxist dream, that people will just not recognize property claims, and we'll drink and be merry. But in the real world, people make claims and expect others to respect those claims.

Autolykos:

I thought we were treating "title" and "ownership" as synonymous. Also, I thought ownership was itself a kind of right.

Bachelors are unmarried men. Bachelors and unmarried men are synonymous. Titles are the rights of ownership. To have title means that you own the object in question.

Autolykos:

What do you mean by "respect"?

From wiktionary on respect:

to have regard for something, to observe a custom, practice, rule or right

to abide by an agreement.

Autolykos:

Isn't "the right of ownership" redundant? Why or why not?

I don't really see the relevance, and I'm fairly certain I've talked about my ideas on "just" or "rightful" ownership versus "unjust" or "wrongful" ownership.

Autolykos:

What do you mean by "violates"?

From wiktionary on violate:

To break, disregard, disagree or not act according to (rules, conventions, etc.).

Autolykos:

I think a broader point can be made with respect to reciprocation. Titles are very relevant to reciprocation because rights are very relevant to reciprocation. I don't see how reciprocation is necessarily limited to one or more specific rights which is/are called "title" or "ownership".

I agree, I don't believe that reciprocation is limited to title or ownership. But a lot gets thrown out when we apply it to law, as we would not allow for violence in response to insults.

Autolykos:

I don't see where you've proven that titles are essential to contracts. With all due respect, you've simply asserted it. In your example here, alienating the right to insult the other would presumably entail the other acquiring the right to retaliate in one or more ways. It also means the other person has the right to prevent him from insulting the other person. And I still don't see how the title theory of contracts can be derived from the non-aggression principle.

I am talking about contracts in terms of reciprocation. You can have a contract regarding whatever you want if the legal system allows for it. But I'm fairly certain that I've been talking about reciprocity and not just whatever legal systems allow for.

I apologize if I was unclear about that before. I suggest you reread the passage with that in mind, as B cannot prevent A from insulting him in terms of reciprocity.

Autolykos:

I'm sorry but I don't think it addresses my contention at all. Are you saying that alienating rights with respect to oneself violates the reciprocity principle? If so, then how exactly do you think that's the case?

It addresses your contention entirely. Here is an excerpt from my post to Minarchist in the What is Property thread:

gotlucky:

But, you might object and say, if I am allowed to take back money by force if it is my property, why can't I take back my slave? Well, this is where we have to look back at the NAP. Walter Block states it rather well:

The non-aggression axiom is the lynchpin of the philosophy of libertarianism. It states, simply, that it shall be legal for anyone to do anything he wants, provided only that he not initiate (or threaten) violence against the person or legitimately owned property of another. [Emphasis added]

Taking your money back does not constitute aggression, and anyone who takes action to prevent you from doing so is violating the NAP. But in the case of "voluntary" slavery, we have a contradiction with the NAP. If you attempt to take back your slave, while you could make the argument that you are taking back rightful property, you are still aggressing against his person. So, in order for Walter Block to maintain his rationalization of "voluntary" slavery, he would have to change his explanation of the NAP. But I don't think it would really be the NAP if he did.

Also, we could do away with the first part and just state:

The non-aggression axiom is the lynchpin of the philosophy of libertarianism. It states, simply, that it shall be legal for anyone to do anything he wants, provided only that he not initiate (or threaten) violence against ~~the person or~~ legitimately owned property of another.

First, as I said, this is not the commonly understood meaning of the NAP (in the opening of Property and Criminality, Rothbard states, "WE MAY DEFINE ANYONE who aggresses against the person or other produced property of another as acriminal. A criminal is anyone who initiates violence against another man and his property: anyone who uses the coercive “political means” for the acquisition of goods and services.") So, in order for this to work, we would have to change the very meaning of the NAP.

Second, this change causes the problem of what rightful property is. As I explained previously, property arises in two ways. The first is that we make claims to own things, and we respect (or not) those claims. The other is through law, but law is not good enough for libertarians, as we want the law to be just. So, in order to talk about property, we have to talk aboutindividuals. If we just skip to property, we miss the entire point of what property is.

So, I do not think we can just rewrite the NAP in order to allow for "voluntary" slavery. Firstly, this causes the problem of libertarians no longer agreeing on what the NAP even means. You might talk about the NAP in terms of property only, whereas I and Malachi might talk about it as including people. Neither is "correct". We would just be having different premises. Secondly, I don't believe it makes much sense to talk about property without understanding what causes property.

Autolykos:

I consider a legal system to be committing aggresion if it forcibly prevents a person from alienating one or more rights with respect to himself. Let me appeal to the golden rule: I would let others alienate their rights in themselves because I would want them to let me alienate my rights in myself.

Legal systems commit aggression? Not people?

You can appeal to the golden rule for this, but as I've pointed out before, what happens when you don't respect that claim? If A ceases to respect B's claim over A's body, reciprocation is that B would not respect A's claims to own B's body.

Autolykos:

At this point, I feel obliged to ask you what your definitions are for "retribution" and "justice". As I see it now, justice is simply about upholding rights. What does "upholding rights" mean? I think it simply means "those actions which are considered legitimate are not prevented or interfered with".

From wiktionary on retribution:

retribution (plural retributions)

Punishment inflicted in the spirit of moral outrage or personal vengeance. [quotations ▲]

1983, Richard A. Posner, The economics of justice, page 208:

Whereas retribution focuses on the offender's wrong, retaliation focuses on the impulse of the victim (or of those who sympathize with him) to strike back at the offender.

