At what point does stolen property become legitimate property?
For example, land stolen from Native Americans... how can it rightfully be deeded to a US citizen and then passed on to subsequent heirs?
This is something I've long wondered about. The problem is that almost everything has a history of violence attached to it, so how can there be any rightful property at all?
So, chapter nine in the Ethics of Liberty is entirely relevant to this thread. I suggest that you read the whole chapter (or even the whole book), but I will quote the most relevant portion:
The answer is that the criterion holds as we have explained above: The right of every individual to own his person and the property that he has found and transformed, and therefore “created,” and the property which he has acquired either as gifts from or in voluntary exchange with other such transformers or “producers.” It is true that existing property titles must be scrutinized, but the resolution of the problem is much simpler than the question assumes. For remember always the basic principle: that all resources, all goods, in a state of no-ownership belong properly to the first person who finds and transforms them into a useful good (the “homestead” principle). We have seen this above in the case of unused land and natural resources: the first to find and mix his labor with them, to possess and use them, “produces” them and becomes their legitimate property owner. Now suppose that Mr. Jones has a watch; if we cannot clearly show that Jones or his ancestors to the property title in the watch were criminals, then we must say that since Mr. Jones has been possessing and using it, that he is truly the legitimate and just property owner. Or, to put the case another way: if we do not know if Jones’s title to any given property is criminally-derived, then we may assume that this property was, at least momentarily in a state of no-ownership (since we are not sure about the original title), and therefore that the proper title of ownership reverted instantaneously to Jones as its “first” (i.e., current) possessor and user. In short, where we are not sure about a title but it cannot be clearly identified as criminally derived, then the title properly and legitimately reverts to its current possessor. But now suppose that a title to property is clearly identifiable as criminal, does this necessarily mean that the current possessor must give it up? No, not necessarily. For that depends on two considerations: (a) whether the victim (the property owner originally aggressed against) or his heirs are clearly identifiable and can now be found; or (b) whether or not the current possessor is himself the criminal who stole the property. Suppose, for example, that Jones possesses a watch, and that we can clearly show that Jones’s title is originally criminal, either because (1) his ancestor stole it, or (2) because he or his ancestor purchased it from a thief (whether wittingly or unwittingly is immaterial here). Now, if we can identify and find the victim or his heir, then it is clear that Jones’s title to the watch is totally invalid, and that it must promptly revert to its true and legitimate owner. Thus, if Jones inherited or purchased the watch from a man who stole it from Smith, and if Smith or the heir to his estate can be found, then the title to the watch properly reverts immediately back to Smith or his descendants, without compensation to the existing possessor of the criminally derived “title.”[7] Thus, if a current title to property is criminal in origin, and the victim or his heir can be found, then the title should immediately revert to the latter. Suppose, however, that condition (a) is not fulfilled: in short, that we know that Jones’s title is criminal, but that we cannot now find the victim or his current heir. Who now is the legitimate and moral property owner? The answer to this question now depends on whether or not Jones himself is the criminal, whether Jones is the man who stole the watch. If Jones was the thief, then it is quite clear that he cannot be allowed to keep it, for the criminal cannot be allowed to keep the reward of his crime; and he loses the watch, and probably suffers other punishments besides.[8] In that case, who gets the watch? Applying our libertarian theory of property, the watch is now—after Jones has been apprehended-in a state of no-ownership, and it must therefore become the legitimate property of the first person to “homestead” it—to take it and use it, and therefore, to have converted it from an unused, no-ownership state to a useful, owned state. The first person who does so then becomes its legitimate, moral, and just owner. But suppose that Jones is not the criminal, not the man who stole the watch, but that he had inherited or had innocently purchased it from the thief. And suppose, of course, that neither the victim nor his heirs can be found. In that case, the disappearance of the victim means that the stolen property comes properly into a state of no-ownership. But we have seen that any good in a state of no-ownership, with no legitimate owner of its title, reverts as legitimate property to the first person to come along and use it, to appropriate this now unowned resource for human use. But this “first” person is clearly Jones, who has been using it all along. Therefore, we conclude that even though the property was originally stolen, that if the victim or his heirs cannot be found, and if the current possessor was not the actual criminal who stole the property, then title to that property belongs properly, justly, and ethically to its current possessor.
