Michael M:It is because all life ultimately comes to an end that the nature of the choice we are discussing is about whether there will be an interim or not. The end is not relevant to the choice in that way. The relevance of the end is that if there were no end, there would be no fundamental choice, and if there were no fundamental choice, there would be no need for values.
That seems to contradict what you wrote earlier, which was this: "The choice to pursue life that gives rise to the need to have values is long-range. Having short-range desires and/or ends is the pursuit of life in the long-range, i.e. the fundamental choice is already made." By that reasoning, and since death comes after life, it's logically valid to say that pursuing life in the long-range is pursuing death in the even-longer-range.
Michael M:Because not all choices one makes are made in an explicit state of awareness. Walking across a room is a requires a great deal of fully aware deliberative effort for a toddler. But with repetition the choices necessary to do that will be automated and relegated to the sub-conscious.
Nevertheless, walking across a room does take conscious effort on some level, so one could say that all of its "sub-choices" are the result of conscious effort. But what is your definition of "choice" anyway?
Michael M:Do you have some quote from Rand that could give me some idea of what you are referencing? As is, I'm not getting what you mean by this.
I based that part of my response on what David B wrote: "The reason there's so much overlap in practice was that she rigorously articulated logical ethics of a man who seeks to not just survive but thrive." But here's something Rand apparently wrote in The Romantic Manifesto, under "The Goal of My Writing" (source):
Ayn Rand:Just as man's physical survival depends on his own effort, so does his psychological survival. Man faces two corollary, interdependent fields of action in which a constant exercise of choice and a constant creative process are demanded of him: the world around him and his own soul (by "soul," I mean his consciousness). Just as he has to produce the material values he needs to sustain his life, so he has to acquire the values of character that enable him to sustain it and that make his life worth living. He is born without knowledge of either. he has to discover both -- and translate them into reality -- and survive by shaping the world and himself in the image of his values.
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem.
Voluntaryism Forum
Michael M:No. You may not separate the definition from its context. The word value has no meaning outside of the context of life. Thus, since death is the end of life, it is the end of value and cannot therefore itself be a value. The word "value" only pertains in and to a pursuit of life.
Are you saying that the definition of "value" that Rand appeared to give ("that which one acts to gain and/or keep") in her essay "The Objectivist Ethics" is actually not the definition she's using? If so, then what would you say is Rand's definition of "value"? To be quite honest, I don't see how I'm separating the definition from its context at all.
Do you agree that death is something which one can act to gain (and thus keep)? Why or why not?
Michael M:Ayn Rand: It is only an ultimate goal, an end in itself, that makes the existence of values possible. Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action. Epistemologically, the concept of “value” is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of “life.” To speak of “value” as apart from “life” is worse than a contradiction in terms. “It is only the concept of ‘Life’ that makes the concept of ‘Value’ possible.” (For the New Intellectual, 121)
Rand seems to be engaging in circular reasoning here. If life is a value itself, as she clearly states above, then how can the concept of value depend on the concept of life? Logically it would be the other way around.
