Political Theory

Re: Murder by property (rights)

nirgrahamUK — Sun, 30 Sep 2012 12:36:37 GMT

Yes, it is a great problem to get people to realise the truth of various matters.

I am happy to restrict myself to systems of property rights that are logically tenable. So I'm on solid ground. Yeah, there may be all sorts of theoretical property systems, but why should I concern myself with them when they are not fit for purpose. (See De Jasay; Hoppe )

Re: Murder by property (rights)

National Acrobat — Sat, 29 Sep 2012 23:54:03 GMT

nirgrahamUK:

My point is that the hypothetical posed originally, is not a special case, and does not require a special response NOR rejection of the theory as a whole. What needs to happen is a readjustment of expectations. I.e. You should consider why are so horrified about the idea that in a private property world there exists a theoretical possibility that you may get surrounded by uncooperative strangers. Are you so similarly horrified by the notion that it is morally permissable for all present owners of food that are not you to not sell or give you their food ? You confuse logically possible problem with problem worth worrying about at your own peril.

I think you're going to have a problem getting people to adjust their expectations to the idea that they are constantly in a game of cyanide Russian roulette.

The moral outrage buried in the hypothetical is that of the believer in positive rights, the rights to the food, water, standing room of others. The rights of the thief that rejects his fellow being as moral agents with their own autonomy.

What you consider to be positive or negative rights depends on your theory of property. You can argue that libertarian property rights are positive rights as easily as food, water and standing room.

Re: Murder by property (rights)

nirgrahamUK — Sat, 29 Sep 2012 22:37:03 GMT

My point is that the hypothetical posed originally, is not a special case, and does not require a special response NOR rejection of the theory as a whole. What needs to happen is a readjustment of expectations. I.e. You should consider why are so horrified about the idea that in a private property world there exists a theoretical possibility that you may get surrounded by uncooperative strangers. Are you so similarly horrified by the notion that it is morally permissable for all present owners of food that are not you to not sell or give you their food ? You confuse logically possible problem with problem worth worrying about at your own peril.

The moral outrage buried in the hypothetical is that of the believer in positive rights, the rights to the food, water, standing room of others. The rights of the thief that rejects his fellow being as moral agents with their own autonomy.

Re: Murder by property (rights)

National Acrobat — Sat, 29 Sep 2012 22:14:33 GMT

nirgrahamUK:

Yes, I understood the point of the original hypothetical.

Perhaps you didn't understand the point of mine ?

Maybe I didn't. What was your point?

Re: Murder by property (rights)

skylien — Wed, 26 Sep 2012 13:08:30 GMT

@ Conza:

I have a short question just for the record since they were brought up here: I assume that easements would be something that would exist even within anarcho capitalism, correct? There is nothing that would logically exclude them to exist in private law, right?

Re: Murder by property (rights)

Conza88 — Wed, 26 Sep 2012 09:44:25 GMT

So, is me taking a sandwich you set on the table while you get up to get mustard a legitimate act by me?

Papirius wrote: Until I see arguments how can property follow from self-possession, I'd say yes.

FYI folks, he's a mutualist. A Philosophy For Thieves, as the above indicates. Also: "A Critique of Mutualist Occupancy" by Stephan Kinsella. Or am I way off, and you're preaching some kind of hip-new bread of political philosophy?

* Since you've indicated you're looking for arguments re: the above, here it is. Open mind please, would love to hear your considered thoughts.

"In general, I am moving in the direction of a one-step argument in which self-ownership is not treated separately from homesteading, but as a special example of homesteading such that there is a single unified justification of both “self-ownership” and homesteading of external resources. I think the key to resolving this issue more clearly is once again better applying the subject/object distinction, in this case to the precise meaning of “self.”

In this view, the act of making use of one’s own physical body before anyone else does as part of the natural process of human development is simply the prototype of a first-appropriation (“homesteading”) act. The whole body is a “relevant technological unit” in Rothbard’s sense, a natural unity for appropriation by an actor (Let’s say you are hunting and kill a deer. If a stranger shows up and tries to arbitrarily claim a section of it, which part of the deer is yours? The whole deer; not just the patch where the arrow struck! That would be another application of the RTU idea).

