zefreak: Property is an ethical concept, it doesn't exist in an ontological sense. There is no property sans ethics.
Property is an ethical concept, it doesn't exist in an ontological sense. There is no property sans ethics.
I would like to clarify "property". When I say property what I'm referring to is: the quality or characteristic of an object. In that fine hair suggestion, properties, like heat is the property of fire, or the greenness of a leaf, are unavoidably aspects of the object. For instance, liberty is a property of human nature. Life is a property of human nature. Thus property is a metaphysical concept. To avoid property being some Platonic thing where redness exists all by itself without say a red wagon, property may or may not be modal logic (I'm personally not sure), but it is contingent. It is true and it is not true. It depends on the object in which it is a characteristic of. And each person has property and necessitates property so in this case I think there is an argument that it is a mode of being.
This is exactly how a human being (is) property. Not that this solely suggests the human "owns" him or her self nor does it suggest that another person (or another thing) owns people outside of themselves. Owning is clarified with will and negative liberty (free-will of the primary agent) and positive liberty (a secondary agent; a master), but these being properties of a human, property in this sense does refer to a sense of ownership. The heat of a fire is of the fire. It is not of the snow. Thus heat being a property of fire refers to origination which is what owning is. So for this ontology to make sense all three: life, liberty, and property are pertinent (and since I introduced two liberties at this point, the liberty I'm referring to ontologically in my original premise is negative liberty).
The extension of property, as in the property referring to what a human has labored to make is now to be discussed. This identification of these tangible objects being properties of the artist (the human producer/laborer) is as with the person being property too. It is identified by will and what the properties are the property of (in this case a human). The will that generates into the goods/property. The owner of such properties, and in other words, the originating nature that has such and such properties, liberty, life, tangible goods, these are referring to human nature.
Brainpolice: BP seems to put something on the table sometimes, but then throws in comments on how he could rationalize killing innocents. I never claimed that I can *legitimately* rationalize killing innocents, I was rejecting argumentation ethics style arguments.
BP seems to put something on the table sometimes, but then throws in comments on how he could rationalize killing innocents.
I never claimed that I can *legitimately* rationalize killing innocents, I was rejecting argumentation ethics style arguments.
Yes, but UKnirgam. pointed out that for argumentation ethics it is a given that the argument is rational.
Lilburne:There is no third aim. There are two aims, one of which is valued more.
Here is my disection of the problem. Whenever an individual chooses between 2 or a set of things, he has a basis for choice. Eudaimonia if I understand it correctly is the assertion that there must be an ultimate end that is the ultimate basis that underlines all choice. That implies that eudaimonia must be an a priori truth similar to all men act. Then eudamonia must be that men choose what they think is best. The unchooseable starting point, is that you must choose :) This truly has been a brain shredding few days.
twistedbydsign99: Here is my disection of the problem. Whenever an individual chooses between 2 or a set of things, he has a basis for choice. Eudaimonia if I understand it correctly is the assertion that there must be an ultimate end that is the ultimate basis that underlines all choice. That implies that eudaimonia must be an a priori truth similar to all men act. Then eudamonia must be that men choose what they think is best. The unchooseable starting point, is that you must choose :) This truly has been a brain shredding few days.
Excellent point and insight.
The question is, why isn't the ultimate end conceived, as you write, along the lines of an a priori "truth" or formal axiom?
The confusion seems to revolve around the attempt to conceive the ultimate end in more concrete terms, so that it would be of the same essential nature as the "2 sets of things" chosen by the individual. That is, there seems to be a philosophical attempt to conceive the ultimate end, not as an axiom or a priori formal construct, but as some concrete value or set of values, or some concrete set of norms or social institutions.