@David B In the rapid sequence of posts/replies, I missed commenting on the firs of your 08/18 posts: "But our mental A is A, is a subset or a formalization of aspects of the objective A is A in reality. It's very easy to conflate the two, and think they are the same thing, and I believe this is what Rand does." Not at all, in her words: "... before you have a certain concept, that particular something doesn't exist in your mind. When you have formed the concept of 'concept,' that is a mental something; it isn't a nothing. But anything pertaining to the content of a mind always has to be treated metaphysically not as a separate existent, but only with this precondition, in effect: that it is a mental state, a mental concrete, a mental something. Actually, "mental something" is the nearest to an exact identification. Because "entity" does imply a physical thing. Nevertheless, since 'something' is too vague a term, one can use the word 'entity,' but only to say that it a mental something as distinguished from other mental somethings (or from nothing). But it isn't an entity in the primary, Aristotelian sense in which a primary substance exists." (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 157) Concepts of physical existents are mental entities (phenomena of a consciousness) that have a particular relationship to the physical existent itself. ---------- "By saying "essential characteristics" subjective or selective observation of features is chosen. In other words, there's no reason not to have carved off a slightly different set of features, or adding an additional criterion for subsetting humanity. For example, I may add, "And possesses a uterus." Well doesn't this imply procreation and some level of ethical obligation to replicate? After all the proper use of a uterus is to grow an egg into a human being." The content of the concept "'man" does not consist ONLY of rationality and animality. It includes ALL the characteristics possible for men. One holds that concept and defines it with the most essential characteristics common to all instances that distinguish it from all other existents. Having a uterus is understood to be a characteristic of some human beings, but not all. Having the capacity of reason is common to all men and no other entities. ---------- "In this case, there is no "reason" for "reason" to have primacy over eating, sleeping, defecating, or procreating. All vital important functions that are in the "nature of living organism" which should be lived to the fullest." Values only pertain to goal directed actions for which there are alternatives. To the extent the other functions present alternatives, reason is the capacity for choosing among them and it is the only faculty that can measure an action against the goal of life. And man does NOT have a "social nature." The value of social interaction is conditional. ------- "But at the same time, I accept responsibility for both determining what is "Good" for me AND what constitutes a "Good" way for me to achieve these ends. Her system of philosophy says out of one side of the mouth that the genius man is the pinnacle of reality, and he should selfishly pursue his own greatness, and then out of the other side of the mouth says, and that greatness is "X" and if you don't do "X" then you aren't Great. That second statement directly conflicts with the first statement." Actually, you cannot "determine" what is good, you have to discover it. What is good or bad for you has two contexts: 1) that which is good for you in principle as a human being is an immutable fact of your nature—of reality. 2) There is an all but infinite range of concrete actions that you may choose from that fulfill without contradiction the requirements of one's human nature in principle. Rand is in effect saying, "health requires nutrition (X) and if you don't get X then you will not be healthy, ... but you should selfishly pursue your own health with broccoli or brussels sprouts per your pleasure ... meaning, do whatever pleases you within the limits established by reality ... "nature to be commanded, must be obeyed" (Bacon) -------- "No, reality is the ultimate consequence generator. It produces the consequences of our actions. It has no concept of good or bad for the consequences."
That is what I meant by metaphorical phrase "arbiter of what is right or wrong." Reality is the 'judge and 'jury' that will dole out the consequences of contradicting the reality of a law ... in this case, a law of nature.
Autolykos:That seems to contradict what you wrote earlier, which was this: "The choice to pursue life that gives rise to the need to have values is long-range. Having short-range desires and/or ends is the pursuit of life in the long-range, i.e. the fundamental choice is already made." By that reasoning, and since death comes after life, it's logically valid to say that pursuing life in the long-range is pursuing death in the even-longer-range.
The fact that death is the end of life does not make it that which one pursues. The "pursuit of life" only refers to the goal to sustain life, i.e. to maximize the quantity and quality of it, i.e. the pursuit of life is the pursuit of not dying.
Autolykos:Are you saying that the definition of "value" that Rand appeared to give ("that which one acts to gain and/or keep") in her essay "The Objectivist Ethics" is actually not the definition she's using?
No.
Autolykos:If life is a value itself, as she clearly states above, then how can the concept of value depend on the concept of life? Logically it would be the other way around.
No for two reasons: 1) The choice of life from the fundmantal alternative establishes life as one's primary value—one's goal. Thence the task of choosing actions to achieve that primary value necessitates a set of secondary values to serve as a guide due to the specific nature of the evaluating and acting. and 2) The concept "value" is hierarchically dependent on the concept "life." One cannot conceive of the concept "value" and grasp life as such without a prior concept of "life."
Michael M:The fact that death is the end of life does not make it that which one pursues.
I wasn't talking about death being the end of life - I was talking about death being after life. Your argument was that, in the long run, we're all pursuing life, wasn't it? In the longer run, we're all dead, so by your own reasoning, we're necessarily pursuing death over pursuing life.
Michael M:The "pursuit of life" only refers to the goal to sustain life, i.e. to maximize the quantity and quality of it, i.e. the pursuit of life is the pursuit of not dying.
Yet it seems safe to assume that one will eventually die, even if one has been pursuing life the whole time. With that assumption in mind, any pursuit of life is also pursuit of death in the even longer run.
Michael M: Autolykos:Are you saying that the definition of "value" that Rand appeared to give ("that which one acts to gain and/or keep") in her essay "The Objectivist Ethics" is actually not the definition she's using? No.