Now, in the idea of self-ownership, who is doing the appropriating of the “self”? Can the “self” appropriate the “self?” What does that mean? This is where this literature has sometimes gotten confusing. The answer is there, but it’s not always clarified as well as I think it could be.

Much of the confusion stems from a double meaning attached to “self” (sorting this out is also a resolution path for the larger “mind-body problem” controversy, as Ken Wilber has suggested). To unpack this, I define the “self” as the subject, the actor. That subject can claim the physical body associated with itself, which is the “self” as an object, that is, “empirically” measurable in the physical world. Thus, the human being considered as an acting person is a SUBJECT and not any kind of physical “object.” An acting person is not just a body, not just an empirical object, like a kidney or a stone (or a kidney stone…). A subject as contrasted with a physical object is not measurable or claimable as property at all. This (subject) “self” is an intangible like an idea (the basis of anti-IP thought too, is that ideas are not scarce objects and can therefore not be properly owned). The acting person has a physically observable aspect, but is not reducible to physical substance. We are subjects-and-objects by nature.

This is why I try to bring in Ken Wilber to re-emphasize the importance of better refining our differentiation of the interior perspective of a subject (an acting person) and the exterior perspective of an object, which can be a non-bodily external “object” or a bodily “object” such as a particular part of the body in just the same sense. AE [Argumentation Ethics] is talking about subjects making statements and the nature of justifiability of claims so made. It bridges subject/object in that it treats claim-making as a physical action, which it is, rather than a disembodied one, which is impossible. It depicts a subject making use of physical resources (objects) to make propositional claims. Such resources include the acting person’s physical body, etc. In contrast to this necessary dualism, two flavors of reductionism will get you either “an object making claims” (an internal contradiction) or “a subject making claims without any physical means for making them” (an absurdity).

Actually appropriating physical objects through a process of action and claiming is a different layer from having a consciousness capable of acting/claiming. The prototype of appropriation, as I said, is using and claiming one’s own physical body. It may already be evident from the above that I am working to develop this into a one-step argument, whereas Hoppe’s presentations have been multi-step, in that self-ownership is given first and then the justifiability of other appropriations are based on it in step two. However, if we maintain a clear subject-object duality of personhood the whole way through, “self-ownership” (meaning an acting subject’s ownership of its own physical body) is not any different from any other case of homesteading scarce physical resources; it is just another result of the acquisition by an actor/subject of a physical resource, in this case, the acting subject making use of the physical body that is associated with that subject in “a subject/object duality pair” (that is, “a person” ☺). This has also been harder to see, because relative to the case of a truly external resource such as an apple, a subject is uniquely positioned to make use of and claim the physical body uniquely associated with itself, the alternative being some kind of fantastic neurobiological remote control system (although guardianship of someone incapable of acting, as below, is a more realistic alternative).

So we actually embody methodological dualism because we are more or less integrated subject/objects. Yet in theorizing, we always have to go back to asking which perspective we are talking about or taking. We may have been missing that self(own-body)-appropriation is just another case of homesteading, simply because it is so obvious that it is hard to even reflect on it. The physical body is one case of first appropriation in which it is basically impossible for it to be otherwise. (I say, “basically” because, in extremis, one could imagine a hypothetical human who was born, but never developed in such a way as to be able to discernibly act or make choices. Such a person would never develop the ability to “take over” the reigns of their own life from their initial caretakers and would presumably remain a ward of a parent or guardian)."

— Konrad Graf

Can I get a clarification on what the concepts 'use' and 'abandon'?

Papirius wrote: No.

Comical. Unban for mere entertainment factor alone. He is in fact asking the right questions, mostly.. just a shame no-one really gave a him a proper answer.

Re: Murder by property (rights)

Conza88 — Wed, 26 Sep 2012 09:25:58 GMT

"Re: But I thought self-ownership was impossible?

Papirius wrote: "And unjustified to posit in the first place. Just for the sake of discussiom, I've assumed that it isn't."

Lmao, oh hell no..

