The Error of Vulgar Libertarianism

[youtube:rAl6fMfuTxA] 

What say ye?

I agree with it for the most part. The term 'capitalism' is an anti-concept, with little bearing in most peoples' minds to how we use it (i.e. a free exchange economy predicated on private ownership of resources.) For some reason, a lot of people think by right-libertarianism that we mean thinkers like Dr Hoppe, Mises, Rothbard etc. However, although some of them tend to be culturally conservative in their orientation, they are radical in their advocacy of total privatization (and they seem to recognize this by the concepts they raise in their works, e.g. Hoppe's rehabilitation of the classical liberal class theory.) In that sense, I am a right-libertarian. On the other hand, if the term is used to designate statist libertarians, e.g. most Catoites, then I think it fits perfectly and I want nothing to do with individuals of that sort. Unfortunately, outside the Austrian School and some other groups, most libertarians seem to be vulgar libertarians.

What's that music?! It's amazing.

Your content is interesting. Libertarians could distinguish themselves from conservatives perhaps by focussing on the ending of corporate welfare as a key issue. This would also attack the military industrial complex "where it lives".

 I liked the critique, but I'm not so sure that the proposed solutions were as good; property theory has come a long way since Locke, and I'm not so sure that his views are the best on the issue.  You might be interested in taking a look at Hillel Steiner's and Peter Vallentyne's collection, Left-Libertarianism and Its Critics: The Contemporary Debate (that is, if you have access to a library that has it; it's probably not worth buying!).  If you can't get to that, I can probably suggest some other resources.

On the face of it, it seems more or less right but maybe a bit hysterical. The real problem is that this video--and this goes for many of those who employ the term "vulgar libertarianism"--aren't keen on actually citing the works or books or articles with which they disagree. So how we anyone really see who is right here? The brush is so broad.

 Now if you are talking about a Heritage-AEN-Cato-NatRev style support of a slightly more market-oriented status quo, that's one thing. If you are talking about busting up all corporations, or smashing Microsoft because it sells to public schools, or expropriating the automotive industry on grounds that cars drive on public roads, that's something else entirely. The goal might not be socialistic but the means are.

 So far as I know, this phrase vulgar libertarianism comes from Kevin Carson, who is far from being a property-rights libertarian in the Misesian Rothbard sense. The JLS devoted an entire issue to his thought, and I found it quite devastating. If I were a socialist seeking to enlist libertarians in my cause, I hope I would be clever enough to manufacture a critique of capitalism along these lines. It toys with the brains of principled libertarians. 

All issues of left and right aside, the plumb line on libertarianism of the most principled sort is still For A New Liberty by Rothbard.  

  

 If Rothbard is what makes libertarianism, then I'm out.

 I'll be willing to admit that I don't know of a string of theory that justifies government-owned property versus Locke's method (but I'm a new guy - still learning)  And you could always argue that we aren't being stringent enough with principle.  But does that make it necessarily a bad thing?  If we are trying to travel the path from A to B, is arguing that we move towards the middle point "selling out"?  I don't see the problem in doing that so long as we admit that we are freely moving to "B" even though that may be unachievable right now.  

 Clearly - somebody who advocates stopping at the midpoint must have a reason - and we can argue the principles associated with that.  But until we get to that point - is the spooky music necessary?

I like the gist of the video, and I think J. Tucker's critique is valid. The main part that I disagree with is the idea that market anarchists should ally with radical leftists for political progress. That's like saying that you'll be able to beat the Giants if only you manage to form an unbeatable team of leukemia patients and quadrapalegics. Yeah, alright, the state is trembling in its jackboots right now. 

Donny with an A:

 If Rothbard is what makes libertarianism, then I'm out.

 

 

What's wrong with Rothbard? 

From chapter two of "For A New Liberty":

"...as we have seen, no producer really creates matter; he takes nature-given matter and transforms it by his labor energy in accordance with his labor energy in accordance with his ideas and vision.  But this is precisely what the pioneer - the 'home-steader' - does when he brings previously unowned land into his own private ownership.  Just as the man who makes steel out of iron ore transforms that ore out of his know-how and with his energy, and just as the man who takes iron out of the ground does the same, so does the homesteader who clears, fences, cultivates, or builds upon the land.  The homesteader, too, has transformed the character of the nature-given soil by his labor and his personality.  The homesteader is just as legitimately the owner of the property as the sculptor or the manufacturer; he is just as much a 'producer' as the others."

