I have always considered myself a Misesian utilitarian libertarian, but after reading Rothbard's For a New Liberty, I have begun to question that stance.
What arguments for natural rights are your favorite? Can anybody suggest any other books that I should read?
My favorite argument is the same as the Declaration of Independence - natural rights are inalienable. There is no way to infringe natural rights, only man made rights may be infringed upon. That is why I'm and anarchist. Anarchism is not a political system - it is a discription of the fact that natural rights are inalienable. All statist systems, which exist over every person who interacts with others, occur within the confines of a reality which is comprised of anarchy. Anarchy is to politics as physics is to baseball. It is a description of the distribution of natural rights.
I think you should read "The economics and ethics of private property" - Hans-Hermann Hoppe. It really drives home the emportance of converting the state system into the controlled burn of pure economic governance. Milton Friedman said that capitalism is necessary for freedom, but not sufficiant. But, what are the limits to a capitalist social order? How much coercion is necessary to sustain free markets? Governance is all about property rights, and Hoppe's book investigates the edges of the intersection of property rights, the distribution of goods and services, and the law.
miksirhc: What arguments for natural rights are your favorite?
What arguments for natural rights are your favorite?
Self evidence.
Only I can control my actions. My self determination is inalienable.
The only alternative to natural rights and self ownership is someone else owning me. (If no one else tries to claim ownsership over me, I am self owning by default; in practice, if not in name.)
Universal self ownership is the only possible equal protection under the law. The only alternative is slavery.
Peace
Inquisitor:I haven't read their works yet, but I think Veatch's Rational Man, Rasmussen's and den Uyl's The Norms of Liberty and Liberty and Nature and of course Rand's The Virtue of Selfishness are good places to look to. Maybe even Aquinas.
To what Inquisitor wrote, I would add the following:
Douglas Rasmussen's "A Groundwork for Rights: Man's Natural End" in JLS - argues that man's natural end is the proper foundation for rights and that human action must be understood in light of an ultimate end.
Roderick Long's Reason and Value: Aristotle versus Rand in which he critiques Rand on some things and puts forth Aristotle as a better alternative.
Long's "Slavery Contracts and Inalienable Rights" - in my dissertation, I'm extending his argument against slavery contracts to the state.
Long's "Why Does Justice Have Good Consequences?" - demonstrates the praxeological instability of rule-consequentialism, among other things.
And to plug myself, the working draft of one of the chapters of my dissertation on Aristotelian libertarianism. In this chapter I attempt to synthesize the differing accounts of rights provided by Ramussen/Den Uyl and Long.
I favor the burgeoning tradition of Aristotelian liberalism/libertarianism which can provide an integrated theory of virtue ethics and natural rights that allows for a robust but highly individualized conception of the good while protecting the absolute liberty of the individual.
For more on Aristotle himself, and the roots of liberalism in his thought, I recommend Fred D. Miller, Jr.'s Nature, Justice and Rights in Aristotle's Politics and Roderick Long's amendment to it, "Aristotle's Conception of Freedom" (Review of Metaphysics 49 (1996), pp. 775-802; also see his website, it's been reprinted in an anthology too). There's a lot of other good stuff by Long online and off too, both on Aristotle and aspects of Aristotelian libertarianism.
Yours in liberty,Geoffrey Allan Plauché, Ph.D.Adjunct Instructor, Buena Vista UniversityWebmaster, LibertarianStandard.comFounder / Executive Editor, Prometheusreview.com
Also in JLS there is Douglas Den Uyl's "In Defense of Natural End Ethics: A Rejoinder to O'Neil and Osterfeld."
miksirhc: I have always considered myself a Misesian utilitarian libertarian, but after reading Rothbard's For a New Liberty, I have begun to question that stance. What arguments for natural rights are your favorite? Can anybody suggest any other books that I should read?
You liked Rothbard on natural rights? Then why not ask Rothbard who he recommends :)
"Prof. Hans Hoppe, a fairly recent immigrant from West Germany, has brought an enormous gift to the American libertarian movement. In a dazzling breakthrough for political philosophy in general and for libertarianism in particular, he has managed to transcend the famous is/ought, fact/value dichotomy that has plagued philosophy since the days of the scholastics, and that had brought modern libertarianism into a tiresome deadlock. Not only that: Hans Hoppe has managed to establish the case for anarcho-capitalist-Lockean rights in an unprecedentedly hardcore manner, one that makes my own natural law/natural rights position seem almost wimpy in comparison."