"The answer to the question what makes my body "mine" lies in the obvious fact that this is not merely an assertion but that, for everyone to see, this is indeed the case. Why do we say "this is my body"? For this a twofold requirement exists. On the one hand it must be the case that the body called "mine" must indeed (in an intersubjectively ascertainable way) express or "objectify" my will. Proof of this, as far as my body is concerned, is easy enough to demonstrate: When I announce that I will now lift my arm, turn my head, relax in my chair (or whatever else) and these announcements then become true (are fulfilled), then this shows that the body which does this has been indeed appropriated by my will. If, to the contrary, my announcements showed no systematic relation to my body's actual behavior, then the proposition "this is my body" would have to be considered as an empty, objectively unfounded assertion; and likewise this proposition would be rejected as incorrect if following my announcement not my arm would rise but always that of Müller, Meier, or Schulze (in which case one would more likely be inclined to consider Müller's, Meier's, or Schulze's body "mine"). On the other hand, apart from demonstrating that my will has been "objectified" in the body called "mine," it must be demonstrated that my appropriation has priority as compared to the possible appropriation of the same body by another person.

As far as bodies are concerned, it is also easy to prove this. We demonstrate it by showing that it is under my direct control, while every other person can objectify (express) itself in my body only indirectly, i.e., by means of their own bodies, and direct control must obviously have logical-temporal priority (precedence) as compared to any indirect control. The latter simply follows from the fact that any indirect control of a good by a person presupposes the direct control of this person regarding his own body; thus, in order for a scarce good to become justifiably appropriated, the appropriation of one's directly controlled "own" body must already be presupposed as justified. It thus follows: If the justice of an appropriation by means of direct control must be presupposed by any further-reaching indirect appropriation, and if only I have direct control of my body, then no one except me can ever justifiably own my body (or, put differently, then property in/of my body cannot be transferred onto another person), and every attempt of an indirect control of my body by another person must, unless I have explicitly agreed to it, be regarded as unjust(ified).[7]"

— [7]Informal translation from Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Eigentum, Anarchie und Staat (Manuscriptum Verlag, 2005, pp. 98-100; originally published in 1985).

Re: First, you want self-ownership but the inability to do what one chooses with one's body and/or labor, calling employment illegitimate. This is proven to be illogical.

Papirius wrote: "No, it has not. It actually show that self-ownership is self-contradictory (being that it allows to sell oneself)."

Baby with the bath water boys... you're both wrong.

"In other words a labor contract may be viewed as an exchange only economically, but not legally. Economically, the employer gives up title to money, in "exchange" for you performing some action. But legally, it's not an exchange at all, it's just a one-way transfer of title: a conditional transfer of future title to future money, conditioned on the occurrence of a certain event happening (namely: that the "employee" does a certain action). The performance of the action triggers the transfer of money from the employer, but the action is not literally "sold" because the employee did not "own" his labor, and the employer does not own it after it is performed. We have to stop thinking sloppily and overusing metaphors."

"A contract in which payment is to be made for the performance of a service, such as an employment arrangement, is not an exchange of titles because the employee does not transfer any title. Although it may be referred to as an exchange of title for services, such a contract is better viewed as a unilateral, but conditional, future transfer of title to the monetary payment, conditioned upon the specified services being performed. That is, if you mow my lawn, then title to this gold coin transfers to you. Again, the transfer of title in this case is both expressly conditional and future-oriented. Title to the coin transfers only if the lawn is mowed, and I still own the coin."

— Stephan Kinsella, "A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability"

Re: Murder by property (rights)

Conza88 — Wed, 26 Sep 2012 08:19:40 GMT

Re: "If Joe were to go to sleep, and during his sleep Bob appears and builds walls around him (not violating Joe's property rights) and when Joe wakes up he finds it's impossible to go anywhere or get any food or water because he is enclosed by Bob's property. When Joe dies because of this, that's not murder, because Bob hasn't violated any Joe's rights, and therefore, Bob has done nothig wrong, right?"

Wrong.

I'm just going to assume everyone in this thread failed to hit on the right response. Unfortunately, that's probably a safe assumption. And no, easements aren't really it.

Intent folks. Intent.

