I was impressed by this argument which seems to start off from a different type of basis than the discussions I've read so far. Let's see how it holds up in this forum.Bold+italic addition "of animal rights" is mine.
The line (of animal rights) is drawn at sentience (the capacity to consciously experience pain and pleasure) because sentience is the precondition for having morally significant interests, and because we regard pain and suffering as morally relevant. Without sentience one cannot have an experiential welfare or subjective awareness that can be benefitted or harmed. In short, neither plants nor microorganisms have sentience. They do not have brains, central nervous systems, endorphins, nociception, benzodiazipan receptors, or any other indications of sentience. They have no experiential welfare or subjective awareness because they lack the brains needed to engage in these cognitive activities, pure and simple. Are insects sentient? Are they conscious beings with minds that experience pain and pleasure? I do not know. But the fact that I do not know exactly where to draw the line, or perhaps find drawing the line difficult, does not allow me to use animals as I please. Although we may not know whether insects are sentient, we do know that cows, pigs, chickens, chimpanzees, horses, deer, dogs and cats are sentient. So the fact that we do not know on what side of the line to place insects does not relieve us of our moral obligation to the animals whom we do know are sentient.The problem with drawing the line at the ability to abide by contracts is that not all humans are able to do so. However, we still accord these sentient nonrational humans the basic right not to be treated as our resources. If we were consistent with contract theory, we would not accord sentient nonrational humans this basic right. This is precisely why contract theory is untenable, and why our intuitions tell us that what really matters from a moral standpoint is sentience. The inability of a sentient human or nonhuman to abide by a contract may be relevant when deciding whether we allow them to vote, attend school, or drive a car, but it has no moral relevance whatsoever when deciding whether we can exploit them as our resources.It is irrelevant whether animals devised rights or can even understand the concept of rights. We do not require that humans be potential devisers of rights or understand the concept of rights in order to be beneficiaries of rights. For example, a severely retarded human might not have the ability to understand what a right is, but that does not mean that we should not accord her the protection of at least the basic right not to be treated as a resource of others.
Not that the following is a well-formed idea, nor do I necessarily abide by it, but I'm just going to throw this out there:
The problem with drawing the line at the ability to abide by contracts is that not all humans are able to do so.
Is that necessarily a problem? People only have the rights that are afforded to them by power. How does someone with an IQ of 20 represent themselves and defend themselves in court? How do they fit in or contribute to society? I think the truth is, anyone who isn't owned by him/herself is owned by someone else. (or by no one at all)
Only beings that can consciously understand and agree to contracts have the rights of people.
"Ownership" could be said to be the idea that someone has a range of control over something. People who have conscious control over themselves own themselves. Those who do not have the mental faculties to control themselves do not own themselves. Typically, they are cared for by other people, and can be considered to be "owned" by other people. I suppose this would make it morally acceptable to own someone that is mentally/physically handicapped to the point where they cannot control themselves, but not own someone who is mentally/physically able. (as in slavery)
I think something like the above can be extended to animals. They don't get contracts, and from what we can tell, they don't reason. They have no conception of rights, so why should they have rights by anyone, other than by their owner?
This argument also makes babies and children not people, but property. :/
I'm still largely undecided on this whole issue, except that I like eating meat and I like being nice to handicapped people and babies.
"The first lecture, I want to talk about the nature of man. Comparing men with animals and illuminating the major differences, and characterizing what one can call the human condition, the condition that mankind finds itself confronted with."
"So with this, let me begin talk about the nature of man and the human condition. And speak in particular about three elements that are unique, so to speak, to mankind. One is language, the second one is property, and the third one is production or technology."
"Now, you realize then, when we begin all of this here, we are already talking. We are already using some of our capabilities, some of our skills and achievements, that are the result of human evolution. That is, the reconstruction that I will offer you of human history, makes already use of some of the tools that have only gradually evolved in the course of time. Actually, the origin of language is dated back roughly 200,000-250,000 years ago. All of these estimates are of course as you can imagine rather vague estimates. Nobody was around at that time and recorded exactly when they started talking. But these are the numbers that some geneticists and biologists and anthropologists give us for the beginning.
And you notice something else from the fact that we begin all this enterprise from talking to each other, that somehow humans are social animals. We are aware of the fact that there exists people who are interested in game theory, for instance, who seem to have problems sometimes explaining why do people cooperate at all and do not fight each other all the time. But the funny thing is, that this debate takes already place using language. Which in a way, from the outset explains that there must be something wrong with this idea that man was at some point deciding whether they should fight each other or whether they should not fight each other. Obviously, as soon as mankind began to talk with each other, they must have already recognized that there are certain advantages to doing this, and to be social in one's endeavor. And it is perfectly clear of course from the outset, what the great advantage of having a language available and communicating with other people is: we can convey knowledge to other people than would be possible if we simply had to just look what other people are doing and try to reconstruct so to speak the ideas that were behind what they were doing. Through language, we have the possibility of communicating directly what it was that led us to do this or led us to do something else.
Now, with language, two ideas so to speak emerge. I use here the ideas that were developed first by some Austrian psychologists, Carl Bruehler, who also had some influence on Karl Popper who uses some of his ideas. And Carl Bruehler makes the point that we can distinguish, when we look at language so to speak between four difference functions. Two of which we find already on the animal level, and two of which are unique to humans.
On the animal level we find use of symbols or sounds that express something. Like pain, for instance. That is an express function of language we can ascribe easily to animals and say in this sense they can express some internal feelings. They can do this.
On the other hand language has sometimes a signal function. That is we can produce sounds that indicate there is some danger coming, or warn people, warn other animals to run away. Both of these of course is also possible for humans to do. Language has an expressive function for us, and also has this signal function, to make other people aware of these.
What is not found in the animal kingdom is that language has a descriptive function. That is, language describes "this is such-and-such". And with a descriptive function of language, for the first time the idea of truth emerges. That is, for expressions and signals, whether it is true or not is not really an issue. But when we say "this is such-and-such", then it becomes possible to say "is that really the case?" So the idea of truth comes into being because language has a descriptive function.
And the most primitive descriptive propositions would be of the type "this is such-and-such". That is, having a proper name or an identifying expression, and then a general term characterizing a particular object as having general characteristics.
And the second unique human function of language is the argumentative function. That we have complex statements, connected by 'and' and 'or', several statements combined to each other, that we in Language has an expressive function for us, and also has this signal function, to make other people aware of these."