The answer is that the criterion holds as we have explained above: The right of every individual to own his person and the property that he has found and transformed, and therefore “created,” and the property which he has acquired either as gifts from or in voluntary exchange with other such transformers or “producers.” It is true that existing property titles must be scrutinized, but the resolution of the problem is much simpler than the question assumes. For remember always the basic principle: that all resources, all goods, in a state of no-ownership belong properly to the first person who finds and transforms them into a useful good (the “homestead” principle). We have seen this above in the case of unused land and natural resources: the first to find and mix his labor with them, to possess and use them, “produces” them and becomes their legitimate property owner. Now suppose that Mr. Jones has a watch; if we cannot clearly show that Jones or his ancestors to the property title in the watch were criminals, then we must say that since Mr. Jones has been possessing and using it, that he is truly the legitimate and just property owner.
Or, to put the case another way: if we do not know if Jones’s title to any given property is criminally-derived, then we may assume that this property was, at least momentarily in a state of no-ownership (since we are not sure about the original title), and therefore that the proper title of ownership reverted instantaneously to Jones as its “first” (i.e., current) possessor and user. In short, where we are not sure about a title but it cannot be clearly identified as criminally derived, then the title properly and legitimately reverts to its current possessor.
But now suppose that a title to property is clearly identifiable as criminal, does this necessarily mean that the current possessor must give it up? No, not necessarily. For that depends on two considerations: (a) whether the victim (the property owner originally aggressed against) or his heirs are clearly identifiable and can now be found; or (b) whether or not the current possessor is himself the criminal who stole the property. Suppose, for example, that Jones possesses a watch, and that we can clearly show that Jones’s title is originally criminal, either because (1) his ancestor stole it, or (2) because he or his ancestor purchased it from a thief (whether wittingly or unwittingly is immaterial here). Now, if we can identify and find the victim or his heir, then it is clear that Jones’s title to the watch is totally invalid, and that it must promptly revert to its true and legitimate owner. Thus, if Jones inherited or purchased the watch from a man who stole it from Smith, and if Smith or the heir to his estate can be found, then the title to the watch properly reverts immediately back to Smith or his descendants, without compensation to the existing possessor of the criminally derived “title.”[7] Thus, if a current title to property is criminal in origin, and the victim or his heir can be found, then the title should immediately revert to the latter.
Suppose, however, that condition (a) is not fulfilled: in short, that we know that Jones’s title is criminal, but that we cannot now find the victim or his current heir. Who now is the legitimate and moral property owner? The answer to this question now depends on whether or not Jones himself is the criminal, whether Jones is the man who stole the watch. If Jones was the thief, then it is quite clear that he cannot be allowed to keep it, for the criminal cannot be allowed to keep the reward of his crime; and he loses the watch, and probably suffers other punishments besides.[8] In that case, who gets the watch? Applying our libertarian theory of property, the watch is now—after Jones has been apprehended-in a state of no-ownership, and it must therefore become the legitimate property of the first person to “homestead” it—to take it and use it, and therefore, to have converted it from an unused, no-ownership state to a useful, owned state. The first person who does so then becomes its legitimate, moral, and just owner.
But suppose that Jones is not the criminal, not the man who stole the watch, but that he had inherited or had innocently purchased it from the thief. And suppose, of course, that neither the victim nor his heirs can be found. In that case, the disappearance of the victim means that the stolen property comes properly into a state of no-ownership. But we have seen that any good in a state of no-ownership, with no legitimate owner of its title, reverts as legitimate property to the first person to come along and use it, to appropriate this now unowned resource for human use. But this “first” person is clearly Jones, who has been using it all along. Therefore, we conclude that even though the property was originally stolen, that if the victim or his heirs cannot be found, and if the current possessor was not the actual criminal who stole the property, then title to that property belongs properly, justly, and ethically to its current possessor.
But there is far more before and after this portion, and it is even better when read in context. So I highly suggest reading the entire chapter.
jodiphour: Of course, someone will argue that violence requires infringement of property rights, so taking property from a thief is not violent. And that is a valid point too and may solve the conundrum.
