@ AJ
Quoting from your link:
AJ: Hoppe: More specifically, as long as there is argumentation, there is a mutual recognition of each other's exclusive control over such resources. Here Hoppe can charitably be interpreted in one of two ways: Recognition = acknowledgment of the fact of "each other's exclusive control over such resources." Recognition = acknowledgment of each other's right of exclusive control over such resources.
Hoppe: More specifically, as long as there is argumentation, there is a mutual recognition of each other's exclusive control over such resources.
Here Hoppe can charitably be interpreted in one of two ways:
Actually, it has to be both.
It must be the first because for two people to have an argument and for it to count as an argument, both parties must be able to exchange propositions freely. If someone were to force or compel them to make wome proposition not of their own free will, but under duress, it wouldn't count as an argument, at least not one in which they are a participant.
It must be the second because each participant has entered into the argument of their own free will (again; or else it wouldn't be an argument), and are demonstrating their preference to be in an argument with that person. They also demonstrate, by logical extension, that they each prefer the other person to be in control of their own body and standing room, as these are the necessary conditions for an argument to take place. Hence, they demonstrate that they prefer the norm that their opponent in the argument have full control over their own body and standing room and that it is implicitly justified as it is the necessary norm for anything to be justified in any argument whatsoever. That is to say, for any proposition which is justified (demonstrated to be true), anything wich logically presupposes it is also justified. And rights are justified norms.
RothbardsDisciple:For the purpose of discussion, why should it matter only if it affects you?
For example, if you agree with me that "England exists" (i.e., it matters for your actions) then it matters to both of us, and we can talk coherently about England.
So it seems you are hinting at intersubjectivity (agreement on our subjective experiences), not objectivity. Why not just call it intersubjective value?
"Intersubjective valuation between you and me" means we both value the same thing. It could even be that everyone values the same thing - universal valuation. But that is not "objective valuation" - unless that is all you really meant by "objective" in the first place.
Why anarchy fails
AJ: Stephen:How can I be sure what you mean by objective, meaningless, or word, or anyone else be sure what you mean, unless it is already taken for granted that the concepts which these words denote are mutually understood/intersubjective/agent neutral/objective? Intersubjective - exactly. Intersubjective is different than objective. Intersubjective just means someone else agrees with you, or shares the same experience as you. If we define "objective" in that way, I'd be fine with it, but here it seems that people want to define it a different way.
Stephen:How can I be sure what you mean by objective, meaningless, or word, or anyone else be sure what you mean, unless it is already taken for granted that the concepts which these words denote are mutually understood/intersubjective/agent neutral/objective?
Intersubjective - exactly. Intersubjective is different than objective. Intersubjective just means someone else agrees with you, or shares the same experience as you. If we define "objective" in that way, I'd be fine with it, but here it seems that people want to define it a different way.
Ok; Necessarily intersubjective. Someone agree with you, but they don't have any choice in the matter, except to be in error, or be silent.
Better?
No, the geographical area of England exists independently of you or I or anyone else. It's objective. It doesn't matter whether we both "value" it or not, because I don't think that has anything to do with existence. You seem to think Man creates reality, which is patently false. Reality exists ere man can "invent" it.
"There is a reality" is a meaningful statement independent of human thought.
Well you're addressing two different sets of arguments.
One is that "objective" is a useless term, and the other involving Hoppe's AE. As for the first, yes "intersubjective" is better.
As for Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics, well for one thing the choice to be "in error" doesn't seem to have any negative consequences anyway, so why should anyone care even if that were the case? Normally being in error could result in death, like if you were in error about whether you were eating spinach or hemlock. But this kind of "in error" you speak of seems to be a very special kind where it would result in no possible negative consequences.
It is broken on every level.
Stephen:Actually, it has to be both.
