I have not read all the literature on ArgEth, but I believe that what I have in mind is different, yet is best labeled as ArgEth as well.
Standard ArgEth starts with claims that state that to have a discussion we must recognize each others' right to existence. It then goes from there (ie, I don't know how it goes from there).
I've read some convincing critiques of it (if I remember correctly), but I do not wish to address those right here.
Part of the following section will be a different color. This is so that you can safely skip it if you have read the following paragraph and agree with the conclusion:
I'd like to make the claim (though it's surely been made before), that although morality/ethics are subjective in their nature (as many of you believe), morality/ethics must necessarily be employed in any normative argumentation.
This is obvious because while positive analysis focuses on what "is," normative analysis focuses on what "ought" to be. What "ought" to be relies on some conception of "good." Nothing, however, is inherently "good" (because it ought to have been good before the existence of humans as well, and that simply makes no sense). Any argument of what "ought" to be can be reduced to something which supposedly should be because it is "good." There is some fundamental assertion about what is "good," which acts as the basis for all decisions. Since the decision of "good" is a subjective one created by the human mind and not existing outside of it, all argumentation boils down to this subjective decision of some inherently unmeasurable attribute "good."
One may argue that utilitarian theory tells us that you can be objectively increase the utility of society by allowing for voluntary interactions which are necessarily utility-maximizing (though I have recently come to disagree with this and will start another thread). Alright, but why is increasing the utility of society something desirable? Because it's "good." I can just as easily claim that it's "bad." Our culture and upbringing has taught us that people feeling better is a "good" thing, and people feeling worse (with no good cause), is bad.
Similarly, a natural rights approach will boil down "voluntary interactions" to an analysis of property rights. When we ask why property rights are required, we have no definition but to say that they are "good" and aggression is "bad."
Yet we'd like to have normative arguments. We'd like to be able to say "we should do this" as opposed to "stuff happens." Hence, we must necessarily choose some subjective value to be "good."
Applying this to the idea of objectively maximizing utility, we argue out of intuition that people feeling better is "good." This may in fact be a universally-acceptable assertion. However, utilitarian analysis claims that because interpersonal utility comparisons are impossible, the only way to objectively increase utility is to make sure that no one's utility is decreased. This means that we might have situations that are "immoral" where one million people would benefit greatly (in their perception), while another person suffers a minor inconvenience. Though a libertarian might not disagree with this, it is not very palatable to the public at large. They will then claim that in such cases objectively increasing overall utility is not "good." Instead, "social justice" is good. This itself is an arbitrarily-defined term, yet being a subjective claim, we cannot objectively argue against it being "good." We may at best scoff at it, but under the realities of a democracy, we have no way of solving this.
Thus, we see that we are reduced to "selfish" definitions of "good" which cannot be changed except through irrational appeal.
Now, this is the more important part:
In any case, any normative argument relies on subjective valuations of which we try to convince others.
The more interesting thing, however, arises out of a deeper analysis of this realization.
How do I convince others that my subjective valuation is better than theirs?
Well, assume I try to convince you in my "human right A" over your "human right B." Assume you accept my argument and are converted.
How did you become converted?
You have judged my argument through some judgment function of yours. This is not objective, as I have said before, because morals are subjective.
However, your judgment function overcame your previous subjective assertion of "good." That means that you had some greater, deeper idea of what is "good" or what can qualify as "good."
Hence, your idea of "good" was in fact deeper than what we previously thought your idea of "good" was.
Unless this process of going to deeper and deeper functions can happen indefinitely (which would mean your brain has infinite capacity for valuation functions that are indefinitely deep), you have a universal valuation function. This function may be individual-specific or may be universal to everyone.
Case 1: Individual-specific and random - this could be completely random and of no consequence. Either coded genetically or acquired during brain development. In fact, it may be simply some underlying "assumption" that your brain makes or some signal that happened to have caught on at some point.