"And you realize that it is precisely this last function, this argumentative function, that we must also use as a tool if we now want to make a more precise distinction between the abilities of man on the one hand and the different abilities of animals. And I want to follow here a philosopher Brand Blanshard, who has pointed out some important differences between animals and humans.
And I want to begin with a little quote from Blanshard, in a book called Reason and Analysis, where he says this about animals, and then draws a conclusion that this is somehow still very different from what mankind can do. He says: What does it mean to have human reason or human rationality? And he answers: it cannot be consiousness. Of course because no one can sensibly doubt that animals feel fear and hunger and pleasure and pain. Animals can also make mistakes, which we recognize as when for instance a dog drops a bone for a more inviting bone that he sees in the water. And since only judgements can be mistaken, animals must be also in some way able to make judgements. That is, come to the conclusion that I made a wrong judgement. And since judgement is thought, we can also say that animals think. But they do obviously not think in the same way that humans do.
Now, what is the difference between our way of thinking and their way of thinking? Now let me emphasize four points in this connection, which partly overlap.
The first thing to be noted is that animal thought is always tied to perception. Whereas human thought can wander around, go back to eternity, wander to the future, can think about objects that are far away, can even think about objects that have never existed. Animals cannot think in this way. Whatever their thinking is it requires so to speak some present cue, some observation from which their thinking arises. We can imagine for instance that animals can also think to a certain extent about things that are absent. As if a dog sits in front of a house because the house knows that his master has gone into the house, and waits there patiently until the master comes back out. But even there you can see that it is tied to perception. If he had not seen his master go in there, he would not do what he does sitting there waiting, and in any case he cannot think of things far away, or impossible, or things in the far distant future. So that is the first thing: animal thought is tied to perception, and human thought is in this way freed up of perception.
[To Q:] Yeah.
[Q: Is it possible that my dog is not waiting for me when I come back?]
Yes, we would make distinctions of course also between more intelligent animals and less intelligent animals, right? So the cockroach that you might have brought with you while you were just going into the house, might well not be waiting. So here I am talking, so to speak, about the most developed of animals.
[Q: But how do you know this? Because they do not report back?]
What?
[Q: Because there's a language barrier, how do we know that they're not thinking about the stars or infinity. They don't report to us.]
That brings me exactly to the second point (laughter). You say, that's one other fundamental difference between humans and animals, that they cannot do this. So even if you think that they might think about this sort of stuff, they have no way of conveying this sort of information to us.
Or, you can say: animals can't abstract, in the way that humans can abstract. Certainly animals can see shapes, and colors, and they can perceive smells, and things like this. But it doesn't seem to be the case that they have a concept of shapes, or triangles or whatever, or a concept of green or blue or yellow. Or a concept of different types of smells. Again this is an aspect of what I just mentioned. It is just tied to specific events, but they cannot abstract from the specific event and build a general concept.
If they could, then we would expect them to, yeah, to form a word for these things. And it is not that animals are not capable of producing sounds. Many animals do have the equipment to produce sounds. So this does not explain why they don't have words. Obviously, despite the fact that they can form sounds, they cannot form what we refer to as words. Sounds to which we attach a certain abstract idea for which we find various instances in the real world.
The third thing that distinguishes mankind from animals are: that animals cannot make inferences explicitly. Again this has something intimately to do with the two points that I already made. Animals can of course make inferences, but these inferences are implicit. That is to say if you have a chicken and you give some food to the chicken that is too big, doesn't fit into its mouth or so, and it is desperate that it can't eat it, and then you throw another one of roughly the same size in front of it, then the chicken might refuse to even try to do the same with the second piece of material, because it recognizes that it didn't work with the first it's not going to likely work with the second. But again due to the lack of concepts, they cannot make explicit inferences. That is, infer from one concept to another, and thereby be able to say: why such-and-such caused such-and-such a problem, and why it would be in vain to try the same thing twice, that did not already work in the first case.
And the most important difference between animals and humans is the difference that animals do not have what we call self-consciousness. They do have consciousness but not self-consciousness, and what I mean by self-consciousness is: they cannot stand back, so to speak, and reflect about their own behavior. They cannot pause and criticize their own behavior, think about why their behavior was successful or unsuccessful. They do not have anything like norms or principles, against which they can judge their own behavior and criticise their own behavior."
"Let me on this point again quote Blanshard, on this most important of differences, that is the human ability of self-conscious reflection. There he says: finally human reason has added an extra dimension to the animal consciousness in the form of self-consciousness. An animal lacks the power which is the source in ourselves of so much achievement and so much rue, of standing off from itself and contemplating what it is doing. It eats, sleeps, and cavorts, but never pauses in the midst of a meal to take note that it is eating greedily. Never asks if it is not unseemly to sleep the hours away, (laughter) you see in some respects of course humans have not developed that far beyond animals (laughter). Apparently never reflects, as it leaps and runs, that it is a little off-form today. It makes mistakes, but having made one, it cannot sit down and consider what principle of right thinking is violated. Because it cannot contemplate its own behavior, it cannot criticise itself. Being below the level of self-criticism, it has no norms. And having no norms, it lacks one great obvious essential to the light of reason: that is, the power to be guided by principle.
And Blanshard then summarizes all of what I tried to convey up to this point by saying the following: when we say that man is a rational animal, then we seem to imply that he can command ideas independently of sense. Independently of perception. That he can abstract, that he can infer explicitly, and that he can sit in judgement of himself. The highest of animals can do none of these things. The stupidest of man, if not a pathological case, can to the light of reason: that is, the power to be guided by principle."
...
Or you can listen to the audio: Nature of Man and the Human Condition: Language, Property, and Production (Hoppe)
nirgrahamUK: if a rational sentience lacked the central nervous response of pain, he would have rights, as pain has nothing to do with rights. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congenital_insensitivity_to_pain
if a rational sentience lacked the central nervous response of pain, he would have rights, as pain has nothing to do with rights.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congenital_insensitivity_to_pain
The line is correcly drawn at sapience, not sentience. Cats and dogs are sentient, true, but not sapient. They can think, in a limited way, but cannot think about thinking. They assert no rights. They would be incapable of even comprehending the concept. Thus, they have no rights.
A classic article on the subject: http://www.ncc-1776.org/tle1996/le960302.html
SPOILER ALERT: I love to eat animals.
That being said, I think the arguments for animal rights is legitimate.
Giant_Joe:People only have the rights that are afforded to them by power. How does someone with an IQ of 20 represent themselves and defend themselves in court? How do they fit in or contribute to society?
Simply because someone must rely on someone else to enforce their rights does not mean they don't have rights. Moreover, simply because someone cannot hold a job or defend themselves in court does not mean they are beyond human consideration for ethical treatment.