If it has to be both 1 and 2 at the same time, Hoppe cannot go on to make his argument:
AJ: Recognition = acknowledgment of the fact of "each other's exclusive control over such resources." Recognition = acknowledgment of each other's right of exclusive control over such resources. Hoppe:It is this which explains the unique feature of communication: that while one may disagree about what has been said, it is still possible to independently agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement. Note that this implies Interpretation (1) above, and does not imply Interpretation (2). So far he consistently means (1); no equivocation yet. Hoppe:(Lomasky does not seem to dispute this. He claims, however, that it merely proves the fact of mutually exclusive domains of control, not the right of self-ownership. He errs: Whatever - such as the law of contradiction, for instance - must be presupposed insofar as one argues, cannot be meaningfully disputed, because it is the very precondition of meaningful doubt, and hence must be regarded as indisputable, or a priori valid. This still implies Interpretation (1), and not (2), because at best only the fact of "each other's exclusive control over such resources" need be presupposed, and only that fact cannot be meaningfully disputed. One could of course meaningfully dispute the right of exclusive control without pressupposing such a right. All that is actually required is presupposition of the fact, not the right. Lomasky may be wrong (or not), but in any case Hoppe must still intend Interpretation (1) here if Hoppe is to be interpreted charitably. Note that switching to Interpretation (2) without explicit reference to that switch would be a bald equivocation. So far, Hoppe is in the clear. Hoppe:In the same vein, the fact of self-ownership is a praxeological precondition of argumentation. Anyone trying to prove or disprove anything must in fact be a self-owner. If his argument is to coherently follow from what he wrote above, Hoppe must here define "the fact of self-ownership" as "the fact of 'each other's exclusive control over such resources'." And he must define "self-owner" as "one who has 'exclusive control over such resources'." Hoppe still clearly means Interpretation (1) above. Still no equivocation. Hoppe:It is a self-contradictory absurdity then to ask for any further-reaching justification for this fact. Required, of necessity, by all meaningful argumentation, self-ownership is an absolutely and ultimately justified fact.) From above, all Hoppe is saying here is, "each other's exclusive control over such resources" is an absolutely and ultimately justified fact. But the dear reader will note that this statement - taken at face value - does not imply Hoppe's argumentation ethics (right to exclusive control), only argumentation facts (fact of exclusive control). No, for Hoppe's purposes, the sentence will have to carry the implication that "the right of self-ownership is an absolutely and ultimately justified fact." Sadly, Hoppe can only achieve this by pulling the old switcheroo, by equivocating between Interpretation (1) and Interpretation (2).
Hoppe:It is this which explains the unique feature of communication: that while one may disagree about what has been said, it is still possible to independently agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement.
Note that this implies Interpretation (1) above, and does not imply Interpretation (2). So far he consistently means (1); no equivocation yet.
Hoppe:(Lomasky does not seem to dispute this. He claims, however, that it merely proves the fact of mutually exclusive domains of control, not the right of self-ownership. He errs: Whatever - such as the law of contradiction, for instance - must be presupposed insofar as one argues, cannot be meaningfully disputed, because it is the very precondition of meaningful doubt, and hence must be regarded as indisputable, or a priori valid.
This still implies Interpretation (1), and not (2), because at best only the fact of "each other's exclusive control over such resources" need be presupposed, and only that fact cannot be meaningfully disputed. One could of course meaningfully dispute the right of exclusive control without pressupposing such a right. All that is actually required is presupposition of the fact, not the right. Lomasky may be wrong (or not), but in any case Hoppe must still intend Interpretation (1) here if Hoppe is to be interpreted charitably.
Note that switching to Interpretation (2) without explicit reference to that switch would be a bald equivocation. So far, Hoppe is in the clear.
Hoppe:In the same vein, the fact of self-ownership is a praxeological precondition of argumentation. Anyone trying to prove or disprove anything must in fact be a self-owner.
If his argument is to coherently follow from what he wrote above, Hoppe must here define "the fact of self-ownership" as "the fact of 'each other's exclusive control over such resources'." And he must define "self-owner" as "one who has 'exclusive control over such resources'."
Hoppe still clearly means Interpretation (1) above. Still no equivocation.
Hoppe:It is a self-contradictory absurdity then to ask for any further-reaching justification for this fact. Required, of necessity, by all meaningful argumentation, self-ownership is an absolutely and ultimately justified fact.)
From above, all Hoppe is saying here is, "each other's exclusive control over such resources" is an absolutely and ultimately justified fact. But the dear reader will note that this statement - taken at face value - does not imply Hoppe's argumentation ethics (right to exclusive control), only argumentation facts (fact of exclusive control).
No, for Hoppe's purposes, the sentence will have to carry the implication that "the right of self-ownership is an absolutely and ultimately justified fact." Sadly, Hoppe can only achieve this by pulling the old switcheroo, by equivocating between Interpretation (1) and Interpretation (2).
