I have nothing against mathematical thinking. Mathematics is one of the greatest tools for human cognition. In particular, mathematics is the best way to approach problem-solving in areas that have some sort of structure. What I have something against is the uncritical use, not of mathematical thinking, but of particular results of that thinking. I'm critical of the assumption that if something can be modeled, it can be predicted, and that modeling can substitute for understanding. Modeling is used either where specific predictions are needed, or precisely because what is going on is not understood by the speaker, as in your example of the reactions among three mutually catalytic chemicals. There is a difference between thinking like a mathematician, a great form of reasoning, and simply grabbing at techniques.
I find it ironic, by the way, for a non-specialist to conclude that specialists, like Gould, are laughably wrong.
Finally, perhaps as a "peace offering" in this argument of ours, I can tell you something where I think we do have common ground. I do really think many Austrians(especially younger ones) need to brush up on mathematics and learn it well. A lot of people had much more difficulty with my presentation than I anticipated. Avoiding mathematics was certainly nothing done by the likes of Mises and Rothbard. Indeed I'm pretty sure Mises himself said the best way to avoid the pitfalls of mathematical economists was to properly master mathematics(I think he said the same vis a vis psychology and psychologism).
Certainly, mathematics is a great science and well worthy of study. But it is certainly not praxeology or catallactics, as useful as it may be to the historian of economic events.
I'm surprised that this thread has gone on for over one full page and no one has yet brought up the issue of methodological dualism.
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
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Voluntaryism Forum
RJM II: StrangeLoop: Using derivatives to understand marginal analysis is so easy that it's shocking other strategies are even considered. Calculus > Austrianism. They see me writing...I'm trollin'..My math is so loud...they hate it... Math is not economics. It's that freaking simple. Economics is a teleological science, it has to do with purposivity and not any BS like 'maximization functions' which do not exist. I'm not sure what you mean by the non-existence of maximization functions. I just really don't get what you mean (are we delving into some sort of philosophic discussion about the Platonic realism of mathematics or what?). I could, just as flippantly perhaps, claim that "ordinal preference scales do not exist," but I'm not even sure what I mean. Of course, it sounds like an appropriate rebuttal all the same! We can clearly build a model to maximize revenue, right? I'm not quite sure how any science can be entirely constrained as a "teleological science." Mathematical models are used for biological systems quite frequently (e.g., population dynamics), even if organisms exhibit choice behavior. Frankly, overemphasizing teleology would produce a blind spot to many facets of economic inquiry (e.g., Hayekian spontaneous orders). If we look at cognitive science and related fields (e.g., neuroscience), then we witness scholarship heavily dependent on mathematics. I find it odd to believe that economics, since it deals with purposive behavior, is walled-off from mathematics while other sciences detailing how choice actually works are fully dependent upon mathematics.
RJM II: StrangeLoop: Using derivatives to understand marginal analysis is so easy that it's shocking other strategies are even considered. Calculus > Austrianism. They see me writing...I'm trollin'..My math is so loud...they hate it... Math is not economics. It's that freaking simple. Economics is a teleological science, it has to do with purposivity and not any BS like 'maximization functions' which do not exist.
StrangeLoop: Using derivatives to understand marginal analysis is so easy that it's shocking other strategies are even considered. Calculus > Austrianism.
Using derivatives to understand marginal analysis is so easy that it's shocking other strategies are even considered. Calculus > Austrianism.
They see me writing...I'm trollin'..My math is so loud...they hate it...
Math is not economics. It's that freaking simple. Economics is a teleological science, it has to do with purposivity and not any BS like 'maximization functions' which do not exist.
I'm not sure what you mean by the non-existence of maximization functions. I just really don't get what you mean (are we delving into some sort of philosophic discussion about the Platonic realism of mathematics or what?). I could, just as flippantly perhaps, claim that "ordinal preference scales do not exist," but I'm not even sure what I mean. Of course, it sounds like an appropriate rebuttal all the same! We can clearly build a model to maximize revenue, right?