If you disagree, bring on the infanticide!!!!
Or stab a retarded person in front of his family. See if they believe you have the entitlement to stab their son or daughter.
Giant_Joe:Only beings that can consciously understand and agree to contracts have the rights of people.
The right of contract is different from the right to self-ownership, as well as the right to be spared unnecessary pain. Animals surely shouldn't have the same rights as people, but that doesn't mean they shouldn't have other rights.
Giant_Joe:hey are cared for by other people, and can be considered to be "owned" by other people.
An ownership claim still must retain boundaries with other claims by others, of which some are implicit. A caretaker does not have full property ownership over another human. Full ownership rights imply that the owner can legitimately destroy the property. Obviously, a caretaker would not be considered a legitimate caretaker if he were to murder the disabled or force them to perform sex acts.
Simply because the victim has no ability to communicate that he believes his legal rights are being violated does not mean that he has none. It simply means that others must enforce them on his behalf. Obviously, this makes their enforcement more difficult and complicated. For enforcement to be 100% effective almost guarantees that other rights must be disregarded. So we take what we can get. The same things applies to abusive parents.
Check my blog, if you're a loser
meambobbo:Or stab a retarded person in front of his family. See if they believe you have the entitlement to stab their son or daughter.
He said a retarded person could be owned, so he does not believe he would have entitlement to stab their child anymore than he would have entitlement to wreck their car.
At most, I think only 5% of the adult population would need to stop cooperating to have real change.
meambobbo:The right of contract is different from the right to self-ownership, as well as the right to be spared unnecessary pain. Animals surely shouldn't have the same rights as people, but that doesn't mean they shouldn't have other rights.
So what is your threshold for whether or not an animal's rights have been violated? And by what right does someone derive the right to prosecute on behalf of an animal?
Anyone should be allowed to bring a case against anyone, so long as a court is willing to hear it.
I think most people could identify what actions would and what wouldn't cause an animal pain or suffering, and I think most people would desire animals be protected against most pain and suffering, given reasonable exceptions. Things like farming, branding, slaughtering, and medical experimentation may be tolerable, given the social functions they serve, but prize fighting, recreational torture and mutilation, and negligence may not be.
Really it depends upon social sentiment - humans must determine the rights of animals, both because we are practically much more capable of harming or protecting animals than they are capable of protecting themselves, and because we have a steep tradition in using animals as a means to serve our ends.
I think the above activities are generally-agreed upon as ethically permissible and impermissible. I don't think we need to spell out the exact ethical content or legal solution in advance for such cases.
Arg why do these threads always go so fast? No time to read this all tonight!
Anyway I think I just thought of a clearer way to say what I'm thinking. Those here who say animals are property and have no rights are basically proposing two distinct "categories":
Correct?
I'm trying to suggest that perhaps it makes more sense to think of three distinct categories:
Sentient rights would be a subset of human rights which does not include concepts such as the NAP (no contracts, only humans can do this), but does include certain core rights. What those core rights would be, I've yet to think about.
meambobbo: Really it depends upon social sentiment - humans must determine the rights of animals, both because we are practically much more capable of harming or protecting animals than they are capable of protecting themselves, and because we have a steep tradition in using animals as a means to serve our ends. I think the above activities are generally-agreed upon as ethically permissible and impermissible. I don't think we need to spell out the exact ethical content or legal solution in advance for such cases.
A voice of reason appears!
Why anarchy fails
meambobbo:Anyone should be allowed to bring a case against anyone, so long as a court is willing to hear it.
So you think it should be legal for me take someone to court on your behalf, without your consent?
meambobbo:I think most people could identify what actions would and what wouldn't cause an animal pain or suffering, and I think most people would desire animals be protected against most pain and suffering, given reasonable exceptions.
And most people think we need government education. How is what most people think relevant?
meambobbo:Things like farming, branding, slaughtering, and medical experimentation may be tolerable, given the social functions they serve, but prize fighting, recreational torture and mutilation, and negligence may not be.
Using what threshold? How are you deciding what is right and what is wrong to do to an animal? And who will enforce these "rights" in a voluntary society? And again, what right does anyone have to take someone to court over a supposed violation of his or her pet's rights?
meambobbo:Really it depends upon social sentiment - humans must determine the rights of animals, both because we are practically much more capable of harming or protecting animals than they are capable of protecting themselves, and because we have a steep tradition in using animals as a means to serve our ends.
How do you propose "humans" decide what rights animals have? Majority rule? How is that possible in a voluntary society?
My own subjective valuations say that humans are different and more special than all living creatures and we're entitled to special treatment because we're humans. Why does an infant have more rights than a dog in my mind? Because the infant is human. I'm human. All of us discussing this are humans and if another living thing has to die for a human to live, so be it.
auctionguy10: My own subjective valuations say that humans are different and more special than all living creatures and we're entitled to special treatment because we're humans. Why does an infant have more rights than a dog in my mind? Because the infant is human. I'm human. All of us discussing this are humans and if another living thing has to die for a human to live, so be it.
Really? So if some alien race showed up that was not human, but was just as intelligent as humans, they would not have rights because they are not humans? I think you need to think this through more.
Spideynw: auctionguy10: My own subjective valuations say that humans are different and more special than all living creatures and we're entitled to special treatment because we're humans. Why does an infant have more rights than a dog in my mind? Because the infant is human. I'm human. All of us discussing this are humans and if another living thing has to die for a human to live, so be it. Really? So if some alien race showed up that was not human, but was just as intelligent as humans, they would not have rights because they are not humans? I think you need to think this through more.
That is a strawman Spidey. He left unsaid why humans have rights and animals don't. He was comparing infants to animals. You still refuse to acknowledge that infants (and invalids) are potential moral agents ("adults").
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
E. R. Olovetto:You still refuse to acknowledge that infants (and invalids) are potential moral agents ("adults").
Really? When did I ever refuse to acknowledge that?
E. R. Olovetto:That is a strawman Spidey. He left unsaid why humans have rights and animals don't.
How is asking questions a strawman? I was asking him to clarify exactly why humans have rights.
Spideynw:So you think it should be legal for me take someone to court on your behalf, without your consent?
We are talking about two different paradigms at the same time. Let's diffuse them, so we're clear.
In an anarcho-libertarian world, anyone should be able to take anyone to court for any reason, so long as the court decides the case is worth hearing. I don't think a court would hear a case where the victim did not consent -> this would cast doubt on whether or not there actually is a victim or an aggressive, immoral act. Nevertheless, I don't think victim's consent is necessary or even feasible in many cases. Think about murder. The victim clearly can't consent to bring the case to court.