Of course, someone will argue that violence requires infringement of property rights, so taking property from a thief is not violent. And that is a valid point too and may solve the conundrum.
That is not the typical understanding of the word violence. Violence is physical force. If you take the property from the thief through force, you have used violence against him.
This is different from aggression, which is the initiation of violence or the threat thereof. Taking the property from the thief is not aggressive (within proportion), so it is in line with the NAP.
Violence can be used to create just ownership.
There is a proper role for the use or threat of violence. The fact that - a priori - we desire the minimization of violence does not flow from violence being in some cosmic sense "immoral" but, rather, from the simple fact that it is impoverishing. Hence, the minimization of violence is not an end-in-itself. Rather, prosperity (individual human flourishing) is the end desired and the minimization of violence is one of the logical preconditions to achieving this. This is why we're not pacifists.
Clayton -
Thanks Wesker1982, it seems relevant, I'll read through your discussion.
And just for completeness, ownership type #3 would encompass violent competition type ownership as well. So just randomly waring factions taking the spoils of war. That is a type of law, but it isn't consistent with NAP, it might be consistent with whatever rules of conduct the victor has determined though. So using stolen resources (stolen according to NAP), to go take land from natives (own according to NAP by the natives) falls under case #3... it is probably legal according to whatever legal system the invading conuntry has created. Libertarians want #3 to become identical with #2. I'm not sure what libertarians think about #1, yet... seems like they might not accept it as relevant.
I think the take away message I am trying to get at is this:
This is not actually inconsistent with the NAP. This is not saying that I can take your property and then it is mine; that is #3. It is saying that I can take your property and have it become mine under specific conditions which do not purely involve voluntary exchange. I think that this encompasses both #1 and #2.
So, does the new just owner have to voluntarily acquire it from the thief? Or can it be violently taken from the thief? In other words, pure violence can create ownership consistent with the NAP. This is one of the issues at question here.
So in order to right the wrong, it has to be completely negated, meaning the prpoerty must necessarily be removed from the thief's possession. And this is by definition negating the initial violence. So, in essense, two wrongs make a right, however, philosophically speaking, the second wrong is the negation of the first wrong! This brings up many more questions which I will save for another thread...
Sorry for so many posts in a row...
I will consider this question mostly resolved, not perfectly, but mostly.
@ Wesker1982
SO that would mean that my apartment would suddenly belong to me and my landlord would be SOL. Is this what you propose?
If the original victim and heirs could not be identified, then your landlord was the first occupier of the unowned land. He homesteaded it when he built your apartment, or acquired it voluntarily from the previous owner (who homesteaded it).
This is from your thread. I think there is a misunderstanding here and a technicality overlooked. If it was discovered that the specific land the apartment complex was built on was stolen, and the heirs no longer exist, then it becomes unowned. When did it become unowned? At the death of the last heir, or at the moment of discovery of the original ownership claim?
It might be that the current resident in the apartment becomes the new just owner, depending on how we answer that question. My point in this thread is that the living heir is still the absolute just owner (#1). It becomes unowned when that heir dies. If the apartment complex was built after that death, then I would say the landlord is the new just owner. If the heir died after the apartment complex was built, I would say the renter would be the new just owners, because the landlord never justly owned it. The landlords legal ownership becomes illigitimate and a new homesteading must occur, which is instantaneously satisfied by the renter's presense. However, one might argue that all renters would have to move out and remove all their property, and then a free for all would determine who gets the apartments, however, I think this is less desireable. The most desireable thing (for keeping social peace), would be to keep legal records as they are... i.e. that the landlord keeps ownership. But i see that as less consistent with the NAP if the apartments were built before the death of the heir.
This would not be my personal opinion, but would be what I think is most consistent with the NAP and ownership type #1.
jodiphour: If Jim claims the stolen property and did not take part in the theft and murder, then he becomes the rightful owner. Whether he bought it from the thief or stole it from the thief (which by definition is not theft) is immaterial. Yes?
If Jim claims the stolen property and did not take part in the theft and murder, then he becomes the rightful owner. Whether he bought it from the thief or stole it from the thief (which by definition is not theft) is immaterial. Yes?
