twistedbydsign99:What you and I believe are of utmost importance. If we want to objectively answer the question of who should own you, if not what we believe, then what method?
The question we're trying to answer is whether AE proves anything. Beliefs are irrelevant for answering it. Even if we ALL agreed in our belief that everyone should own themselves, that wouldn't prove one iota of anything beyond what we merely believe. 90%+ of all the humans on this planet believe in some form of a God. Almost everyone believed the Earth was flat centuries ago. These beliefs proved nothing. That's why they are called beliefs, to begin with.
Z.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Juan:Okay Z, I find your 'opinions' and evasiveness tedious. Besides since you are not trying to prove anything but simply stating opinions, there's nothing to discuss.
Dodging? Do you or do you not agree with Z that beliefs are not proof?
To each their own. Travel well. I couldn't see how your line of inquiry was going to move the discussion forward, anyway.
Amidst all the diversionary tactics my refutation of AE's "proof" remains unanswered (or un-"dispatched"). And that's not an opinion, but a fact.
z1235: The question we're trying to answer is whether AE proves anything. Beliefs are irrelevant for answering it. Even if we ALL agreed in our belief that everyone should own themselves, that wouldn't prove one iota of anything beyond what we merely believe. 90%+ of all the humans on this planet believe in some form of a God. Almost everyone believed the Earth was flat centuries ago. These beliefs proved nothing. That's why they are called beliefs, to begin with. Z.
I don't feel I'm derailing here. If your contention is that AE does not tell us who should own us, then I think asking you for what method there is to determine that is valid. Believing the earth is flat is a perfectly sensible belief, it looks flat, but you are correct that they were incorrect. And how did they determine that there beliefs were incorrect, which is what I'm contending is of utmost importance? The scientific method. That explains things that are. We are talking about things that should be. Who should be ones owner. If you want to know how I determine what should or should not be its by consequences mostly.
The consequences of a person owning himself are better than not in the general case. Do you dispute that?
they are not merely beliefs, they are necessary beliefs given that a coherent set of beliefs are demanded by seekers of truth.
if you believe in the possibility of knowledge you must accept various axioms of logic. if you believe in the possibility of communication and you believe in personhood you might have cause to reflect on what such beliefs necessitate. if you discover the these beliefs necessitate things that you dont wish to assent to, then you are faced with an obvious choice.
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
z1235: twistedbydsign99:What you and I believe are of utmost importance. If we want to objectively answer the question of who should own you, if not what we believe, then what method? The question we're trying to answer is whether AE proves anything. Beliefs are irrelevant for answering it. Even if we ALL agreed in our belief that everyone should own themselves, that wouldn't prove one iota of anything beyond what we merely believe. 90%+ of all the humans on this planet believe in some form of a God. Almost everyone believed the Earth was flat centuries ago. These beliefs proved nothing. That's why they are called beliefs, to begin with.
What it proves is that no ethic contrary to the NAP can be argumentatively justified. sure, that "all" it does. That's all! That's enough.
Stephan Kinsella [email protected] www.StephanKinsella.com
twistedbydsign99:The consequences of a person owning himself are better than not in the general case. Do you dispute that?
That's an appeal to preference utilitarianism, which I can get behind, but it is not proof of an objective fact.
I'm curious LS, where do you sit along the spectrum between myself and Z on the narrow topic of 'rational argumentation' vs. 'charades thereof' ?
liberty student:That's an appeal to preference utilitarianism, which I can get behind, but it is not proof of an objective fact.
If who should be the owner is in the realm of objective fact, then the scientific method would suffice. Some natural fact about reality or humans would make it clear that the person who controls the body right at birth should remain the controller.
twistedbydsign99:If your contention is that AE does not tell us who should own us...
That is not my contention. My contention is that it doesn't PROVE anything.
twistedbydsign99:then I think asking you for what method there is to determine that is valid.
Sure we could discuss what method is best (and according to what standard), but that WOULD derail the discussion from the search for AE's "proof".
twistedbydsign99: Who should be ones owner. If you want to know how I determine what should or should not be its by consequences mostly. The consequences of a person owning himself are better than not in the general case. Do you dispute that?