Actually my last post wasn't very good. It is necessarily intersubjective, as in everyone must understand the same concept in the same way. It must be taken for grante that everyone has the same structure of logic. That there is no polylogism. That the same concepts mean the same thing to different people.
Hmm OK, I'm not sure what you're getting at now. Are you talking about AE or just about objectivity?
RothbardsDisciple: So it seems you are hinting at intersubjectivity (agreement on our subjective experiences), not objectivity. Why not just call it intersubjective value? No, the geographical area of England exists independently of you or I or anyone else. It's objective. It doesn't matter whether we both "value" it or not, because I don't think that has anything to do with existence.
No, the geographical area of England exists independently of you or I or anyone else. It's objective. It doesn't matter whether we both "value" it or not, because I don't think that has anything to do with existence.
I was just tying it back in with the original discussion on objective ethics, not talking about England anymore in that last question. If we are still talking about England, we can say it "intersubjectively exists," meaning we both deem the sensations we experience that we label "England" to be part of the set of sensations that matter to our future actions/anticipations. (As per my definition above.)
RothbardsDisciple:"There is a reality" is a meaningful statement independent of human thought.
It is circular. "There is X" = "X exists" = "X is part of reality." The only way to break out of that circularity is to refer to actual experience, as my definition does.
Objectivity. Sorry, this is somewhat confusing as we are having two arguments in the same thread.
OK, that helps but I'm still not sure what you are saying there. Are you agreeing with me or something else?
AJ: nirgrahamUK:In ethics, 'values' are propositions with weight attached to them. Someone that says 'being honest is a core value of mine' is not using value in the economic sense, but rather using is metaphorically to motivate the idea that he puts weight, or importance on such dictums/rules/norms/behaviours. This is quite different, and I wan't people to be aware of this confusion where the terminology is quite common in two spheres but quite different. I could perhaps agree that these valuations (the economic and ethical) are of a different nature. The thing I have a problem with is the nominalization (that is, to make into a noun) of the word "value." As long as value is used as a verb, it should be clear that only individuals can value. And maybe this is a key out of this debate: we can drop the objective/subjective line of debate and instead just look at individualist vs. collectivist analysis. What I am saying, I suppose, is that valuation is something individuals do, not groups. It is in that sense necessarily subjective - but to avoid the confusion that the terms objective and subjective bring, I can simply say that individuals value certain dictums/rules/norms/behaviors. Perhaps that would lay the debate to rest?
nirgrahamUK:In ethics, 'values' are propositions with weight attached to them. Someone that says 'being honest is a core value of mine' is not using value in the economic sense, but rather using is metaphorically to motivate the idea that he puts weight, or importance on such dictums/rules/norms/behaviours. This is quite different, and I wan't people to be aware of this confusion where the terminology is quite common in two spheres but quite different.
I could perhaps agree that these valuations (the economic and ethical) are of a different nature. The thing I have a problem with is the nominalization (that is, to make into a noun) of the word "value." As long as value is used as a verb, it should be clear that only individuals can value.
And maybe this is a key out of this debate: we can drop the objective/subjective line of debate and instead just look at individualist vs. collectivist analysis. What I am saying, I suppose, is that valuation is something individuals do, not groups. It is in that sense necessarily subjective - but to avoid the confusion that the terms objective and subjective bring, I can simply say that individuals value certain dictums/rules/norms/behaviors. Perhaps that would lay the debate to rest?
That's a very good point Nir. I think this is a good reason why it doesn't work to simply say that 'ethical values' are subjective because they are a subset of 'values'. 'Ethical values' should perhaps be called 'virtues' to avoid this confusion. The disagreement, then, is about whether virtues, statements about certain norms/behaviors with weight attached to them, are objective, i.e. subject to being shown to be correct/incorrect, or whether we can only say that virtues are a preference like aesthetic preferences and not subject to being proved correct or incorrect.
Or in Hoppe's words, whether statements about ethics are "truth claims" which "must be raised and settled in the course of an argumentation". AE only applies to these truth claims, so are ethical statements like "the NAP is the best norm" truth claims or not?
Question for Nir / Conza... if I were to make the statement that "Picasso paintings are beautiful" and you disagree and we have an "argument" about it, would this be an "argument" in the sense Hoppe uses that term? I mean, it's not like this is going to be "settled". One of us is not going to prove the other person incorrect. Even if I persuaded you to change your mind, neither of us would say you were 'incorrect' before.