Correct, Jim would be able to take it by force from the thief and still have a better claim to it than the thief.
jodiphour: and as I clarified earlier... the phrase "cannot be found" needs to be explained carefully. It sounds like you mean a legal title search for the just owner. But to me this is inconsistent. The just owner will not always hold a legal title. This is why I differentiated the types of ownership into absolute just, practical just, and legal.
and as I clarified earlier... the phrase "cannot be found" needs to be explained carefully. It sounds like you mean a legal title search for the just owner. But to me this is inconsistent. The just owner will not always hold a legal title. This is why I differentiated the types of ownership into absolute just, practical just, and legal.
The just owner always holds a legal title. A title does not have to be a formal document stating that one holds title. You hold title to the clothes on your person, even if you have since thrown out the receipt stating that you bought the clothes. People prefer to have physical documents stating that they hold title when the property in question is extremely valuable (to them or others). Most people do not bother to take the time to catalogue and document all their possessions, but they certainly make sure they have documents about their house, their car, and any other valuables (e.g. a gun, though a lot of that has to do with the state requiring documents).
jodiphour: So it sounds like libertarian just ownership is type #2 as I have described above and not type #1.
So it sounds like libertarian just ownership is type #2 as I have described above and not type #1.
I think you are making a distinction where there isn't one. I have stated this at least twice, and you have not addressed this point:
A claim to ownership is a necessary condition of ownership.
If you find a $20 on the street, you have no way of knowing who the owner is. The owner has no way of knowing if that $20 is even his (we are presuming that the owner did not just drop it and immediately pick it right back up). The point is, no one is claiming to own that $20. It is an unowned $20. Whoever picks it up becomes the new just owner.
If it were the case that the just owner was able to trace it, suppose he has marked it in some way, then if he were to find it, then he could make a claim that it is his rightful $20. If he can actually prove to other people that it is in fact his $20, then the fact of the matter is that we do know who the owner is, so the property must go back to the just owner.
We are stressing the point of traceability because there is a lot of property that just cannot be traced, such as money you find on the street. If it cannot be traced, then there is no just owner, as there is no owner. But this depends entirely upon the fact of it not being traced. If it could be traced, then we would know who the owner is.
I don't see how you can make a distinction between "philosophical just owner" and "practical just owner". Someone is either a just owner or they are not.
Care to substantiate them? None of them are controversial except the claim that the settlers actually did understand indigenous property rights and chose to violate them anyway. This conclusion I arrive at on a thymological basis, in other words, I disbelieve the accounts of European settlers who claimed they were of the impression that the natives had no conception of private property. Such claims are transparently self-serving.
Care to substantiate them?
None of them are controversial except the claim that the settlers actually did understand indigenous property rights and chose to violate them anyway. This conclusion I arrive at on a thymological basis, in other words, I disbelieve the accounts of European settlers who claimed they were of the impression that the natives had no conception of private property. Such claims are transparently self-serving.
With other words, you can not, not even remotely, substantiate your claim. And that's why you resort to an ad populum claim. All of what you claim is controversial, there are just some interest groups that would like to make others believe they are "common knowledge". Quite commonly the "indigenous property rights" are based on ius ad usum or ius ad bellum. That means the person or group that are using land or items right now are rightfully owning it. Or that means whoever is powerful enough to coerce others to either give up or to defend something is entitled it. I have no idea what each single settlers perception of "indegenous property rights" were, but I deem it possible that at least some of them did kind of fall back onto the same mind set and viewed either what they've home-steaded as theirs or what they've taken with might to become rightfully theirs. It seems the "natives" did actually share that view, until some of them came to enjoy education at Western/European institution where they were exposed to other legal theories. I can also tell you how it works with the different Bantu people. I'd have to pay a chief a lump sum or agree on employing of his people to get ad usum rights to some area. Alternatively I could get a artisanal gold claim for R600 (less then US$70) again at their pleasure, but with the hope that I will employ of their people. This isn't property fixed to a person but vesting in the tribe of people represented by their chief.
Still you can't substantiate anything of what you say.
what they've taken with might to become rightfully theirs
So you admit that I'm right. The European settlers knew exactly what they were doing to the indigenous people but they did it anyway because they could.