1999, Barbara Hanawalt, Medieval crime and social control, pg. 73

1. Revenge is for an injury; retribution for a wrong.

2. Retribution sets an internal limit to the amount of the punishment according to the seriousness of the wrong; revenge need not.

3. Revenge is personal; the agent of retribution need have no special or personal tie to the victim of the wrong for which he exacts retribution.

4. Revenge involves a particular emotional tone, pleasure in the suffering of another, while retribution need involve no emotional tone.

It seems like wiktionary doesn't have a single definition, but I think it provides an accurate picture of retribution. Sometimes revenge and retribution overlap, but the point is that retribution is "punishment inflicted" and not restitution.

I agree with you on what the concept of justice is. It has to do with rightful and wrongful behavior, and making sure that wrongs are dealt with in some manner. Not everyone agrees on how wrongs ought to be dealt with, but not everyone agrees with what ought to be considered just.

Autolykos:

Keep in mind that I think the non-aggression principle is simply this: "Aggression is morally wrong." That has nothing necessarily to do with reciprocity. I don't know what you mean by "reciprocal justice", though, so I don't understand your assertion that it can't be had if someone ceases to respect a slave contract. Depending on the contract in question, I think there could very well be justice to be had. For example, if the slave contract gives the master complete ownership over the slave, then if the slave runs away, I think it would be just for the master to forcibly recover him - in the same way that I think it would be just for a farmer to forcibly recover a horse that escaped his farm.

Regarding what the NAP is, see my above excerpt. It appears that you do not share the standard explanation of the NAP as most libertarians. Then we are coming from different premises. All I can say is that the NAP as commonly understood does not allow for voluntary slavery.

If you read wikipedia on the NAP, you can trace the history of how people have stated it. Whoever wrote the article started with Epicurus and wrote the Golden Rule as stated by Jesus second, but Epicurus' statement was also the Golden Rule. And if you read the page on the ethic of reciprocity, you will see how cultures throughout the world have stated this rule.

I will also quote the part from Rothbard's chart from the portion on the history of the NAP:

"No one may threaten or commit violence ('aggress') against another man's person or property. Violence may be employed only against the man who commits such violence; that is, only defensively against the aggressive violence of another. In short, no violence may be employed against a nonaggressor. Here is the fundamental rule from which can be deduced the entire corpus of libertarian theory."

Quite reciprocal. Violence may be used only against those who have first used it. And Rothbard even goes on to say that libertarianism is entirely derived from this one rule. Maybe I should take back what I said about Rothbard just assuming homesteading as a separate principle. Whether or not he explained it well, it seems that he did understand that homesteading comes from the NAP.

Autolykos:

I think estoppel is a consequence of moral universalization, i.e. holding everyone to the same moral propositions. Of course, the personal ethical egoist could say that his ethic is also universal, because he's applying it to everyone - it's just that no one else is the same as him. For moral universalization to have any distinctiveness, then, it must entail not making any distinctions among people. Does that make sense?

Yes. But the personal ethical egoist (henceforth known as PEE) makes a serious mistake when he says that he is applying it to everyone. The action of homicide is homicide regardless of who is doing the killing. If PEE tries to claim that homicide isn't homicide because he did it, then he's full of shit. If PEE tries to claim that hitting another person is not battery because he did it, then he's full of shit. The fact is that PEE hit someone, and by doing so, he has demonstrated that he believes the act of hitting another to be rightful behavior.

PEE is just trying to confuse actions with actors. Who the actor is does not change what the action is. And if PEE aggresses in some way, he is saying that the action is rightful behavior, else he would not have done it. He's not fooling anyone when he claims that the action is somehow different when he is the actor instead of his victim. If PEE doesn't think that it is rightful for others to beat him, then he should not demonstrate the opposite when he beats others. It is not universal if PEE tries to claim exemption.

Re: Inalienability of the self

Autolykos — Fri, 20 Jul 2012 19:07:30 GMT

Woops, forgot to reply to this.

gotlucky:
I explain how the various main concepts of libertarianism do originate from the NAP in this post.

Except they don't all originate from the NAP. You yourself say so here:

gotlucky:
But some libertarians, such as Rothbard and Kinsella, make an exception regarding the body. They have different reasons, but they both say that title to the body is the one exception to the rule of title-transfer theory of contracts. One way or the other, the title is inalienable, even if you want it to be [alienable]. So now that we have looked at how reciprocity applies to all these other main principles of libertarianism, let's look at how reciprocity applies to the body. [Emphasis added.]

The basis for that exception needs to be explained. Either it's derivable as a conclusion from premises like the non-aggression principle, or it isn't, in which case it's an additional premise.

gotlucky:
We respect other people's claims of property so that they will respect ours. Estoppel is a very relevant and useful theory in understanding property. If A doesn't respect B's house, A can't complain when B doesn't respect A's house in return.

A is still physically able to complain. You (and presumably B) just don't think it's legitimate for him to do so. But really it's more like you consider any use of force by A against B in that situation is illegitimate.

gotlucky:
So, now that we have established property, we can see what titles are.

Where exactly have we established property? The post you linked to doesn't establish it, as far as I can tell. I don't see where else you (let alone "we") have done so.

gotlucky:
Titles are the rights of ownership.

I thought we were treating "title" and "ownership" as synonymous. Also, I thought ownership was itself a kind of right.

gotlucky:
Suppose A owns a house. He expects B to respect that house.