If you accept this view, you essentially rule out the idea of dispossession altogether, and declare out of existence any reason for discussing property theory at all. 

As far as the whole "left" thing goes, I think "left" is generally being used in a classical sense. So when I think of "returning libertarianism to its leftist roots", state-socialism doesn't come to mind. Benjamin Tucker does. I suppose it depends what one means by "left". In this context I think of it as signifying anti-authoritarian radicalism, so I have no problem considering libertarianism "leftist". But in either case, I'm really keen on the idea that the state is homesteadable (and possibly even certain corporations).

Ok, I thought more on this overnight. Jefferson was on the left, Paine on the Left, Bastiat on the left -- fine. So why was the Old right on the right? Difference in views? No. it was because the left sold out completely, first with world war I (including the American anarchists of the late 19th century) and most especially with the New Deal. Hazlitt and Flynn and Garrett all thought they were left, until the New Deal when the left became the supporters of the corporate state. So of course they were considered to be on the right. Later the New Left sounded pretty much like the Old Right.

 In any case, given all this history, I can't imagine a less fruitful path than to endlessly assert, with hard dogmatism, that we are on the left as versus the right. I agree that right now, the right is a much greater danger to liberty than the left -- Lew Rockwell said as much in a column three years ago. At the same time, you can't just wipe out a century of political history and pretend that it didn't happen. 

 

 

I don't get it. Libertarians are not a part of the left-right conflict as far as either the left or the right are concerned. Why should we try to inject ourselves into something we are not a part of.

Left-Right is only useful when describing people of similar world views. Trying to use left vs right to compare anarchists to statists is silly.  It only becomes useful when, for example, comparing Noam Chomsky to Murray Rothbard.

There can be left wing and right wing libertarians, but libertarianism can not be so narrowly defined.

What do you think is a reasonable view on intellectual property?

I ask, because by using the performance of Honegger's Pacific 231 without attribution either to the composer or to the performers you have, according to some, violated their rights, which is fairly ironic given the content of your video. Obviously a thorny issue in this day and age.

But I believe it would be common courtesy to give credit where credit is due. I spent a fair amount of time figuring out what the piece was, I would still like to know who the performers were.

Thanks.

Ok, I thought more on this overnight. Jefferson was on the left, Paine on the Left, Bastiat on the left -- fine. So why was the Old right on the right? Difference in views? No. it was because the left sold out completely, first with world war I (including the American anarchists of the late 19th century) and most especially with the New Deal. Hazlitt and Flynn and Garrett all thought they were left, until the New Deal when the left became the supporters of the corporate state. So of course they were considered to be on the right. Later the New Left sounded pretty much like the Old Right.

I agree. The old libertarian left sold out and ideologically disintegrated. The same is true of the "old right" that is so romantisized by many libertarians. They sold out and ideologically disintegrated as well. Many of them ended up blending into the general conservative movement and losing their radical edge.

jtucker:

Ok, I thought more on this overnight. Jefferson was on the left, Paine on the Left, Bastiat on the left -- fine. So why was the Old right on the right?

 

When the franchise is limited to aristocrats, being on the left only means that you're a left-aristocrat. 

jtucker:

Ok, I thought more on this overnight. Jefferson was on the left, Paine on the Left, Bastiat on the left -- fine. So why was the Old right on the right? Difference in views? No. it was because the left sold out completely, first with world war I (including the American anarchists of the late 19th century) and most especially with the New Deal. Hazlitt and Flynn and Garrett all thought they were left, until the New Deal when the left became the supporters of the corporate state. So of course they were considered to be on the right. Later the New Left sounded pretty much like the Old Right.

 In any case, given all this history, I can't imagine a less fruitful path than to endlessly assert, with hard dogmatism, that we are on the left as versus the right. I agree that right now, the right is a much greater danger to liberty than the left -- Lew Rockwell said as much in a column three years ago. At the same time, you can't just wipe out a century of political history and pretend that it didn't happen.

 

First of all I must state that I am likely not well versed enough to make a comment, but if nothing else perhaps I can provoke some smarter than I to respond.