In our statist world, things work differently. We don't need to bring a court case before anyone. We simply contact the police that someone is breaking the law. The victim's consent is considered in charging the aggressor, but it is not necessary.
But we're not talking about non-consenting victims - we're talking about victims that cannot effectively communicate whether they desire legal restitution and protection. In most cases it is plain to see that the victims did not consent to the aggressions committed against them. Animals certainly attempt to avoid pain. This is the basis of any animal cruelty case. No one expects a beaten dog to take their master to court - perhaps he even consents to do so but cannot effectively communicate such.
Spideynw:And most people think we need government education. How is what most people think relevant?
It isn't - that wasn't the point. The point is that a wide variety of people can clearly and consistently determine some acts as ethical and others as unethical without the need to explain themselves through universal, objective rules. Sure, this tells us nothing about the "gray areas". It does tell us that there is some common thought process that leads to similar conclusions.
Spideynw:Using what threshold? How are you deciding what is right and what is wrong to do to an animal? And who will enforce these "rights" in a voluntary society? And again, what right does anyone have to take someone to court over a supposed violation of his or her pet's rights?
Right and wrong will differ from individual from individual. Vegans get no benefit from slaughtering animals, and they may consider the process unethical. I like meat, so I consider it ethical when performed in a manner that prioritizes the minimization of the animal's suffering. Others may desire to watch animals squirm in pain.
Maybe economic interests can outweigh moral principles. If the above three mindsets decided they would fight to protect their interests, you'd likely see my group win. On consistency and principle, the vegans win - they do not think animals should be subject to any intentional suffering via human hands. Or the abusers win - they believe animals are their property to be used for their amusement with no other considerations. My position is the least principled, but likely the most desirable. People desire meat but they don't desire intentionally inflicting pain on animals, and they are willing to expend enough resources to see both of these ends met to a reasonable degree.
And in a voluntary society, the right to take someone to court is simply an extension of the right to property - I am simply using my property to hire a market service. The court itself is bound by no law either. It can overrule prior case law or adhere to it. It can create new principles or rely on old ones. Whether its ruling betters society or worsens it will be determined in time, and future rulings will take into account those consequences.
Spideynw:How do you propose "humans" decide what rights animals have? Majority rule? How is that possible in a voluntary society?
These are broad questions about what rights are, whether they are universal, and whether they come from law or from nature. Is a voluntary society one in which there are no criminals, no successful criminals, or no sanctioned aggression? If aggression is sanctioned, who has the authority to do so?
My point is that the "voluntary society" is not a product of law but will. Most people in this society must will universal property rights and their enforcement. Of course, some people won't believe in such, and others will curb their legal desires for personal gain as the situation arrives. The only means by which the "voluntary society" survives is by ensuring that such actions are rarely successful. Most people will expend resources to prevent such, directly (voluntarily funding the police) or indirectly (voluntarily funding an insurer, who subsequently hires police). In other words, the "voluntary society" is a society of majority rule. Only, it derives its power from the employment of resources, not voting systems.
If the majority sanctions some forms of aggression, you will have some forms of aggression.
Here's the bottom line.
A retarded son is not a family's play thing. Using him as a pin cushion or sex toy is almost definitely immoral to everyone, especially where we can see he explicitly expresses displeasure. We surely see no immorality in evidencing such actions or reporting them to authorities, nor is it immoral for authorities to forcefully intervene, removing this person from the abusive family's care and punishing them. Why should it be different for animals?
The largest difference in my eyes is that animals have traditionally been used as a means to serve human ends. We eat their meat and "steal" their labor. To some extent, such means can be substituted. As technology furthers, such will be more and more so. For example, cloning technology may allow us to grow meat, rather than raise animals, and in the process create meat more efficiently. Animal labor is largely unnecessary already.
It seems most people desire the middle ground. Animals should not be given full human rights and are still employable as means for our ends, like property; however, they retain some rights for ethical treatment, in which they are spared unnecessary pain and not employed towards certain ends that society considers immoral and illegitimate.
Spideynw: E. R. Olovetto:You still refuse to acknowledge that infants (and invalids) are potential moral agents ("adults"). Really? When did I ever refuse to acknowledge that?
Countless threads where you claim that parents own children as if they are a dog or rock, and thus have the right to rape and murder their children?
Spideynw: E. R. Olovetto:That is a strawman Spidey. He left unsaid why humans have rights and animals don't. How is asking questions a strawman? I was asking him to clarify exactly why humans have rights.
Strawman... lmao....
Actually, what you did was introduce the subject of aliens and all but make an argument for him that was unrelated. I don't expect better from you and probably won't respond to whatever nonsense you concoct next.
meambobbo:I don't think a court would hear a case where the victim did not consent -> this would cast doubt on whether or not there actually is a victim or an aggressive, immoral act. Nevertheless, I don't think victim's consent is necessary or even feasible in many cases. Think about murder. The victim clearly can't consent to bring the case to court.
True. So by what right does someone bring a case to court on behalf of the dead person? I am not saying there is not one, I just want to understand your reasoning.
meambobbo:In our statist world, things work differently. We don't need to bring a court case before anyone. We simply contact the police that someone is breaking the law. The victim's consent is considered in charging the aggressor, but it is not necessary.
But not for civil cases. So by what right does someone have a right to bring a case against someone else, for a civil dispute for a dead person?
meambobbo:Animals certainly attempt to avoid pain. This is the basis of any animal cruelty case. No one expects a beaten dog to take their master to court - perhaps he even consents to do so but cannot effectively communicate such.
And this is relevant how? Isn't killing an animal generally much worse than torturing it for a little bit? And doesn't an animal suffer pain upon death usually? Again, I have no idea what your threshold is for determining whether or not an animal's supposed rights have been violated.
meambobbo: Spideynw:And most people think we need government education. How is what most people think relevant? It isn't - that wasn't the point. The point is that a wide variety of people can clearly and consistently determine some acts as ethical and others as unethical without the need to explain themselves through universal, objective rules. Sure, this tells us nothing about the "gray areas". It does tell us that there is some common thought process that leads to similar conclusions.
The reason murder is wrong is because murder implies lack of consent. In other words, it is not just a majority of the world's population that thinks it is wrong, it is every single person, by definition. Consent implies ability to reason. Animals cannot reason, as such, they cannot be murdered, just like one cannot murder a plant. For something to be truth, it must be universal, not just a majority opinion.
meambobbo:Right and wrong will differ from individual from individual.