What do you mean by "respect"?

gotlucky:
Now, if A transfers the title to B, he is saying that B now has the right of ownership over the house. If A violates the house in some way, he is saying that he does not respect B's rights of ownership to the house. So titles are very relevant to reciprocation.

Isn't "the right of ownership" redundant? Why or why not?

What do you mean by "violates"?

I think a broader point can be made with respect to reciprocation. Titles are very relevant to reciprocation because rights are very relevant to reciprocation. I don't see how reciprocation is necessarily limited to one or more specific rights which is/are called "title" or "ownership".

gotlucky:
Titles are essential to contracts. In other words, a contract without some transfer of title is just an informal agreement. For example, A and B might agree to not insult each other, and let's suppose they sign a document saying that they won't insult each other. What happens when A insults B? What has A taken from B? Certainly, if we were to follow reciprocity, B can insult A, but what else can he do? Can B hit A? No.

We could assume that the title-theory of contracts is separate from the NAP, but it can be derived from it.

I don't see where you've proven that titles are essential to contracts. With all due respect, you've simply asserted it. In your example here, alienating the right to insult the other would presumably entail the other acquiring the right to retaliate in one or more ways. It also means the other person has the right to prevent him from insulting the other person. And I still don't see how the title theory of contracts can be derived from the non-aggression principle.

gotlucky:
Here is a post that I wrote in response to Papirius that I think addresses this.

I'm sorry but I don't think it addresses my contention at all. Are you saying that alienating rights with respect to oneself violates the reciprocity principle? If so, then how exactly do you think that's the case?

gotlucky:
I think the main point is that when someone violates your body, that is aggression. Certainly, you can allow them to use violence, but violence does not equal violate. Rothbard and Kinsella argue for inalienability based on control, but I'm beginning to think that the best response is to refer to reciprocity, which is what the NAP is all about. Certainly, you can alienate your rights regarding your body, but that is a question of legality. Does the legal system you are in allow for this? But that is not really the question, because we are asking an ought question.

I consider a legal system to be committing aggresion if it forcibly prevents a person from alienating one or more rights with respect to himself. Let me appeal to the golden rule: I would let others alienate their rights in themselves because I would want them to let me alienate my rights in myself.

gotlucky:
The question becomes, if A ceases to respect B's claim to own A, then reciprocation is B ceases to respect A's claim to own B. Papirius objected to this because what if A never claims to own B. So what? That is not the point of reciprocal justice. And this is why "voluntary" slavery has no place in a system with the NAP as a principle. There is just simply no retribution to be had. If A pokes out B's eye, then B may poke out A's eye. There can be retribution. But there is no retribution regarding slave contracts, insofar as we are concerned with reciprocal justice (i.e. the NAP).

So, certainly one could say that he has a right to life, but he is going to alienate that right so that another may help him commit suicide, or maybe he is going to duel with another. But these are still voluntary. There has been no crime yet.

At this point, I feel obliged to ask you what your definitions are for "retribution" and "justice". As I see it now, justice is simply about upholding rights. What does "upholding rights" mean? I think it simply means "those actions which are considered legitimate are not prevented or interfered with".

gotlucky:
I'm goint to restate it for clarity's sake: I think we end up assuming something like inalienability because there is just no reciprocal justice to be had if someone ceases to respect slave contracts. If we don't take the NAP/ethic of reciprocity/golden rule as our starting point, then we could certainly assume that a body is alienable.

Keep in mind that I think the non-aggression principle is simply this: "Aggression is morally wrong." That has nothing necessarily to do with reciprocity. I don't know what you mean by "reciprocal justice", though, so I don't understand your assertion that it can't be had if someone ceases to respect a slave contract. Depending on the contract in question, I think there could very well be justice to be had. For example, if the slave contract gives the master complete ownership over the slave, then if the slave runs away, I think it would be just for the master to forcibly recover him - in the same way that I think it would be just for a farmer to forcibly recover a horse that escaped his farm.

gotlucky:
I think a better way of stating what Kinsella said is: When you commit aggression, you are stating that you believe whatever act you did to be okay. When your victim comes along and seeks retribution, you cannot complain (legally) about this, as you have already demonstrated that you believe it is rightful behavior. So you alienate your rights in the sense that you are saying that if you were acting rightfully, then someone else doing the same thing to you would be acting rightfully.

I think estoppel is a consequence of moral universalization, i.e. holding everyone to the same moral propositions. Of course, the personal ethical egoist could say that his ethic is also universal, because he's applying it to everyone - it's just that no one else is the same as him. For moral universalization to have any distinctiveness, then, it must entail not making any distinctions among people. Does that make sense?

Re: Inalienability of the self

gotlucky — Sat, 14 Jul 2012 07:59:23 GMT

Autolykos:

I thought I did address the second quote, at the very least. It seems to be a presupposition beyond the non-aggression and self-ownership principles to say that a contract is binding if and only if it involves at least one transfer of title. I don't see how that notion can be logically derived from those principles per se. As I said before, whether the slave changes his mind doesn't have to be relevant. If his master is considered to have any right to coerce him (i.e. use or threaten physical force against him), then such coercion cannot logically constitute aggression.

I explain how the various main concepts of libertarianism do originate from the NAP in this post. We respect other people's claims of property so that they will respect ours. Estoppel is a very relevant and useful theory in understanding property. If A doesn't respect B's house, A can't complain when B doesn't respect A's house in return. So, A repects B's house and B respects A's house. Most of society is okay with this. Fortunately, the criminals in society who do not respect others are a small percentage of society.