The question is, is Eudaimonia the formal conception of happiness? Or does Eudaimonia depend on specific concrete values or norms? This seems to be where the unclarity is coming from. If Eudaimonia depends on concrete values that have been rationally assessed (concrete values that everyone must hold to experience Eudaimonia), then those concrete values and their rational assessment should be subject to discussion and analysis.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
wilderness: I would like to clarify "property". When I say property what I'm referring to is: the quality or characteristic of an object. In that fine hair suggestion, properties, like heat is the property of fire, or the greenness of a leaf, are unavoidably aspects of the object. For instance, liberty is a property of human nature. Life is a property of human nature. Thus property is a metaphysical concept. To avoid property being some Platonic thing where redness exists all by itself without say a red wagon, property may or may not be modal logic (I'm personally not sure), but it is contingent. It is true and it is not true. It depends on the object in which it is a characteristic of. And each person has property and necessitates property so in this case I think there is an argument that it is a mode of being. This is exactly how a human being (is) property. Not that this solely suggests the human "owns" him or her self nor does it suggest that another person (or another thing) owns people outside of themselves. Owning is clarified with will and negative liberty (free-will of the primary agent) and positive liberty (a secondary agent; a master), but these being properties of a human, property in this sense does refer to a sense of ownership. The heat of a fire is of the fire. It is not of the snow. Thus heat being a property of fire refers to origination which is what owning is. So for this ontology to make sense all three: life, liberty, and property are pertinent (and since I introduced two liberties at this point, the liberty I'm referring to ontologically in my original premise is negative liberty). The extension of property, as in the property referring to what a human has labored to make is now to be discussed. This identification of these tangible objects being properties of the artist (the human producer/laborer) is as with the person being property too. It is identified by will and what the properties are the property of (in this case a human). The will that generates into the goods/property. The owner of such properties, and in other words, the originating nature that has such and such properties, liberty, life, tangible goods, these are referring to human nature.
What does this have to do with the OP?
Adam Knott:The question is, why isn't the ultimate end conceived, as you write, along the lines of an a priori "truth" or formal axiom?
I believe it is the same reason people don't precieve "All men act" as a priori true without the explanation. There first inclination is "no thats false, i can just not do anything!" and then you always have to point out inaction is an act. Similarly "all men choose" the first inclination is that "I can just not choose anything," but alas it is a choice. To choose to willfully not choose. Its part of our brain that makes us not have to consider everything, it keeps us from going nuts, but sometimes hides a truth from us.
BP:I never claimed that I can *legitimately* rationalize killing innocents, I was rejecting argumentation ethics style arguments.
BP: zefreak: Property is an ethical concept, it doesn't exist in an ontological sense. There is no property sans ethics. I've been painstaking trying to tell him why conflating ethics with ontology is absurd over the course of multiple threads.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
liberty student: What does this have to do with the OP?
Nothing other than the person who wrote the OP asked me something in which one short sentence spilled this out to fully answer what I thought was an answer at the time. And then somebody questioned what I meant so I further responded with an exegesis of what property means. Now if specific examples of happiness would arise as Adam recently suggested might be something to do, then of course what I brought up has everything to do with the OP.
Juan: BP:I never claimed that I can *legitimately* rationalize killing innocents, I was rejecting argumentation ethics style arguments. So, you can't prove that killing innocents is OK ? It must be wrong then ? BP: zefreak: Property is an ethical concept, it doesn't exist in an ontological sense. There is no property sans ethics. I've been painstaking trying to tell him why conflating ethics with ontology is absurd over the course of multiple threads. Zefreak's comment is quite sloppy as usual - I'm surprised you agree with him. I thought you said you are not a moral subjectivist anyway ?
How is my comment sloppy? Because you don't understand it?
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
The question is, is Eudaimonia the formal conception of happiness? Or does Eudaimonia depend on specific concrete values or norms?