That said, I have come to a very similar conclusion to what Jeff Tucker says here. From what I have read (I think it was from the evil Cato VP David Boaz's book Libertarianism - evil because most at LvMI see them as sell-outs - I actually really like the book, which pays homage to both Rothbard and Mises) the terms left and right referred to which side of the legislative assembly that Bastiat and his cohorts were seated. Bastiat being a liberal and sitting on the left, etc. Of course any time that an idea comes to be accepted as commonly understood it has been so disfigured and contorted that it no longer has anything to do with it's original meaning. I can't remember if it was Orwell or some socialist theorist who pointed out that a great thing for a politician to do is redefine words as their opposite so that any discussion of them becomes meaningless. I know that Orwell made great use of the idea in 1984, in which the "Ministry of Truth" destroyed all facts and disseminated propaganda, the "Ministry of Peace" made perpetual war, etc.

So it is only natural that the "left" would come to be the party of big government, social welfare, etc. because they were the original "progressives", or "liberals" (progressive originally meaning progressing away from state oppression and toward liberty - see how it now means the opposite also?). So now that the "left' were the New Dealers, the only thing you could be if you were opposed to the New Deal was "right".

Tucker is absolutely correct that talking about left and right are meaningless and useless, but most people who think for themselves have know this for a very long time. But there are those who decide to be on either the Red team or the Blue team are going to close their ears and minds to any who disagree with the people who tell them what to think (like the girl that told me that "You have to listen to Sean Hanity EVERY DAY!"

And I agree with a Republican congress and Republican President the right is dangerous, but I bet the left would make up for lost time very, very quickly if they controlled both executive and legislative branches. Imagine the unprecedented growth in amazingly destructive social programs to finally make us all "equal" (whatever that means - and also I would like to know what "fair" means if we have any omnipotent commentators in the peanut gallery).

 

Donny with an A:

If you accept this view, you essentially rule out the idea of dispossession altogether, and declare out of existence any reason for discussing property theory at all. 

 

How so?

 

Rothbard is suggesting that people produce the value in natural objects when they mix their labor with them.  If this is the way we look at it, then we're practically committed to saying that dispossession isn't a problem; people aren't being deprived of anything by privatization; homesteading is Pareto improving.  Does that make sense?   

Donny with an A:

Rothbard is suggesting that people produce the value in natural objects when they mix their labor with them.  If this is the way we look at it, then we're practically committed to saying that dispossession isn't a problem; people aren't being deprived of anything by privatization; homesteading is Pareto improving.  Does that make sense?   

 

Danny, I think you are misinterpreting what Rothbard is saying.   I have read the book a couple of times and the way I understand it is not that people produce value in natural object by mixing labor with them.  Rather that they produce something more valuable than the object was originally and that once it has been improved that it is very hard to separate the labor from the original object and thus it should become their own private property.  However he does talk about merely walking on land as using that land and thus it becoming the property of the first person to walk on it.

Rothbard's objective with his book is to provide a truly consistent framework for a legal system based on the rights of private property and to be consistent with what the rights of private property are so that everyone, even the most simple person with no knowledge of the legal system will understand what is right, or wrong, allowed or disallowed, and to know these things intuitively.  (Think about developing a legal system for a society of children who will only be able to follow consistent, logical rules)

Also there is a lot of context around the quote that you left out (understandably, because to really get the context I think one has to read the whole book).  Rothbard's purpose is to define rules that can be used as firm principles with no exceptions.  Such as the example of yelling "FIRE" falsely in a crowded theatre being not an exception to the right of free speech, but a violation of an implied contract between movie patron, and theatre owner.  Therefor, in this example Rothbard attempts to prove that there should be no exceptions to the right of free speech, but that the rights of private property and contractual agreement must also remain valid.  So in the "fire" case, you have the right to say whatever you want, but the people who are harmed by your actions also have the right to be compensated for the damages done to them by you.  

Property (or objects) can only be acquired in 1 of 3 ways.  By purchase from another person, by gift from another person, or by homesteading of unowned property. 

So back to your original statement, when Rothbard is talking about people taking possession of something which is unowned and mixing labor with it that it then becomes their own, he is trying to lay down a system by which unowned property could be allocated in a society based on the rights of private property.  He also explains that for example, if one were to walk a huge perimeter that only the ground that was actually walked on would become his property and the area inside of it would still be unowned.  His sole objective is to be consistent, which seems to be a theme with most Austrian Libertarian thought, because complex legal systems with myriad exceptions to every rule are nearly impossible for anyone to follow or understand without constant study and updating of all the new rules.  Having to check legality for everything you do slows progress and only benefits lawyers.   Layers and judges of some sort would still be necessary to determine the nuances of the law, but I imagine there would be much, much fewer of them.