Who should be ones owner. If you want to know how I determine what should or should not be its by consequences mostly.
Non sequitur. Let's conclude that AE proves NOTHING so we can discuss methods for optimal resource allocation and standards thereof in some other thread.
nirgrahamUK: they are not merely beliefs, they are necessary beliefs given that a coherent set of beliefs are demanded by seekers of truth. if you believe in the possibility of knowledge you must accept various axioms of logic. if you believe in the possibility of communication and you believe in personhood you might have cause to reflect on what such beliefs necessitate. if you discover the these beliefs necessitate things that you dont wish to assent to, then you are faced with an obvious choice.
Lofty stuff. The above is no different from (actually eerily reminiscent of) something a medieval monk would have written -- elevating the (necessary!) belief in God as a precondition to discerning the truth. Are you trying to build a cult or a science?
nirgrahamUK:I'm curious LS, where do you sit along the spectrum between myself and Z on the narrow topic of 'rational argumentation' vs. 'charades thereof' ?
So far neither Kinsella nor any of the links he has posted address the central issue: that AE implicitly defines "argumentation," "justification," and "objection" in such a way as to make the proof circular (at best). This is just a more sophisticated form of begging the question. Some of the links do address the issue of question begging in general, but in particular, none of them address the fact that AE defines these concepts so as to rule out merely "subjective" (or any other non-objective) argumentation, justification, and objection, implicitly pointing to some kind of objective conception of ethical norms.
Hence AE appears to be devoid of significant content to anyone who does not accept the notion that ethics can be objective. Kinsella in turn responds by tacitly implying that those who don't accept objective ethics are "criminals" (or else this is a strawman against z1235) as I point out in this post, which has been conspicuous in that it still lacks a reply from Kinsella even though he immediately pounced on subsequent low-hanging fruit.
I think it's important to note that both Hoppe and Kinsella at several points make clear that they are aware of this issue:
Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, pg. 239 (emphasis mine):The answer is that the source of human rights is, and must be, argumentation as the manifestation of our rationality. It is impossible to claim anything else to be the starting point for the derivation of an ethical system, because claiming so would once again have to presuppose one's argumentative capability.
It's clear that here Hoppe does not mean "a subjective ethical system" or "only an ethical system for deciding your personal values." Hence Hoppe seems to understand that his real audience is those who already accept objective ethics as a meaningful and valid concept. Logically, his audience would have to already accept that something can be right and wrong for all people, without reference to any notion of "right/wrong for a specific purpose."
Likewise, as detailed here and noted again in his post immediately above, Kinsella has claimed:
nkinsella:[AE] is a way of showing why no non-libertarian norm can ever be argumentatively justified.
Even presuming that AE has no flaws, it is still clear that here "argumentatively justified" must refer to argumentative justification defined within the context of objective ethics - as Hoppe himself seems to admit above. (These statements would make no sense, or at least say nothing interesting or novel, within a subjective ethical context.)
Of course, it wouldn't really undermine the objective ethical position if they had to point out that their arguments have nothing to say to those who don't accept the notion that ethics can be objective. After all, there are surely many who believe ethics are objective but don't have a strong logical argument to reinforce what they believe. Here Hoppe and Kinsella may be relevant, but Kinsella - at least - seems quite unsatisfied with this.
Like it or not, arguing in circles within the objective ethical context can never prove objective ethics itself. If that is the aim - which Kinsella's apparent reluctance to admit the above point seems to indicate - then might it not be better to attempt a direct proof that ethics can be objective? Rather than merely assuming it and plowing ahead anyway?
Why anarchy fails
Original post here. I quoted your word in captialization below too in order to be accurate.
z1235: wilderness:This isn't a microwave. This is a computer. There, you used the word you denied again.
wilderness:This isn't a microwave. This is a computer.
There, you used the word you denied again.
You don't explain yourself very well. Previously you said "EVERYTHING" can be denied because everything is used to deny itself. I am currently using a computer and not a microwave so I am denying the microwave and NOT USING it.