It's given in the abstract as a formal conception of happiness (along with several features thereof, such as it being agent-relative, individualised &c.) Flourishing in the specific depends on the individual in the neo-Aristotelian schema, and is a matter of them exercising practical reasoning in order to achieve it. Basically, the system is unlike deontology in that, aside from rights (which it takes to be the conditions that must be in place in order for flourishing to take place - their justification is given by the fact that flourishing is largely a self-directed activity because it is contingent on active reasoning by the individual in question, which must not be hindered by violent repression), it is up to the agent to figure out how to achieve it, and there are no easy to apply, readily had rules to do so - it makes the individual into a "lifelong project" so to speak. I've mentioned Rasmussen and den Uyl's Norms of Liberty before, and I'll reiterate its value in clarifying the system's concepts. I'm more inclined towards epistemological proofs for libertarianism and so I am still on the fence regarding it, but as far as it goes the neo-Aristotelian defence of libertarianism is one of the more elaborate ones I have seen.
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
Jon Irenicus: The question is, is Eudaimonia the formal conception of happiness? Or does Eudaimonia depend on specific concrete values or norms? It's given in the abstract as a formal conception of happiness (along with several features thereof, such as it being agent-relative, individualised &c.) Flourishing in the specific depends on the individual in the neo-Aristotelian schema, and is a matter of them exercising practical reasoning in order to achieve it. Basically, the system is unlike deontology in that, aside from rights (which it takes to be the conditions that must be in place in order for flourishing to take place - their justification is given by the fact that flourishing is largely a self-directed activity because it is contingent on active reasoning by the individual in question, which must not be hindered by violent repression), it is up to the agent to figure out how to achieve it, and there are no easy to apply, readily had rules to do so - it makes the individual into a "lifelong project" so to speak. I've mentioned Rasmussen and den Uyl's Norms of Liberty before, and I'll reiterate its value in clarifying the system's concepts. I'm more inclined towards epistemological proofs for libertarianism and so I am still on the fence regarding it, but as far as it goes the neo-Aristotelian defence of libertarianism is one of the more elaborate ones I have seen.
Thank you for this Jon.
Here is what I'm seeing in your description, if I may separate it roughly into two parts:
1. It's given in the abstract as a formal conception of happiness (along with several features thereof, such as it being agent-relative, individualised &c.) Flourishing in the specific depends on the individual in the neo-Aristotelian schema, and is a matter of them exercising practical reasoning in order to achieve it. ...flourishing is largely a self-directed activity because it is contingent on active reasoning by the individual in question... it is up to the agent to figure out how to achieve it, and there are no easy to apply, readily had rules to do so - it makes the individual into a "lifelong project" so to speak.
2. ...rights (which it takes to be the conditions that must be in place in order for flourishing to take place - their justification is given by the fact that flourishing is largely a self-directed activity because it is contingent on active reasoning by the individual in question, which must not be hindered by violent repression)... (my underline)
Regarding #1, at least as you are describing it, I don't see much that is inconsistent with the Misesian conception of action. Happiness is conceived formally, is subjective to each individual (agent-relative), and is a self-directed activity. In addition, to the extent that, as Mises writes "Reason and action are congeneric and homogeneous, two aspects of the same phenomenon." (Ultimate Foundations, p.43), then by definition, action is "cotaneous" with the individual exercising his reason. So in #1, in general I don't see anything importantly inconsistent with the concept of action.
As for #2, this seems to entail a person's particular vision of libertarian society. This is the question of what social order provides "the conditions that must be in place in order for flourishing to take place." To me, this boils down to the individual's "preferred" libertarian society. Here is where I see a possible theoretical disagreement. The question is whether "the conditions that must be in place in order for flourishing to take place" are "objectively" ascertainable, or are "agent relative" (subjective to each individual). This is where it may become contentious. As you probably agree, there are almost as many visions of libertarian society as there are libertarians, and this fact alone lends strong support to the idea that the concrete social institutions conducive to flourishing (happiness, eudaimonia, etc...) may be agent relative.
I have my new copy of Norms of Liberty in hand, and I ran across these passages on page 298:
"....human flourishing is...essentially individualized and agent-relative, the possibility of differing versions of self-perfection requires that attention be given to how to create and maintain a social/political context that is in principle both open to divergent forms of self-perfection and consistent with all...."