As I just explained, this is incorrect. Right and wrong are universal. Every single person in the world would agree that being killed without giving consent first is wrong. Every single person in the world would say that being forced to have sex without giving consent is wrong. Every single person would agree that stealing property is wrong. They are all wrong by definition.
meambobbo:On consistency and principle, the vegans win
They win? Really? So what do vegans propose to settle property disputes between animals and other animals and between humans and animals? How do they propose to settle disputes between meat eaters and plant eaters? No, they do not win, they fail. People who understand that animals do not have rights are the only ones that are consistent and "win" on consistency and principle.
E. R. Olovetto:Countless threads where you claim that parents own children as if they are a dog or rock, and thus have the right to rape and murder their children
Which means that I do not recognize the fact that children are potential moral agents how?
Oh yeah, and while you are bringing up your nonsense, I think it so funny how you live in a fantasy land that you think in a voluntary society, people can have their children taken from them legally before they have even gone to court.
Spideynw: E. R. Olovetto:Countless threads where you claim that parents own children as if they are a dog or rock, and thus have the right to rape and murder their children Which means that I do not recognize the fact that children are potential moral agents how?
Does this mean that you do now recognize this fact of human nature? What I meant to say was that you don't recognize that this means that children have a certain amount of basic, negative rights... Could this not be more clear?
A child, given certain basic needs are met and unforeseen accidents averted, will reach adulthood within roughly 1/5th of their lifetime.
A non-human animal, given the same, exhibits the potentiality of moral agency, as far as we know, only in the possibility that over many generations their species will become sentient.
Spideynw: Oh yeah, and while you are bringing up your nonsense, I think it so funny how you live in a fantasy land that you think in a voluntary society, people can have their children taken from them legally before they have even gone to court.
We've been over the moral and economic aspects of this issue before too. In short, a parent qua guardian can only "own" a child insomuch as it aids the child in reaching a state of moral agency. An abused child is then basically seen as unowned, and the legitimate guardian may then represent the child's interests in bringing a case against the aggressor.
None of your "arguments" about this have ever gone anywhere, so I don't feel the need to repeat myself, especially here in yet another thread about animal rights. If someone else is confused, feel free to ask.
Spideynw:So by what right does someone bring a case to court on behalf of the dead person? I am not saying there is not one, I just want to understand your reasoning.
Spideynw:But not for civil cases. So by what right does someone have a right to bring a case against someone else, for a civil dispute for a dead person?
I am not really talking about restitution. If you abuse your dog, I shouldn't have a claim to a monetary restitution simply by taking the case to court. Similarly, if a person is murdered and has no legal heirs, restitution is moot. Or if the heirs are themselves the killers... Society at large, however, is surely interested in justice and preventing moral hazards for the future violation of rights. Thus, it chooses to punish the perpetrator.
Anyone can bring forth the case. One logic might be that allowing rights violations in such specific cases sanctions further rights violations. Since everyone has rights and injustice threatens these rights, enforcing someone else's rights can legitimately be perceived as protecting one's own. A simpler logic is that people don't like injustice and choose to punish it...or people like punishing injustice.
For animals, I am talking more about protection. I believe animals have a right to be spared unnecessary pain. Thus, anyone can enforce that right on behalf of a dog. They could steal your dog from you vigilante style. This might cause further conflict, however. Courts are used as independent third parties who can wisely determine who is right and wrong and sanction force, such that conflict is reduced and justice is served, both in the current case and future ones.
To be clear, civil cases are not what I'm talking about.
Spideynw:And this is relevant how? Isn't killing an animal generally much worse than torturing it for a little bit? And doesn't an animal suffer pain upon death usually? Again, I have no idea what your threshold is for determining whether or not an animal's supposed rights have been violated.
I agree that torture is morally worse than death. I agree that death likely involves pain and the animal does not consent to it, which may be considered immoral. However, I think that such pain can be considered morally insignificant compared to the benefits, which do not take as much of a moral value as an economic one. I admit the moral inconsistency.
If you want a threshold, it is simply a judge's discretion per a given case. But it all breaks down. If the decision is unpopular, it may go unenforced, and it may be disregarded by future decisions. If it is unpopular and enforced, there may be violent protests and riots. Or the enforcement firm and court could go bankrupt. We can't firmly predict these things and determine what is best for any given society in advance by a set of universal rules and principles.
There may even be a utilitarian case against a moral foundation that has better principles. For example, we could claim it is morally correct to abolish taxation and government as we know it overnight. Yet, this would likely drive many people into panic or outrage, such that a lengthy era of violence would ensue. Perhaps there is a more desirable means from here to there, even if less moral in principle. (I do not necessarily believe abolishing gov't overnight would be a bad thing, but you can see the argument.)
I can only tell you my own subjective beliefs and that I employ resources to see that they are followed. If others employ greater resources such that practically my beliefs are unenforceable, I still would not consider the ruling order of the day moral, just as I do not consider democracy moral. Others, however, would see it as moral. Principles and methodologies can help create consistent visions of morality and help people change their moral beliefs, but the root of moral opinion is subjective and individualist.
Spideynw:The reason murder is wrong is because murder implies lack of consent. In other words, it is not just a majority of the world's population that thinks it is wrong, it is every single person, by definition. Consent implies ability to reason. Animals cannot reason, as such, they cannot be murdered, just like one cannot murder a plant. For something to be truth, it must be universal, not just a majority opinion.
It implies a lack of consent, from the point of view of the victim, I agree. But it falls back to property and self-ownership as the moral basis. We could then ask why property or self-ownership are moral. Ultimately, morality, like all human desire, is emotional, not rational. What is the rationality of survival, or of prosperity? There is none. We simply subjectively prefer them given alternatives, but there is no rational explanation why. There is no rational basis to explain why we dislike pain and enjoy pleasure - it simply is what it is. (Note - this does not mean I'm a nihilist, or a hedonist, or whatever else you might infer.)
I don't think animals can recognize the concept of life forms or that life is good in and of itself. Thus, they cannot consent to or argue against being killed. However, they clearly recognize pain and do not consent to it. I am not arguing for an animal's right to life, only its right to be spared unnecessary pain.
Note, this is different from simple response to stimulus. For example, a plant grows towards light. Thus, we could consider it desires light, and would not consent to being denied light. Yet, plants are outside of this discussion. They do not feel pain, because they do not have a nervous system. Maybe the difference is purely one of perspective, not fundamentals, but simply put, I have no empathy for plants' desires, whereas I do for animals. Note: I do not and never will "torture" plants. However, I view them solely as a means and not an ends.