You're a space cadet if you seriously believe that a social order could exist with this sort of social norm.
gotlucky: The just owner always holds a legal title.
The just owner always holds a legal title.
The just owner holds title, but not necessary according to the law of the State where the property is located. This is the sense I am using legal in. Human law is arbitrary (legal ownership, #3), NAP law is not arbitrary (just ownership, #1 & #2).
gotlucky: I think you are making a distinction where there isn't one.
I think you are making a distinction where there isn't one.
Jim steals Bob's watch. Bob is the absolute just owner (#1 --- assuming he acquired it nonviolently, etc, etc). However, if Bob cannot make a successful claim and prove that Jim stole his watch, he is not the practical just owner (#2), but he is still the absolute just owner due to the unrecognized reality of history that has unfolded. We do not require lady justice to know all of history with absolute perfect precision. I am distinguishing between reality and our imperfect knowledge of reality.
gotlucky: A claim to ownership is a necessary condition of ownership.
gotlucky:
Yes, for ownership of type #2, but not type #1. This is what I am arguing.
gotlucky: If you find a $20 on the street, you have no way of knowing who the owner is...
If you find a $20 on the street, you have no way of knowing who the owner is...
This is a separate issue, lost vs stolen. The difference is agency is involved in the latter. I agree with your analysis, however, if there were antional registry of cash by serial number, and the finder knew about this registry, I would argue that NAP would require the finder to make some reasonable attempt to locate the owner.
gotlucky: I don't see how you can make a distinction between "philosophical just owner" and "practical just owner". Someone is either a just owner or they are not.
This is the question. See the watch example above. Just because someone cannot prove just ownership, should not mean they aren't the just owner. Otherwise a carefully crafted theft can result in just ownership. This is why I distinguish between two types of just ownership. It alows us to live our lives and be practical without having to worry about the deeper events of reality that we cannot know.
In other words, the average US citizen does not need to worry about returning the stolen land they occupy to the Native Americans it was stolen from. The Native Americans are still the absolute just owners (assuming the lineage is still alive), but they are not the practical just owners because their claim cannot be proven or because they haven't made a specific claim.
Again, the distinction is between the actual hsitory of events and human knowledge of those events. Isn't it self evident that human knowledge can be distinct from objective reality? If we reject that, then we open a whole other HUGE can of worms...
Classical example of taking quotes out of context and attaching meaning to it to suffice ones own purposes. Except for the rest of the problems, where did you substantiate what you said previously? Place it or admit your failure to do so. This would be the only basis for any further debate on the subject.
Can you substantiate your counter claim? Aren't you both making claims about action that we all agree existed? The question is only about the details of that action and the actors intent (state of knowledge). One person makes a claim the mind state was X, the other person makes a claim the mind state was Y.
Of course, all the history books could be wrong, and Native Americans could be the invaders and Europeans the indiginous... Can you prove to me that this is not the case?
It is silly to not accept historical records and scientific method as proof. It is the only thing we have for proving anything. It's not a ad populum argument because it is based in historical records.
If Native Americans accepted that the rules of war means they did not own their property after it was taken/lost, then that does not negate the fact that the property was stolen according to the NAP. It just means they did not understand the NAP. Is it ok to tax Democrats and Republicans but not libertarians because they understand the NAP? No, it is wrong because it violates the NAP, not because of a particular belief held by the victim.
jodiphour: The just owner holds title, but not necessary according to the law of the State where the property is located. This is the sense I am using legal in. Human law is arbitrary (legal ownership, #3), NAP law is not arbitrary (just ownership, #1 & #2).
Yes, what I wrote was incorrect. The legal owner always holds title. What libertarians are saying is that the just owner ought to be the legal owner (and that his property ought to be returned if it has been stolen).
jodiphour: Jim steals Bob's watch. Bob is the absolute just owner (#1 --- assuming he acquired it nonviolently, etc, etc). However, if Bob cannot make a successful claim and prove that Jim stole his watch, he is not the practical just owner (#2), but he is still the absolute just owner due to the unrecognized reality of history that has unfolded. We do not require lady justice to know all of history with absolute perfect precision. I am distinguishing between reality and our imperfect knowledge of reality.