I'm not quite sure how any science can be entirely constrained as a "teleological science." Mathematical models are used for biological systems quite frequently (e.g., population dynamics), even if organisms exhibit choice behavior. Frankly, overemphasizing teleology would produce a blind spot to many facets of economic inquiry (e.g., Hayekian spontaneous orders).
If we look at cognitive science and related fields (e.g., neuroscience), then we witness scholarship heavily dependent on mathematics. I find it odd to believe that economics, since it deals with purposive behavior, is walled-off from mathematics while other sciences detailing how choice actually works are fully dependent upon mathematics.
"I'm not a fan of Murray Rothbard." -- David D. Friedman
I don't buy methodogolical dualism, actually. I am very much with Roderick Long on this. Human purposiveness is a causal result of the machinery of our brains, it can (in principle) be broken down to the mechanics of electrons but the result of those electrons is intentionality. Methodological dualism is like saying that because everything in real life has particular ontological properties which are not floating numbers that numbers are inappropriate. It's true you can't qualitatively analyze things with numbers, but all qualities are such because of certain quantities of force they exhibit. Quality and quantity are two elements of every object or force; there is no 'dualism' needed; what we have is merely a non-precisive abstraction.
I agree that methodological dualism is ultimately unfounded. Our neurons operate according to the same laws of physics as all other matter in the universe. However, the human mind is so complex vis-a-vis the laws of physics that we cannot (yet) accurate simulate the former using only the latter. In other words, there is still a wide (but narrowing) gap between quality and quantity. Until quality can be accurately explained in terms of only quantity, I think methodological dualism is appropriate.
Autolykos:I'm surprised that this thread has gone on for over one full page and no one has yet brought up the issue of methodological dualism.
No other science studying choice behavior embraces methodological dualism; and, within economics, only Austrians do. It's an antiquated methodology.
Would you expect neuroscientists to be methdological dualists? No. I think it's a matter of self-evidence that choice behavior has been more greatly probed now that mathematically-dependent science has peeked under the hood.
If economic theories become overturned or revised, I suspect it will be due to empirical findings (e.g., neuroeconomics), not methodological theorizing.
That's a practical problem, but what I am saying is a bit different. I am saying that intentionality is a real property of human beings and that any mechanical explanation would have to explain intentions as a product of these interactions. Quality does not need to be explained in terms of quanity, or vice versa - the two are inextricably linked; we deal with some for one purpose and some for others. For the purposes of catallactics it is the qualitative nature of intentionality that matters but, unlike Mises, I do not think this is dualistic or some kind of stop-gap; it is simply the relevant features. Obviously something in our neural machinery determines the specific quantitative functions of our intentional behavior; i.e. why I will buy a beer for $2 but not for $3. The qualitative aspect explains what it means to buy something at all.
StrangeLoop:No other science studying choice behavior embraces methodological dualism; and, within economics, only Austrians do. It's an antiquated methodology.
Besides economics, what other sciences would you say study choice behavior?
Regardless, I don't consider the charge of antiquation to be a valid rebuttal of anything.
StrangeLoop:Would you expect neuroscientists to be methdological dualists? No. I think it's a matter of self-evidence that choice behavior has been more greatly probed now that mathematically-dependent science has peeked under the hood.
It depends on what kind or branch of "neuroscience" you're talking about. But I'll put it to you this way - a perfect theory of mind for human beings could not be completely understood by any individual human being.
The fact that choice behavior has been probed in no way erases or invalidates the concept of choice. Otherwise it would be like saying human bodies no longer exist because now we know their internal anatomy.
StrangeLoop:If economic theories become overturned or revised, I suspect it will be due to empirical findings (e.g., neuroeconomics), not methodological theorizing.
I'm not sure what your point is with this.
Mathematical modeling can be a very convinient and powerful method for concealing one's ignorance and complete disconnect from reality.