Spideynw:As I just explained, this is incorrect. Right and wrong are universal. Every single person in the world would agree that being killed without giving consent first is wrong. Every single person in the world would say that being forced to have sex without giving consent is wrong. Every single person would agree that stealing property is wrong. They are all wrong by definition.
Yet, most of society believes it is moral for other people to pay taxes against their consent. Most people believe in moral duties, with or without the consent of the actor. (I do believe in moral duties; however, I do not believe they can ethically be enforced violently.) We could say most people's "morality" is simply wrong. Or we can simply say that others have different moral beliefs than ourselves.
Moral beliefs are not confined to the parties involved in a conflict, either. In fact, conflicting parties often seek 3rd parties to learn their moral belief about the particular case. The "losing" party may or may not drop the moral belief that was found in error. The beliefs of 3rd parties often play a greater role in determining our rights, or at least enforcing them.
A given moral methodology might tell you whether something is right or wrong according to that framework, but it cannot dictate a universal morality. There are many methods of determining morality, such as utilitarianism and deontological ethics. Also, we can judge by intentions or consequences. Or we can go by our gut. The methodological means are useful to attempt to universalize moral principles, but they cannot dictate morality.
If I accept moral methodology A and you a conflicting methodology B, we will arrive at conflicting moral judgments. Who is right, and who is wrong? One of us must prove the morality of our methodology. Now we're in a circular logic. We cannot determine the morality of the methodology by using the methodology upon itself. There must be subjective reasonings why we each chose different methodologies. One could even start with a moral belief and work backwards to create a methodology that finds such a belief as correct.
So while there is no "right" and "wrong", generally the moral structure favored by the majority of society will shape the legal arrangement of that society. Democracy may not be "right" from our perspective, but it is our reality, given the moral opinions of most of society on it.
Judging morality from owner's consent implies that property rights are always moral - that they trump other moral concerns. I don't think this is always true (however, it is so often true that I am indeed a libertarian). There can be cases where property rights are violated without immorality. Of course, this is only if you allow room for subjective beliefs on morality. If your methodology to determine morality is based upon firm property rights, their violations will always be deduced as immoral.
Also, moral judgments are the most conflicting for parties involved. Thus, morality shouldn't be dictated by the aggressor or victim so much as an independent third party. The victim surely feels his aggressor's act is morally unjustified - he does not consent to it. But a third party can disregard such if there are more pressing moral values.
Consider a man A who is trying to kill himself and is stopped by another man B. B has moral intentions, does not realize the man is trying to kill himself, etc. Basically, a third party completely exonerates him from any wrong-doing, even if A believes B improperly acted on his property against A's consent. So who is correct, A., B, or the third party? They likely all have different moral beliefs on the case. Can the judge determine who is right or wrong, or does he simply offer his own moral opinion? He may use principles to determine his opinion, but how can we be sure the principles themselves correctly determine morality? Ultimately, we simply agree with them.
Spideynw:They win? Really? So what do vegans propose to settle property disputes between animals and other animals and between humans and animals? How do they propose to settle disputes between meat eaters and plant eaters? No, they do not win, they fail. People who understand that animals do not have rights are the only ones that are consistent and "win" on consistency and principle.
I didn't mean the full vegan platform of giving animals all human rights wins. I simply meant that if you want the most consistent ideology, you either accept that animals should never be intentionally delivered pain, or that animals are the complete property of their owners and can be inflicted with pain to the owner's desire. Few people, however, would outright accept such an ideology, instead favoring the compromise position I advocate. Although their desires conflict (they want to eat meat but they don't want to harm animals), they seek to minimize the degree to which they do.
I don't believe wild animals should be given a right to freedom, property, life, etc. I believe they can (and in most cases should) be owned, and the owner should accept liability for damages caused by their animals. I just don't think owners have the right to purposefully inflict pain on their animals where can be avoided, although I do grant a limited buffer in using animals for common, non-controversial human ends, such as labor and food sources.
E. R. Olovetto:What I meant to say was that you don't recognize that this means that children have a certain amount of basic, negative rights... Could this not be more clear?
Me denying that children have rights is not the same as me denying that they are potential moral agents.
E. R. Olovetto:A child, given certain basic needs are met and unforeseen accidents averted, will reach adulthood within roughly 1/5th of their lifetime.
So will sperm and eggs. And you are advocating positive rights, which is completely un-libertarian.
Well when Aliens show up then we'll figure that out. But at the moment that's not the world we're living in. To me, Humans have rights just because they are humans. That's the only reason needed. I don't see the point in trying to figure out the rights of highly intelligent extraterrestrials when they're not here.
auctionguy10:Well when Aliens show up then we'll figure that out.
I guess we should wait until government disappears before we figure out what rights people have too, right?
Spideynw: auctionguy10:Well when Aliens show up then we'll figure that out. I guess we should wait until government disappears before we figure out what rights people have too, right?
Do you really think that's a good comparison? If so then would you mind explaining why? I think I have a vague idea of what you're getting at but I'd appreciate it if you made it more clear.
Aliens only exist in terms of the probability that the universe is so vast that there has to be some type of intelligent life outside of ours. I really don't see the point in discussing the rights of unknown species as intelligent as ours when currently there are none known to us. Is that the only argument against humans having rights just for being human? That there may be intelligent aliens?
There is an essay I pointed out to you before re: aliens. You still strawmanned him.
Spideynw: E. R. Olovetto:What I meant to say was that you don't recognize that this means that children have a certain amount of basic, negative rights... Could this not be more clear? Me denying that children have rights is not the same as me denying that they are potential moral agents.
I clarified what I meant, and all you are doing is repeating yourself and evading the original topic. Your claim that children have no rights undermines everything else you purport to stand for.
Spideynw: E. R. Olovetto:A child, given certain basic needs are met and unforeseen accidents averted, will reach adulthood within roughly 1/5th of their lifetime. So will sperm and eggs. And you are advocating positive rights, which is completely un-libertarian.
You are less of a libertarian than Glenn Beck and you have a serious misunderstanding to get that I am advocating "positive rights". Your signature with an exact percent and a vague concept of resistance is contrary to Austrian economics as well. The only reason I feel the need to respond to your lunacy is that you are a huge embarrassment to our community and I know of no acclaimed libertarian author that is in agreement with you.