Then what are you saying?
Michael M:No for two reasons: 1) The choice of life from the fundmantal alternative establishes life as one's primary value—one's goal. Thence the task of choosing actions to achieve that primary value necessitates a set of secondary values to serve as a guide due to the specific nature of the evaluating and acting.
First off, by that reasoning, a person can stop choosing life (i.e. start choosing death) at any time - in which case his primary value changes. You and Rand seem to be arguing that, once a person can be said to have chosen life, then life necessarily serves as his primary value forever after. The only thing that can logically follow from is the notion that a person can't change his mind about anything ever.
Second, the statements "life is what makes values possible" and "life is one's primary value" are contradictory with respect to one another. The former implies that life is not a value, while the latter explicitly states that it is a value. So which is it? Is life a value or is it not?
Michael M:and 2) The concept "value" is hierarchically dependent on the concept "life." One cannot conceive of the concept "value" and grasp life as such without a prior concept of "life."
Here you're just repeating what you said earlier. It adds no new information about your position. Let me try explaining again: if life is a value, then to say that the concept of value is hierarchically dependent on the concept of life introduces a circular reference. How can the statement "life is a value" mean anything if the concept of value hasn't already been established?
Do you consider life to be something that one can act to gain and/or keep? What about death?
Autolykos:Your argument was that, in the long run, we're all pursuing life, wasn't it? In the longer run, we're all dead, so by your own reasoning, we're necessarily pursuing death over pursuing life.
I did not say that. I said that values are measured against life (and only life) in the long range (of one's life) as opposed to the short range. We are not merely pursuing a long range sequence of inevitable events. Just the opposite. The pursuit of life is an attempt to prevent the inevitable death to whatever extent we can control it.
It is the inevitability of death that provokes the fundamental question in the first place. "Do I choose that the inevitable will occur now? Or do I choose to pursue it's postponement to maximize life in the interim? That is to say, the significance of death to ethics is that were there no inevitable death, there would be no need to value life or anything else.
Autolykos:First off, by that reasoning, a person can stop choosing life (i.e. start choosing death) at any time - in which case his primary value changes. You and Rand seem to be arguing that, once a person can be said to have chosen life, then life necessarily serves as his primary value forever after.
No, if one chooses to die, he is choosing for his primary value to cease being a value. Death is not a metaphysical something. It is the absence of something.
But one can choose "death" throughout one's life without choosing to die. If one chooses consciously or inadvertently to act contrary to his nature at any given time, that is to the extent it is detrimental to his life, a choice favoring death. Remember that in the context of ethics, "death" refers to more than just whether or not one is physically surviving. It includes the whole of the process of surviving and thriving in accordance with one's nature.
Autolykos:"How can the statement life is a value" mean anything if the concept of value hasn't already been established?
It can't. But that doesn't change the fact that one must have the concept life before one can possibly have the concept value.
Michael M: No, if one chooses to die, he is choosing for his primary value to cease being a value. Death is not a metaphysical something. It is the absence of something. But one can choose "death" throughout one's life without choosing to die. If one chooses consciously or inadvertently to act contrary to his nature at any given time, that is to the extent it is detrimental to his life, a choice favoring death. Remember that in the context of ethics, "death" refers to more than just whether or not one is physically surviving. It includes the whole of the process of surviving and thriving in accordance with one's nature.
I think here I can make my point that I was trying to get to in our nature discussion. Action is the implementation of theory into reality, to achieve realities preferred and discard or avoid realites that are not preferred. There is risk, which is necessarily present because of 2 things, failures of theory, and failures of data. So any action could reasonably at the same time, have consequences which tended towards "life" and which also tended towards "death". That evaluation is notoriously risky, for the two reasons I mentioned. We don't know whether or not we are actually tending toward either. We just think we do.
I wonder what's wrong with a man valuing something specific over and against his own life? Like his child's life, or his wife's. I wonder if a man might choose to maximize some aspect of his life in the present even if a long term side effect might be the shortening of his life?
It might be over-simplified, and more specifically it doesn't accurately demonstrate the range of human behaviors, and it doesn't even predict which behaviors are dominant in reality.
I wouldn't claim that life and ethics are without risks. But those risks are usually the product of insufficient knowledge. To mitigate that, we have the capacity to think.
