This post continues a discussion begun in another thread:
http://mises.org/Community/forums/p/19009/357420.aspx#357420
mgmcintyre replied on Wed, Aug 18 2010 8:27 AM
Thanks for the good reply. Still absorbing the Hoppe stuff but had one comment about your second post.
Adam: The means are perceptually present, while the end is never perceptually present, but rather perpetually sought. In this definition and conception then, means would be "physical" and ends would be "imaginary." But this wouldn't mean imaginary as in "an imagined image" (since that would be perceptually present), but rather, imaginary as in "non-perceptible."
This is fine, but I feel we still need to distinguish the "type" of end. Once the end arrives, it can still be either material or not.
"I sought and then found food." -vs- "I sought and then found a good story on which to base my screenplay."
******
Mgmcintyre:
Thank you for your reply.
I think you missed the subtle point.
In both instances above, you write "I sought and then found X."
When you found X, it then became no longer something sought (and end), and became instead something "present" or "at hand" (means).
Thus, you are not distinguishing between types of ends, but rather types of means.
I can distinguish between things that are present or at hand. I cannot distinguish something I am seeking, for it is not yet present to me or at hand for making distinctions in regard to.
Here are some passages from Mises that reinforce this same notion of things:
"As soon as people venture to question and to examine an end, they no longer look upon it as an end but deal with it as a means to attain a still higher end. The ultimate end is beyond any rational examination. All other ends are but provisional. They turn into means as soon as they are weighed against other ends or means."(Theory and History, p.14)(emphasis added)
"As soon as we start to refute by arguments an ultimate judgment of value, we look upon it as a means to attain definite ends. But then we merely shift the discussion to another plane. We no longer view the principle concerned as an ultimate value but as a means to attain an ultimate value, and we are again faced with the same problem."(Theory and History, p.23)
"In fact, he who passes judgement of an alleged end, reduces it from the rank of an end to that of a means. He values it from the viewpoint of an (higher) end and asks whether it is a suitable means to attain this (higher) end."(Money, Method, and the Market Process, p. 22-23)(emphasis added)
"Strictly speaking, only the increase of satisfaction (decrease of uneasiness) should be called the end, and accordingly all states which bring about such an increase means. In daily speech people use a loose terminology. They call ends things which should be rather called means. They say: This man knows only one end, namely, to accumulate more wealth, instead of saying: He considers the accumulation of more wealth as the only means to get satisfaction. If they were to apply this more adequate mode of expression, they would avoid some current mistakes."(Money, Method, and the Market Process, p.22)
"Happiness—in the purely formal sense in which ethical theory applies the term—is the only ultimate end, and all other things and states of affairs sought are merely means to the realization of the supreme ultimate end. It is customary, however, to employ a less precise mode of expression, frequently assigning the name of ultimate ends to all those means that are fit to produce satisfaction directly and immediately."(Theory and History, p.13)
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
AJ:
A: "I am using no competing theory to evaluate yours."
B: "My contention is, once again, that the rejection of the visualizable/experienceable is not an effective way to proceed."
B is a theory. It doesn't matter that you refuse to refer to it as such.
"My contention is that in doing X, you will not be able to achieve Y."
"He who thinks a causal relation thinks a theorem." (HA)
Adam Knott: a. the back of the basketball
a. the back of the basketball
I can't figure out how to interpret those words without perceiving a certain sequence of 2D images (rotating the basketball in my mind).
Adam Knott: In referring to something that does not appear to us perceptually, and in our inability to do otherwise (as one might argue), we find grounds for the notion of a category of fundamental unobservability.
In referring to something that does not appear to us perceptually, and in our inability to do otherwise (as one might argue), we find grounds for the notion of a category of fundamental unobservability.
Adam Knott: Theoretically, I think this concept [imperceptibles, unobservables, or whatever] proves its usefulness. Consider the notions of: gravity, strong force, weak force, other minds, concepts, universals, etc..