Humans are not asexual. Sperm and eggs must be combined to create a zygote. Even if it were true that sperm and eggs should be considered potential moral agents, all we would be considering is the right to ejaculate or menstruate, a "wilding of our reproductive cells". People can create situations where positive obligations exist. This is the essence of contracts. By claiming guardianship, an adult must care for a child, otherwise their claim is invalid. If a parent wants to abandon their claim of guardianship, they must make this known (by whatever convention society adopts, say leaving the child at an orphanage or hospital). As is the case with other forms of property, the guardian may not forestall other would be homesteaders, for example by announcing that they relinquish their claim while locking the child in an unknown location.
Please respond in the relevant thread if you want to here.
auctionguy10: Is that the only argument against humans having rights just for being human?
I never argued that humans do not have rights. You however did assert that only humans have rights.
auctionguy10:I really don't see the point in discussing the rights of unknown species as intelligent as ours when currently there are none known to us.
Because just claiming a species has rights for being some species is circular. Why do humans have rights?
E. R. Olovetto:You are less of a libertarian than Glenn Beck and you have a serious misunderstanding to get that I am advocating "positive rights". Your signature with an exact percent and a vague concept of resistance is contrary to Austrian economics as well. The only reason I feel the need to respond to your lunacy is that you are a huge embarrassment to our community and I know of no acclaimed libertarian author that is in agreement with you.
You sure like to make a lot of assertions.
E. R. Olovetto:Even if it were true that sperm and eggs should be considered potential moral agents,
I hope everyone has as good of a laugh at this statement as I. Of course it is true.
E. R. Olovetto:all we would be considering is the right to ejaculate or menstruate, a "wilding of our reproductive cells".
No, using your logic, we would be considering whether or not ejaculating or menstruation is murder.
E. R. Olovetto:People can create situations where positive obligations exist. This is the essence of contracts.
Do you have evidence of a contract between parents and children?
E. R. Olovetto:By claiming guardianship, an adult must care for a child,
Which means a parent can do whatever he or she wants with his or her child. I am glad we finally agree.
E. R. Olovetto:As is the case with other forms of property, the guardian may not forestall other would be homesteaders, for example by announcing that they relinquish their claim while locking the child in an unknown location.
"Hear ye, hear ye! Let the mad rush begin for taking away these parent's child! The first person to nab the child get's the kid!"
Uh yeah, right.
meambobbo,
You did an amazing job at avoiding all of my questions. Your post is full of, well, nonsense.
Your questions were basically moot. That should have been evident by our first exchange.
You don't need a specific right to get a court case. Or I could point to any number of rights, like liberty or property. What does it matter at all?
As for a legal threshold, I said let judges decide for specific cases. As for my own opinion, I listed activities I agreed and disagreed with - anything further I'd have to decide on the specifics of the case. You're free to disagree with me, but I'm just trying to make sure you understand what I'm talking about.
My only assertions were that moral opinions/beliefs are subjective, and that they don't need a methodological backing to exist and function in society. Is that nonsense?
meambobbo:You don't need a specific right to get a court case.
That was never an issue. The issue is, how does one derive the right to take a case to court on behalf of another? The answer is only by getting consent or having a claim to the other. If your neighbor is not treating his animal like you think he should, how do you derive the right to take your neighbor to court on behalf of the animal? The answer is, you cannot, because the animal is unable to give consent for you to do so, and you have no claim on the animal. All courts would throw out the case, because it obviously violates the property owner's rights. So why would you take it to court in the first place?
But you are obviously uninterested in reality. Just spouting nonsense.
So let's try this. You have my neighbor in a cage in your basement. You've told me so, and you've told me you're holding him against his will. Only, I have no means to communicate with him, and he has not explicitly given me consent to call the police on his behalf. Or maybe you let me see him, but you've cut out his tongue, blinded his eyes, and cut off his hands, and he has no way to communicate with me. Maybe there's even a video of this, but it is edited where he cried out for help. Better yet, it's not my neighbor; it's my cousin, being tortured in your cage.
By your logic, you are not doing anything unethical, as he has not consented that anyone stop you. Or maybe you are, but no one simply has the authority to stop you.
Spideynw:But you are obviously uninterested in reality.
Realistically, people are quite in favor of humane treatment of animals. And they won't care about any libertarian code or non-aggression axiom if it fails to protect ideals they cherish.
Your idea of 'voluntary society' sounds like legislating strict, basic, libertarian law to me, which seems ironic. The libertarian way is not to legislate or centrally plan, expecting society to conform to your moral pronouncements, but to harmonize possibly conflicting plans non-violently and freely by those whom it concerns. This means that courts discover laws about effective means to resolve disputes.
Ansury:Those here who say animals are property and have no rights are basically proposing two distinct "categories": Human Rights - exclusive club, contract-ability required, human nature only No Human Rights - animals, trees, inanimate objects, anything non-human (would also include children and those with cognitive disabilities in some ways, such as the inability to engage in contracts) Correct? I'm trying to suggest that perhaps it makes more sense to think of three distinct categories: Human Rights - Considering the nature of man and the human condition, etc, unique to humans Sentient Rights - Animals who have morally significant interests because we regard pain and suffering as morally relevant Non-sentient (or we can't confirm sentience?) - physical property, trees, plants, etc. Sentient rights would be a subset of human rights which does not include concepts such as the NAP (no contracts, only humans can do this), but does include certain core rights. What those core rights would be, I've yet to think about.
I just wanted to point this out again and also add that there isn't any debate here (based off what I've presented) whether humans have more rights than animals or not; we do of course. But the question I'm posing is regarding whether humanity's code of ethics requires that all sentient beings be afforded some type of basic rights, non-inclusive of contract-based human rights.
By the way, the aliens will fit in just fine given the ethics rules presented above, once we figure out what to rename the higher order set of rights.
I disagree with the reasoning on consent. Consent doesn't imply ability to reason. Expressing consent does, because it requires reasoning to find out whether one consent or not.
If someone threathens me with a gun, I will most probably run away, fight or try to convince him not to shoot me. My lack of consent to be shot is obvious, but wasn't found through reasoning. It was more a consequence of an emotional response or survival instinct than of rationnal thinking. I could as well consent to be shot and this would be the result of my reasonning, because I would have figured out whether I consent or not.
My point is that consent or lack of consent can very well be implicit. Applying this to animals, it seems obvious to me that an animal that runs away or attacks in response to a threath lacks consent to endure consequences of this threath. Even some plants developped strategies in order to avoid being harmed (needles, poison, etc.). And so, to some extent, even some plants implicitly lack consent to being harmed or killed.
The Pavlov's experiment showed that dogs are able to refer to past experience to recognize a stimulus that makes him anticipate a future outcome (my understanding of conditioning). The process that makes the dog anticipate a future outcome is most probably not reasoning. Yet the dog anticipates and reacts. This basic combination is implicit consent (or lack of consent, depending on the reaction).