Folowing his logic land can only be dispossessed in two of the three ways mentioned above, it can either be sold, or given away.  And for the right price someone would probably sell their land.  However they should never be forced to do so.  Rothbard also talks about land once owned is always owned unless sold or given away, and never returns to being unowned even if it is not used (contrary to the Georgist proposition that land can be homesteaded if it has not been used in x number of years).

Donny with an A:

Rothbard is suggesting that people produce the value in natural objects when they mix their labor with them.  If this is the way we look at it, then we're practically committed to saying that dispossession isn't a problem; people aren't being deprived of anything by privatization; homesteading is Pareto improving.  Does that make sense?   

As the other person who responded to you said, it is impossible to separate the value of the labor put into natural objects and thus you are the owner. In fact anything you wish to claim as your own is made of matter which was there before you. If you hold that labor and nature are seperable than try to justify your self-ownership when you are made primarily of carbon and water.

I'm wonderign what this has to do with dispossessing. Nobody owns untouched antrue, so you are not dispossessing anybody of anything.
Similarly what does this have to do with privatization?

 Sorry if I wasn't clear.  Charges of dispossession basically amount to the view that being denied access to natural resources makes people worse off in a morally relevant sense.  So to illustrate, let's say we both simultaneously land on an island after a shipwreck, and we have no hope of leaving or being rescued.  You immediately set to work improving and enclosing the island (except for the land I'm currently on), while I take a nap on the shore.  When I wake up from my nap, I see that you've basically staked a claim to everything, leaving me with practically nothing. 

Perhaps I can survive on my piece of land (there are some crabs and a palm tree; I won't starve to death or die of thirst or exposure), but I'm pretty much condemned to a pretty meager existence.  And let's say that the island is a very bountiful place, and your control of it will lead to extraordinary wealth and pleasure for you.  Some people would say that by laying claim to pretty much the whole island, you've deprived me of an opportunity that is morally significant.  That is, it's not fair for you to get all the resources for yourself, leaving me pauperized.  Yes, you took the initiative and I didn't, but "First come, first served" seems like a really unfair way to go about this sort of thing.  I shouldn't have to scramble to gather as much as I can before you get your hands on the rest; it seems like I should have a right to some share of the island, and if you use that share, I don't violate your rights if I take that share back.

The problem with Rothbard's theory is that it basically declares that sort of reasoning out of existence.  It essentially forces us to say that your taking the initiative and enclosing the land first is really a legitimate basis for saying that I now have no right to any of the island's resources.  If I have to live a life of abject poverty, and you live a life of opulence and wealth, then I have no basis for crying foul; you went out and took the resources first, and I took a nap instead, so I forfeit my right to complain.  For those of us that think that such a scenario really would be unfair, Rothbard's reasoning just doesn't cut it.  He doesn't really explain why we're wrong to think that we would have grounds for complaint; it just follows from his theory.  But his modus ponens is my modus tollens.  That is, he says "If my theory is true, then you have no grounds for complaint.  My theory is true, therefore you have no grounds for complaint."  I, on the other hand, say "If your theory is true, then I have no grounds for complaint.  I have grounds for complaint, therefore your theory is not true."  If you think that dispossession is morally relevant, then you find yourself on my side; if you think it's not, then you won't find any problems with Rothbard here.

Couldn't this all just be resolved with some contract before the flight? 

 Sure, just like if everyone got together and agreed on the fair rules for appropriating natural resources, no one would have any reason for complaining that they didn't have any.  And just like if everyone agreed on the form of government we should have, and how it should operate, then no one could complain about anything the government did, as long as the agreement was adhered to.  The point is, that kind of contract doesn't exist, and never did.

Donny with an A:

 Sure, just like if everyone got together and agreed on the fair rules for appropriating natural resources, no one would have any reason for complaining that they didn't have any.  And just like if everyone agreed on the form of government we should have, and how it should operate, then no one could complain about anything the government did, as long as the agreement was adhered to.  The point is, that kind of contract doesn't exist, and never did.

 

 It's been a while since I read Rothbard on this but I think you'd be hardpressed to find support in his work for the idea that the other guy could claim almost the entire island by fencing you into a small portion of it.