It is a matter of fact that the mathematical economists cannot in any way relate their mathematical abstractions to reality. Unlike biology or some of the other fields mentioned here, who can and do demonstrate such a relation.
Ricky James Moore II:That's a practical problem, but what I am saying is a bit different. I am saying that intentionality is a real property of human beings and that any mechanical explanation would have to explain intentions as a product of these interactions. Quality does not need to be explained in terms of quanity, or vice versa - the two are inextricably linked; we deal with some for one purpose and some for others. For the purposes of catallactics it is the qualitative nature of intentionality that matters but, unlike Mises, I do not think this is dualistic or some kind of stop-gap; it is simply the relevant features. Obviously something in our neural machinery determines the specific quantitative functions of our intentional behavior; i.e. why I will buy a beer for $2 but not for $3. The qualitative aspect explains what it means to buy something at all.
Then I think we're using different definitions for "methodology". My understanding of the term is that it is a practical problem - that is, "methodology" concerns the practical problem of how to best understand (part of) the world. So when you say that "we deal with [quality] for one purpose and [quantity] for others", that to me is the same as saying "we use methodological dualism".
With this in mind, I'm rather at a loss as to what you mean by "methodology" yourself.
The methodology of Austrian economics is causal realism; the relevant points of analysis are qualitative. We are not avoiding using mechanical descriptions, it's just that what we are talking about is not related to any specific mechanical state. It is a non-precisive abstraction; if we were dealing with the neurology of decision making that would be a different thing than the science of intentionality as such. The same reason we don't deal with questions of morality when deciding how to make airplanes fly. Whatever relations they might have they are different subjects.
RJM II:Human purposiveness is a causal result of the machinery of our brains, it can (in principle) be broken down to the mechanics of electrons but the result of those electrons is intentionality.
I completely agree. Danny Sanchez, are you listening?
Ricky James Moore II:The methodology of Austrian economics is causal realism; the relevant points of analysis are qualitative. We are not avoiding using mechanical descriptions, it's just that what we are talking about is not related to any specific mechanical state. It is a non-precisive abstraction; if we were dealing with the neurology of decision making that would be a different thing than the science of intentionality as such. The same reason we don't deal with questions of morality when deciding how to make airplanes fly. Whatever relations they might have they are different subjects.
Hence, methodological dualism. I fail to see anything in the above that doesn't agree with what I've already written.
Also, you haven't explained to me what you mean by "methodology".
StrangeLoop: RJM II:Human purposiveness is a causal result of the machinery of our brains, it can (in principle) be broken down to the mechanics of electrons but the result of those electrons is intentionality. I completely agree. Danny Sanchez, are you listening? I agree too, actually. Yet I'm arguing for methodological dualism (so to speak). The keyboard is mightier than the gun. Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem. Voluntaryism Forum | Post Points: 20
I agree too, actually. Yet I'm arguing for methodological dualism (so to speak).
I think that the use of mathematics or biology to explain praxeology would be wrong because intentionality is apart from any particular intention-generating mechanisms; just as the concept of being in general is not tied to any particular thing's existence. Pretending away the complexities in practice and perhaps even in theory, a total model of the human mind would let us predict a person's actions but the person's actions would still consist of desires, ideas, etc.
Ricky James Moore II:I think that the use of mathematics or biology to explain praxeology would be wrong because intentionality is apart from any particular intention-generating mechanisms; just as the concept of being in general is not tied to any particular thing's existence. Pretending away the complexities in practice and perhaps even in theory, a total model of the human mind would let us predict a person's actions but the person's actions would still consist of desires, ideas, etc.
Sure, but those desires, ideas, etc. would also consist of specific brain structures, neural connections and firing patterns, neurotransmitter concentrations and gradients, etc. - which would all be known in advance under the total model of the human mind. So such a model would not only allow one to predict a person's actions, but it would allow him (given the necessary equipment [whatever that may mean]) to physically cause a person to perform certain actions.