BUT now you are talking about words. You NEVER brought up words - you said quote "EVERYTHING". Everything includes non-words too. Next time clarify yourself.
z1235: Wilderness, this is not the first time that you and I have concluded that we speak different languages.
Wilderness, this is not the first time that you and I have concluded that we speak different languages.
Yes. You said quote: "EVERYTHING". And now you are changing the goal posts and talking about "words". Nearly worlds of a difference.
z1235: (I feel as if you speak Klingon, most of the time.) If you consistently don't understand (or don't want to understand) what I am saying, then simply stop responding to my posts. Please s**t (i.e. show how the above line of inquiry is relevant to the discussion in this thread) or get off the pot. Z.
(I feel as if you speak Klingon, most of the time.) If you consistently don't understand (or don't want to understand) what I am saying, then simply stop responding to my posts. Please s**t (i.e. show how the above line of inquiry is relevant to the discussion in this thread) or get off the pot. Z.
I showed how you are inconsistent in what you are talking about above. I'll ask. Are you only talking about words and NOT "EVERYTHING" (your capitalization not mine)?
liberty student:I can't follow it all.
liberty student:I think Z just zinged Wilderness pretty good (no offense wilderness),
You should have stuck with your original assertion, because you didn't "follow it all". "EVERYTHING" is very distinct from "words" or do not see that distinction?
z1235:they are not merely beliefs, they are necessary beliefs given that a coherent set of beliefs are demanded by seekers of truth.
well, you hastly deny whole paragraphs of mine in a fell swoop. do me the courtesy of denying my particular propositions ....
do you deny the very possibility of necessary beliefs? is there no such thing in any context?
or do your denials begin further down the path?
wilderness:You should have stuck with your original assertion, because you didn't "follow it all". "EVERYTHING" is very distinct from "words" or do not see that distinction?
I have no idea what you are talking about.
LS,
too true. so next time before you stick your foot in your mouth, please ask.
To each their own. Travel well. I couldn't see how your line of inquiry was going to move the discussion forward, anyway. Amidst all the diversionary tactics my refutation of AE's "proof" remains unanswered (or un-"dispatched"). And that's not an opinion, but a fact.
student:Dodging?
nirgrahamUK: z1235:they are not merely beliefs, they are necessary beliefs given that a coherent set of beliefs are demanded by seekers of truth. well, you hastly deny whole paragraphs of mine in a fell swoop. do me the courtesy of denying my particular propositions .... do you deny the very possibility of necessary beliefs? is there no such thing in any context? or do your denials begin further down the path?
Right. This is the thing. Either you admit or deny there are some presuppositions of argumentation. I can't see how anyone can deny there are some (if only the fact that discourse is possible).
And either you admit or deny that some of the things presupposed are norms. Again, for argumentation to have meaning and to be what it is, there have to be certain norms presupposed. This is so commonly recognized that is is a bit maddening that it needs to be argued for -- but for more on this this see the insights of other thinkers, not only me and Hoppe, but also Apel and Habermas, Knight, Madison, Machan, Rasmussen-den Uyl, Hare, Narveson, Van Dun etc. and others -- discussed in New Rationalist Directions in Libertarian Rights Theory, and also Quotes on the Logic of Liberty; see also Frank Van Dun's “Argumentation Ethics and The Philosophy of Freedom”.
How can it be denied that participants in discourse necessarily presuppose certain norms? As I asked of Callahan and Murphy in their criticism of Hoppe's AE:
Do they maintain that participants in discourse do not presuppose any truths? – or do they just say that none of these are normative? Or do they think that argumentation is not a conflict-free way of interacting? – in which case they would seem to think bashing someone over the head or stealing their wallet is also a form of peaceful, cooperative discourse.
... MC do not do attempt to debunk argumentation ethics in general, or, alternatively, to show just what ethics are implied in argumentation (and why these are not the ones that Hoppe proposes). Do they believe any norms are implied in argumentation? If not, they would seem to reject the entire edifice of work in this regard, including work by Jurgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, Frank Van Dun, G.B. Madison, Alan Gewirth, Roger Pilon, Tibor Machan, and others discussed in my survey article "New Rationalist Directions in Libertarian Rights Theory."