"Clearly, while “objective” (external, observable) criteria must play an important role in the determination of ownership and aggression, such criteria are not sufficient. In particular, defining aggression “objectivistically” as “overt physical invasion” appears deficient because it excludes entrapment, incitement and failed attempts, for instance. Both the establishment of property rights and their violation spring from actions: acts of appropriation and expropriation.

However, in addition to a physical appearance, actions also have an internal, subjective aspect. This aspect cannot be observed by our sense organs. Instead, it must be ascertained by means of understanding (verstehen). The task of the judge cannot-by the nature of things-be reduced to a simple decision rule based on a quasi-mechanical model of causation. Judges must observe the facts and understand the actors and actions involved in order to determine fault and liability."

— "Property, Causality, and Liability" by Hans-Hermann Hoppe

The gem of this short article goes on to lay out the framework. Go read it.

Cutting to the chase: did Bob intend to entrap Joe and thus murder him? Yes, no?

Yes - Joe did intend to murder him. Well then, it's kind of clear then.

No - Perhaps Joes existence was completely unknown to Bob, a building contractor who had been hired to do a job. Joe was [tres]passing through, slept during the night and woke up trapped? I'd also say this is fairly intuitive and clear.

As someone has more than likely pointed out; these scenarios are demented hypotheticals entirely unrelated to reality.

Re: Murder by property (rights)

nirgrahamUK — Tue, 25 Sep 2012 21:26:20 GMT

Yes, I understood the point of the original hypothetical.

Perhaps you didn't understand the point of mine ?

Re: Murder by property (rights)

National Acrobat — Tue, 25 Sep 2012 01:23:00 GMT

nirgrahamUK:

Consider this, you have two glasses of wine, and one cyanide capsule and one inert capsule. You put one in each of the wine. You put the wine on a rotator and watch them both spin, you loose track of which is which. You play russian roulette with a glass of wine. You don't have Hydroxocobalamin, I do.

You ask me if I will give you some of my Hydroxocobalamin. I refuse. You die of cyanide poisining. Did I murder you ? no. You took a risk that didn't pay off, and you relied on my charity to survive, which you could not guarantee or have a moral claim to.

Now how is going to sleep in a *surroundable* territory , where another has the right to enclose you, different from the above?

Isn't the point of the thought experiment to show that something like being killed through enclosure is possible under a particular system of property rights and that therefore such a system should be rejected?

So the way to deal with such a problem is to deny the right to enclose people and kill them.

Re: Murder by property (rights)

Malachi — Sun, 23 Sep 2012 16:46:00 GMT

I maintain my consideration that that is a "good thing."

Re: Murder by property (rights)

Anenome — Sun, 23 Sep 2012 06:07:39 GMT

HabbaBabba:

Was it the superior argumentation, or determination to oppose the opinions of others at any cost that led to these changes? The change was basically becoming more wrong to avoid having to admit the initial wrong. That's not learning where I come from. We call that asinine. Specifically, an incapability of learning. Like telling a kid not to do something, so he does something gradually worse every time you say something. He's only learning how to be a bigger pain in the ass.

That's my read too. He was only here because he thought he had an argument that could stump us. When it failed he shifted to a new one :\

Re: Murder by property (rights)

vive la insurrection — Sun, 23 Sep 2012 05:02:10 GMT

Show me the case where this has happened. If it hasn't happened, let me know your fantasy land and fantasy courts verdict. There's your answer.

After that:

right and wrong are moral questions the way you are framing this, so that's a big "who cares". Murder is a legal question, and regardless of the customs is incorrect social behavior by definition to which ever legal body you find relevant - whatever those perameters may be.

Re: Murder by property (rights)

HabbaBabba — Sun, 23 Sep 2012 01:49:51 GMT

Was it the superior argumentation, or determination to oppose the opinions of others at any cost that led to these changes? The change was basically becoming more wrong to avoid having to admit the initial wrong. That's not learning where I come from. We call that asinine. Specifically, an incapability of learning. Like telling a kid not to do something, so he does something gradually worse every time you say something. He's only learning how to be a bigger pain in the ass.

Re: Murder by property (rights)

Malachi — Sun, 23 Sep 2012 01:03:25 GMT

I contend that one who changes his mind in the face of superior argumentation is willing and capable of learning.