Political Theory

Re: Justification for Rothbardian Punishment

Minarchist — Thu, 13 Sep 2012 18:52:02 GMT

@ColinKirby

Unless there is some justification that involves why we ought not to initiate aggression, libertarianism is nothing more than an idea.

If you mean that libertarianism is founded on subjective valuations, then I agree. All ethical systems are founded on subjective valuations.

Intuition and pre-existing values are useful as a guide to discovering correct behaviour but they are not in themself justification.

If to justify an ethical proposition is show that it is objectively valid, then no ethical proposition can be justified. I wasn't suggesting that intuition justifies ethical propositions, I was merely observing that in many cases intuition is is fact the historical origin of ethical propositions. That is, intuition is the answer to the question "why does Jimmy believe in ethical proposition X," not to the question, "why is ethical proposition X objectively valid?"

Also, rights are normative, therefore if you claim that it is impossible to prove normative statements you contradict yourself.

I don't follow, could you elaborate?

Re: Justification for Rothbardian Punishment

Andrew Cain — Thu, 13 Sep 2012 10:28:44 GMT

But again, Rothbard points out that mere making whole is not in fact making whole. If you only restore the $50 the thief stole back to its rightful owner the victim still had to suffer the theft, face the loss of his money for a time, etc., etc. And how would merely returning the money to its victim be a punishment on the thief for his crime?

If I recall he was using this theory to show that there is no utilitarian justification for compensating an individual who had been wronged by the state in such a case as emminent domain.

Re: Justification for Rothbardian Punishment

bloomj31 — Wed, 12 Sep 2012 06:12:40 GMT

@Colin

I realize now that I got a little confused over your use of the word "could" in "If I were a billionaire I could buy slaves etc." I read could as 'would be allowed to by law and/or social norms.' I don't know why.

I'm thinking now that you meant 'could' as "would be capable of."

You're right that a free society would have crime. And I think you're right that assassination and slavery are usually considered immoral, at least based on my limited experience of the world. It seems reasonable to assume that the currently prevailing social norms would carry over into our free society.

But then again those norms could change. If slavery and assassinations became acceptable in our hypothetical free society (however unlikely that may seem to be) at least to the extent that a billionaire could legally purchase slaves and hitmen then it would seem to me that he wouldn't have to justify his purchases to anyone and would probably be considered a moral man by most of his social peers.

That's all I'm trying to say.

Re: Justification for Rothbardian Punishment

ColinKirby — Wed, 12 Sep 2012 05:41:06 GMT

Anenome:

TL;DR: The OP may profit from a reading of Ethics of Liberty.

I've read it a few times so I know what Rothbard's arguments are. My original post was asking what his justification was for people losing their rights to the extent of their crime. He provides absolutely none. He simply "proposes" it.

Anenome:

But again, Rothbard points out that mere making whole is not in fact making whole. If you only restore the $50 the thief stole back to its rightful owner the victim still had to suffer the theft, face the loss of his money for a time, etc., etc.

All supporters of restitution I know of include those things as part of the compensation.

Anenome:

And how would merely returning the money to its victim be a punishment on the thief for his crime?

A lack of punishment is not a problem unless you can find a reason that they should be punished. Some people automatically associate justice with punishing the criminal but I do not. However neither position is justified without an argument unless you take it as a first principle.

bloomj31:

Possibly. That would depend on the sort of law/social norms that our hypothetical free society generated wouldn't it?

Not really. Assassination and slavery is illegal and considered immoral everywhere in the world right now (so far as I know) but it still happens. There is no such thing as a perfect society so even a libertarian one would have crime.

bloomj31:

To whom would I be required to justify my purchases to in a free market if they were already deemed legal during the development of market law?

No one.

Re: Justification for Rothbardian Punishment

bloomj31 — Wed, 12 Sep 2012 04:20:22 GMT

Colin Kirby:
If I was a billionaire I could buy slaves and pay to have people murdered (even in Libertopia).

Possibly. That would depend on the sort of law/social norms that our hypothetical free society generated wouldn't it?

Colin Kirby:
Just because something is provided in a market does not mean it is just or moral.

I'm not so sure about that. I suppose that depends on how one conceptualizes morality.

I tend to think of morality as a complex social feedback system. I think we use our understanding of morals/social norms as tools to determine how we are to treat one another. I see these sorts of morals and social norms as emergent phenomena much like language, they've developed over time not through any one person's efforts but through countless trials of human interaction.

So I can't help but wonder: To whom would I be required to justify my purchases to in a free market if they were already deemed legal during the development of market law? Who would have standing to demand justification from me if my actions were seen as moral and normal by the society in which I lived?