So, now that we have established property, we can see what titles are. Titles are the rights of ownership. Suppose A owns a house. He expects B to respect that house. Now, if A transfers the title to B, he is saying that B now has the right of ownership over the house. If A violates the house in some way, he is saying that he does not respect B's rights of ownership to the house. So titles are very relevant to reciprocation.

If A sells his house to B, but then doesn't actually give the house to B, he has defrauded B. A is saying that he does not respect B's claims to either the money or the house (or both). So B has no reason to respect A's claims either.

Titles are essential to contracts. In other words, a contract without some transfer of title is just an informal agreement. For example, A and B might agree to not insult each other, and let's suppose they sign a document saying that they won't insult each other. What happens when A insults B? What has A taken from B? Certainly, if we were to follow reciprocity, B can insult A, but what else can he do? Can B hit A? No.

We could assume that the title-theory of contracts is separate from the NAP, but it can be derived from it.

Autolykos:

As I said before, whether the slave changes his mind doesn't have to be relevant. If his master is considered to have any right to coerce him (i.e. use or threaten physical force against him), then such coercion cannot logically constitute aggression.

Here is a post that I wrote in response to Papirius that I think addresses this.

Autolykos:

Regarding the first quote, presupposing body-alienability in order to prove it is indeed question-begging, but I don't see why body-alienability has to be proven. What's meant by "body-alienability" anyway? I think the question is really about whether a given right can be considered to contain "sub-rights". For example, if one is considered to have the right to life, does that mean he has separate "sub-rights" to not be killed by A, B, C, etc.? And can those "sub-rights" be considered separable - that is, can the overall right to life be considered divisible in any way?

I think the main point is that when someone violates your body, that is aggression. Certainly, you can allow them to use violence, but violence does not equal violate. Rothbard and Kinsella argue for inalienability based on control, but I'm beginning to think that the best response is to refer to reciprocity, which is what the NAP is all about. Certainly, you can alienate your rights regarding your body, but that is a question of legality. Does the legal system you are in allow for this? But that is not really the question, because we are asking an ought question.

The question becomes, if A ceases to respect B's claim to own A, then reciprocation is B ceases to respect A's claim to own B. Papirius objected to this because what if A never claims to own B. So what? That is not the point of reciprocal justice. And this is why "voluntary" slavery has no place in a system with the NAP as a principle. There is just simply no retribution to be had. If A pokes out B's eye, then B may poke out A's eye. There can be retribution. But there is no retribution regarding slave contracts, insofar as we are concerned with reciprocal justice (i.e. the NAP).

So, certainly one could say that he has a right to life, but he is going to alienate that right so that another may help him commit suicide, or maybe he is going to duel with another. But these are still voluntary. There has been no crime yet.

Autolykos:

Certainly such has often been presumed for other forms of property. I see no reason why it can't be logically extended to human beings, unless it's simply assumed that it can't be.

I'm goint to restate it for clarity's sake: I think we end up assuming something like inalienability because there is just no reciprocal justice to be had if someone ceases to respect slave contracts. If we don't take the NAP/ethic of reciprocity/golden rule as our starting point, then we could certainly assume that a body is alienable.

Autolykos:

Where is that quote from? Earlier in this thread?

Conza88 actually provided the link in this post.

Autolykos:

Basically, I don't think a person has to commit aggression in order to alienate one or more of his rights. I think a person can do so freely as well. Furthermore, an individual can only alienate his own rights. For him to alienate someone else's rights is just as illegitimate to me as someone trying to alienate another's property. Note that this means I don't consider a valid contract to be one where at least one transfer of title is stipulated. Rather, I consider a valid contract to be one where at least one assignment of right is stipulated. This includes, but is not limited to, transfers of title (unless one considers "title" to mean the same thing as "right").

I think a better way of stating what Kinsella said is: When you commit aggression, you are stating that you believe whatever act you did to be okay. When your victim comes along and seeks retribution, you cannot complain (legally) about this, as you have already demonstrated that you believe it is rightful behavior. So you alienate your rights in the sense that you are saying that if you were acting rightfully, then someone else doing the same thing to you would be acting rightfully.

Re: Inalienability of the self

Minarchist — Wed, 11 Jul 2012 20:45:43 GMT

(from other thread)

@gotlucky

Definitions are not right/wrong.

I'm still highly amused that you think definitions have truth values.

There are different kinds of definitions.

A stipulative definition sets a relationship between a sign (word) and a referent (thing to which the word refers). If we take Rothbard's definition as a stipulativce definition, then he's saying, "Hey, you know that thing that controls the mind and body and is inseperable therefrom? Let's call it 'will' for the purpose of this conversation." That would be a stipulative definition: merely assigning a word to some thing. If this is what Rothbard is doing (it's not), then you're right that the definition has no truth-value. Calling this thing "will" is no more or less correct than calling it "stone" or "chicken." And if we take Rothbard's definition this way, as a stipulative definition, then I agree it has no truth-value, and my criticism is levelled against the claim implicit in the stipulative definition (namely, that the thing which has been labelled "will" controls the mind and body and is inseperable therefrom). That is, I object not to what word you want to assign to the thing that we're calling will, I object to the real relationship you are positing between that thing and other things (body and mind).