On the other hand, if they accept that argumentation implies some norms, which are they? Do these norms support libertarianism? Socialism? Or are they only non-rights-related interpersonal norms, like "be nice" or "don't lie"? Are these argumentatively-presupposed norms at least consistent with libertarianism? MC write: "Whenever people engage in argumentation, they implicitly agree to a set of norms. For example, each participant implicitly agrees to try to persuade the other(s) through peaceful methods." I am not clear whether they are only paraphrasing or whether they accept this is true. If they do accept it as true, are there no implications to be drawn from this? Does it place no constraints whatsoever on the legitimacy of norms propositionally advanced in the course of (peaceful!) argument?
It seems to me that if MC accept any form of argumentation ethics as valid – that is, if there are some norms implied in discourse – then, as libertarians who believe libertarian norms are (somehow) justified, they would have to believe that the argumentative norms are at least compatible with, if not the grounding for, libertarian rights.
(see my Defending Argumentation Ethics: Reply to Murphy & Callahan)
Note, significantly, that Murphy and Callahan do say: "Whenever people engage in argumentation, they implicitly agree to a set of norms. For example, each participant implicitly agrees to try to persuade theother(s) through peaceful methods."
These are norms! Even skeptics of AE admit this.
So there ARE certain norms presupposed in argumentation.The only question, then, is what are these norms--grundnorms, you might say--and what are their implications for libertarianism. Now here to me is what is striking. The libertarian already believes and accepts the NAP and related peace-related grundnorms. if he also accepts that argumentation presupposes some peace-related norms, and he recognizes that any possible ethic has to be justified argumentatively--that all justification just is argumentative justification--then it is extremely odd that he would deny that libertarian norms are not implied by the grundnorms of argumentation. He already agrees there are norms of argumentation; he agrees that these are generally peaceful; he also agrees with the implications of a pro-peace stance, namely the non-aggression principle; and he cannot help but agree that any argument for the NAP must be done in argumentation and thus cannot hope to establish norms that are contrary to the very norms presupposed as true in argumentation. It is obvious that a libertarian who accepts the NAP, who thinks it is compatible with and indeed implied by a pro-peace position and arguably demonstrable logic and reasoning about economics and the nature of property, and who recognizes that there are also peace-related norms of argumentation and thus of any argumentative justification--has no reason to doubt that a socialist, anti-NAP ethic can never be argumentatively justified--that is to say, that it is forever unjustifiable.
In short, the advocate of AE simply says that there are norms of argumentation, and that these are peace-related. He favors peace, and he thinks that as a matter of fact anyone who engages in discourse also demonstrates a preference for peace. That this supports his endorsement of the NAP is quite obvious.
I made some similar comments in the anti-state.com forum discussing this, namely:
here:
Non aggression implies seeking for a conflict- free solution which implies assigning property rights in an objective, universalizable way. This implies that particularistic, arbitrary rules won't work, they don't serve as objective links. "you can say" the "oldest guy gets it" as a rule, but others could propose a million other verbal arbitrary rules that would be inconsistent, so conflict is not avoided. Let me be clear: if you are saying you don't think first-use is an objective link between owner and resrouce, or you don't think it's the only or best objective link--then let's discuss that. Do you grant there must be an objective link? Because if you grant that, I think Hoppe's won. Then it's only sweeping up. Do you grant this? Is your only reservation that it is not the only objective link; or do you dispute the necessity of an objective link at all?
"Anyway, my point is that just because you believe "property rights" should be respected, doesn't necessarily make you a Rothbardian (which is sometimes taken to mean "libertarian" I think)."
No, but if you do, you have accepted the validity of norms concerning scarce resources, in parituclar libertarian norms. Thus it seems a bit rich to feign incredulity when another libertarian actually takes seriously the notion that there IS something special and unique about the status of our rules, as opposed to others. Here you are, as a libertarian, believing (for some reason), that libertarian rights are objectively superior to other. And when this distinction is relied upon in an argument you try to argue there is no objective distinction. I don't get you people.