David B:I wonder what's wrong with a man valuing something specific over and against his own life? Like his child's life, or his wife's. I wonder if a man might choose to maximize some aspect of his life in the present even if a long term side effect might be the shortening of his life?
A rational man in the situations that give rise to the consideration you are thinking of here would not frame it in that way. At the basic level, giving up your life in order to get something of value is inherently self-contradictory. You would have no way to know if the other person actually did live or what that would lead to in their life—it would be impossible to "get" the value you sought, to experience the success of your choice, because you would be dead before the result.
In almost every case, the choice is not to give up your life, but rather to risk your life to save someone else. And the rational man will evaluate his choice with an assessment of the value of the other person to his own life. And in the most extreme instances, that could result in the decision that one would risk it all the way to death, because that person represented such a high value—such an integral and essential component of one's own life—that life without that person would no longer be worth living.
The standard for the evaluations that would take you to that conclusion can only be your life.
Rand: It is only an ultimate goal, an end in itself, that makes the existence of values possible. Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action. Epistemologically, the concept of “value” is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of “life.” To speak of “value” as apart from “life” is worse than a contradiction in terms. “It is only the concept of ‘Life’ that makes the concept of ‘Value’ possible.”
Michael M:I did not say that. I said that values are measured against life (and only life) in the long range (of one's life) as opposed to the short range. We are not merely pursuing a long range sequence of inevitable events. Just the opposite. The pursuit of life is an attempt to prevent the inevitable death to whatever extent we can control it.
I don't think that was clear from what you did say. But thank you for the clarification. What I fail to see is how Rand's definition of "value", which you apparently follow - "that which one can act to gain and/or keep" - conveys any notion of being measured against life (and only life). Furthermore, if life itself is a value, then we run into the circular assertion that life is measured against life (and only life).
Michael M:It is the inevitability of death that provokes the fundamental question in the first place. "Do I choose that the inevitable will occur now? Or do I choose to pursue it's postponement to maximize life in the interim?["] That is to say, the significance of death to ethics is that were there no inevitable death, there would be no need to value life or anything else. [Emphasis added.]
Can you please provide the reasoning behind the emphasized part? I don't see how it follows.
Michael M:No, if one chooses to die, he is choosing for his primary value to cease being a value. Death is not a metaphysical something. It is the absence of something.
I think you mean that he's choosing for his primary value to cease being a value at all (let alone his primary value) for himself. That in no way means that no one else can act to gain and/or keep it.
"Death" can be defined as "the absence of life", sure. But I don't see how that in any way means one can't act to gain (and thus keep) it - for himself and/or for others. Analogically, if I consider food to be a value, then I consider the absence of hunger to be a value, don't I?
Michael M:But one can choose "death" throughout one's life without choosing to die. If one chooses consciously or inadvertently to act contrary to his nature at any given time, that is to the extent it is detrimental to his life, a choice favoring death. Remember that in the context of ethics, "death" refers to more than just whether or not one is physically surviving. It includes the whole of the process of surviving and thriving in accordance with one's nature.
In the context of Objectivist ethics, "death" might refer to that. But that doesn't mean it refers to that for all ethical theories. In fact, there's not even universal agreement over what "ethics" means.
Michael M:It can't. But that doesn't change the fact that one must have the concept life before one can possibly have the concept value.
Do you have any reasoning and/or evidence for this alleged fact?
I'd also really appreciate explicit answers to my earlier questions - do you think life is something one can act to gain and/or keep? What about death?
@ Autolykos: I have already clarified that. When life is chosen as a goal it is ipso facto the primary value. All values thereafter a subordinated means in the quest for the primary value. When your goal is to win a race at a track meet, crossing the finish line is your primary goal. In order to do that you must define a code of values that will tell you in principle what kinds of actions throughout the race will most likely gain victory for you. Those values cannot exist without the primary value that is your goal. The fact that the goal and the means are both values is in no way "circular." It ia hierarchical. ------ When I say if there were no death there would be no ethics, I mean that if you were immortal, if nothing could harm or destroy you, if would not make any difference what choices you would make. So you would not need a code of values to guide you. Robots do not need an ethics.
Michael M:I have already clarified that.