Whereas, real definition is a claim, a proposition, which asserts that such and such is the case. It has truth-value. If we take Rothbard's definition as a real definition (it is), then he's saying "that thing, the will,controls the mind and body and is inseperable therefrom." That is, he's making a claim. It's the same as if I said "gotlucky's brain prevents him from thinking properly." Now, would you say I just made a stipulative definition that cannot be challenged (i.e. I was merely giving a name to that thing which prevents you from thinking properly), or was I making a claim that such and such is the case (namely, that there's something preventing you from thinking properly)?

If you now appreciate that Rothbard's definition is a real definition, i.e. a claim with truth-value, we can move on to why I think it is a false claim and why (as a consequence) his argument against voluntary slavery is unsound.

I thought you were never going to respond to me again?

You invaded another thread and directly attacked me with an OT post referencing this thread. That requires a response. In general, though, I'll be happy to respond to you next time you say something substantive. We'll see how long I have to wait for that to happen.

if you want to continue this lovely conversation, I humbly request that you bring it to the appropriate thread.

See above.

Re: Inalienability of the self

Autolykos — Mon, 09 Jul 2012 17:09:37 GMT

gotlucky:
I had these two quotes in mind, which you did not address in your post to Conza88:

But the slave has not committed aggression, so (b) is not a possible justification. Some alienabilists disingenuously argue that it IS "aggression" since the master owns the slave's body, so it's trespass (aggression) for the slave to use the master's property (the slave's body) in ways the owner (master) does not consent to. This argument is disingenuous because it is question-begging; it presupposes the legitimacy of body-alienability, in order to prove it. So this does not fly. I will say that I get very tired of people who engage in question-begging arguments. They do this all the time in IP -- where they label an act of copying "stealing" in order to show that what was "stolen" must have been ownable property. Horrible reasoning. I hope you don't engage in this kind of dishonest trick.

As for (a); clearly the slave who tries to run away does NOT consent to the force the master wants to apply to him. The only way the alienabilist can get around this is to say that the PREVIOUS consent the slave gave (say, a week before) is still somehow applicable, i.e. that the slave cannot change his mind. Why not? because ... well ... because ... well ... because the slavery contract was binding! So we see, yet again, the sneaky and dishonest resort to question-begging; slavery contracts are binding because they are binding. Neat trick, that!

I thought I did address the second quote, at the very least. It seems to be a presupposition beyond the non-aggression and self-ownership principles to say that a contract is binding if and only if it involves at least one transfer of title. I don't see how that notion can be logically derived from those principles per se. As I said before, whether the slave changes his mind doesn't have to be relevant. If his master is considered to have any right to coerce him (i.e. use or threaten physical force against him), then such coercion cannot logically constitute aggression.

Regarding the first quote, presupposing body-alienability in order to prove it is indeed question-begging, but I don't see why body-alienability has to be proven. What's meant by "body-alienability" anyway? I think the question is really about whether a given right can be considered to contain "sub-rights". For example, if one is considered to have the right to life, does that mean he has separate "sub-rights" to not be killed by A, B, C, etc.? And can those "sub-rights" be considered separable - that is, can the overall right to life be considered divisible in any way?

Certainly such has often been presumed for other forms of property. I see no reason why it can't be logically extended to human beings, unless it's simply assumed that it can't be.

gotlucky:
Maybe both sides are question begging: I assume one cannot alienate the body, and you assume one can. But I think Kinsella puts forth very good arguments as to why it is not question begging to assume inalienability, though he does say one can alienate rights in the case of aggression. It seems that not all anti-voluntary-slavery libertarians have the same arguments:

I think a careful reading of Rothbard shows that his view does not rest on "impossibility" (as I used to think). Instead, I think Rothbard was not taling about the case of commmission of crime, but only the narrow context of a would-be voluntary slave who has not committed aggression. Rothbard notes that it is impossible for the slave to get rid of his will, and "therefore" the promise to be a slave is not binding, i.e. his body is not alienable. I think what Rothbard was getting at is this: in the normal, default situation, each person IS a selfowner BECAUSE he has a will: i.e., a direct control over his body. THis direct control is the natural position, and gives the person a better claim to his body than anyone else. Thati s WHY he is a selfowner. Hoppe later makes this argument explicitly: the reason we are slef-owners is that each person has a unique and direct connection to his body: his direct control over it--or, as Rothbard says, his will. Now Rothbard is implicitly recognizing that the slave who promises to be slave still has his will, as he did not literally alienate it. Therefore, he still has the best link to his body, and thus he is still its owner. Now it is true that iti s possible for someone to alienate their rights to their body, despite still having a will: by committing aggression. When you commit aggression you overcome the default presumption that you have the best right to control your body; now your victim has a better right to your body, despite your having the direct link to and direct control over it. But the point is the woudl-be voluntary slave never did commit aggression, so for him, he is able to change his mind.

Where is that quote from? Earlier in this thread?

Basically, I don't think a person has to commit aggression in order to alienate one or more of his rights. I think a person can do so freely as well. Furthermore, an individual can only alienate his own rights. For him to alienate someone else's rights is just as illegitimate to me as someone trying to alienate another's property. Note that this means I don't consider a valid contract to be one where at least one transfer of title is stipulated. Rather, I consider a valid contract to be one where at least one assignment of right is stipulated. This includes, but is not limited to, transfers of title (unless one considers "title" to mean the same thing as "right").