"Do you believe that any person not convinced of the correctness of Hoppe's argument is therefore obviously unreasonable and therefore need not be bothered with? (This is, by the way, the way that you are coming across to me.) If that is what you believe, then I must disagree."
What does it matter? This is completely irrelevant as to whether or not Hoppe's argument is valid--which was allegedly the point of Murphy-Callahan's argument. But no, I do not believe someone who disagrees w/ Hoppe is "unreasonable" per se. I am not a Randian after all. I just think the person disagreeing with Hoppe is wrong--because he is right, and there is objective reality, and to that extent I AM a Randian.The fundamental flaw among you people here is similar to someone pretending to be a total skeptic. They challenge you in argument to "prove" that you exist; they claim "nothing can be known". They are obviously wrong, and stubborn to boot; they themselves have to exist, and to presuppose they exist, in order to engage in argumetn. So they know SOME THING, that is that they exist (among with other things). They may be dishonest, cynical, nihilistic, sophistic, petulant, honestly mistaken, or whatever, if they fail to acknowledge the things they themselves presuppose as true, and go on to challenge these thigns. Same is true here. You and I all already presuppose certain things as true. Yet you seem to think the burden is on ME , to prove to you things you arleady hold to be true. That is chutzpah.
Asserting a second-user rule is adopting the principle that any arbitrary rule can be asserted and adopted. (Can you really argue with a straight face that the first-user rule is arbitrary? Here is where Rothbard is right that original appropriation is the "natural" position--it does not mean necessarily that there is natural law or anything, but it does mean that first use is not just arbitrary, but it is a clear, objective link between owner and property.) If you adopt this rule, then what's to prevent someone else from asserting the third-user rule? In fact, the "third user" IS a "second user" with respect to the (first?) "second user". In other words, this second-user rule does not fulfill the conflict-avoidance function since it endorses any arbitrary rule (like, third, fourth etc. user).Bob: think about this. If you ARE a libertarian, for whatever reason, you must also favor the "superiority" of the first-user rule over competing rules. Ask yourself WHY. There must be SOME reason. Whatever this reason is, doesn't your own view that he first-use rule is "better" than others, actually support the contentions I'm making? All I'm saying is that the first-user has a better claim to property than late-comers. You actually agree with this (necessarily, as a libertarian). So what's the problem?
Well, imagine you and I both loved the Mona Lisa; we both thought it was better than Munch's "The Scream". We are looking at it, and I say, "It's better than The Scream." Given that you also believe this, would it not be strange for you to say, "you have no basis for believing that" or "someone could assert The Scream is better"--? In a sense, it's just self-contradictory--you are saying, "it's better" and "it's not better" at the same time. In fact, this should not be surprising since the nature of Hoppe's argument it so show that you already presuppose certain norms. That's why it's so frustrating when people who even admit to agreeing with the norms Hoppe asserts are true, then challenge Hoppe by saying he hasn't proved these norms to be true. That's not the point--the point is that you yourself already accept them. The point is to simply point out that everyone in argumentation necessarily presupposes some truths. This permits us to take these truths as apodictically established.
nskinsella: This is so commonly recognized that is is a bit maddening that it needs to be argued for...
This is so commonly recognized that is is a bit maddening that it needs to be argued for...
i know. it inclines me to believe they are in conflict with themselves and project that onto others and life in general.
nskinsella: You and I all already presuppose certain things as true. Yet you seem to think the burden is on ME , to prove to you things you arleady hold to be true. That is chutzpah.
You and I all already presuppose certain things as true. Yet you seem to think the burden is on ME , to prove to you things you arleady hold to be true. That is chutzpah.
such a good line of statements. In the Aristotlean sense, they attack what they maintain. Again, either logical inconsistency, a flaw in their knowledge, or maybe some form of psyche turmoil. Then get lazy and ask others to maintain it for them. At least in this forum I see some pop in every once in a while and say, 'Nobody is being persuasive enough here.' And then leave without trying to persuade anything themselves. And then attack those that are on their side - for chr-st sake. It's somebody sitting on the couch, then getting hungry, and when somebody comes home after working all day, the couch-sitter yells at them for not getting them something to eat when they were at work. yeah, it doesn't make sense, but do they!
nskinsella: The point is to simply point out that everyone in argumentation necessarily presupposes some truths. This permits us to take these truths as apodictically established.