I didn't say that he did.  I said that he improved the land, mixing his labor meaningfully with it.  To Rothbard, appropriation is a Pareto improving action.  If that's not true, then Rothbard's view is too simplistic.

Donny with an A:

I didn't say that he did.  I said that he improved the land, mixing his labor meaningfully with it.  To Rothbard, appropriation is a Pareto improving action.  If that's not true, then Rothbard's view is too simplistic.

 

 

He did all that while you were napping? Give me a break. How big is this island?

Regarding Pareto optimality and improvements, have you read Rothbard's "Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics"?

 

Donny with an A:

It essentially forces us to say that your taking the initiative and enclosing the land first is really a legitimate basis for saying that I now have no right to any of the island's resources.  If I have to live a life of abject poverty, and you live a life of opulence and wealth, then I have no basis for crying foul; you went out and took the resources first, and I took a nap instead, so I forfeit my right to complain.

As far as your example goes, if there's only the two of you on the island, then YOU are the only person he can exchange with to take advantage of division of labor. Claiming a majority of the island and excluding you from it may help him to a degree, assuming he is able to exclude you, but it severely limits what HE can accomplish to improve his own lifestyle. Mutual trade is to his benefit as well as yours, regardless of how much he "owns".

In society in general, the value of exchange and division of labor also holds.  Rich people aren't going to get other rich people to work for them, and it begs the question of how they got rich in the first place.  More importantly, in society in general, a just legal system is going to give people the ability to contest what are deemed to be unjust appropriations, and the first guy to appropriate unowned resources must then be able to defend his appropriation to a court and/or to society in general.  Thus, merely being the first to appropriate, while remaining an important factor, does not have to be an absolute justification.

 Yes, Geoffery, I sleep like a champ.  That's why thought experiments are fun.  But I haven't read Rothbard's essay; is there some part in particular you have in mind or do I really need to read the entire thing to get the general point you're thinking of?

Macsnafu, I'm not sure what your point is.  Are you saying that it's fair for you to take all the valuable island resources because I can just work for you at whatever wage we agree on?  I mean, I'm sure you could offer me a nice low wage that would make working for you better than just sitting around my tiny patch of land, but it still seems like something unfair is going on.  It's my contention that you shouldn't have been able to appropriate all the resources for your exclusive use. 

It's not a problem for that argument that perhaps you would offer me a wage if I helped you improve the value of the resources you took.  Think of it this way.  Let's say you own five coconut palms, and I have one.  A coconut palm naturally produces 10 coconuts per day, so without doing any work, you get 50 coconuts, and I get 10.  But let's say that with someone there to keep it watered, fertilized, and bug-free, a coconut palm's output could increase from 10 coconuts to 20.  You're not very good at servicing coconut palms, so you can only take care of one palm per day.  On your own, you'd end up with 60 coconuts.  I'm more efficient than you, and can service two palms per day, but I only have one on my land, so in isolation, I end up with 20 coconuts.

But let's say I notice that you have unattended trees.  Since I have extra time in the day, and I'm hungry, I agree to accept 4 coconuts per day as payment for watering, fertilizing, and de-bugging the tree.  By taking this wage, I certainly do make myself better off.  I now get 24 coconuts per day instead of 20, which represents a fantastic increase in my total wellbeing.  And you're better off too.  You get 66 coconuts instead of 60.  But you go too far when you imply, "And so there's no problem!"  The fact that you own the tree in the first place needs to be taken into account.  Since you appropriated it, and most of the rest of the island, while I was asleep, and left me with practically nothing, I think it does seem like I might have reason to complain about the arrangement. 

Take note of two things.  First, you end up with 66 coconuts, and I with 24, simply because you gained control of the resources first; I am actually a more efficient coconut producer than you.  Second, when I work for you in exchange for a wage, you actually get more additional coconuts than I do, even though you didn't have to do anything (of course the example could have been changed so that this weren't the case, but all that's important is that it be possible that this could happen).  Doesn't this seem to suggest that something has gone wrong?

Donny with an A:

Doesn't this seem to suggest that something has gone wrong?

Something went wrong when you two people got stuck on an island with each other.  You'll either work out your differences or you'll most likely kill each other.  Fair or not, there's no one else to appeal to.  I'm saying two things: 1) it's to his benefit to work it out with you instead of trying to exclude you.  2) In a real society, there would also be a legal system that could be appealed to that can make judgements about apparent wrongness.  That's what a legal system is for.  Thus, the island analogy with only 2 people can't be the same as society in general.