Anyway, back to the quote above. It seems like this person's characterization of Rothbard's and Hoppe's argument proves too much. If whoever owns a thing is the one with the "best" (i.e. most direct) link to a thing, then by that reasoning, whoever currently possesses a thing is its owner, as he has the most direct link to it by virtue of his current possession. Otherwise, Rothbard and Hoppe are sneaking in another presupposition - namely that ownership of human bodies is to be determined differently from ownership of other things.

I don't think either side has to be question-begging, to be honest. The premises they work with may simply be different from one another.

gotlucky:
But anyway, I'm curious as to what you think about Kinsella's paper, as his argument is still different from this one here.

Will do.

Re: Inalienability of the self

Autolykos — Mon, 09 Jul 2012 16:33:06 GMT

gotlucky:
I didnt' realize that it was so far back in the thread, but here it is (it's a little long winded compared to yours):

[snipped inner quote because it's from the post linked to below]

I may have started out that way [arguing that, because a given action is impossible, it's therefore impossible to claim that the action is/would be right], but in this post here, I tried to show that I recognized that I was making a fallacious argument, and I tried to refine my point, that claiming a right regarding a situation that cannot occur is a moot point. You can still have opinions and claims about who would be in the right should the situation occur, but if it cannot occur, then it is a moot point.

I think I agree with the rest of the post.

Reading that post again, I think I may have misinterpreted what you wrote here: "Certainly we can say that if Kryptonians exist and Kryptonite is poisonous to them, then these are the rights involving such a scenario [emphasis added]." It seemed to me that you were still saying that rights (normative claims) regarding Kryptonians and Kryptonite could only exist (i.e. be made) if Kryptonians and Kryptonite exist. Thus, if they don't exist, then no claims can be made about them.

If that wasn't your intended meaning with that passage, then I'll gladly stand corrected. And in any event, it doesn't seem like that's your position now. We seem to be in agreement at this point about the "nature" of rights. So I think we can move on to whether any form of slavery/servitude is consistent with the non-aggression and/or self-ownership principles.

Re: Inalienability of the self

gotlucky — Mon, 09 Jul 2012 16:21:25 GMT

Autolykos:

I did read Conza's posts before, and I addressed them early on in the thread. But if you'd like me to read Kinsella's paper before engaging me further on this issue, I'll be happy to do so.

I had these two quotes in mind, which you did not address in your post to Conza88:

But the slave has not committed aggression, so (b) is not a possible justification. Some alienabilists disingenuously argue that it IS "aggression" since the master owns the slave's body, so it's trespass (aggression) for the slave to use the master's property (the slave's body) in ways the owner (master) does not consent to. This argument is disingenuous because it is question-begging; it presupposes the legitimacy of body-alienability, in order to prove it. So this does not fly. I will say that I get very tired of people who engage in question-begging arguments. They do this all the time in IP -- where they label an act of copying "stealing" in order to show that what was "stolen" must have been ownable property. Horrible reasoning. I hope you don't engage in this kind of dishonest trick.

As for (a); clearly the slave who tries to run away does NOT consent to the force the master wants to apply to him. The only way the alienabilist can get around this is to say that the PREVIOUS consent the slave gave (say, a week before) is still somehow applicable, i.e. that the slave cannot change his mind. Why not? because ... well ... because ... well ... because the slavery contract was binding! So we see, yet again, the sneaky and dishonest resort to question-begging; slavery contracts are binding because they are binding. Neat trick, that!

Maybe both sides are question begging: I assume one cannot alienate the body, and you assume one can. But I think Kinsella puts forth very good arguments as to why it is not question begging to assume inalienability, though he does say one can alienate rights in the case of aggression. It seems that not all anti-voluntary-slavery libertarians have the same arguments:

I think a careful reading of Rothbard shows that his view does not rest on "impossibility" (as I used to think). Instead, I think Rothbard was not taling about the case of commmission of crime, but only the narrow context of a would-be voluntary slave who has not committed aggression. Rothbard notes that it is impossible for the slave to get rid of his will, and "therefore" the promise to be a slave is not binding, i.e. his body is not alienable. I think what Rothbard was getting at is this: in the normal, default situation, each person IS a selfowner BECAUSE he has a will: i.e., a direct control over his body. THis direct control is the natural position, and gives the person a better claim to his body than anyone else. Thati s WHY he is a selfowner. Hoppe later makes this argument explicitly: the reason we are slef-owners is that each person has a unique and direct connection to his body: his direct control over it--or, as Rothbard says, his will. Now Rothbard is implicitly recognizing that the slave who promises to be slave still has his will, as he did not literally alienate it. Therefore, he still has the best link to his body, and thus he is still its owner. Now it is true that iti s possible for someone to alienate their rights to their body, despite still having a will: by committing aggression. When you commit aggression you overcome the default presumption that you have the best right to control your body; now your victim has a better right to your body, despite your having the direct link to and direct control over it. But the point is the woudl-be voluntary slave never did commit aggression, so for him, he is able to change his mind.

But anyway, I'm curious as to what you think about Kinsella's paper, as his argument is still different from this one here.

Re: Inalienability of the self

gotlucky — Mon, 09 Jul 2012 16:06:44 GMT

Autolykos:

Sorry, which statement was that?

I didnt' realize that it was so far back in the thread, but here it is (it's a little long winded compared to yours):

gotlucky:

As we have both agreed, rights are just another way of saying who is acting rightfully in any given situation. I think there is a way to refine this. If a situation occurs, then this is who is acting rightfully. That is what rights are. It should mean the same thing as "who is acting rightfully in any given situation". I suppose the only difference is instead of saying, "When this situation occurs, this is who is acting rightfully," we are saying, "If this situation occurs, then this is who is acting rightfully."