...
"Hoppe's most important breakthrough has been to start from standard praxeological axioms (e.g., that every human being acts, that is, employs means to arrive at goals), and, remarkably, to arrive at a hard-nosed anarcho-Lockean political ethic. For over thirty years I have been preaching to the economics profession that this cannot be done : that economists cannot arrive at any policy conclusions (e.g., that government should do X or should not do Y) strictly from value-free economics. In order to come to a policy conclusion, I have long maintained, economists have to come up \nth some kind of ethical system. Note that all branches of modern "welfare economics" have attempted to do just that: to continue to be "scientific" and therefore value-free, and yet to make all sorts of cherished policy pronouncements (since most economists would like at some point to get beyond their mathematical models and draw politically-relevant conclusions). Most economists would not be caught dead with an ethical system or principle, believing that this would detract from their "scientific" status.
"And yet, remarkably and extraordinarily, Hans Hoppe has proven me wrong. He has done it: he has deduced an anarcho-Lockean rights ethic from self-evident axioms. Not only that: he has demonstrated that, just like the action axiom itself, it is impossible to deny or disagree with the anarcho-Lockean rights ethic without falling immediately into self-contradiction and self-refutation. In other worlds, Hans Hoppe has brought to political ethics what Misesians are familiar with in praxeology and Aristotelian-Randians are familiar with in metaphysics: what we might call "hard-core axiomatics. " It is self contradictory and therefore self-refuting for anyone to deny the Misesian -xiom (that everyone acts), since the very attempt to deny ith is itself an action. It is self contradictory and therefore self-refuting to deny the Randian axiom of consciousness, since some consciousness has to be making this attempt at denial. For if someone cannot attempt to deny a proposition without employing it, he is not only caught in an inextricable self-contradiction; he is also granting to that proposition the status of an axiom.'"
"Nevertheless, by coming out with a genuinely new theory (amazing in itself,considering the long history of political philosophy) Hoppe is in danger of offending all the intellectual vested interests of the libertarian camp..."
"Hoppe has lifted the American movement out of decades of sterile debate - and deadlock, and provided us a route for future development of the libertarian discipline."
http://hanshoppe.com/publications/liberty_symposium.pdf
Google Hoppe and "argumentation ethics". You should come across one of several defenses of his thesis, and more than a few discussions of it.
Hehe it's really embarrassing that Rothbard said that, eh?
Donny with an A: Hehe it's really embarrassing that Rothbard said that, eh?
How so?
Donny with an A:Hehe it's really embarrassing that Rothbard said that, eh?
Hah! :D
Pauled, to plug my own work: On the Objectivity of Self-Ownership
Donny with an A:Pauled, to plug my own work: On the Objectivity of Self-Ownership
I'm not sure I understand what you just said, but my point was that it's embarrassing that Rothbard wholeheartedly bought into an intellectual framework with such obvious flaws. Are you arguing that my rejection of Hoppe's claims was premature?
gplauce, could you please paraphrase your hah! ?
kaxahdan:gplauce, could you please paraphrase your hah! ?
I thought what Donny said was really funny. I've been arguing with Paul about the deficiencies of AE for months now on a different forum.
gplauche, thanks.
now i have a penny for denny, as i'm just trying to digest your questioning the nexus b/w morality and owning. i think it's important. are you saying it is totally nonexistent, not even implied? isn't it a kind of coersion and hence "immoral" for a stranger to even use one's pen without permission?
kaxahdan:gplauche, thanks. now i have a penny for denny, as i'm just trying to digest your questioning the nexus b/w morality and owning. i think it's important. are you saying it is totally nonexistent, not even implied? isn't it a kind of coersion and hence "immoral" for a stranger to even use one's pen without permission?
I believe in the rights to life, liberty and property. I just think that Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics is flawed and can't be fixed.
I'm arguing that the idea of ownership, even self ownership, requires our acknowledgement of certain ethical ideas. Some ethical claims (e.g., murder is wrong) are relatively uncontroversial, but they are still normative in nature. Hoppe tries to get around making normative claims, as does Rothbard, but I don't believe they succeed, or that anyone can. Ethics is not a science which can be settled by appeals to empirical evidence.