 

 

 

 I specifically demonstrated how despite it being to your benefit to negotiate, I can still end up much worse off than you, and the only reason would be your enclosure of the overwhelming share of the resources.  If Rothbard's principle were embodied in the law, then appealing to a legal system wouldn't do me any good.  Rothbard is saying that what you do by enclosing the resources is perfectly fair, and that if those resources were taken from you, then it would represent expropriation.  Accordingly, any law which would give me the resources would have to be considered an unjust law by a Rothbardian.

Donny with an A:

 I specifically demonstrated how despite it being to your benefit to negotiate, I can still end up much worse off than you, and the only reason would be your enclosure of the overwhelming share of the resources.  If Rothbard's principle were embodied in the law, then appealing to a legal system wouldn't do me any good.  Rothbard is saying that what you do by enclosing the resources is perfectly fair, and that if those resources were taken from you, then it would represent expropriation.  Accordingly, any law which would give me the resources would have to be considered an unjust law by a Rothbardian.

 

 Do you have an alternative yet still libertarian principle?

Regarding Rothbard's essay "Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics," I believe it is online on Mises.org and in it, among other things, he criticizes the idea of Pareto improvements and optimality.

 

Donny with an A:

If Rothbard's principle were embodied in the law, then appealing to a legal system wouldn't do me any good. 

And I specifically stated that first come, first serve, while generally a good idea, doesn't have to be absolute or inviolable.  I say this precisely because there is much grey area about what or how much constitutes a just appropriation, or how much labor is necessary to make such an appropriation.  What do you do when conflicts exist?  Arbitration - appeal to a third party. 

Well Geoffery, the entire left-libertarian research program is dedicated to figuring out such a principle.  Basically, left-libertarianism is a reaction to the fact that principles of world-ownership don't follow from the principle of self-ownership, and you can be a libertarian without taking a Rothbardian line on appropriation.  I'll be the first to acknowledge that I don't have a suggestion on what the right principle for justice in appropriation should be, and I think that most of the ideas that people have come up with aren't very convincing.  But I do think that the left-libertarian paradigm is much more plausible.

Macsnafu, I think what you're reacting to is the intuition that mixing your labor with something is a good place to start when thinking about just appropriation.  I agree with that.  But I think that in certain situations, mixing your labor with something shouldn't mean that you own it, because ownership is a very stringent kind of relationship.  I think that in the island example, there comes a certain point where we'd want to say that when you mix your labor with some more resources, you don't gain ownership of them as a result, because you haven't left me with a fair share.  That intuition goes all the way back to Locke (if not further), and I think it's really plausible.

Donny with an A:

But I think that in certain situations, mixing your labor with something shouldn't mean that you own it, because ownership is a very stringent kind of relationship.  I think that in the island example, there comes a certain point where we'd want to say that when you mix your labor with some more resources, you don't gain ownership of them as a result, because you haven't left me with a fair share.

My intuition tells me that there are limits to what a person can appropriate based upon what a person can reasonably manage and control, not on how much is left over for others.  If you really want to get technical about it, I can see a person trying to appropriate more than he control, and the result would be his being unable to do anything profitable with it, that instead it may be a responsibility, a drain on his resources, and thus he would want to get rid of some portion of it.  In other words, variable land values based upon what use the land is being put to, something a market can handle quite well.

Donny with an A:

Well Geoffery, the entire left-libertarian research program is dedicated to figuring out such a principle.  Basically, left-libertarianism is a reaction to the fact that principles of world-ownership don't follow from the principle of self-ownership, and you can be a libertarian without taking a Rothbardian line on appropriation.  I'll be the first to acknowledge that I don't have a suggestion on what the right principle for justice in appropriation should be, and I think that most of the ideas that people have come up with aren't very convincing.  But I do think that the left-libertarian paradigm is much more plausible.

 

It is hard to see how it is more plausible if it has no alternative principle on offer whose plausibility we can assess. Also, you speak of left-libertarianism as if it is impossible to be both a left-libertarian and a Rothbardian on property rights, but Roderick long considers himself to be both. Would you say he's not a left-libertarian?

  

Donny with an A:

I think that in the island example, there comes a certain point where we'd want to say that when you mix your labor with some more resources, you don't gain ownership of them as a result, because you haven't left me with a fair share. That intuition goes all the way back to Locke (if not further), and I think it's really plausible.