I should tell you that I'm not a libertarian. I don't subscribe to libertarian ethical premises. I'm imagining myself living in Libertopia and as far as I'm concerned if it's legal then it's moral, particularly in a society where the law is generated not by the state but by the market actors themselves.

Re: Justification for Rothbardian Punishment

Anenome — Wed, 12 Sep 2012 04:02:24 GMT

Andrew Cain:
Another fascinating theory of justice is Roderick Long's theory which I think is something close to classical interpretations of justice. The theory being that the victim be compensated to the state they were before the violation but now that I think about that, it sounds like proportional justice. Hmm. A lot of thinking going on. Good topic.

If crime were not punished beyond mere compensation to include restitution there would be no punishment on the criminal at all. Therefore you need a rational and objective guideline to limit the punishment proportionally to the crime.

And, as Rothbard points out in Ethics of Liberty, there can be no better a proportional punishment than to do to the criminal what he had himself done to the victim. Thus, the criminal must not merely restore the victim back his $50 but must also be himself deprived on $50 more, the exact thing he tried to perpetrate on the victim.

I think it's brilliant, rational, and workable. It gets a bit odd to think of having to rape the rapist and things like that tho >_>

Rothbard also allows the victim to decide at the point of conviction whether he'd like the criminal to have the same thing done to him or else to negotiate a monetary buy-out of that consequence. Thus, rather than the rapist being raped, albeit clinically and likely with a non-living object, the victim could accept $100,000 from the criminal in lieu of that punishment, or w/e they or their agents decide.

TL;DR: The OP may profit from a reading of Ethics of Liberty.

Re: Justification for Rothbardian Punishment

Andrew Cain — Wed, 12 Sep 2012 01:03:21 GMT

I think, though I am not sure, that it is Block who believes "two eyes for one" and not Rothbard. Rothbard believes in proportional justice. Another fascinating theory of justice is Roderick Long's theory which I think is something close to classical interpretations of justice. The theory being that the victim be compensated to the state they were before the violation but now that I think about that, it sounds like proportional justice. Hmm. A lot of thinking going on. Good topic.

Re: Justification for Rothbardian Punishment

ColinKirby — Wed, 12 Sep 2012 00:27:16 GMT

bloomj31:

I don't see why a system for the punishment of wrongdoers would require any moral justification once it had been tested by the market.

If I was a billionaire I could buy slaves and pay to have people murdered (even in Libertopia). Just because something is provided in a market does not mean it is just or moral.

Re: Justification for Rothbardian Punishment

bloomj31 — Tue, 11 Sep 2012 15:13:13 GMT

I don't see why a system for the punishment of wrongdoers would require any moral justification once it had been tested by the market.

Perhaps things would be very different in a free society, but I don't find myself currently having to justify my market preferences to anyone. Why would things be different in a freer society?

Wouldn't the fact that a particular "punishment product" survived and thrived in the market process be the ultimate justification for its existence, particularly to people who exalt the free market?

My experience and understanding (limited as it may be) of market processes leads me to believe that all possible preferences for the punishment of wrongdoers could and would be tested at some point. Ultimately the free market process could let us know what the general feeling is/was/will be about what sorts of punishments should be levied against criminals.

I tend to think (and hope) that two teeth for a tooth will not satisfy many consumers, I know that it does not satisfy me in the least.

I know this response isn't exactly on topic but I personally find these sorts of quandaries very difficult to consider without thinking about how the market could actually settle the issue by itself.

Re: Justification for Rothbardian Punishment

ColinKirby — Tue, 11 Sep 2012 14:55:09 GMT

I'd like to point out that I was asking for information in this thread and was not arguing whether this conception of justice is true or not.

Anenome:

Because justice demands that the punishment fit the crime, and the only way to do that rationally is to impose on the criminal the thing he intended to do to his victim.

I can say that justice demands that restitution but that itself is not an argument. I completely agree that if justice demands punishment then it must be proportional. It would also help to define what you mean by justice.

Anenome:

But simply giving back what was stolen is not nearly making one whole.

Of course. Restitution includes payment, not necessarily money, for the immediate and the non-immediate consequences of a rights violation. So, as you say, criminals are also responsible for many others things than the initial crime.

Minarchist:

You might adopt them because they are intuitively satisfying, or because you value the consequences which you believe their realization would yield, or some combination of both.

Unless there is some justification that involves why we ought not to initiate aggression, libertarianism is nothing more than an idea. Intuition and pre-existing values are useful as a guide to discovering correct behaviour but they are not in themself justification. Also, rights are normative, therefore if you claim that it is impossible to prove normative statements you contradict yourself.

Re: Justification for Rothbardian Punishment

Minarchist — Tue, 11 Sep 2012 10:08:39 GMT

The first tooth in the Rothbardian dictum follows from property rights, which are axiomatic.