No. Bob is still the just owner, only he cannot prove it to the rest of society. Jim becomes the legal owner, and it is unfortunate. Humans are not perfect.
jodiphour: Yes, for ownership of type #2, but not type #1. This is what I am arguing.
I see where the problem is. A claim of ownership is a necessary condition even for your type #1. Consider:
A man is hiking in the forest, and everything within this particular forest is unowned. He comes across a blueberry plant, and he picks some blueberries. Now, should he claim this plant as his own, he would be the just owner according to libertarian theory. But suppose he does not claim it as his own. Suppose he just uses it the one time and decides he does not care to claim it as his own. Well, should someone else come along and pick blueberries from the same plant, he is not violating the first man's just property, as the first man never claimed it as his property.
As you can see, a claim of ownership is a necessary condition even for your type #1, as a claim of ownership is a necessary condition for ownership of any kind.
jodiphour: This is a separate issue, lost vs stolen. The difference is agency is involved in the latter. I agree with your analysis, however, if there were antional registry of cash by serial number, and the finder knew about this registry, I would argue that NAP would require the finder to make some reasonable attempt to locate the owner.
No. You are not obligated to do anything according to the NAP. You only cannot use aggression against anyone else or their just property. As Clayton pointed out in an earlier post, buyer beware. Check to see if the property you are trying to acquire is not stolen (or lost). Should the just owner of the property trace and attempt to reclaim his property, you must honor his wishes or go to court (this is only true in libertopia, of course; the state does whatever it wants).
jodiphour: This is the question. See the watch example above. Just because someone cannot prove just ownership, should not mean they aren't the just owner. Otherwise a carefully crafted theft can result in just ownership. This is why I distinguish between two types of just ownership. It alows us to live our lives and be practical without having to worry about the deeper events of reality that we cannot know.
If someone cannot prove he is the just owner, it is true that he may still be the just owner, but nobody else will be able to know this fact. Someone is either a just owner or they are not. In libertopia, the goal is to attempt to have all legal owners be just owners, even if it won't be the case. The law in libertopia will never settle everything perfectly. But it will come a hell of a lot closer to perfect than the current statutory law that we have.
jodiphour: In other words, the average US citizen does not need to worry about returning the stolen land they occupy to the Native Americans it was stolen from. The Native Americans are still the absolute just owners (assuming the lineage is still alive), but they are not the practical just owners because their claim cannot be proven or because they haven't made a specific claim.
Well, there may be Native Americans who are just owners, except that they can only be just owners if specific people make claims to specific plots of land. Otherwise, their claims are akin to saying, "My entire family was mugged the other night in NYC. Someone, somewhere in NYC has my wallet. I want all NYC muggers to return all stolen wallets to my family." That just doesn't fly. They don't have claims to everyone else's wallet. They have a claim to their own wallet.
When the wallet cannot be traced to the owner, that is another way of saying that no one is claiming to own the wallet. Anyone other than the thief can rightfully own the wallet. But should the man whose wallet was stolen find and reclaim the wallet, then his wishes should be honored.
jodiphour: Again, the distinction is between the actual hsitory of events and human knowledge of those events. Isn't it self evident that human knowledge can be distinct from objective reality? If we reject that, then we open a whole other HUGE can of worms...
Just because human knowlege is fallible does not change who the just owner is. It can only change who the legal owner is. Libertarians just want the legal owner to be the same as the just owner. But, as I said above, this may not be possible even in libertopia, as humans are fallible. But in libertopia, it is far more likely that the legal owner will be the just owner than in any kind of statist society.
gotlucky: No. Bob is still the just owner, only he cannot prove it to the rest of society. Jim becomes the legal owner, and it is unfortunate. Humans are not perfect.