The point is to simply point out that everyone in argumentation necessarily presupposes some truths. This permits us to take these truths as apodictically established.
yeap
z1235:Point to where I denied the law of identity. Even if I did, that would NOT be a performative contradiction
Knight_of_BAAWA:z, do you understand the reason that denying the law of identity involves a performative contradiction?
z1235:"A is A" (law of identity) is the a priori (axiom) of all logic and knowledge.
Knight_of_BAAWA:Now since I'm going to assume you do, how about translating that into what we're talking about. Then you'll no longer have any silly hang-ups.
z1235:I'm afraid you'll have to show me the steps of how "A is A" helps AE prove anything.
AJ:So far neither Kinsella nor any of the links he has posted address the central issue: that AE implicitly defines "argumentation," "justification," and "objection" in such a way as to make the proof circular
Knight_of_BAAWA: AJ:So far neither Kinsella nor any of the links he has posted address the central issue: that AE implicitly defines "argumentation," "justification," and "objection" in such a way as to make the proof circularNo, it doesn't. But thanks for not understanding the nature of argumentation. What you're proposing is no different from the post-modernist morons who decry logic as a "tool of western male oppression". And yes: I've actually witnessed that. We're not proposing something circular; we're looking at the nature of the thing.
I rest my case.
Did you forget to put in a reply?
AJ:I rest my case.
he's resting. don't bother him.
wilderness: nskinsella: You and I all already presuppose certain things as true. Yet you seem to think the burden is on ME , to prove to you things you arleady hold to be true. That is chutzpah. such a good line of statements.
such a good line of statements.
I know. I'm so good that sometimes I depress myself.
nskinsella:In short, the advocate of AE simply says that there are norms of argumentation, and that these are peace-related. He favors peace, and he thinks that as a matter of fact anyone who engages in discourse also demonstrates a preference for peace. That this supports his endorsement of the NAP is quite obvious.
Stephan, you keep avoiding to address my refutation of AE's proof and you keep moving the goal-posts. Claims of proofs have now turned into jingoistic pleadings of unity in belief and support of fellow advocates. There were plenty of opportunities for anyone to take a stab at refuting me over the last half dozen pages. Sadly, no one has even come close (including the content in your links). My mind is made up: AE proves NOTHING. Of course, everyone else is free to draw whatever conclusion they want. I join AJ in resting my case, as well, as I can't see a productive avenue for this discussion going forward.
...I also wanted to thank AJ, Stephan, Nir, Knight, wilderness, liberty student, twistedbydesign, and everyone else that participated with insightful comments. No hard feelings here against anyone, and I hope that the feeling is mutual.
z1235:Stephan, you keep avoiding to address my refutation of AE's proof
z1235: ...I also wanted to thank AJ, Stephan, Nir, Knight, wilderness, liberty student, twistedbydesign, and everyone else that participated with insightful comments. No hard feelings here against anyone, and I hope that the feeling is mutual.
Thanks, and I'm afraid it is my sad duty to inform you that this very attitude--agreeing to disagree--is further support of Hoppe's argumentation ethics.
nskinsella:Thanks, and I'm afraid it is my sad duty to inform you that this very attitude--agreeing to disagree--is further support of Hoppe's argumentation ethics.
Don't be sad. Support for AE was never denied. But proofs don't need support. They either exist or they don't. Lacking a proof for anything, AE could certainly use all the support it can muster.
Whew, I am glad that is done. Hopefully this shift in the topic is a little more interesting.
@nskinsella, I started reading over your paper again in order to understand some of the differences between your take and Dr. Block's on proportionality. There's some clear differences which I don't understand, but I really need more time to think it through. If you could explain, I think it would be wonderful.
Did you consider a possible reducio of the whole "compensation ratio" thing? In terms of elegance, I think we would prefer to not have to depend on some arbitrary "detection ratio", or at least depend as little as possible, right?