Government Explained 2: The Special Piece of Paper
Law without Government
@RD
I see how it could look like I'm saying "we create our reality," but I'm just saying we cannot speak coherently about that which we cannot experience. It may sound odd when someone actually speaks in terms of only what they actually experience firsthand, but it is the only way to be precise in this discussion.
No. That "X exists" is the only way to break the circularity. Otherwise you are arguing with circularity that the world only exists because you create it. Which is circular. My argument isn't, because it is just a basic truth, or axiom. X=X; X exists.
But it is the only way to be precise in this discussion.
Why? Because it conforms to your biases rather than mine? I could just as easily argue that the only way to be precise is to accept the actual definitions of the words as per the OED, rather than creating your own, which don't make any sense.
@Graham Wright
If we use the word virtue, I sure hope there's a way to make it into a verb. "Put importance on" works for me, and apparently also for Nir. I can place importance on people not hurting others, for example.
Going on with our objectivity discussion.
Objectivity is simply necessary for any argument to take place. If the mind of A has a different logical structure than the mind of B, and understands concepts differently, they could not have an argument. There would simply be no way for either of them to know what the other means or what they are agreeing with or disagreeing with. The fact that they are arguing and can understand what the other means by A follows from B, regardless of whether or not they agree with the proposition, show that they both understand (inter-subjectively/objectively or whatever) What concept A means and what concept B means and what it means for one to logically follow from the other. Otherwise, neither of them would be able to justify anything to the other and there would be no point to arguing.
No, I am disagreeing with you that the word objective has no objective meaning. See above post.
RothbardsDisciple: It is circular. "There is X" = "X exists" = "X is part of reality." The only way to break out of that circularity is to refer to actual experience, as my definition does. No. That "X exists" is the only way to break the circularity. Otherwise you are arguing with circularity that the world only exists because you create it. Which is circular. My argument isn't, because it is just a basic truth, or axiom. X=X; X exists.
Keep in mind that we are trying to define the word exist, not make an axiom. We are trying to define the word merely for the purposes of communicating clearly, which I assume is your goal. Hence saying "X=X; X exists" just doesn't tell me anything.
RothbardsDisciple: But it is the only way to be precise in this discussion. Why? Because it conforms to your biases rather than mine? I could just as easily argue that the only way to be precise is to accept the actual definitions of the words as per the OED, rather than creating your own, which don't make any sense.
Because when we communicate we have to make sure we are both talking about the same thing. We have to have some confidence that when I say a word, you understand the same thing that I understand by it. We have to know what each other's words refer to before the discussion can even begin. The OED is not anywhere near precise enough to be useful, and that should come as no surprise considering it's just a catalog of everyday usage. If you don't like my definition, tell me why, and propose your own - one more precise than OED, one that is not obviously circular. Mine is, at least, not circular: it points to particular aspects of experience.
Hence saying "X=X; X exists" just doesn't tell me anything.
Why? It's just true, is it not?
And for purposes of commnicating clearly, I'm going to stick with the OED definitions in this case. So it seems we're at a stalemate, for I'm not going to accept your definitions (which objectively exist but are false), and you're not going to accept mine (which objectively exist but are true).
Stephen: Going on with our objectivity discussion. Objectivity is simply necessary for any argument to take place. If the mind of A has a different logical structure than the mind of B, and understands concepts differently, they could not have an argument. There would simply be no way for either of them to know what the other means or what they are agreeing with or disagreeing with. The fact that they are arguing and can understand what the other means by A follows from B, regardless of whether or not they agree with the proposition, show that they both understand (inter-subjectively/objectively or whatever) What concept A means and what concept B means and what it means for one to logically follow from the other. Otherwise, neither of them would be able to justify anything to the other and there would be no point to arguing.
It seems we are in agreement.
If you don't like my definition, tell me why, and propose your own - one more precise than OED, one that is not obviously circular.
The OED definition isn't circular, though, which I already explained. For objects "to have place in the domain of reality" is simply the way of the world. You seem to think you're the centre of everything, whereas nothing else exists, save for what you make of it. I contest this notion.
RothbardsDisciple: Hence saying "X=X; X exists" just doesn't tell me anything. Why? It's just true, is it not?