I'm not sure this is inline with Rothbard. This means that Native Americans are still the just owners of certain pieces of land. In my opinion, absolute just ownership doesn't require the action of making a claim, nor the ability to prove a claim if it were made. I was taking your comment "claim of ownership" to mean the act of making a claim, such as a verbal statement. Maybe you just meant being the owner is equivalent to having a claim of ownership, e.g. title (not necessarily a State-legal one), property rights, etc.
gotlucky: A man is hiking in the forest, and everything within this particular forest is unowned. He comes across a blueberry plant, and he picks some blueberries. Now, should he claim this plant as his own, he would be the just owner according to libertarian theory. But suppose he does not claim it as his own. Suppose he just uses it the one time and decides he does not care to claim it as his own. Well, should someone else come along and pick blueberries from the same plant, he is not violating the first man's just property, as the first man never claimed it as his property. As you can see, a claim of ownership is a necessary condition even for your type #1, as a claim of ownership is a necessary condition for ownership of any kind.
Not as I have defined it. The original picker of the blueberry plant would own it without making a claim if the picking was a regular and somewhat frequent event. This constitutes continued use of the object, which makes it property in my opinion. However, if multiple people are picking from the plant regularly, then they collectively own it. This is just my opinion, I'm not deriving this from Rothbard or NAP. In my opinion, Native Americans own the land that they use regularly even though they do not have a concept of land-ownership. Otherwise, we must conclude that non-libertarians are not stolen from when they are taxed.
gotlucky: No. You are not obligated to do anything according to the NAP.
Ok, this is fine. I can accept that the NAP doesn't require this. But still there is a distinction between lost and stolen. With loss, the finder can be just owner, with stolen another change of hands is required and aggression was initiated. I think the latter is a bit more complicated a situation in that there are more variables to deal with. This gives rise to all sorts of new questions too: So the NAP just requires the finder to give it back if the loser can prove the claim? Why would the finder believe the loser's claim, what if they do not agree on what constitutes proof? In the end it is just a case of SOL. In my opinion, the loser is still the just owner and not the finder. This is why I distinguish between #1 and #2.
gotlucky: Well, there may be Native Americans who are just owners, except that they can only be just owners if specific people make claims to specific plots of land.
Well, there may be Native Americans who are just owners, except that they can only be just owners if specific people make claims to specific plots of land.
This is why I am distinguishing between just ownership and the ability to prove it.
gotlucky: Just because human knowlege is fallible does not change who the just owner is.
Just because human knowlege is fallible does not change who the just owner is.
??? This is my point!!! Even if the absolute just owner cannot prove ownership, they are still the just owner. I am making a fundamental change to Rothbard's position.
"Therefore, we conclude that even though the property was originally stolen, that if the victim or his heirs cannot be found, and if the current possessor was not the actual criminal who stole the property, then title to that property belongs properly, justly, and ethically to its current possessor."
Yes, Rothbard is correct that if the just owner cannot be found, then the new non-thief owner is the just owner. However, my claim is that this is a practical just ownership. It is conditional ont he continual non-finding of the original just owner. Because 10 years down the road, if the original just owner turns up and can prove the claim, the practical just owner loses ownership. This by definition is not absolute just ownership. Absolute just ownership would mean that it is not possible for someone to make a true claim (one representing the actual unfolding of history). Of course one might succesfully make a false claim to aggress against someone's just ownership, but that does not destroy the absolute just ownership; it can only create a succession of practical just ownerships. We cannot say it is unjust for the subsequent non-thief parties to be owners. But we can claim that they are not the just owners as well... this is why I think a ddistinction is necessary.
gotlucky: Libertarians just want the legal owner to be the same as the just owner. But, as I said above, this may not be possible even in libertopia, as humans are fallible. But in libertopia, it is far more likely that the legal owner will be the just owner than in any kind of statist society.
Libertarians just want the legal owner to be the same as the just owner. But, as I said above, this may not be possible even in libertopia, as humans are fallible. But in libertopia, it is far more likely that the legal owner will be the just owner than in any kind of statist society.
Yes, this is what I said. But still, you have no choice but to recognize the difference between human knowledge of reality and actual objective reality.
In Libertopia, the Law is the NAP, but this is not enough to always determine perfect absolute justice. Following the NAP does not give humans perfect knowledge, and therfore errors is making legitimate claims will occur. Of course, if you condition Libertopia on every citizen following the NAP perfectly (no aggression exists), then all ownership will exactly be type #1 (with some assumptions on history).