So, while we can't solve the is-ought problem, we can say that it is a moot point. Certainly we can say that if Kryptonians exist and Kryptonite is poisonous to them, then these are the rights involving such a scenario. So long as there aren't Kryptonians and all that jazz, then it's a moot point. No one can be acting rightfully regarding Kryptonite and Kryptonians as they don't exist. But should they exist, then these would be the rights involved.

Autolykos:

Okay, it just seems to be that you've been arguing (at least at times) that, because a given action is impossible, it's therefore impossible to claim that the action is/would be right. After thinking about it some more, I think part of the issue here is how to distinguish rights from claims. Should we consider a right itself to be a claim, or something else?

I'm inclined to see a right as a kind of claim, namely a claim of legitimacy for an action. In that sense, then, claiming I have a right to life is the same as claiming it's legitimate for me to live. The important part here is that while the claim itself (or theform of the claim) can be treated descriptively, the content of the claim (the legitimacy) cannot be so treated.

I may have started out that way, but in this post here, I tried to show that I recognized that I was making a fallacious argument, and I tried to refine my point, that claiming a right regarding a situation that cannot occur is a moot point. You can still have opinions and claims about who would be in the right should the situation occur, but if it cannot occur, then it is a moot point.

I think I agree with the rest of the post.

Re: Inalienability of the self

Autolykos — Mon, 09 Jul 2012 15:40:52 GMT

gotlucky:
Like I said before, I consider Rothbard's argument to be convincing, but perhaps Kinsella's is even better. Also, I don't know if you remember Conza88's posts earlier in the thread, but he did post some nice quotes. Conza88's quotes are spread over 2 posts, and I suggest reading them. Kinsella makes some good points, but I still suggest reading the paper by Kinsella that I linked to.

I did read Conza's posts before, and I addressed them early on in the thread. But if you'd like me to read Kinsella's paper before engaging me further on this issue, I'll be happy to do so.

Re: Inalienability of the self

Autolykos — Mon, 09 Jul 2012 15:31:01 GMT

gotlucky:
Right, but I thought I had said that earlier too. So I think my confusion is that I can't tell if you agree with this statement or if you only agree with part of it.

Sorry, which statement was that?

gotlucky:
It's a moot point in that you can claim you have a right to do whatever you want, but if you can't nobody can do it, so what? Nobody can levitate, so while it might be interesting to determine who would be acting rightfully should levitation be possible, it has no bearing on the real world. That's all. It's not an ought from an is. It's just stating that certain situations are impossible, so while it might be well with Superman's rights to fly around Metropolis, there is no Superman and there is no Metropolis. So it's a moot point.

Okay, it just seems to be that you've been arguing (at least at times) that, because a given action is impossible, it's therefore impossible to claim that the action is/would be right. After thinking about it some more, I think part of the issue here is how to distinguish rights from claims. Should we consider a right itself to be a claim, or something else?

I'm inclined to see a right as a kind of claim, namely a claim of legitimacy for an action. In that sense, then, claiming I have a right to life is the same as claiming it's legitimate for me to live. The important part here is that while the claim itself (or the form of the claim) can be treated descriptively, the content of the claim (the legitimacy) cannot be so treated.

gotlucky:
Well, you can claim that it's your right to fly around Metropolis, but you cannot fly and there is no Metropolis. But if you were to claim that it's your right to own a gun, then we are talking about real world possibilities.

Sure, but in both cases the claim still exists (i.e. has been made).

gotlucky:
I probably didn't state that well. What I mean is that legal rights are positive claims about the world. Legal rights are what the law is, not what it ought to be. They may be abstract in the way that math is abstract, but it doesn't make them any less true. Essentially, it is a fact that murder is prohibited by law in America, with the glaring exception of state sanctioned murder. This is a positive claim. I might make the normative claim that it ought not be the case that there should be exceptions to this law. But I am not making a claim about the world as it is, I am making a claim about the world as it ought to be.

As I noted above, I think there's a difference between the form of a claim, which is objective/descriptive, and the content of a claim, which can either be objective/descriptive or subjective/normative. For example, if I say that the sky is blue, that's a descriptive claim (i.e. the content of the claim is descriptive). Whereas, if I say that Chairman Mao is a sacred cow, that's a normative claim (i.e. the content of the claim is normative). Since legitimacy is a value judgement that's imputed to things, any claim of legitimacy is necessarily the latter type of claim.

Re: Inalienability of the self

Fool on the Hill — Mon, 09 Jul 2012 04:27:16 GMT

Well put.

Re: Inalienability of the self

Minarchist — Mon, 09 Jul 2012 02:04:33 GMT

Yes, B engaged in coercion since the contract was no longer valid as A informed him about. It is as with any other thing. Ie a woman may promise you she will have sex three days from now, but change her mind before that time comes without having to worry about you forcing yourself on her anyway.

If the contract was valid when it was signed, then A cannot unilaterally abrogate the contract, correct? If he can, well then contracts are meaningless.

And if A cannot unilaterally abrogate the contract, then the contract was in force when B acted, and so B did not engage in coercion, but rather acted within his rights, correct?

But I take it your position is that the contract was invalid from the start, yes?

And it was invalid because it was a mere promise (as with your woman example), i.e. because it involved no transfer of title?