Clarifying something requires it to be clear in the mind of the recipient, yes? So if it wasn't clear to me before, then as far as I'm concerned, you didn't clarify it before.
Michael M:When life is chosen as a goal it is ipso facto the primary value. All values thereafter a subordinated means in the quest for the primary value.
You're trying to make it logically necessary for everyone to choose life as a goal (and thus as the primary value). You're trying to do this by claiming that death is not something that one can act to gain (and thus keep). To me, that doesn't follow at all.
Michael M:When your goal is to win a race at a track meet, crossing the finish line is your primary goal. In order to do that you must define a code of values that will tell you in principle what kinds of actions throughout the race will most likely gain victory for you. Those values cannot exist without the primary value that is your goal. The fact that the goal and the means are both values is in no way "circular." It [is] hierarchical.
Yes, I understand that already, and it's quite beside my point. My point is about the concept of life requiring the concept of value to already be defined (as well as itself) in order for propositions like "life is a value" to have any meaning.
Another point of mine is that it's certainly possible for one to change his primary value.
Michael M:When I say if there were no death there would be no ethics, I mean that if you were immortal, if nothing could harm or destroy you, if would not make any difference what choices you would make. So you would not need a code of values to guide you. Robots do not need an ethics.
First off, robots can be destroyed. Second, even such an immortal being could perceive different levels of benefit from different choices, so he'd still have things that he can act to gain and/or keep.
There is no life without death. and there is no death without life.
A good movie about death is: The Fountain. Very good movie 10/10!
Even if youre immortal, then you dont really live, for there is no distinction between living and not living.
If youre immortal, there is still immoral things that do not kill you, like lying, stealing, cheating on spouse, etc.
“Since people are concerned that ‘X’ will not be provided, ‘X’ will naturally be provided by those who are concerned by its absence.""The sweetest of minds can harbor the harshest of men.”
http://voluntaryistreader.wordpress.org
Despite my name I find myself disagreeing with Rand as I study the thread, though it has been a while since I've read any of her non-fiction. I think we normally act in accordance with life as the standard of value, but that maximising pleasure, or minimizing pain are the true standards of value. I mainly wanted to post this though thinking that the examples below might serve as contexts for making your points concrete.
We start off as children only thinking of immediate pleasure or pain, but then learn that we can buy more long term pleasure with some short term pain (physically working out, mentally doing our jobs).
Giving your life for someone you love is minimizing the pain of going through life without them knowing you may have been able to save them.
A person choosing not to undergo a long series of debilitating cancer treatments is making an economic choice for immediate pleasure and minimizing long term pain. In this case the person is chooing death, though death is not the goal.
Ragnar D Being animals ourselves, we also have an automated pleasure/pain physical function to alert us of potential failures and successes of our pursuit of life. Being human animals however means that we have a far greater capacity for dealing with reality beyond the simple pleasure/pain mechanism. We are conceptual beings, an ability that enables us to understand pleasure/pain instead of just automatically reacting to it, and even enabling us to act contrary to the signals of that system for more important long term gain. Consequently we have additionally an emotional system of joy/suffering that signals potential success or failure of our actions in a cognitive context where physical pleasure/pain is not involved at all. One has to be careful to be fully aware when using the terminology: the pain of an insult or rejection is metaphorical. As a side note, the pleasure/pain mechanism is inherently geared to support the pursuit of one's own life, and it is, in that respect, an inherent physical complement to the derivation of an egoistic code of ethics that is consistent with the nature of man.
Kelvin_silva, Thanks for the movie, it was quite beautiful and fun to watch. Not that I found any intelligent message in there—it's mostly a hodge-podge of historical and mystical devices composed in the manner of modernist art that mistakenly equates the abstruse with profundity. When considering this discussion of life and death as the most fundamental alternative, you must be careful not to drop the context. Death in this context is not the same use of the word to mean simply the end of physical existence. It is much broader than that, because the context is philosophical. The pursuit of life in this context means action to maximize the potential of one's nature in both quantity and quality. Ipso facto in that context, the extent to which any action would be detrimental to that goal would be inherently anti-life, and since the fundamental alternative is life v. death, such actions would constitute opting for death. The action does not have to kill you to be an instance of opting for death. It needs only to be an action detrimental to life.