"The question facing political philosophy is how to determine what justice is for a "system of cooperation" that encompasses a social context that is open-ended or cosmopolitan, and the virtue of justice, as we have noted, cannot provide this. Further, no shared set of values or commitments can be assumed."(my underline)
"Here justice seeks to regulate human conduct so as to establish conditions for the possibility of individuals seeking their own form of human flourishing among others. Its aim is two-fold: to preserve the open-ended or cosmopolitan character of human sociality and to respect the individualized, self-directed, and agent-relative character of human flourishing."
I personally find these passages promising, and I found the underlined passages particularly important. To me, this implies that the system of cooperation that is open-ended (the society or societal form envisioned) is not provided by one's virtue of justice, and does not assume a shared set of values. This means to me that the particular form of society conducive to one's happiness is agent-relative. And to the extent this interpretation is generally correct, I don't see any principled difference between this conception and the political philosophy of Panarchism, which envisions multiple societies coexisting across and through the same territory or geographical region. This allows each individual to join or to disassociate from any civil or social organization, according to his/her own values, convictions, and level of social development.
So an important question seems to be:
Is the particular form of society conducive to individual happiness subjective to each individual? I think this is an important question. Does person A have to live in a society envisioned by person B, because person B has determined that this is the society conducive to A's happiness? Or does person A choose based on his agent-relative estimation of what society will make him happy?
Laughing Man:Ah my apologies, I thought you were asking how many different ultimate ends there could be in the sense as something besides the ultimate end of social preference. Well my personal eudiamonia is a life of intellectual advancement.
You seem to have replaced your contradiction with another. Eudaimonia is the ultimate end. The whole point of Long's ice cream/fame argument is that one's eudaimonia/ultimate end is singular, and not plural. Yet you are saying your eudaimonia/ultimate end is both social preference and intellectual advancement. Well which is it?
Laughing Man:If you know the position then why ask the question? Seems like a waste of time unless you just like testing people.
I don't know the answer to the question I asked, which was, "Okay, what does Long's "third aim" position say about "why they value what they value, etc..."?" That's why I'm asking you.
Laughing Man:Who is being the cadre now?
How am I being "a cadre"? Are you saying I'm adopting cadre tactics? If so, how so? And what cadre do you suppose I belong to?
Lilburne: Laughing Man:Ah my apologies, I thought you were asking how many different ultimate ends there could be in the sense as something besides the ultimate end of social preference. Well my personal eudiamonia is a life of intellectual advancement. You seem to have replaced your contradiction with another. Eudaimonia is the ultimate end. The whole point of Long's ice cream/fame argument is that one's eudaimonia/ultimate end is singular, and not plural. Yet you are saying your eudaimonia/ultimate end is both social preference and intellectual advancement. Well which is it?
as Jon pointed out, it's agent-relative. I know I had a long post in this thread, but the reason being "open-ended" as I stated or as Jon called it a "life-long project" shows the vastness of possibilities. In the other words, the potentiality of how a human might live, as long as they are allowed to live such an endeavor that is - meaning their natural rights are not violated and each person is able to therefore live life as the vast experiment/adventure that it is.
My guess is that they'd answer yes to the first (provided said society does leave the individual free to reason, as they take reasoning as integral to flourishing), and no to the second. As long as one does not interfere with another person's life and force them to live in the sort of society they envision, it's up to them to figure out what sort of society they wish to live in, whether it be anarcho-capitalism, a collection of communist enclaves &c. So basically it would amount to panarchism.
Lilburne:You seem to have replaced your contradiction with another. Eudaimonia is the ultimate end. The whole point of Long's ice cream/fame argument is that one's eudaimonia/ultimate end is singular, and not plural. Yet you are saying your eudaimonia/ultimate end is both social preference and intellectual advancement. Well which is it?