I don't think this is necessarilly a correct extrapoliation of Locke's enough-and-as-good proviso. On a tiny remote island it might have some plausibility, but in typical society, not to mention a globalized economy, it would seem to be highly implausible to point to someone and say he hasn't left enough-and-as-good for you. To elevate the plausibility (accepting it for the sake of argument for now) of it being just to expropriate the land appropriated by the one castaway who didn't leave enough-and-as-good for the other, to elevate it to the level of a principle of justice for a normal society would I think be a monumental mistake, a departure from true justice and libertarianism. It's a mistake to formulate a general principle for normal social situations from such an extremely irregular case.

 Besides, as Macsnafu points out, there are limits to how much a single person really can legitimately appropriate. I think your island hypothesis needs to be fleshed out a great deal more before it can be useful. Just how big is the island? What kind of resources does it have? Exactly what are the improvements castaway #1 is supposed to have made while you were napping (keeping the nap time here to a believable duration)? I find it hard to believe he could make enough improvements on the island during the time you are asleep to appropriate nearly all of it unless it were an exceedingly small and barren island, in which case I'd say you are probably both screwed whatever castaway #1 has managed to do. Let's say there are some coconut and banana trees and he plucks a few coconuts and bananas for his own use. I don't think this necessarily means he's appropriated the trees themselves and all the fruit on them. In what way can he be said to have appropriated them? It's not like you two are still a part of a community and he can legitimately say he's appropriating previously unowned coconut and banana trees in order to tend an orchard for the trading of coconuts and bananas with the rest of your community. There's just the two of you there, so this would be implausible. And so on.

 In another thread I suggested the philosopher David Schmidtz to TokyoTom. He has some interestign arguments regarding applications of Locke's enough-and-as-good and spoilage provisos. Here are some books reviews of his work by David Gordon:

http://www.mises.org/misesreview_detail.aspx?control=184

http://www.mises.org/misesreview_detail.aspx?control=299

Here's an interesting passage from the second review:

"In like fashion, Schmidtz maintains that a system that allows initial acquisition easily overcomes a common egalitarian objection. What happens, "left libertarians" and Georgists inquire, if people appropriate all unowned property? Will not latecomers be disadvantaged, if not altogether squeezed out? Schmidtz vigorously dissents: "latecomers would see first comers as a threat if it were really true that, in a first possession regime, it is better to arrive early rather than late. But it is not true. One central fact about any developed economy: Latecomers are better off than the first generation of appropriators. . . . First possessors pay the price of converting resources to productive use. Latecomers reap the benefits" (p. 156)."
 

Finally, on something of a side note, as Aristotelians Roderick and I don't take self-ownership as an axiomatic starting point 

Oh, btw, I just noticed that David Schmidtz has done some work on environmental ethics. See his personal webpage. He's a very good philosopher, very thought provoking, and a nice guy. I have a signed copy of his The Elements of Justice.

Macsnafu, I guess we just differ on that.  Let's say that in order to get any coconuts from the palm trees, you need to build a fence around them so that the island's crabs don't come and eat them.  While I was asleep, you built such fences around the five trees which you claim to own, thereby mixing your labor meaningfully with them.  And because you're a big eater, and the coconuts are delicious, you're perfectly able to find uses for all the coconuts you harvest.  It still seems to me that at some point, you started encroaching on my fair share of the coconut palms when you were building your fences, and I would be justified in demanding compensation, or some of the trees, or something like that.  I admit that exactly what I'd be justified in demanding is unclear.  But it seems to me like I'd be justified in demanding something, because your actions just seem unfair.  If you don't share this intuition, then I'd be hard pressed to tell you you're wrong; it just seems self-evident to me.

Geoffery, in the introduction to what I take to be one of the more significant left-libertarian works in recent memory, Left-Libertarianism and Its Critics: The Contemporary Debate, Peter Vallentyne writes, "Left-libertarian theories of justice hold that agents are full self-owners and that natural resources are owned in some egalitarian manner."  I take that to be the definition of left-libertarianism.  That view is somewhat reflected in Roderick Long's explanation of why he considers himself to be a left-libertarian: "I've had some kind words for multiculturalism, postmodernism, political correctness, environmentalism, and collective ownership; and I regard libertarianism as properly rooted in egalitarianism."  Long also writes, however, that he considers himself "90% orthodox Rothbardian" and that he doesn't approve of Tucker-style or Georgist limits on land ownership.  What this means in terms of his accepting Rothbard's view of just appropriation is unclear.  But if we accept the definition of left-libertarianism which (I believe) is used by most people involved in the debate, then it's as simple as saying "If he believes in some egalitarian principle of appropriation of natural resources, then he's a left-libertarian; if he accepts Rothbard's, then he's not."  I think I'm comfortable with that.