Why? because life is self-generated, self-sustained action. Positive choices and actions are the prerequisites of life. Thus, mere passivity is also an instance of opting for death.
@Michael M
I don't know how to move forward in this discussion, I'm actually trying to find common ground, or a way to integrate what Rand was saying, without violating the way I view reality generically. Or if necessary find a way to alter some aspect of how I view reality to the same end, an integration of the concepts and ideas. To that end, I'm again trying to find the dissonance. The way you answer my questions, and others here seems to be related to some fundamental dissonance in the way certain concepts are understood.
It seems to me, and has since I first started looking at these issues that the disconnect is one of what we mean when we say reality, and where we see purpose originating and secondarily if the existence of purposeful behavior itself is some kind of binding contract between the mind and reality, or some type of binding relationship between the mind and itself. I don't think anyone disputes that man is purposeful, uses reason, cannot avoid pursuing some purpose in life, ultimately must remain alive in order to continue pursuing any other goal. But I guess the difference is in how each of us individually understands what that last statement means.
I don't see purpose in reality itself. So reality does it's thing, and one side effect is that it produces intentional systems. Reality continues to iterate the intentional organisms and the result is ever increasing complexity and plasticity in the generated instances of these intentional systems. I don't think anyone is going to dispute this. But for the sake of argument, let's assume that each individual man is a slightly varied instance of an intentional system. I view he human mind as a real phenomena (emergent) generated from a physical substrate (the brain). So if one were to point to sources of variation between instances of the animal called "man", we would point to 1) genetic variation, 2) the physiological expression of the genome (to include the brain), and 3) the emergent phenomena itself that we call a brain.
If we look back at what reality tells us about variation and survival (at the individual level itself) is that the specific adaptations in those 3 variations will play a sufficiently large role in determining whether or not the specific organism survives to reproduce. In other words, some of the selection events (death) will happen due to circumstances that one might call unfortunate, rockslides, famine, extreme weather events, etc. Now, we only see the results of a specific genetic structure through the organism that builds from that genetic plan. So, while the genes are important above the test is not direct but indirect through the physical structure of the body. The organization and interaction between the components of the nervous system is the source intentional behavior. That structure is generated from the genome.
From the physiological interaction of the brain we get an emergent phenomena that we call the mind. This is I believe what Rand is referring to when she talks about the self.
As the brain, through the long periods of evolution, became more and more complex the selection process continued to operate on the mind. Behaviors that lead to survival and propogation of the genes were one portion of the selection mechanism, but one behavior in particular became a dominant factor in any survival computation performed by reality. This is knowledge, the production and use of knowledge by the individual is part of that. Abstract manipulation of symbolic representations of reality allowed the mind to imagine and implement new behaviors which had not been attempted by that specific organism before. However, in addition to this specific adaptation, the use of symbols allowed communication of ideas. Symbols and knowledge were able to pass from mind to mind. Culture and technology became part of the selection criteria for the individual itself. The propogation of good technical adaptations (non physiological) meant that individual behaviors became more effective at overcoming the obstacles to survival that man encountered.
Up to this point in my explanation, I hope we don't disagree.
None of us question the role of logic, intentional choice, technological innovation, and culture as an accumulation and propogation of technology in the survival of man, both at the individual level and on a larger scale in groups.
Rand observes rightly, that the source of behavior is in the mind, and that it is an individually experienced, directed, and evaluated thing. But reality will test the content of the mind, and it's effectiveness in reality. And effectiveness is evaluated in different ways. Always, there will be the subjective valuation of the reality one encounters. In other words do I prefer what I have in my life, who I am, the social environment around me, to alternatives 1) I can imagine, but more specifically 2) that I can imagine and I think I can create through my actions.
Now, Praxeology says this is a tautology. The reason man acts is to create a future reality better than the one he imagines will happen without his action. I have always interpreted Rand's statement, as an interpretation of this in terms of a final end, fullest expression of life.
The problem I always have with what Rand says is that self-sacrifice is necessarily the abdication of this ultimate value.
For whatever reason, man is encumbered with this drive to reproduce and to improve life, not just for himself specifically, but also for whatever community or social group he feels connected to. In saying this I don't think I'm abdicating any type of methodological individualism, but I think I am stepping away from radical individualism if that means the pursuit of one's own survival over and above any voluntarily chosen self-sacrifice.