My eudiamonia is intellectual advancement, the overall eudiamonia of individuals whose -preferences are not known to me at this time period is the maximization of their social preference. We say social preference in order to include numerous amounts of subjective desires for ultimate ends.
Lilburne: I don't know the answer to the question I asked, which was, "Okay, what does Long's "third aim" position say about "why they value what they value, etc..."?" That's why I'm asking you.
Why do they value a rational deliberation of the advancement of their social preference?
Lilburne:How am I being "a cadre"? Are you saying I'm adopting cadre tactics? If so, how so? And what cadre do you suppose I belong to?
You implied that 'young, impressionable libertarians' are being brainwashed into Long's hype about eudiamonia. You treat them like underlings unable to choose for themselves which argument they prefer and you tell them to 'take a hard look at the real-world.' I have come to find that the 'real-world' is merely linguistic code for 'start thinking like me.'
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
Laughing Man: My eudiamonia is intellectual advancement, the overall eudiamonia of individuals whose -preferences are not known to me at this time period is the maximization of their social preference. We say social preference in order to include numerous amounts of subjective desires for ultimate ends.
Laughing Man:
Clarification please.
When you write: "their social preference," I don't fully understand. Why is the word "social" necessary in your conception here? In your description of your own eudiamonia, you do not write "social intellectual advancement."
To me, the word social somehow implies, or might imply, interpersonal relations. So my question of clarification is whether or not in your conception, the overall eudiamonia of individuals whose preferences are not known to you must be described as "their social preferences," or can be described simply as "their preferences." ?
Is the word "social" necessary for your conception of the eudiamonia of others or not?
If the word or general concept of "social" is necessary, then how does this concept attach to your eudiamonia of intellectual advancement? In this case, would you write: "my social intellectual advancement?"
Adam Knott:To me, the word social somehow implies, or might imply, interpersonal relations
Eudiamonia could possibly be interpersonal relations.
Adam Knott:So my question of clarification is whether or not in your conception, the overall eudiamonia of individuals whose preferences are not known to you must be described as "their social preferences," or can be described simply as "their preferences." ?
I say social preferences because we are engaging in behaviorial actions. However if you want to say just 'preferences' then I see nothing wrong with it.
Adam Knott:If the word or general concept of "social" is necessary, then how does this concept attach to your eudiamonia of intellectual advancement? In this case, would you write: "my social intellectual advancement?"
Well it would depend on how I use my intellectual achievements.
Jon Irenicus: Is the particular form of society conducive to individual happiness subjective to each individual? I think this is an important question. Does person A have to live in a society envisioned by person B, because person B has determined that this is the society conducive to A's happiness? Or does person A choose based on his agent-relative estimation of what society will make him happy? My guess is that they'd answer yes to the first (provided said society does leave the individual free to reason, as they take reasoning as integral to flourishing), and no to the second. As long as one does not interfere with another person's life and force them to live in the sort of society they envision, it's up to them to figure out what sort of society they wish to live in, whether it be anarcho-capitalism, a collection of communist enclaves &c. So basically it would amount to panarchism.
Thanks Jon.
If this is true, then to me it represents an emerging consensus around the idea of a non-monopolistic conception of government or civil associations, and the idea of individual choice in membership in them. Maybe this is old-hat to some. But I consider the prominent libertarian theories of the mid-to-late twentieth century to have been monopolistic in overall conception. I don't recall much discussion along the lines of "it's up to the individual to figure out what sort of society they wish to live in." I sense the libertarian paradigm is shifting.
Laughing Man: Adam Knott:To me, the word social somehow implies, or might imply, interpersonal relations Eudiamonia could possibly be interpersonal relations. Adam Knott:So my question of clarification is whether or not in your conception, the overall eudiamonia of individuals whose preferences are not known to you must be described as "their social preferences," or can be described simply as "their preferences." ? I say social preferences because we are engaging in behaviorial actions. However if you want to say just 'preferences' then I see nothing wrong with it. Adam Knott:If the word or general concept of "social" is necessary, then how does this concept attach to your eudiamonia of intellectual advancement? In this case, would you write: "my social intellectual advancement?" Well it would depend on how I use my intellectual achievements.