Theoretically, I think this concept [imperceptibles, unobservables, or whatever] proves its usefulness. Consider the notions of: gravity, strong force, weak force, other minds, concepts, universals, etc..
Would you change your mind if I were to point to how to reduce those things (concepts, universals, other minds, the future, and so on) to the "immediately given" (our perceptions)?
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
I. Ryan:
" Would you change your mind if I were to point to how to reduce those things (concepts, universals, other minds, the future, and so on) to the "immediately given" (our perceptions)?"
If you have a new proposal, could you start a thread on it ?
Adam Knott: AJ: A: "I am using no competing theory to evaluate yours." B: "My contention is, once again, that the rejection of the visualizable/experienceable is not an effective way to proceed." B is a theory. It doesn't matter that you refuse to refer to it as such. "My contention is that in doing X, you will not be able to achieve Y." "He who thinks a causal relation thinks a theorem." (HA)
The underlined is a theory, yes, but not a competing one, and certainly not one I'm using to evaluate yours: I haven't even found a possible interpretation of yours yet, remember? So I obviously cannot evaluate it. The underlined is simply supplementary advice on how to communicate your theory so that I (or anyone) might understanding it in order to evaluate it, since it felt stonewall-ish for me to simply say I didn't understand and give you no suggestions for how you might be able to get me to understand.
Why anarchy fails
...and it looks like we both feel that these arguments are played out for the moment, and that an alternative conception needs to be presented to advance discussion.
I can already see possible ways to make some of these concepts you consider imperceptible perceptible, but I have held off mentioning them so far because the discussion was heavy enough as it was that I barely had time to keep up. I will post in the new thread if I. Ryan creates one, since it might be off-topic for this one.
As to this post.
As you probably remember, I like to distinguish between pure praxeology and applied praxeology:
For pure praxeology, we can't "meaningfully think of the negation of what it asserts", for we can't think of a world without at least some kind of action. But, for applied praxeology, we can always do that ("meaningfully think of the negation of what it asserts"), for we can always think of a world without a specific kind of action.
Anyway, as JohnnyFive wrote, "praxeological" statements try to apply to every single action (past, present, and future). If there's even just one possible action that it doesn't try to describe, it's simply not praxeological. But of course he was referring to pure praxeology there. If there's even just one conceivable action that it doesn't attempt to characterize, it's simply not purely praxeological!
Now, as you said, we venture out of pure praxeology and into applied praxeology ("refer to content") as soon as we make any distinctions between any of our perceptions (e.g. black vs. red, vivid vs. dull, lasting vs. fleeting). Well yeah. I mean, I find that I remember things much more vividly and lastingly than I merely imagine them, but of course it wouldn't need to be that way; it could be some other way. It would be conceivable that I would find my memories brighter than what I simply imagine (instead of more vivid and lasting), or that I would see a red dot in the upper right corner of my visual field when it's a memory and nothing when I'm simply imagining something, or whatever. It's not a part of pure praxeology to say that I remember things much more vividly and lastingly than I simply imagine them (even though that's true!), for I can "meaningfully think of the negation of what [that] asserts"; its opposite is thinkable.
Anyway, in pure praxeology, we need the distinction between means and ends, because that distinction is "present" in every conceivable action (right?), but it doesn't follow that we need to use a specific distinction for it (such as the vivid vs. dull one); we could simply say that they must be different. It's not that one (the means) is "vivid", and the other (the ends) is "dull"; it's simply that the means are different than the ends. That's it. It's not as if we need this or that distinction; it's simply that we need a distinction. And, if you want to call that distinction the perceptible vs. imperceptible one, that's fine. I think that it's pretty misleading, but whatever. If I know your meaning, I won't let the words do me any harm!
Thoughts?
Adam Knott: If you have a new proposal, could you start a thread on it ?
Sure, but it might be a while.