Donny with an A:I'm not sure I understand what you just said, but my point was that it's embarrassing that Rothbard wholeheartedly bought into an intellectual framework with such obvious flaws. Are you arguing that my rejection of Hoppe's claims was premature?
Yes, i have to admit i had to ponder a while to identify your point, but that is the point i finally decided you were making and that is what i was responding to. I think that it is one thing to disagree with Hoppe, and to disagree with Rothbard's assessment of Hoppe's argument. But to express the sentiment that one thinks Rothbard's comments are an embarrassment to himself, should come, if at all, after one can first demonstrate he's grasped the argument in question and has a sound rebuttal to it. And you fail to do this with the link you provide. So i view your rejection as yes, weak, premature, and for you, an embarrassment.
Haha *blush*
Is there a particular part of my argument you'd like to object to? I'm pretty sure it's valid...
Donny with an A:Haha *blush*Is there a particular part of my argument you'd like to object to? I'm pretty sure it's valid...
According to what i saw in what you linked to, your argument is this: "Hoppe does not prove that we are morally justified in excluding others from attempting to control our bodies. To illustrate this, I would only need to tie you up and drag you off while you explained to me how I was violating your right to self-ownership"
His argument doesn't hinge on the assumption that a proof of the libertarian ethic must prevent violations of it. He has addressed this argument himself. What he does is prove that such violations cannot be justified. They cannot be justified because logically implied in the act of argumentative justification, is the presupposition that one is and must be an independent decision making entity, free to act and decide on the truth of any truth proposal presented for consideration. This necessary presupposition cannot be denied because to do so represents a performative contradiction that disqualifies itself. Argumentation presumes self-ownership. No argument can be made that denies self-ownership without falling into contradiction.
I'm sorry, but I think you completely missed my point. I'll try to reduce the argument to its bare bones components.
If P owns X, then it is the case that BOTH (a) P has the ability to control X, AND (b) P is entitled to exclude others from attempting to control X.
If P argues, then she presupposes that she controls herself, and perhaps even that she is entitled to control herself in the manner necessary for arguing. Accordingly, P's relationship with herself could very reasonably be held to satisfy (a).
There is no clear connection between P's arguing and (b); Q could attempt to control P without acting in a manner inconsistent with P's arguing.
In order to prove that P owns herself, Hoppe needs to demonstrate both (a) and (b).
Hoppe does a reasonable job showing that (a) is true, but not only does he not demonstrate (b), but it is unclear how arguing has anything to do with (b), and furthermore, there seem to be plausible alternatives to (b) which Hoppe doesn't address.
Therefore, Hoppe fails to demonstrate the objective truth of self-ownership.
Is that more clear?
Donny with an A: I'm sorry, but I think you completely missed my point. I'll try to reduce the argument to its bare bones components. If P owns X, then it is the case that BOTH (a) P has the ability to control X, AND (b) P is entitled to exclude others from attempting to control X. If P argues, then she presupposes that she controls herself, and perhaps even that she is entitled to control herself in the manner necessary for arguing. Accordingly, P's relationship with herself could very reasonably be held to satisfy (a). There is no clear connection between P's arguing and (b); Q could attempt to control P without acting in a manner inconsistent with P's arguing.
I think i follow your point. You are saying that there is no connection between P's arguing that Q has no right to coerce P, and the fact that Q can and will in fact coerce P. And so the fact that coercion is possible and that arguing doesn't change this or prevent it, argumentation is irrelevant to the justness of the coercion. Do you follow you?
It is an impossibility proof. It shows that it is impossible to argue in favor of aggression, without falling into contradiction. It does not claim that argumentation, or any propositional justification or proof of non-aggression can physically prohibit aggression. It acknowledges that aggression will probably continue to happen, despite that it cannot be justified. It merely shows that such aggression cannot be justified.
Nicely argued!
You provoke me to a meta-question, though: why is Q trying to justify anything in the first place? As soon as Q attempts to justify his coercion to P, he has already lost by admitting that P deserves an explanation.
Disclaimer: I've always been a proponent of Hoppe's argument, since before I heard it. The justiifcation of my self-ownership has always been that nobody else can justify their coercion of me. More generally, my "right" not to be aggressed against is nothing more than everyone else's "no right" to aggress against me.
--Len.