If I understand it correctly, "social preferences" are largely identical to "preferences of behavioral actors," and may include, but do not necessarily include, interpersonal relations. Is that a fair interpretation?
And in this conception, there is no ontological priority or ontological hierarchy granted to interpersonal relations as a constituent of eudiamonia, as opposed to other possible preferences not entailing interpersonal relations? Or is this incorrect?
That's possibly due to a failure on part of the proponents of libertarian theories to a) realise what their own theories entail and/or b) make that aspect of their theories explicit. Either way, I think Rasmussen and den Uyl do favour something along the lines of panarchism though personally they are minarchists. But they're not the sort who would say an anarchist society is taboo - they'd just prefer to let it be and keep to their own preferred society. That is the vibe I got from NoL and I think they do state as much somewhere in it, though it's been to long since I've read it to recall where.
Adam Knott:If I understand it correctly, "social preferences" are largely identical to "preferences of behavioral actors," and may include, but do not necessarily include, interpersonal relations. Is that a fair interpretation?
True a eudiamonia could possibly deal with things like popularity, likeability etc.
Adam Knott:there is no ontological priority or ontological hierarchy granted to interpersonal relations as a constituent of eudiamonia, as opposed to other possible preferences not entailing interpersonal relations?
Do you mean to ask if there more important matters then simple preference that guide us towards eudiamonia?
Laughing Man: Adam Knott:If I understand it correctly, "social preferences" are largely identical to "preferences of behavioral actors," and may include, but do not necessarily include, interpersonal relations. Is that a fair interpretation? True a eudiamonia could possibly deal with things like popularity, likeability etc. Adam Knott:there is no ontological priority or ontological hierarchy granted to interpersonal relations as a constituent of eudiamonia, as opposed to other possible preferences not entailing interpersonal relations? Do you mean to ask if there more important matters then simple preference that guide us towards eudiamonia?
No, I'm sorry. I don't think you're following me.
Previously, you wrote that your eudiamonia is intellectual advancement, but the eudaimonia of other people whose preferences you don't know is their "social preference." This latter definition made it seem as though you were making eudiamonia dependent on "social" in the sense of interpersonal relations; that a necessary component of eudiamonia in your theory is that the individual must be involved in interpersonal social relations, thus "social preference."
I believe we clarified that the word "social" was not necessary, and that we could re-phrase your original reference to other people's eudiamonia simply as "their preferences." In other words, the eudiamonia of other people whose preferences we do not know is based on their preferences (social or otherwise).
(if it helps to clarify, this is something I am in general agreement with)
But I wanted to clarify a point about eudiamonia as you understand it, and I think you will see the reason I'm asking for clarification.
I wrote above:
"If I understand it correctly, "social preferences" are largely identical to "preferences of behavioral actors," and may include, but do not necessarily include, interpersonal relations. Is that a fair interpretation?"
And you answered:
"True a eudiamonia could possibly deal with things like popularity, likeability etc"
The point I'm trying to clarify is whether eudiamonia must entail a "social" component.
Your answer seems to be: eudaimonia doesn't have to be "interpersonal relations," but it may be popularity or likeability, etc..
But these are still social components. They still refer to a social situation, i.e., these things still refer to a social context.
So to me it appears as you may be taking it for granted, but not explicitly saying that eudiamonia must have a social component.
A person can go in a hike by himself and sit on top of a mountain in the sun and warm breeze. A person can move to a far corner of Alaska and live in isolation, receiving only a few visits a year or month from a water plane that delivers essential supplies. A person can stay at home and watch a movie. None of these things is strictly speaking "social" in the sense of involving social interaction or reference to the opinions or thoughts of another person.
But throughout your explanations of eudiamonia you are seeming to default to a description of eudiamonia that contains a social component.