Regardless of which stance a man takes, that there are good reasons for me to sacrifice some personally beneficial end in favor of the end of another, or that there is no good reason to do so, the fact is that both occur. This to me is the true battle man faces, in putting of short term gains for longer term gains even if he may never see their fruition. Even if the consequences may not be to his own personal benefit, but are in fact to the benefit of others.
This is the disconnect for me, Rand can argue that a man should serve his own best interests, but I always take IS statements as sufficient to explain all phenomena. Her IS construction doesn't explain the behavior of man in the reality I experience.
In praxeology I see a tautological explanation of action in terms of preference from which a social science is built using methodological individualism. In Rand I hear an exhortation to embrace an ethic of methodological selfsishness because of her correct observation that the experience of man, and the unit of social life is methodologically individual. But I don't think the second follows.
As a man, I care about the emergent phenomena of social life, and how my behavior specifically contributes to that.
Again, help me understand what I'm missing.
@David B "The way you answer my questions, and others here seems to be related to some fundamental dissonance in the way certain concepts are understood." Yes, but possibly because we are too often not speaking the same language. I frequently have to reach for a translation of what you are trying to say. For example, while "dissonance" indicates some conflict, it is way to imprecise for a discussion like this ... do you mean disagreement, contradiction, or what? Or, what does this mean: "So reality does it's thing, and one side effect is that it produces intentional systems. " What are "intentional systems." Who is the intender? Certainly not reality. I also lose you every time you say things like "IS statements" and "IS construction" ... what are you trying to say with this all caps IS. If these phrases are meaningless in lower case, what does capitalizing them add? I think it would help you immensely in dealing with Rand's ideas if you would use her terminology, and her concise, razor sharp definitions. If you disagree with one, that can be discussed. But at least use the definitions you agree with to discuss the ideas. You can always review her formulations on The Ayn Rand Lexicon.
----------
"It seems to me, and has since I first started looking at these issues that the disconnect is one of what we mean when we say reality, and where we see purpose originating and secondarily if the existence of purposeful behavior itself is some kind of binding contract between the mind and reality, or some type of binding relationship between the mind and itself. I don't think anyone disputes that man is purposeful, uses reason, cannot avoid pursuing some purpose in life, ultimately must remain alive in order to continue pursuing any other goal. But I guess the difference is in how each of us individually understands what that last statement means."
Reality is what is—everything. There is nothing "outside of" reality. Don't try to make more of it than that simple fact. The behavior of man is purposeful, because purpose is the value of one's capacity to apply reason to action in the production and trade of that which maximizes one's life: "Productive work is the central purpose of a rational man’s life, the central value that integrates and determines the hierarchy of all his other values. Reason is the source, the precondition of his productive work—pride is the result." (The Virtue of Selfishness, 25)
-----------
"The reason man acts is to create a future reality better than the one he imagines will happen without his action. I have always interpreted Rand's statement, as an interpretation of this in terms of a final end, fullest expression of life. The problem I always have with what Rand says is that self-sacrifice is necessarily the abdication of this ultimate value." Look. "sacrifice" is defined by a simple principle. Your musings might help you to get all your ducks in a row, but ultimately you will still have to address the principle in order to settle the question of what is or is not "sacrifice." To wit: The values that comprise one's code of values are not all uniform in their contribution to one's life in all instances at all times. A code of values is necessarily hierarchical. The same is true of the concrete evaluations one makes in accordance with that code. Therefore, every alternative one faces in life will be between something that makes a greater contribution to your life—a higher value—and something that makes a lesser contribution—a lower value. It should be obvious that in the pursuit of one's life that is the standard against which all values are measured, one should always opt for the higher value over a lower one. The act of opting for a lower value to your life over a higher one would be to sacrifice the good of your life to its detriment, it would be a violation of the standard you established by making the fundamental choice to pursue your life, i.e. it would be immoral.
Still waiting for a reply from you, Michael M.
To the OP: check out this website if you want to know a little about Rand's philosophy. The author doesn't completely agree with her, and he goes into Misesian praxeology so there's a ton of info to obtain.
@Maynard -
Thanks for that link, he's the first person I've seen, other than some blustering I've been doing in the last 9 months, who places Ethics and Politics into the realm of Praxeology.