Case 2: Individual-specific and meaningful - it could in fact be meaningful and acquired during brain development. Research has shown that the structure of the brain is too complex to be encoded in DNA and must instead be built "real-time" given the input we receive. As such, our brain is putty to be molded to whatever environmental stimulus we receive. Of course, this putty is placed on some skeleton of general brain functions coded in our DNA.
What this possibility entails is that some concept of morality we are taught early on sticks. I am not eager to accept this, as it appears that children's morality may change substantially during their lifetimes.
Case 3: Individual-specific and hereditary - this means that our genetics determine this judgment function, and these genetics are specific to different genetic heritages. This allows for nature to explore through natural selection which moral-judgment function is superior. It allows it to tinker with different levels of sociability and with respect for other members of society and for other creatures/objects. This in turn affects hunting habits and mating behaviors. Theoretically, if such a factor is important (and not overshadowed by our ability for progress through technological advance), then eventually we'd have humans which have one moral system over all others that allows for the best relation between human and environment. Of course, because environment is always changing, this function might never settle into an optimum but always be in flux, meaning we might be stuck forever with things like "war" and "theft" and "hate" that could never be solved.
Case 4: Universal to everyone - this function has therefore arisen out of evolution and incorporates some code for natural selection/evolutionary selection. Thus, our actions are not really governed by reason but by some animal instinct that has come about through evolution. This is the same across all humans, and hence there could be a "universally-acceptable ethics" that can be derived if we figure out the ethical-analysis function.
Case 5: Random, circular, and maybe an artifact - The judgment function could be an unintentional byproduct of some other brain function that is not really needed but is "there." Note that this could, I guess, become relevant to Case 2 or 4 if evolution ever makes this random phenomenon important.
As such, the judgment function could be circular in reasoning. The brain makes some weird assumption that is not even a fully-formed concept, on which it bases a bunch of other stuff. This assumption relies on some other weak assumption. When some discourse affects these causal relationships, some new random assumption is made.
Evidence for the different cases:
We note that in being utility-maximizing, people are not always "selfish." That means that at times they place more value on something else than on their own lives at times. There's the example of the soldier who covered a grenade with his helmet and jumped on it to save his friends. This suggests that there may be individual judgment functions.
On the other hand, this could easily be critiqued by saying that the judgment function was not really given enough time to work its course. Of course people hold different moral beliefs at a snapshot of time, but that's because their judgment functions could have not had enough time to explore the concepts thoroughly enough. The function may yet be universal.
On the idea that some innate belief in property exists in humans - this could very well be some entitlement mentality that caters to survival of the self. Also, stealing may be evidence of direct tampering with someone's utility function. Note too, however, that stealing also occurs naturally. This shows that we can have utility values assigned to items that others "own." In any case, simply because we believe in property doesn't mean that we believe in the morality of property - just the use we derive from it.
Anyway, these are some ideas. Your thoughts?
The soldier who covered the gernade is acting selfishly. All action is rational and for the purpose of meeting an end. The soldier saw more utility in covering the gernade then not. At least at the that moment. You seem to agree that morals are subjective, but I would go as far as to say adjectives are subjective. Even adjectives like colors. I'm sure you've been in a situation were you say to someone, "You see that blue thing down there?" That person says in reply, "Do you mean the green thing?" "No, the blue thing!" "No need to spout, as it is must certainly a green thing." What may seem unselfish or unrational, is on the same plane as all actions. If one is to act they must have a desire and what they deem as correct, is what they saw as having in their opinion the most utility.
In regards to your other question, how can someone be convinced? Well something needs to added or understood in a discussion, that before was not, and that fits appropriately into the recievers world view.
I'm not sure what conclusion you're trying to reach with the notion of "universal valuation function." I think universal is a bad term too, since you say that it can be individual specific.
The problem with your analysis seems to be that you treat valuation statically. Why do you think that, when I accept your argument for Right B over mine for Right A, it is a matter of me realizing a deeper idea of good rather than just a shift in what I value? Why are values uncovered as if they are already in the mind instead of just presenting themselves to us?
A lot of what you are discussing seems to be under the scope of psychology, and I think this sort of reasoning doesn't lend itself to that field in the same way it does in philosophy.