I hope this gives you a better context for the question I'm asking:
In your conception of eudiamonia, is a person's eudiamonia exclusively based on his preferences? Or are there certain things a person must have as part of his eudiamonia, one of which is a social component?
Another way of asking the same question might be, in your conception of eudiamonia, if a person substitutes some other thing for a social component (such as living alone in the wilderness) based on his own agent-relative preferences, then can that person experience the same "level" of eudiamonia as he would were he to substitute a social component (interpersonal relations, likeability, popularity, etc.) for living alone in the wilderness?
If a person, based on his agent-relative preferences, chooses to constitute his eudiamonia with lots of things, but not social things, is this person just as eudiamon as he would otherwise be if he included social things?
Adam Knott:A person can go in a hike by himself and sit on top of a mountain in the sun and warm breeze. A person can move to a far corner of Alaska and live in isolation, receiving only a few visits a year or month from a water plane that delivers essential supplies. A person can stay at home and watch a movie. None of these things is strictly speaking "social" in the sense of involving social interaction or reference to the opinions or thoughts of another person.
Well who do you get the movies from? Who is the individual in the plane who is giving you supplies? And is hiking to the top of a mountain and sitting there an ultimate end in life?
Adam Knott:then can that person experience the same "level" of eudiamonia as he would were he to substitute a social component (interpersonal relations, likeability, popularity, etc.) for living alone in the wilderness?
I think that humans are social creatures, that we desire communication with others. I believe it maybe possible to achieve such a state but highly unlikely to ensue for a long period of time.
Laughing Man: I stated that there is a third party to which rationalizes whether ice cream or fame is better for the individual. Ice cream is valuable Fame is valuable There must be a way to decide which is more valuable
I stated that there is a third party to which rationalizes whether ice cream or fame is better for the individual.
Ice cream is valuable
Fame is valuable
There must be a way to decide which is more valuable
Wisdom.
marquise: Laughing Man: I stated that there is a third party to which rationalizes whether ice cream or fame is better for the individual. Ice cream is valuable Fame is valuable There must be a way to decide which is more valuable Wisdom.
Is it though? The implication here is that ice cream and fame are rivalrous, and that only one can be attained at the expense of another. Thickoids tend to see things as a zero sum game, instead of an ordinal series of preferences which includes ice cream and fame, and only worries about which should be attained first, not which must be rejected for the other.
liberty student:Thickoids tend to see things as a zero sum game
Thickoids? Preferences can be ice cream and fame, I could enter an ice cream eating contest and gain fame. However, when presented with A or B and it can't be both then there needs to a be a rational agent that chooses either A at the expense of B or vice versa.
Adam Knott:Once we define what constitutes eudaimonia, won't the individual have the choice to diminish his own eudaimonia in order to commit an immoral act should he choose to do so?
Eudaimonia is based on ones virtues and wisdom. How can the individual diminish them and still be eudaimon?
liberty student:Is it though? The implication here is that ice cream and fame are rivalrous, and that only one can be attained at the expense of another. Thickoids tend to see things as a zero sum game, instead of an ordinal series of preferences which includes ice cream and fame, and only worries about which should be attained first, not which must be rejected for the other.
Yes, I got the rivalry implication. And, as everything else, wisdom is proper to each individual. So is eudaimonia, of course.
liberty student:Thickoids
Btw, what does it mean?!?
marquise: liberty student:Thickoids Btw, what does it mean?!?
I believe it to be a degatory term for 'thick libertarians' which are libertarians who think libertarianism is more then simply the NAP.
marquise: Adam Knott:Once we define what constitutes eudaimonia, won't the individual have the choice to diminish his own eudaimonia in order to commit an immoral act should he choose to do so? Eudaimonia is based on ones virtues and wisdom. How can the individual diminish them and still be eudaimon?
OK if eudiamonia is comprised of xyz particulars, such as virtues and wisdom, then simply substitute those particulars for "eudiamonia" in my question.