Anyway, in the meantime, do you have any thoughts on the prospect of that idea?
I.Ryan:
I think you and AJ have both indicated something similar. Using what you have both proposed, I'll try to illustrate what I'm talking about.
Here is your suggestion:
"Anyway, in pure praxeology, we need the distinction between means and ends.........but it doesn't follow that we need to use a specific distinction for it .........we could simply say that they must be different..........it's simply that the means are different than the ends. That's it. It's not as if we need this or that distinction; it's simply that we need a distinction......"
Here is AJ's:
"Wouldn't it be all right for the theory to reference two types of perceptions, just calling them A and B, without specifying anything about what distinguishes them, only that they are distinct for the actor? In other words, what you've explained here seems to prohibit the theory from saying, "These two categories are distinguished in this [such-and-such particular] way," but it does not seem to prohibit the theory from saying, "There are two categories distinguished in some way by the actor.""
These are essentially the same suggestions.
Both of these passages put forth the notion that we assume the existence of a distinction, but we do not assert the particular nature of the distinction.
We are not referring to a particular distinction such as blue versus red.
But we are referring to distinction.
Thus, we are referring to distinction....in general (distinction universally), i.e., the concept of distinction.
Thus, the concept of distinction, as opposed to a particular distinction, has no perceptual (distinguishable) content.
This is/was contained in our original premise or axiom when we assumed the existence of something with no distinctions.
We are referring to "something" that has no perceptual content (that can't be distinguished or perceived). That is the unavoidable circumstance of action.
My point is that in the theory of action, this "something" that has no perceptual (distinguishable) content is the category of ends.
The end stands in the same relation to the means as the concept of distinction stands in relation to a particular distinction.
The end cannot have distinguishable content. Only the means can be distinguishable.
By the way, could you try to be a little bit more direct with your posts?
For one, I'm sort of confused about where (or whether!) you're disagreeing with me in this.
Adam Knott: Thus, the concept of distinction, as opposed to a particular distinction, has no perceptual (distinguishable) content.
What would it mean for an unspecified distinction to have no distinguishable content?
Adam Knott: We are referring to "something" that has no perceptual content (that can't be distinguished or perceived).
We are referring to "something" that has no perceptual content (that can't be distinguished or perceived).
Can't be distinguished or perceived by who?
Adam Knott: That is the unavoidable circumstance of action.
That is the unavoidable circumstance of action.
I assume that you already explained why in this thread, so could you link to it for future reference?
Adam Knott: My point is that in the theory of action, this "something" that has no perceptual (distinguishable) content is the category of ends.
But can't you strive for one end rather than another?
(Might be an annoying question, but I'm putting it out there because I think that the answer might be helpful for understanding your position.)
Adam Knott: The end stands in the same relation to the means as the concept of distinction stands in relation to a particular distinction.
What exactly is that relation?
Adam Knott: Only the means can be distinguishable.
Only the means can be distinguishable.
Wait, how could you distinguish one means from another in pure praxeology?
If you say that somebody uses means A, it would always be possible to conceive of the opposite (not using means A).
I Ryan:
When we get to the point where virtually every sentence and phrase is disputed or contended, that may be the point where we can leave a discussion that has reached the point of diminishing returns and start a different discussion.
I think my previous post makes an important insight, and does so by showing how the commonalities between the two proposals that you and AJ made indicate a principle similar to what I've been trying to convey. Your comments above imply you got nothing out of it. So be it.
If you have an alternate theory or vision I'm open to discussing it. As I mentioned, why not start a thread on it ?
Adam Knott: every sentence and phrase is disputed or contended
every sentence and phrase is disputed or contended
I was asking for clarification, not disputing or contending anything.
Adam Knott: So be it.
So be it.
Why give up on me that easily?
Adam Knott: As I mentioned, why not start a thread on it ?
As I mentioned, why not start a thread on it ?
Well, I plan to, but it might take me a while to write it up and whatever.