Could a criminal argue that he owes at most 1/10th of the cost of the rare and valuable artifact which was under heavy security, because he had surely less than a 5% chance of succeeding? I've thought that maybe the nature of such and such crime belongs in the "scaring" "bucket", (like if a man stole a cowboy's horse, it meant imminent death to be stranded), if that makes any sense.
Also, I think that I found something wrong in the estoppel paper. This is really just a nitpick anyhow, and I'm not even sure if I am right.
Your footnote 19 references the very last line of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, "Wherof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."
This is an alternate translation of "Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen." to "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."
My complaint doesn't say anything about estoppel. The words still make sense. I think that you've taken Wittgenstein out of context though. I will draw some really fun diagram if needed. I think that Wittgenstein is talking about the limit between phenomena and noumena, not beyond "[logic's] halo of purest crystal", Bizarro-land, or whatever we might call it.
I think he is talking about Tolstoyan or Kierkegaardian "indirect communication", something which we can think of but must pass over in silence, rather than something which is not even conceivable.
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
AJ: I think it's important to note that both Hoppe and Kinsella at several points make clear that they are aware of this issue: Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, pg. 239 (emphasis mine):The answer is that the source of human rights is, and must be, argumentation as the manifestation of our rationality. It is impossible to claim anything else to be the starting point for the derivation of an ethical system, because claiming so would once again have to presuppose one's argumentative capability. It's clear that here Hoppe does not mean "a subjective ethical system" or "only an ethical system for deciding your personal values." Hence Hoppe seems to understand that his real audience is those who already accept objective ethics as a meaningful and valid concept. Logically, his audience would have to already accept that something can be right and wrong for all people, without reference to any notion of "right/wrong for a specific purpose." Likewise, as detailed here and noted again in his post immediately above, Kinsella has claimed: nkinsella:[AE] is a way of showing why no non-libertarian norm can ever be argumentatively justified. Even presuming that AE has no flaws, it is still clear that here "argumentatively justified" must refer to argumentative justification defined within the context of objective ethics - as Hoppe himself seems to admit above. (These statements would make no sense, or at least say nothing interesting or novel, within a subjective ethical context.) Of course, it wouldn't really undermine the objective ethical position if they had to point out that their arguments have nothing to say to those who don't accept the notion that ethics can be objective. After all, there are surely many who believe ethics are objective but don't have a strong logical argument to reinforce what they believe. Here Hoppe and Kinsella may be relevant, but Kinsella - at least - seems quite unsatisfied with this. Like it or not, arguing in circles within the objective ethical context can never prove objective ethics itself. If that is the aim - which Kinsella's apparent reluctance to admit the above point seems to indicate - then might it not be better to attempt a direct proof that ethics can be objective? Rather than merely assuming it and plowing ahead anyway?
Your objections are nothing new. In fact they have already been covered.
The Economics and Ethics of Private Property p.314-15: Let me start by asking what is wrong with the position taken by Mises and so many others that the choice between values is ultimately arbitrary? First, it should be noted that such a position assumes that at least the question of whether or not value judgments or normative statements can be justified is itself a cognitive problem. If this were not assumed, Mises could not even say what he evidently says and claims to be the case. His position simply could not exist as an arguable intellectual position. At first glance this does not seem to take one very far. Indeed, it still seems to be a far cry from this insight to the actual proof that normative statements can be justified and that it is only the libertarian ethic which can be defended. This impression is wrong, however, and there is already much more won here than might be suspected. The argument shows us that any truth claim, the claim connected with any proposition that it is true, objective or valid (all terms used synonymously here), is and must be raised and settled in the course of an argumentation. Since it cannot be disputed that this is so (one cannot communicate and argue that one cannot communicate and argue), and since it must be assumed that everyone knows what it means to claim something to be true (one cannot deny this statement without claiming its negation to be true), this very fact has been aptly called "the a priori of communication and argumentation." Arguing never consists of just free-floating propositions claiming to be true. Rather, argumentation is always an activity, too. However, given that truth claims are raised and settled in argumentation and that argumentation, aside from whatever it is that is said in its course, is a practical affair, it follows that intersubjectively meaningful norms must exist-precisely those which make some action an argumentation-which have a special cognitive status in that they are the practical preconditions of objectivity and truth.