This reasoning would lead to the conclusion that the only "right" way of feeding ourselves would be through bodies which have adopted a survival strategy of being consumed (like some fruits and vegetables which don't have any mechanism of self-protection).
I eat meat...but I don't pretend to be "right". Do we have to act "right" regarding other species? I don't know. What I'm sure is that considering my ethical position on the subject, my action is either hypocritical or utilitarian. This to say that even if we prove that animals have rights, I don't see them being respected as long as the cooperation benefits of our mutual interaction with nature have not been clarified. (Would be much easier to figure out if we had those weird Na'vi connectors in our hairs ^^)
Spideynw: auctionguy10: Is that the only argument against humans having rights just for being human? I never argued that humans do not have rights. You however did assert that only humans have rights.
True.
Spideynw: auctionguy10:I really don't see the point in discussing the rights of unknown species as intelligent as ours when currently there are none known to us. Because just claiming a species has rights for being some species is circular. Why do humans have rights?
I only apply the claim that a certain species has rights just for being a certain species to humans. Why? Because I'm a human. That's it really.
auctionguy10: I only apply the claim that a certain species has rights just for being a certain species to humans. Why? Because I'm a human. That's it really.
Bad news. The aliens have landed, and they think the same way.
Even more bad news. Primates have evolved, learned to talk (Planet of the Apes?), and decided only they deserve rights because only they are their own species.
I think something more is needed, such as perhaps a contract-based justification for the "higher order" rights of man, such as freedom (vs "basic" rights of sentient beings), which makes much more sense to me. (Not that this justification would negate the justification for respect of sentient beings that are unable to understand and abide by contracts.) Still hashing this out but I don't feel this is an either/or issue where we simply draw up two categories and say "rights"/"no rights". I think it's much more complicated than that.
auctionguy10: Aliens only exist in terms of the probability that the universe is so vast that there has to be some type of intelligent life outside of ours. I really don't see the point in discussing the rights of unknown species as intelligent as ours when currently there are none known to us. Is that the only argument against humans having rights just for being human? That there may be intelligent aliens?
Seriously though, I'd say aliens' rights is a valid thing to ask about because if we're going to justify human rights based on some principle, that principle should be consistently applicable in all circumstances regardless of the specific context. I can't see how a principle could be valid if it would clearly need to be re-evaluated in light of unexpected events. If aliens did get to the planet some day , I'd wager that most people (excluding out-of-control governments) would agree that these sentient, contract-abiding, moral agents would be entitled to the same rights as humans. So "rights are only for humans" doesn't sound like the whole story.
Ansury: auctionguy10: Aliens only exist in terms of the probability that the universe is so vast that there has to be some type of intelligent life outside of ours. I really don't see the point in discussing the rights of unknown species as intelligent as ours when currently there are none known to us. Is that the only argument against humans having rights just for being human? That there may be intelligent aliens? Seriously though, I'd say aliens' rights is a valid thing to ask about because if we're going to justify human rights based on some principle, that principle should be consistently applicable in all circumstances regardless of the specific context. I can't see how a principle could be valid if it would clearly need to be re-evaluated in light of unexpected events. If aliens did get to the planet some day , I'd wager that most people (excluding out-of-control governments) would agree that these sentient, contract-abiding, moral agents would be entitled to the same rights as humans. So "rights are only for humans" doesn't sound like the whole story.
Have any of you bothered to read anything on the subject? The "Rights" of Animals - MNR. As always he preempts the possible counter arguments.
"That the concept of a species ethic is part of the nature of the world may be seen, moreover, by contemplating the activities of other species in nature. It is more than a jest to point out that animals, after all, don't respect the "rights" of other animals; it is the condition of the world, and of all natural species, that they live by eating other species. Inter-species survival is a matter of tooth and claw. It would surely be absurd to say that the wolf is "evil" because he exists by devouring and "aggressing against" lambs, chickens, etc. The wolf is not an evil being who "aggresses against" other species; he is simply following the natural law of his own survival. Similarly for man. It is just as absurd to say that men "aggress against" cows and wolves as to say that wolves "aggress against" sheep. If, furthermore, a wolf attacks a man and the man kills him, it would be absurd to say either that the wolf was an "evil aggressor" or that the wolf was being "punished" for his "crime." And yet such would be the implications of extending a natural-rights ethic to animals. Any concept of rights, of criminality, of aggression, can only apply to actions of one man or group of men against other human beings.
What of the "Martian" problem? If we should ever discover and make contact with beings from other planets, could they be said to have the rights of human beings? It would depend on their nature. If our hypothetical "Martians" were like human beings — conscious, rational, able to communicate with us and participate in the division of labor — then presumably they too would possess the rights now confined to "earthbound" humans.[2]
But suppose, on the other hand, that the Martians also had the characteristics, the nature, of the legendary vampire, and could only exist by feeding on human blood. In that case, regardless of their intelligence, the Martians would be our deadly enemy and we could not consider that they were entitled to the rights of humanity. Deadly enemy, again, not because they were wicked aggressors, but because of the needs and requirements of their nature, which would clash ineluctably with ours.
There is, in fact, rough justice in the common quip that "we will recognize the rights of animals whenever they petition for them." The fact that animals can obviously not petition for their "rights" is part of their nature, and part of the reason why they are clearly not equivalent to, and do not possess the rights of, human beings.[3] And if it be protested that babies can't petition either, the reply of course is that babies are future human adults, whereas animals obviously are not.[4]
[2] Cf. the brief discussion of man and comparable creatures in John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1965), p. 291.
[3] For the close connection between the use of language and the human species, see Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: Macmillan, 1958), vol. 2, pp. xi, 223.
[4] A fundamental error, then, of the advocates of "animal rights" is their failure to identify — or even to attempt to identify — the specific nature of the species man, and hence the differences between human beings and other species. Failing to think in such terms, they fall back on the shifting sands of subjective feelings. See Tibor R. Machan, Human Rights and Human Liberties (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975), pp. 202–3, 241, 1245ff., 256, 292. For a critique of the confusion between babies and animals by animal-rightists, see R.G. Frey, Interests and Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 22ff. Frey's book is a welcome recent critique of the animal-rights vogue in philosophy.
Well that certainly makes a strong point. I'll have to think about it some more; my thought process is based purely on ethics and that which humans consider morally relevant, but he seems to take an entirely different approach. One problem is that there remains a clear difference between inanimate property and a sentient being but that difference never seems to be addressed.