You also write, "On a tiny remote island it might have some plausibility, but in typical society, not to mention a globalized economy, it would seem to be highly implausible to point to someone and say he hasn't left enough-and-as-good for you. To elevate the plausibility (accepting it for the sake of argument for now) of it being just to expropriate the land appropriated by the one castaway who didn't leave enough-and-as-good for the other, to elevate it to the level of a principle of justice for a normal society would I think be a monumental mistake, a departure from true justice and libertarianism. It's a mistake to formulate a general principle for normal social situations from such an extremely irregular case." 

I'm not completely sure how I opened myself up for this objection, because I have intentionally avoided advancing any claim about what kind of principle would be correct.  All I said was that in the island case, it seems like "enough and as good" was not left for me, and that seems unfair.  Exactly where we should go from there is up in the air; I certainly don't know what the right answer is.  My point is this: if you accept Rothbard's view of appropriation, then you commit yourself to saying that the outcome of the island example is perfectly fair.  It's my contention that it's not fair.

The modus tollens structure of the argument is critical; you seem to be attacking me as if I were making a modus ponens argument.  My argument is this:

If Rothbard is right, then the island outcome is fair.  The island outcome is not fair.  Therefore, Rothbard is not right.

It is not:

If principle of justice in appropriation X is right, then Rothbard is wrong.  The island example demonstrates that X is right.  Therefore, Rothbard is wrong.

Do you see how my argument allows me to avoid defining X, and therefore escapes your repeated objections about my inability to do it?

Thanks for the links to Schmidtz's work; I'll check it out when I get a chance.  Incidentally, I'm also not sure how much I accept the principle of self-ownership as it's generally advanced, but I do believe that Cohen was right in saying that libertarianism lives and dies by that principle.  I consider myself a libertarian only because I think that the principle of self-ownership could be ammended to better fit our intuitions, and that an overly stringent view of it is commonly taken.  But that's an entirely different conversation.

 Donny with an A,

The words fairness and egalitarian are in need of clarification. Many different people mean many different things by them.

I note that you didn't address my points about your island hypothetical. I suggested that once more specificity is added your scenario begins to look rather implausible. I also suggested that you may be misapplying Rothbard's principle of first appropriation. I think this may be the case in part because of the lack of specificity in the hypothetical situation and in part from taking a passage from Rothbard's work out of context.

Donny with an A:

Do you see how my argument allows me to avoid defining X, and therefore escapes your repeated objections about my inability to do it?

I see how you're wanting to phrase your argument, but objection raised a legitimate worry about the general approach and what it could lead to. It's rather like using lifeboat situations to discover general principles for everyday social interaction. Further, I don't see "avoiding defining X" to be a good thing. Until and unless an explicit principle is on offer as an alternative so that its implications can be sussed out and its plausibility assessed, I see little reason to take vague intuitions seriously. Statists trade on the use of such vague and undefined intuitions.

 

Donny with an A:

Macsnafu, I guess we just differ on that.  Let's say that in order to get any coconuts from the palm trees, you need to build a fence around them so that the island's crabs don't come and eat them.  While I was asleep, you built such fences around the five trees which you claim to own, thereby mixing your labor meaningfully with them.  And because you're a big eater, and the coconuts are delicious, you're perfectly able to find uses for all the coconuts you harvest.  It still seems to me that at some point, you started encroaching on my fair share of the coconut palms when you were building your fences, and I would be justified in demanding compensation, or some of the trees, or something like that.  I admit that exactly what I'd be justified in demanding is unclear.  But it seems to me like I'd be justified in demanding something, because your actions just seem unfair.  If you don't share this intuition, then I'd be hard pressed to tell you you're wrong; it just seems self-evident to me.

 

Let me be the first to make this clear: your feelings and intuitions are of absolutely no interest or value to anyone and should never be the basis of any principle of justice.