Let me start by asking what is wrong with the position taken by Mises and so many others that the choice between values is ultimately arbitrary? First, it should be noted that such a position assumes that at least the question of whether or not value judgments or normative statements can be justified is itself a cognitive problem. If this were not assumed, Mises could not even say what he evidently says and claims to be the case. His position simply could not exist as an arguable intellectual position.
At first glance this does not seem to take one very far. Indeed, it still seems to be a far cry from this insight to the actual proof that normative statements can be justified and that it is only the libertarian ethic which can be defended. This impression is wrong, however, and there is already much more won here than might be suspected. The argument shows us that any truth claim, the claim connected with any proposition that it is true, objective or valid (all terms used synonymously here), is and must be raised and settled in the course of an argumentation. Since it cannot be disputed that this is so (one cannot communicate and argue that one cannot communicate and argue), and since it must be assumed that everyone knows what it means to claim something to be true (one cannot deny this statement without claiming its negation to be true), this very fact has been aptly called "the a priori of communication and argumentation."
Arguing never consists of just free-floating propositions claiming to be true. Rather, argumentation is always an activity, too. However, given that truth claims are raised and settled in argumentation and that argumentation, aside from whatever it is that is said in its course, is a practical affair, it follows that intersubjectively meaningful norms must exist-precisely those which make some action an argumentation-which have a special cognitive status in that they are the practical preconditions of objectivity and truth.
There is an enormous body of literature on this topic which covers everything. Negative demonstration is nothing new. I don't understand why people have such a negative reaction when it is applied to ethics.
z1235: Proposing a theory, making an argument, proving it, and/or refuting it is not a love-fest. The validity of an argument rests SOLELY in its content and has nothing whatsoever to do with the feelings, beliefs, or circumstances of the agent delivering it. So your questions above are cop-outs and non-sequitur of the highest order for the discussion at hand. If I haven't been clear enough already, let me explain further the silliness of AE's "proof', and how that silliness -- if left unhindered -- could be used to "prove" any belief and assumption made from anyone, anywhere(!). Argumentation Ethics (and its supporters) merely (a priori) DEFINE "argumentation" as an act that is EXCLUSIVELY performed between self-owned agents (Everything else MUST be a charade, as Nir suggested repeatedly). With this revolutionary definition then AE can "prove" that whoever "argues" must be self-owned, or they cannot "argue" against it without contradiction (because they must be self-owned, according to this revolutionary definition of "argumentation".). So, for the tenth time, using/assuming X to prove X, doesn't prove X. It merely assumes it, and that's ALL it does!
Proposing a theory, making an argument, proving it, and/or refuting it is not a love-fest. The validity of an argument rests SOLELY in its content and has nothing whatsoever to do with the feelings, beliefs, or circumstances of the agent delivering it. So your questions above are cop-outs and non-sequitur of the highest order for the discussion at hand.
If I haven't been clear enough already, let me explain further the silliness of AE's "proof', and how that silliness -- if left unhindered -- could be used to "prove" any belief and assumption made from anyone, anywhere(!). Argumentation Ethics (and its supporters) merely (a priori) DEFINE "argumentation" as an act that is EXCLUSIVELY performed between self-owned agents (Everything else MUST be a charade, as Nir suggested repeatedly). With this revolutionary definition then AE can "prove" that whoever "argues" must be self-owned, or they cannot "argue" against it without contradiction (because they must be self-owned, according to this revolutionary definition of "argumentation".). So, for the tenth time, using/assuming X to prove X, doesn't prove X. It merely assumes it, and that's ALL it does!
But we intuitively understand that interpersonal argumentation is propositional exchange between two independent decision making units. There is no coherent concept of argumentation without this. It's not just an arbitrarily chosen definition. It's a reflection of reality.
Also, the validity of any norms which are the practical precondition of forming an argument does not depend on the beliefs of those engaging in argumentation. It rests precisey on the fact that it could not be undone one wised to undo it.