Len! Nice to have you back!
Pauled, you again seem to be missing my point. I never said that someone would be justified in coercing someone. Hoppe needs to show that (b), in my earlier post, is presupposed by a person who argues. That isn't true. Is it?
Keep in mind what it means to deny (b). It means that without being committed to anything which is inconsistent with the ideas presupposed in argumentation, one can hold some view which says that there are at least some circumstances in which you would be justified in attempting to control someone else when they weren't, at that moment, attempting to control you. To be clear, I'm not denying (b) as part of my argument. I will note that affirming (b) requires you to say that you would never be justified in using force except in self defense at the moment of an attack; punishment and exacting retribution would be strictly out, unless you would say that one's right to self ownership disappears once one commits an infraction, and in that case Hoppe would need to show a lot more than what he does (at least in his book, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property).
Len Budney:Nicely argued!You provoke me to a meta-question, though: why is Q trying to justify anything in the first place? As soon as Q attempts to justify his coercion to P, he has already lost by admitting that P deserves an explanation.Disclaimer: I've always been a proponent of Hoppe's argument, since before I heard it. The justiifcation of my self-ownership has always been that nobody else can justify their coercion of me. More generally, my "right" not to be aggressed against is nothing more than everyone else's "no right" to aggress against me. --Len.
As you know, the argument is merely that it is impossible for Q to justify his aggression, and you are correct - the attempt at a justification implicitly acknowledges as valid all that is implied in the attempt at a justification, and implicitly rules out all that contradicts such presuppositions. As to why he would attempt a justification: there is only one reason: he intends to live in a civilized manner and recognizes by reason that this is accomplished by living according to what can be argumentatively justified. Beyond that he may wish to claim ownership in something for himself, and claim the right not to be murdered. But even if none of these things are of interest to him, and he is in fact entirely disinterested in justice and argumentative justification, and he acts accordingly, he is in fact, by nature, nothing better or worse than a lower animal such as a potentially dangerous wolf or mountain lion, subject to the same technical considerations regarding the application of violence against him. That is, killing him or the wolf, are both of equal moral weight, as neither will, in principle, ever ask for, nor offer, a justification for violent actions.
Donny with an A:Pauled, you again seem to be missing my point. I never said that someone would be justified in coercing someone. Hoppe needs to show that (b), in my earlier post, is presupposed by a person who argues. That isn't true. Is it? Keep in mind what it means to deny (b). It means that without being committed to anything which is inconsistent with the ideas presupposed in argumentation, one can hold some view which says that there are at least some circumstances in which you would be justified in attempting to control someone else when they weren't, at that moment, attempting to control you. To be clear, I'm not denying (b) as part of my argument. I will note that affirming (b) requires you to say that you would never be justified in using force except in self defense at the moment of an attack; punishment and exacting retribution would be strictly out, unless you would say that one's right to self ownership disappears once one commits an infraction, and in that case Hoppe would need to show a lot more than what he does (at least in his book, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property).
I think my reply addresses b) which is that a person has or assumes a right to exclusive control over his body. I answered this here: Implied in argumentation "is the presupposition that one is and must be an independent decision making entity, free to act and decide on the truth of any truth proposal presented for consideration." When one argues, he both presumes the right and recognizes the fact that he must be independent - that is that he maintains during argumentation exclusive control over his person. Otherwise he is not independent and is not in a position to voluntarily agree with or disagree with another's truth proposition - and in that case, he is not truly engaged in argumentation.
And this is undeniable. Because for anyone to open his mouth and utter an argument or proposition that is in contradiction to this, demonstrates implicitly that he adheres precisely to the opposite of what he is claiming. And to do so is a performative contradiction, it is logically equivalent to the claim "I cannot make a claim". It is false as it is being uttered and hence it is unjustified.
You may be alluding to a discussion on Stephan Kinsella's Estoppel, which is essentially implied in AE, although not elaborated in it. AE deals with the question of the validity of the initiation of violence, or threat of violence and its implications on the institution of property rights, homesteading, and voluntary property transfer. Estoppel discusses what is implied when property rights are violated when unjustified violence is initiated.
I'm shifting away from Kantianism, but even so, I thought this proof of self-ownership by Hoppe goes nicely with AE.
I think anyone interested in ethical arguments should listen to this series of lectures by Dr Long.