It seems to me that that's the crux of the matter: whether or not a slavery contract involves transfer of title.

I would argue that it does: namely, title to the physical body of the slave.

What do I mean by "title to the physical body of the slave?"

To have title to X is to own X, which is to have the exclusive right to use X: such that no other person has a right to use X or to interfere with your own use of X, provided your use of X does not damage the property of any other person.

So if A buys title to the physical body of B, becoming the owner of that body, what that means is that A acquires the exclusive right to use that body. No other person (e.g. B) can make any legitimate claim to ownership of that body, nor legitimately object to A using that body in whatever way he pleases. For example, if A beats B's body with a whip, B cannot claim this is a tort and demand compensation: i.e. because the body which suffered damage was A's property, not B's. Once B has sold himself into slavery, there is nothing A can do to B's body which would count as a tort against B's property.

Note: A having the exclusive right to use B's body is not the same as A having physical control over B's body. As long as B is alive, B has physical control - obviously. Who physically controls some piece of property and who owns that piece of property are entirely different issues. If I steal your car, I control it - but you still own it. The fact that B still controls his body does not mean that A can't or doesn't own it.

Note2: A tort is damage to a person's property, not to the person itself. The person itself is not property (nor the soul, will, mind, et al), and can neither be owned nor damaged.

Re: Inalienability of the self

Marko — Sun, 08 Jul 2012 21:09:28 GMT

Would you agree that any force used against a person with his consent is not coercion (by definition)?

Suppose I would, but I would question if in such instance the force is really being used against the person giving his consent. It seems more accurate to say it is being used for it, ie according to its wishes.

A slave-owner must get the consent of the slave for each successive use of force against the slave, otherwise the force he uses is coercive. And so if the slave-master uses force against the slave to keep him in slavery against his will (i.e. without his consent), the slave-master is engaged in coercion.

Yes, that's valid.

At time T+3, did B engage in coercion, or did B have a right to use force against A?

Yes, B engaged in coercion since the contract was no longer valid as A informed him about. It is as with any other thing. Ie a woman may promise you she will have sex three days from now, but change her mind before that time comes without having to worry about you forcing yourself on her anyway.

Re: Inalienability of the self

Fool on the Hill — Sun, 08 Jul 2012 20:56:05 GMT

You are missing the keyword "ought".

But the argument in this syllogism is that one ought not to do what they can't do. So if they can do it, the conclusion doesn't follow.

One ought not do things involving A.

B involves A.

Therefore, one ought not do B.

The conclusion follows from the premises. It seems like you have a problem with the premises, which is fine. But it is incorrect to say that the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises given.

This is not at all the first syllogism. The conclusion is that one ought not do C.

But you see, the conclusion still follows from the premises. You have a problem with the premises, but that doesn't change the fact that it is not a non sequitur.

Now you're talking about the second syllogism, which I never said was a non sequitur. I said it was begging the question.

No. There are in fact 2 things considered inalienable: the mind and the body. Rothbard talks about the will, so you could make it 3, but the will does not exist in the same way as the mind and body. So there are particulars. The problem here is that you are making a claim about Rothbard that he never actually claimed. I would give you the benefit of the doubt, but I don't think you are here for honest reasons.

I think the premise would become problematic for Rothbard if it includes the mind. If acting on an inalienable property constitutes aggression, then any action that changes a person's state of mind would constitute aggression. I don't see how this can fit into Rothbard's framework, though maybe I'm wrong.

Regardless of whether or not the argument has been conjured to fit the conclusion, the argument itself is not question begging.

Skepdic gives the following as an example of question begging:

Another example of begging the question is provided by Perry Marshall:

1) DNA is not merely a molecule with a pattern; it is a code ... and an information storage mechanism.

2) All codes are created by a conscious mind; there is no natural process known to science that creates coded information.

3) Therefore DNA was designed by a mind.

Marshall assumes what he should be proving, namely, that all codes are created by a conscious mind.

And Fallacy Files gives this example:

Murder is morally wrong.
All abortions are murders. (Suppressed)
Therefore, abortion is morally wrong.

This is certainly a valid argument. Moreover, it doesn't appear to be circular, since the conclusion is not one of the premisses. Why, then, does it beg the question?

It begs the question because the word "murder" is not a morally-neutral word, such as "killing". All murders are killings, but not all killings are murders. A person who kills someone in self-defense, a soldier who kills in battle, or a policeman who kills in the line of duty, is not a murderer. So, the first, unsuppressed premiss is really unnecessary, as the argument is valid without it.

Rothbard's argument seems pretty similar to these examples to me.

Could be. All I know is that I have no intent of sharing what I actually believe with you anymore. I will clarify if you are posting straw men, but I don't think it's likely I will state why. Like I said, I have no problem having this debate with Autolykos.

I'm sorry if I said anything to offend you. I am certainly not trying to post straw men.

Re: Inalienability of the self

Minarchist — Sun, 08 Jul 2012 19:44:49 GMT

@Marko

You said:

A and B may enter into a deal whereby B is allowed to use force on the body of A.

Let's add time to this equation. Suppose that:

A and B sign a contract at time T whereby B is allowed to use force against A at any time thenceforth.
At time T+1 B informs A that he's going to use force against him per the terms of the contract.
At time T+2 A tells B that he does not give his consent to this proposed use of force and/or that he wants out of the contract.
At time T+3 B uses force against A per the terms of the contract.

At time T+3, did B engage in coercion, or did B have a right to use force against A?