I see no more fundamental principle from which the second tooth would follow, so I take it as being itself axiomatic.

And both axioms are, like all ethical axioms, normative.

There can be no justification of these axioms in the sense of establishing their truth-content.

So why adopt them, as opposed to other contrary ethical axioms?

You might adopt them because they are intuitively satisfying, or because you value the consequences which you believe their realization would yield, or some combination of both.

Re: Justification for Rothbardian Punishment

Anenome — Tue, 11 Sep 2012 07:41:35 GMT

ColinKirby:
What I am confused about is why "a criminal, or invader, loses his own right to the extent that he has deprived another man of his". If it is true then it leads to the two teeth of restitution and punishment. However I do not think it is true, or at least I haven't found a suitable justification for it. Even in Punishment and Proportionality, Rothbard writes:

We have advanced the view that the criminal loses his rights to the extent that he deprives another of his rights: the theory of "proportionality." We must now elaborate further on what such a theory of proportional punishment may imply.

Contrary to modern belief, the ancient idea of 'eye for an eye' was not a massively harsh and punishing, but actually served to limit the amount of violence done as retaliation. Before 'eye for an eye' you find people going overboard to 'death for an eye' and the like.

Absent an objective propertional theory of punishment you could get either extreme of too much or too little retribution

Secondly, it gives us a way to quantify monetary restitution. Because the criminal owes to his victim an 'eye for an eye', thus the victim can choose to have what the criminal did to him also done to the victim, which satisfies proportionality and is perfectly just, or the victim can allow himself to have that punishment bought out and the two must come to an agreement on the proper amount that will satisfy the victim. No longer would it be a judge or jury deciding resitution amounts but a bargan between the criminal and whom he owes, the victim.

ColinKirby:
He advanced that view in the previous chapter then deals the consequences of it without saying why they lose their rights.

Because the criminal has been convicted of a crime; and his rights will now be legitimately abrogated in order that justice may be done.

Because justice demands that the punishment fit the crime, and the only way to do that rationally is to impose on the criminal the thing he intended to do to his victim. That way punishment perfectly fits the crime and there's no issue of going soft or going too far. It's an objective method of punishment which erases whim from the equation.

ColinKirby:
The case for restitution is clear: criminals have an enforceable obligation to return stolen property or to make their victim "whole". My intuitive concept of justice is simply restitution in this sense.

But simply giving back what was stolen is not nearly making one whole. For one has suffered emotionally, been deprived of their property for a certain term, had to face the annoyance of court and deprivation of property, etc., etc. Thus, the victim is not really whole simply because what was stolen has been returned. Rothbard from this principle goes on to then cite the proportionality theory. I think it makes perfect sense.

Re: Justification for Rothbardian Punishment

gotlucky — Tue, 11 Sep 2012 07:24:11 GMT

It's probably not immediately relevant, but I highly recommend Crusoe, Morality, and Axiomatic Libertarianism by Nielsio.

Re: Justification for Rothbardian Punishment

ColinKirby — Tue, 11 Sep 2012 07:13:35 GMT

gotlucky:

But for their to be law there must be at least the threat of violence. So we can imagine hypothetical worlds where people do no wrong to others, or if they were that somehow they right their wrongs from their own self-motivation, but this is just an imaginary world. In the real world, law is the primary mechanism people use to right wrongs, and law requires at the very least the threat of violence.

I agree; I think I just misinterpreted what you were saying in your previous post. I was trying to say that if a person accepts that they committed a crime and is in the process of paying it back, it is not justifiable to threaten them anymore. Of course if they back out then you can threaten them and carry out that threat if necessary.

gotlucky:

I recommend reading A Praxeological Account of Law by Clayton.

I shall, thank you.

Re: Justification for Rothbardian Punishment

gotlucky — Tue, 11 Sep 2012 05:56:04 GMT

ColinKirby:

The argument stops working when the criminal does in fact grow a conscience.

If your idea of justice is restitution, then it does not matter what motivates a wrongdoer to right his wrongs. There can be various incentives that motivate a wrongdoer to right his wrongs. Off the top of my head I can think of: threat of retribution, growing a conscience, or wanting to gain acceptance to a community (shunning can be a powerful motivator). We do not live in a world where all wrongdoers grow a conscience and right their wrongs. Most wrongdoers do not right their wrongs even if they grow a conscience. So sure, violent retribution is not needed in order for their to be restitution. But for their to be law there must be at least the threat of violence. So we can imagine hypothetical worlds where people do no wrong to others, or if they were that somehow they right their wrongs from their own self-motivation, but this is just an imaginary world. In the real world, law is the primary mechanism people use to right wrongs, and law requires at the very least the threat of violence.

I recommend reading A Praxeological Account of Law by Clayton.