I don't need exclusive control of my body in order to argue. I need exclusive control of it to the extent that I can continue arguing, but that's not what Hoppe says. If I tie you up and drag you off, I've done nothing to stop you from arguing. That was the point of the example.
But it also doesn't demonstrate that I ought not to stop you from arguing just because you presupposed that you would be able to argue. Walking presupposes that you'll have exclusive control of your body such that you'll be able to go to the place that you are walking to. But if you unknowingly walk onto my land, I might still escort you out (forcefully, if necessary!), even though I acknowledge what it feels like to not be able to walk somewhere I intended to walk to. The fact that certain intentions are frustrated by interference doesn't mean that one has a right not to have her intentions frustrated.
Donny with an A:I don't need exclusive control of my body in order to argue.
Donny with an A:I need exclusive control of it to the extent that I can continue arguing
Maybe i'm just missing the distinction, but to me it seems you first must decide which of the two positions above you hold.
Donny with an A: If I tie you up and drag you off, I've done nothing to stop you from arguing. That was the point of the example.
Again, the arguer, to truly engage in argumentation must logically presuppose certain conditions, facts and norms. Whether these conditions are empirically and in fact in play when he attempts to make his argument is another thing. It is also irrelevant. If the presuppositions of argumentation are not in play, then true argumentation is simply not taking place. If the aggressor at some point attempts to justify his tying us up and dragging us off, it will be in an argumentative justification. And at that point, he will find himself necessarily implicitly accepting the very peaceful and cooperative norms he claims to reject, while he attempts his justification. And this is what will logically rule out his ability to justify his aggressive actions of tying someone up and dragging him off.
Donny with an A:But it also doesn't demonstrate that I ought not to stop you from arguing just because you presupposed that you would be able to argue. Walking presupposes that you'll have exclusive control of your body such that you'll be able to go to the place that you are walking to. But if you unknowingly walk onto my land, I might still escort you out (forcefully, if necessary!), even though I acknowledge what it feels like to not be able to walk somewhere I intended to walk to. The fact that certain intentions are frustrated by interference doesn't mean that one has a right not to have her intentions frustrated.
AE does not come at it from this direction. It simply states you can't justify aggression. If you try, you will find yourself implicitly accepting the opposite of what you claim. You will fall into contradiction at that moment. It does not claim that you ought to justify your actions, that you ought to live by what is justified, or that you ought to care about justice. It merely claims that you cannot justify aggression, or any norms contradictory to the libertarian norms, which are all implicit in argumentation.
Inquisitor:I'm shifting away from Kantianism, but even so, I thought this proof of self-ownership by Hoppe goes nicely with AE.
I agree. I really liked that article by Kinsella. Hoppe and Kinsella are way up there, in my books, as the great Austrian property and ethical theorists of our time.
This reminds me of the famous argument between Socrates and Jones. And yes, I am a huge douchebag for doing this, but hopefully some of you will find it as amusing as I do. Without further ado, the famous, centuries old debate:
Socrates: "I've had it with those darn crows eating all my corn! Oh yea, by the way, I grow corn now. Jones, I need you to go out in the field for me to scare away the crows. They won't come near if you're out in the field."
Jones: "No way, Socrates! I don't want to guard your corn."
Socrates: "Fine, then. What if I just tie you up and mount you on a pole in my field? That would scare the crows away too."
Jones: "I suppose you could do that, but it wouldn't be right."
Socrates: "This has nothing to do with right and wrong. You can try to stop me if you'd like. But I don't see any reason why your interest in not being tied up is inherently more important than my interest in scaring away the crows, such that I would be wrong to try to scare off the crows at the expense of you being tied up."
Jones: "But don't you see? You're arguing that you aren't wrong in trying to tie me up! In order to argue, you must presuppose that you have the right of self-ownership, which includes the right not to be tied up. As ethical systems, by their nature, should apply to all people, your act of arguing demonstrates that you would be wrong not to accept my right to self-ownership. Accordingly, you ought not to try to tie me up."
Socrates: "Hold on, Jones. You're getting ahead of yourself. Let's get out in the open that I agree that ethical systems should apply to all people; if I have the right to self-ownership, then you do too. We agree on that, right?"
Jones: "Yes. And by arguing, you demonstrate that own yourself. Therefore, I own myself, and you shouldn't tie me up."