I can't know until I know what you mean by exist. Right now it's the same as if you'd written "X=X; X snorgelorp." The OED is, at face value without looking up any of the other terms, like "Snorgelorp is flibberitch, noobergat and zicklewomp." I mean, I do get the point the OED is driving at, and I am saying that the point it is driving it is close to my definition. I'm saying that my definition is functionally what people really mean when they say "exist," "real," "real world," etc. It's just that in everyday talk it is not necessary (and very difficult) to state it so precisely.
If you don't accept my definition and won't say why you don't think it's useful, then I guess yes we are at a stalemate. Or actually we haven't even begun to have a discussion yet, because we haven't even settled on any definitions.
AJ,
Do you agree/disagree with Murphy @ http://www.anti-state.com/murphy/murphy19.html ?
If you agree with Murphy, what is your opinion on morality? Do you side with Mises/Daniel James Sanchez?
Is anyone aware what Murphy's stance is?
Won't say why you don't think it's useful.
It's not useful because there is indubitably a reality beyond my or your perception.
Nielsio:Do you agree/disagree with Murphy @ http://www.anti-state.com/murphy/murphy19.html ?
I read that a long time ago and I recall thinking that M&C made some good points, but that it might be possible to work around them. I don't know that they really hit on any of the fatal problems with AE, so it seems like kind of a softball to me.
Graham Wright:if I were to make the statement that "Picasso paintings are beautiful" and you disagree and we have an "argument" >>about it, would this be an "argument" in the sense Hoppe uses that term? I mean, it's not like this is going to be "settled"
I think that beauty is not an agent-neutral term, so necessarily there is no sense in arguing whether picasso paintings just are beautiful. I think Picassos paintings are beautiful to me.. we could have a discussion where we try to persuade each other so that our subjective opinions are affected but I dont think there is any agent neutral truth about the beauty of picasso paintings that can be found.
We could have a proper argument about whether that there thing over there really is a picasso painting and not something else..... 'its a fake look at this', 'no you are wrong about that because of x' 'oh ok I see I made a mistake because I missed X, I agree with you now'. <-- this one requires interpersonal-norms
Graham Wright:"the NAP is the best norm" truth claims or not?
This would depend on what 'best' meant... If you mean something like,a norm is better than another when it can be asserted without falling into performative contradiction whilst the other cannot. then its a truth claim, because it would only remain to be shown that the nap can be asserted without falling into performative contradiction whilst any other cannot
However if by 'best' you mean 'i have the internal psychological state of liking it more than other norms', then its a truth statement still because it may or may not be true that you like it more or less than you like other norms ..
however if by 'best' you mean 'everyone should have the internal psychological state of liking it more than other norms' then that seems out of reach...
so too is you leave 'best' ambigious because then three different folks could consider the proposition in the three different ways laid out above and there will be no settling the truth of the matter since 'best' has been left as an agent-relative statement
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
RothbardsDisciple: Won't say why you don't think it's useful. It's not useful because there is indubitably a reality beyond my or your perception.
So my definition of "exist" is not useful because things exist?
Precisely. To say otherwise is circular logic.
I'm not sure you know what a definition is.
It's what is objectively in a dictionary, specifically that greatest of dictionaries.
I rest my case.
AJ: Stephen:Actually, it has to be both. If it has to be both 1 and 2 at the same time, Hoppe cannot go on to make his argument:
I read your repost and I don't see why he can't go on and make his argument. At worst, you show that he is not sufficiently explicit with his terminology and that his argument can be taken to mean different things at different points. If you interpret it one way, you can make the argument that he is just conflating. If you take his wording correctly within its proper context, then his argument is sound and robust.
To put it into my own words, the reason why argumentation implies that one has the right of self-ownership and the right to standing room is this:
For an argument to count as an argument, both participants must accept the property norm that they each have exclusive control over their own bodies and standing room. If any proposition is justifed at all, anything which logically presupposes it must also be justified. The norm of each participant having exclusive control over his own body and the standing room his body occupies must be assumed to be justified by both participants, otherwise no proposition could ever be, and there simply would be no point to arguing at all.
This is my restatement of the core of his thesis as I understand it. Now, is it possible to subject it to the same criticism? What I am asking is, does your argument address a systemic problem with his thesis, or is it only incidental to that particular formulation of it?
