In various articles in the past I have made a monist objection to a dualistic concept of self-ownership due to the problems that an absolute mind/body dichotomy leads to. To summarize the problem: who exactly is it that is doing the owning? If I own it, then it is not me. If I am owned, than I am not...
If something is owned, then by definition there is something external to it that is doing the owning. Likewise, something that is owned is by definition something external to the agent that owns it. Taking this very basic point into account, does it really make that much sense to think in terms of "self...
And a lack of a gaurantee of survival and flourishing There are two fundamental ways in which liberty and rights can be defined. One definition of liberty is the freedom to use one's faculties in order to persue one's rational self-interest without infringement by others. This is a negativistic...