Socrates: "I don't think so. I don't need to own myself in order to argue. If you wanted to scare crows away, you would be perfectly within your limits to try to tie me up, and I would be just as well within my limits to try to stop you."
Jones: "But that's not what I said. If you didn't own yourself, you would certainly be able to argue, but you would have no right to do so."
Socrates: "When you say that I would have "no right to argue," do you mean that I would not be justified in attempting to argue if I didn't own myself, or that other people would have no duty to let me argue without interfering?"
Jones: "What's the difference, Socrates?"
Socrates: "Well, for starters, the second one is false. I don't need to presuppose that I will succeed in arguing in order to try to argue. In a few minutes, I will try to tie you up. If you didn't act to stop me, I am reasonably certain that I would succeed. But perhaps your interference will cause me to fail. That doesn't mean that it is somehow inconsistent of me to try to tie you up, does it?"
Jones: "I guess not. But that doesn't mean that you would be justified in tying me up!"
Socrates: "Well no, not if "being justified" means that I have the right not to be interfered with. Just as it's okay for me to try to tie you up, it's okay for you to try to stop me. To argue otherwise would be contradictory. But as I said, when I argue, I don't need to presuppose that I have the right not to be interfered with."
Jones: "Okay, so what's your point?"
Socrates: "Earlier you said that if I didn't own myself, I wouldn't have the right to argue. If when you say "have the right to argue," you mean that I have the right to not be interfered with, then it's true that if I didn't own myself, then I wouldn't have the right to argue. But just as I don't need to presuppose such a right in order to try to tie you up, I don't need to presuppose that I have such a right in order to try to argue."
Jones: "Okay, but what if we define "right" a different way? You suggested an alternative way earlier, didn't you?"
Socrates: "That's right, Jones, I did. You said that if I didn't own myself, I would have no right to argue, and I wondered if you meant that I would not be entitled to try to argue if I didn't own myself. Is that what you meant?"
Jones: "Well what if it is?"
Socrates: "Think about it this way: if I am entitled to try to tie you up, then clearly you don't own yourself, right?"
Jones: "That's right."
Socrates: "But even if I am entitled to try to tie you up, surely you are entitled to try to stop me, right?"
Jones: "I think that's clearly true, Socrates."
Socrates: "So in the same way, if you are entitled to try to stop me from arguing, then clearly I don't own myself. But even if you are entitled to try to stop me from arguing, I am surely entitled to try to argue. Therefore, I need not own myself in order to be entitled to try to argue."
Jones: "But..."
Socrates: "But nothing. My arguing is in no way inconsistent with my view that I do not own myself, and that you do not own yourself either. Accordingly, I think I'll tie you up now."
Jones: "Bummer."
THE END
Donny,
That was damned hilarious. I like your sense of humor.
And i was with Jones until here:
Donny with an A: "But even if I am entitled to try to tie you up, surely you are entitled to try to stop me, right?" Jones: "I think that's clearly true, Socrates."
"But even if I am entitled to try to tie you up, surely you are entitled to try to stop me, right?"
I don't see how this follows.
But regardless, that debate was really really funny.
Donny with an A:And yes, I am a huge douchebag for doing this, but hopefully some of you will find it as amusing as I do. Without further ado, the famous, centuries old debate:
And i will have to add, that i think this post was funny and polite. In fact you've been very polite and non-condescending, this entire discussion. It's been a pleasure.
Thanks, Paul. Perhaps an analogy would help. Let's say we're playing basketball. It seems uncontroversial to say that you are entitled to try to win the game. But it seems equally uncontroversial to say that I am entitled to try to stop you. If I am entitled to try to beat you, then you don't have a right to win the game that is similar to the right of self-ownership. But it would seem odd to say that you have no right to try to win. Does that make sense?
The difference is rooted in two ways of defining the word "right." On one meaning, if I have the right to do something, then it means that I don't act wrongly if I try to do it. But on the other meaning, if I have a right to do something, then it means that you act wrongly if you try to stop me from doing it. I'm saying that argumentation does presuppose a right of the first meaning, but not one of the second meaning. And because Hoppe wants to justify self-ownership, which is a right of the second kind, he fails.