Laughing Man: marquise: liberty student:Thickoids Btw, what does it mean?!? I believe it to be a degatory term for 'thick libertarians' which are libertarians who think libertarianism is more then simply the NAP.
Thank you. More like for instance what?
Adam Knott: marquise: Adam Knott:Once we define what constitutes eudaimonia, won't the individual have the choice to diminish his own eudaimonia in order to commit an immoral act should he choose to do so? Eudaimonia is based on ones virtues and wisdom. How can the individual diminish them and still be eudaimon? OK if eudiamonia is comprised of xyz particulars, such as virtues and wisdom, then simply substitute those particulars for "eudiamonia" in my question.
In my understanding eudaimonia is reached when you are at your best according to your personal moral and intellectual resources. If you lower your level then you are not in an eudaimonia anymore. Substituting it with what it means does not change my answer lol.
Laughing Man:Thickoids?
Flourishoids? Flourishers?
Laughing Man:However, when presented with A or B and it can't be both then there needs to a be a rational agent that chooses either A at the expense of B or vice versa.
I think I understand this. And I have to say, "so what"? Of course where the choice is A/B (actually, there is always a C in positive scenarios) a rational agent acts. That is self. And ones self acts subjectively.
In star wars, C3PO and R2D2 are 'droids. Short for androids. We combine thick libertarians, with 'droids, and we get "thickoids".
Laughing Man:I believe it to be a degatory term for 'thick libertarians' which are libertarians who think libertarianism is more then simply the NAP.
You should tell the teacher.
liberty student: marquise: liberty student:Thickoids Btw, what does it mean?!? In star wars, C3PO and R2D2 are 'droids. Short for androids. We combine thick libertarians, with 'droids, and we get "thickoids".
Lol.
What do you mean by a thick libertarian?
marquise: Adam Knott: marquise: Adam Knott:Once we define what constitutes eudaimonia, won't the individual have the choice to diminish his own eudaimonia in order to commit an immoral act should he choose to do so? Eudaimonia is based on ones virtues and wisdom. How can the individual diminish them and still be eudaimon? OK if eudiamonia is comprised of xyz particulars, such as virtues and wisdom, then simply substitute those particulars for "eudiamonia" in my question. In my understanding eudamonia is [reached] when you are at your best according to your personal moral and intellectual resources. If you [lower] your level then you are not in an eudamonia anymore. Substituting it with what it means does not change my answer lol.
In my understanding eudamonia is [reached] when you are at your best according to your personal moral and intellectual resources. If you [lower] your level then you are not in an eudamonia anymore. Substituting it with what it means does not change my answer lol.
I don't think I'm disagreeing with you Marquise. My point is that if I want to commit an immoral act, I can simply lower (or suspend) my eudaimonia for a while, commit the immoral act, and then after committing the immoral act, I can reach back for and attain my eudaimonia again.
Adam Knott: marquise: Adam Knott: marquise: Adam Knott:Once we define what constitutes eudaimonia, won't the individual have the choice to diminish his own eudaimonia in order to commit an immoral act should he choose to do so? Eudaimonia is based on ones virtues and wisdom. How can the individual diminish them and still be eudaimon? OK if eudiamonia is comprised of xyz particulars, such as virtues and wisdom, then simply substitute those particulars for "eudiamonia" in my question. In my understanding eudamonia is [reached] when you are at your best according to your personal moral and intellectual resources. If you [lower] your level then you are not in an eudamonia anymore. Substituting it with what it means does not change my answer lol. I don't think I'm disagreeing with you Marquise. My point is that if I want to commit an immoral act, I can simply lower (or suspend) my eudaimonia for a while, commit the immoral act, and then after committing the immoral act, I can reach back for and attain my eudaimonia again.
It depends on what your moral values are. If honesty (by this I mean being honest with yourself) and coherence are part of it, then I am not sure that you can reach the same level of eudaimonia. I think that it also depends on what immoral act you are going to commit and according to whom this act would be immoral.
Maybe you should give me an example