Haha, because of the circular idea that everything is subjective, and that there are not abstract, objective concepts. xD
AJ: Stephen: Going on with our objectivity discussion. Objectivity is simply necessary for any argument to take place. If the mind of A has a different logical structure than the mind of B, and understands concepts differently, they could not have an argument. There would simply be no way for either of them to know what the other means or what they are agreeing with or disagreeing with. The fact that they are arguing and can understand what the other means by A follows from B, regardless of whether or not they agree with the proposition, show that they both understand (inter-subjectively/objectively or whatever) What concept A means and what concept B means and what it means for one to logically follow from the other. Otherwise, neither of them would be able to justify anything to the other and there would be no point to arguing. It seems we are in agreement.
Cool.
Re: softball.
They do start with more softball objections, but go deeper as they go along. It appears thorough to me.
Also, my other questions?
Anyway, my whole point in a nutshell. There must be an objective reality which exists, otherwise you would have nothing to subjectively judge and analyse. It would be impossible and circular. If we are living in a dream, then that is the objective reality which we are subjectively judging.
Rothbard's Disciple -
"but the food still objectively and with certainty exists."
Is there a physical intermediary between the food and your eyes that you call light? How do you know the food exists when you believe that something has to travel between it and your retinas? What you are saying is that you strongly infer that the food exists because you are looking at it. This also implicitly assumes something about the definition of "existence," namely that existing things have the potential to influence other existing things. The food influences the light which influences your retinas. The assumption is that this all occurs independent of any thoughts about it.
"Also, let's say person X is eating lunch in England. I may not perceive it, but it is an the object of reality. And if I perceive it, that object of reality becomes the object of perception. (On which I may have many subjective thoughts, such that their meal looks delicious)."
Whether or not they are eating lunch in England in no way depends upon your thoughts or observation of it. If you observe them eating, your sensory faculties are somehow producing an image within your experience. That image is not the same thing as the people eating, you assume that if you think the facts about their lunch of not contingent upon your thoughts/observations. I can reinforce that by pointing to the general belief that there is some physical intermediary we call light which explains how the information about the objects traverses a distance. What we point to in perception, ie, a sensory observation, is assumed to be different than the "objects of reality" which are the way they are even though you aren't in England to attempt to verify it.
Existence in general is when you treat something in your experience as being a representation of something other than the immediate experience. I assume that the moon I imagine is not the "real" moon because the real deal doesn't care whether humans are there to look at it.
This forever severs us from the "facts of reality." We assume that there is a reality beyond our ideas and thoughts, and we infer things about that reality based upon what we observe. Our knowledge, ie, immediate experience, never meets "reality" but only the models we formulate to understand it. In the conext of physics, this demands that the qualities we apply to this external existence be imaginable. If I can't imagine what exists, and what is responsible for the explanation, then I can't imagine the explanation. If I can't understand unambiguously what "warped spacetime" means for example, then I have no ability to understand how or why the Earth is held in rotation by the Sun. What is it that pushes on the Earth? Does it have a surface? This has led me to conclude that the only inherent quality of a physical object is its shape. All the definitions of physics can be derived from physical shape (ie, that which occupies space) and space (formlessness, emptiness, nothingness), and as a result these definitions can be used consistently in the course of an explanation, or in connecting that explanation to the observations/evidence/experiments.
In the conext of economics, this demands similarly that what we are saying exists can be imagined. We can imagine the difference between a mindless robot and a sentient human being. The human makes value judgments, experiences profit and loss, consciously conceives of possible future states of affairs and consciously formulates means and a plan to arrive at the desired end, etc. I'm not sure how much Mises would agree with everything I am saying here, but I think the whole reason he was able to discover economic explanations was because he zoned in on that notion of "what exists." What is really out there? The concept of human action is just the picking out of the qualities inherent to an action, separating them and recognizing their distinctions. I imagine that this required enormoues effort on the part of Mises, but lucky for us once discovered it was easy to communicate. The facts of human actions are not open to us, we assume that they occur and that they entail certain thingsentering into the field of the actor's awareness, such as means, ends, planning, etc.
It's possible that physics and economics, although different in their assumptions about existence, share a common methodology. The often held critique against Austrian economics, ie, that it is unscientific because economic theory cannot be falsified or verified, holds no water in this world view. Explanations deal with existence, and the existence "out there" is assumed to be beyond knowledge, ie, one's immediate experience. Nothing about it can be verified or falsified, we can only attempt to formulate rational explanations for what we observe. I don't see why there should be any difference between economics and the physical sciences in this respect.