Before i answer that, i wanted to present my own rip off of your Socrates-Jones debate. It's not meant to be as much of a logical rebuttal, as just something i find really funny as well. Well, without further ado:
Jones: "That fellow has stabbed you in the back; has taken your silver, and he is now leaving you to die. That's not right!"
Socrates: "This has nothing to do with right and wrong. I might have tried to stop him if you had mentioned him sooner. But I don't see any reason why my interest in not being robbed and murdered is inherently more important than his interest in robbing and murdering me, such that he would be wrong to try to profit at the expense of my life."
Jones: "So then do you not want me to seek justice on your behalf?"
Jones: "Yes, and there is some objective or logical basis on which we can say he was not justified in robbing, stabbing, and leaving you to die."
Socrates: "I don't think so. If I wanted to rob and kill him, I would be perfectly within my limits to try to rob and kill him, and he would be just as well within his limits to try to stop me."
Jones: "I guess. But that doesn't mean that he was justified in robbing, stabbing, and leaving you to die!"
Socrates: "Well no, not if "being justified" means that I have the right not to be murdered. Just as it's okay for him to murder me, it's okay for me to try to stop him. To argue otherwise would be contradictory. But as I said, when I argue, I don't need to presuppose that I have the right not to be interfered with - or a right not to be murdered."
Jones: <Blank stare>.
Socrates: "Think about it this way: if he is entitled to try to rob and murder me, then clearly I don't own myself, right?"
Socrates: "But even if he is entitled to try to rob and murder me, surely I am entitled to try to stop him, right?"
Socrates: "So in the same way, if he is entitled to try to stop me from arguing, then clearly I don't own myself. But even if he is entitled to try to stop me from arguing, I am surely entitled to try to argue. Therefore, I need not own myself in order to be entitled to try to argue."
Socrates: "But nothing. My arguing is in no way inconsistent with my view that I do not own myself, and that you do not own yourself either. Accordingly, the universe is as it should be - I think I'll die now."
Jones: "But, before you do… So I guess I should not try to seek retribution for this, since no injustice has occurred?"
Socrates: "Just as he is entitled to try to rob and murder me, and just as surely I am entitled to try to stop him, you are just as entitled to seek retribution from him on my behalf."
Jones: "And yet i suppose he is just as entitled to deny any form of repayment for his actions against you?"
Socrates: "Of course. Duh!"
Donny with an A: Thanks, Paul. Perhaps an analogy would help. Let's say we're playing basketball. It seems uncontroversial to say that you are entitled to try to win the game. But it seems equally uncontroversial to say that I am entitled to try to stop you. If I am entitled to try to beat you, then you don't have a right to win the game that is similar to the right of self-ownership. But it would seem odd to say that you have no right to try to win. Does that make sense? The difference is rooted in two ways of defining the word "right." On one meaning, if I have the right to do something, then it means that I don't act wrongly if I try to do it. But on the other meaning, if I have a right to do something, then it means that you act wrongly if you try to stop me from doing it. I'm saying that argumentation does presuppose a right of the first meaning, but not one of the second meaning. And because Hoppe wants to justify self-ownership, which is a right of the second kind, he fails.
So let me go direct to the discussion of the concept of "a right". I understand that you don't see argumentation as demonstrating that one is "wrong" in trying to stop another from arguing. I agree with you. But I think AE totally side-steps the right/wrong question. It does not demonstrate and argumentation does not presuppose that one is wrong to prevent an intended argumentation from taking place. The focus is elsewhere. The focus is "justice" and "justification". While we do tend to see what is "justified" as what is "right/good”, right and wrong (good/bad) are outside of AE. Connecting justice to goodness is a subjective thing. What is not subjective, but is instead entirely grounded in reason, is justice. Logically, while one argues, this person must assume that he can argue, and that also, he is justified in arguing. It's a logically interwoven necessity. To argue is to demonstrate implicitly at least a commitment to the idea that arguing is a valid act for the person to engage in. This is all that AE recognizes and requires. All that comes out of it is that certain facts and norms that are consistent with those necessarily supposed in argumentation are logically justified. And just as you claim, it says nothing about the right or wrong of it. It is only when someone comes along and says something like "Hey, justice is good!" that we finally make the justice-goodness connection. Until then, AE is all about what is justified and what is not. That's it.
I'm sorry, but I can't see how you can talk about justice without making any value statement. The claim "Action X is unjust" seems to entail "Action X is bad."