In The Conservative Case for QE2, David Beckworth provides a quasi-monetarist defense for the second round of quantitative easing.
He states that the purpose of QE2 is "about fixing a spike in the demand for money that has significantly hampered spending." He elaborates, "Because the monetary base has been increasing so rapidly and there has been very little inflation, it must be the case that demand for the money must be increasing even more. In fact, money demand has been so pronounced that even the previous $1.2 trillion increase in the monetary base was not enough to prevent outright deflation in 2009 or a sustained decline in core inflation (which shows the trend path of inflation) over the past two years. Thus, a significant portion of the money supply is being hoarded and not spent. This is the excess-money-demand problem."
In essence, the Federal Reserve has failed in the same regard that Milton Friedman blamed it for the Great Depression: "The fact that total current-dollar spending has remained depressed for so long means that the Federal Reserve has failed to do its job and effectively has kept monetary policy too tight." The solution is produced by the new monetary policy: "QE2, then, is a long-overdue attempt by the Federal Reserve to address the excess-money-demand problem. It will do so in two complementary ways. First, QE2 will increase inflation expectations, which should reduce the demand for money. Knowing that prices will be higher in the future will motivate creditor households, firms, and banks to start spending their money today while prices are lower. Second, QE2 will increase the monetary base, and this should begin to satiate excess money demand. Together, these developments should provide the catalyst needed to get the virtuous spending cycle started."
And, of course, lowered-interest rates are not necessarily problematic: "Note that lower long-term interest rates are not the key to QE2 working. Yes, long-term interest rates may initially drop as the Federal Reserve buys up long-term Treasury securities to increase the monetary base. But this effect will be fleeting if QE2 is successful. Once the economy starts recovering, interest rates will start increasing. Similarly, QE2 may initially cause the dollar to lose value, but by spurring a recovery QE2 will ultimately put upward pressure on the dollar."
Bob Murphy responds to Beckworth's quasi-monetarism with several Austrian challenges.
In turn, Bill Woolsey responds, once again pleading the quasi-monetarist case. David Beckworth, too, responds to Bob Murphy. He summarizes his key points skillfully: "During 2008 there emerged a surge in money demand as the housing fiasco began to unfold. This spike in money demand got even more pronounced in late 2008 with the uncertainty created by the financial crisis. Given that we have a central bank — and this is not an endorsement of the Fed — its job should be to offset and stabilize such money demand shocks. The Fed failed on this count and, as a result, what should have been an ordinary recession got turned into the 'Great Recession' of 2007-2009. Yes, this Fed failure — like its failure to raise the federal funds to its natural rate level sooner in the 2002-2004 period — is another indication the Fed is flawed. Nonetheless, we are stuck with this monopoly producer of money and have to work with it. This means the Fed should have done more to prevent the surge in money demand. Because it did not, the Fed effectively tightened monetary policy in 2008. Moreover, despite the large increases in the monetary base to date, money demand remains elevated. From this perspective, then, monetary policy is still relatively tight. QE2 is an attempt — a flawed one as I will discuss later — to address it."
He adds, "Appreciating the importance of money demand shocks also helps explain why conservative economists like Scott Sumner, Bill Woosley, Josh Hendrickson, and I are sympathetic in spirit (if not in form) to QE2. It would do all hard-money advocates some good to wrestle with the monetary disequilibrium literature and its implication for a commodity standard. It is worth noting that there are prominent Austrians like George Selgin and Steve Horwitz who take the monetary disequilibrium seriously."
I think the money demand shock, given our monopolized currency, can only be treated through the machinery of the Federal Reserve; given the excess money demand, greater supply is required.
P.S. I fully endorse free banking.
"I'm not a fan of Murray Rothbard." -- David D. Friedman
Danny Sanchez:And again, the purchasing power of the monetary unit is not the same thing as the purchasing power present in the whole economy.
I'm confused by this sentence. At the beginning of the paragraph, you referred to "the purchasing power of the monetary unit, across the whole economy". However, the sentence quoted above seems to imply that the referenced concept isn't actually valid. Can you please clarify here?
Also, did you happen to miss my earlier post?
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem.
Voluntaryism Forum
Don't have a lot of time now, but I'll answer some of these issues;
The supply of money actually contracts when the demand for money rises (Selgin and White can probably explain why this isn't a problem for their theory).
Well, that's actually a premise behind their theory. The idea is for banks to issue more liabilities through fiduciary media when the volume of returning liabilities (returning notes) falls.
I don't see how the expansion of fiduciary media can be funneled in such a way that it only satiates the demand for money (as opposed to the demand for money as capital).
It's not. The idea that an increase in fiduciary media can avoid a fall in the prices of industries affected by an increase in the demand for money is false, and I'm not sure why economists like Selgin and Horwitz continue to advocate fiduciary expansion on these grounds. To me, free banking simply maximizes savings, and even then it's been shown that in a stable, healthy economy the demand for money doesn't really fluctuate all that much.
I don't understand how changes in the demand for money effects prices in different monetary systems...
It temporarily decreases the amount of money in circulation.
Autolykos:I'm confused by this sentence. At the beginning of the paragraph, you referred to "the purchasing power of the monetary unit, across the whole economy". However, the sentence quoted above seems to imply that the referenced concept isn't actually valid. Can you please clarify here?
You must differentiate between what can be purchased by the lump of all the money tokens (i.e. they can purchase all the goods for sale) and what can be purchased by any one token.
This is kind of difficult to talk about without stepping away from methodological individualism and so on but the *mental heuristic* is that the purchasing power of the class of all money tokens is affected by the real goods in the market place, and and not the number of tokens in the collection. Whereas the purchasing power of each money token individually is determined on one side by the real goods available and on the other by the number of 'competitor' money tokens which are its brothers in the collection.
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Jonathan,
If you get any more time it would be outstanding if you could add some more commentary here. The last several pages of this thread have been excellent.