Also, your treatment of utility is way off base if its read in the Misesian sense - and if its not supposed to be read as Misesian utilitarianism, then you should probably avoid the language (unless its a direct crticism of Bentham or something like that). Stuff like "tampering with someone's utility function" and "utility values assigned to items that others own" sound sort of insane, though I can see what you could mean.
they said we would have an unfair fun advantage
The soldier who covered the gernade is acting selfishly.
I was using the term in the popular meaning. I realize that it maximizes his utility.
I think universal is a bad term too, since you say that it can be individual specific.
Why do you think that, when I accept your argument for Right B over mine for Right A, it is a matter of me realizing a deeper idea of good rather than just a shift in what I value? Why are values uncovered as if they are already in the mind instead of just presenting themselves to us?
There must be some way in which we decide which moral system to choose. And it appears to me that such decisions hinge on some realization that one moral system is more "moral" than another. For example, how do I become convinced that helping 10 people objectively is better than helping 30 people but hurting 10? There appears to be something that tells us "feeling this way is more moral." If there isn't then our decisions are arbitrary.
Also, your treatment of utility is way off base if its read in the Misesian sense
I'm sorry, I meant to ask about that. Can you explain the difference between the two? Here is what I thought Mises's utilitarianism is:
Human action shows ipso facto utility maximization. When you use force to intervene, you are decreasing a person's utility. Since interpersonal utility comparisons are impossible, even if you help A by "slightly" hurting B, you cannot even theoretically prove that this move improves the utility of society.
Please correct me if I'm wrong.
Well, the way that we decide which moral system to subscribe to, again, seems really rooted in psychology and beyond my comfort zone of what I can talk about. I agree that there is a sense that humans are wired to feel that such and such is moral or immoral, but I don't know what we would make of such a conclusion like "This set M is found to be the collection of values and action which nearly all people feel to be moral." It doesn't really establish anything more than what it says - it certainly doesn't make the case that we ought to act according those findings.
There are people here way more qualified than I am to talk about Mises, but I'll give it a go. You are right that utility isn't able to be compared interpersonally because there is no common denominator or unit of measurement to work with. Where you really seem to go astray is when you say something like "Alright, but why is increasing the utility of society something desirable?" Increasing utility is desirable because thats what utility is - its satisfaction of desire. Mises works within the very reasonable assumption that individuals broadly desire the satisfaction of material wants and needs and then uses economic science to demonstrate the best means to acheive those ends. This is treating the question of "society's" utility in terms of the satisfaction of a multitude of individuals, by the way.
Just as we can't make interpersonal utility comparisions, it doesn't make sense to talk about decreasing a person's utility as if its a quantity that we add to or take away. For example if I steal your blanket, I didn't reduce your utility in any real sense. What happened is that you now have an end which needs satisfaction - your feet are cold. We will always be in a state of disatisfaction, of striving. Where utility comes into play, is in the revealed preference of action. When you go out and by a new blanket, it is because you necessarily gain more utility (satisfaction) from achieving that end than from any other.
"Alright, but why is increasing the utility of society something desirable?" Increasing utility is desirable because thats what utility is - its satisfaction of desire.
Ok, slightly misworded. Better wording: "why is increasing utility good?"
I'll think on the rest.
commonsenselako:You seem to agree that morals are subjective, but I would go as far as to say adjectives are subjective. Even adjectives like colors. I'm sure you've been in a situation were you say to someone, "You see that blue thing down there?" That person says in reply, "Do you mean the green thing?" "No, the blue thing!" "No need to spout, as it is must certainly a green thing."
Interestingly, colors are objective. Our names for them may be subjective, but they, in and of themselves, are objective. Color blind or not, blue emits a certain frequency that is distinct from green or forrest green or sea green. With the right equipment, a color blind person could agree what a color is with a not color blind person. This is but one more reason why I do not trust perception or immediate empiricism over logic and science (although based on observations that are empirical which is why I differentiated it by omitting the word "immediate").
"If men are not angels, then who shall run the state?"