Jon Irenicus: The argument of his that you present in your article, How we come to own ourselves, where he demonstrates how the notion of claiming ownership over another ends up imploding on itself in virtue of being indirect (whereas direct control will be presupposed over this individual's own person to effect the indirect control.) It's much more straightforward than arg-ethics.
The argument of his that you present in your article, How we come to own ourselves, where he demonstrates how the notion of claiming ownership over another ends up imploding on itself in virtue of being indirect (whereas direct control will be presupposed over this individual's own person to effect the indirect control.) It's much more straightforward than arg-ethics.
Ah, I see. But I don't see that as really being incompatible with Argumentation Ethics. It's just another way of formulating some of its insights.
Likewise, in my Defending Argumentation Ethics: Reply to Murphy & Callahan, I tried to present Hoppe's argument in a differnet way. But it's still Hoppe's approach.
Aslo, in my New Rationalist Directions in Libertarian Rights Theory I summarized my estoppel approach, Hoppe's AE, and a "third" approach that just tried to show the contradictions of rights skepticism -- Larry Sechrest mentions this approach approvingly here, BTW: Praxeology, Economics, and Law: Issues and Implications (p. 37). But I wouldn't say this is a differnt or "betteR" approach; all these approaches are basically getting at this idea: first, if you want to establish some kind of ought, you have to either prove it by deducing an ought from an is (tricky task); or you have to just point to or appeal to some unchallengeable or uncontroversial grundnorm; AE and related views try to show that it is only libertarian-supporting norms that are necessarily presupposed in all these contexts. The various arguments are just ways of showing this to people who keep failing ot see this--
(some of you may also find this post of interest: Revisiting Argumentation Ethics )
Stephan Kinsella nskinsella@gmail.com www.StephanKinsella.com
nskinsella:Wombatron, what do you mean, it's a precondition of human flourishing? Isn't this vague way of writing a way of hiding the fact that you are trying to smuggle a norm in, to avoid admitting there is an is-ought gap problem? If you want to introduce an explicitly assumed norm to build your case, fine--but then we can ask, why shoudl we accept this norm? The answer lies in the Hoppean-type approach which points to the fact that any sincere questioner already does presuppose certain values; only civilized people--those who have adopted certain values--make such inquiries.
Sorry about being vague, it's hard to go into detail without either turning this into an excessively long post or missing an important detail. As I see it, the is-ought gap is bridged by the existence of a natural, objective end for human beings. You accept rights, because you recognize that they are necessary for you and everyone else to live a life of flourishing. I have an older post here where I go into more detail, and I am basically just using the neo-Aristotelian arguments put out by Rasmussen, Den Uyl, Long, and Plauche, with which I know you are familiar (no snarkiness intended in this last sentence ). And just because certain values are presupposed by questioning or argumentation, doesn't necessarily mean that those values are right or good; here is where I don't see where ought is derived from is.
Market anarchist, Linux geek, aspiring Perl hacker, and student of the neo-Aristotelians, the classical individualist anarchists, and the Austrian school.
wombatron: nskinsella:Wombatron, what do you mean, it's a precondition of human flourishing? Isn't this vague way of writing a way of hiding the fact that you are trying to smuggle a norm in, to avoid admitting there is an is-ought gap problem? If you want to introduce an explicitly assumed norm to build your case, fine--but then we can ask, why shoudl we accept this norm? The answer lies in the Hoppean-type approach which points to the fact that any sincere questioner already does presuppose certain values; only civilized people--those who have adopted certain values--make such inquiries. Sorry about being vague, it's hard to go into detail without either turning this into an excessively long post or missing an important detail. As I see it, the is-ought gap is bridged by the existence of a natural, objective end for human beings. You accept rights, because you recognize that they are necessary for you and everyone else to live a life of flourishing. I have an older post here where I go into more detail, and I am basically just using the neo-Aristotelian arguments put out by Rasmussen, Den Uyl, Long, and Plauche, with which I know you are familiar (no snarkiness intended in this last sentence ). And just because certain values are presupposed by questioning or argumentation, doesn't necessarily mean that those values are right or good; here is where I don't see where ought is derived from is.
I think it's a bit misleading to say we accept rights. Rather, I think that this is a way to describe the normative consequences of already having adopted certain grundnorms.
wilderness: My point was an argument against the initial response that property rights are not true because they are not objective, meaning, they are not objects detached from subjectivity. Yet science shows us, especially in the most well known spheres of quantum mechanics that our choice of measurement of any object, influences the results of what that object is.
One well known experiment involves, the tester of an electrons velocity and position can't be measured at the same time.
So the choice of measurement such as wanting to measure velocity right now will give you a velocity result but not a position result.
This does not mean physical reality does not exist. This means that physical reality is subject to what measurement instruments we choose to use, in other words, value.
I'm actually making the case that reality is more existential then you might be giving me credit for. I think physical reality is wonderfully proven and does exist. Where I part ways, it seems, is that you might be overlapping "reality" with only physical reality. I know physical reality exists, but I also know reality is much more than physical reality.
Society and ideas get more tricky and I don't think we will find an idea under the microscope any time soon.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Juan: Rather, it influences how we see the object, not how the object really is.
Rather, it influences how we see the object, not how the object really is.
We don't know that. How we see the object could very well be what the object really is.
Juan: Also, it's true that measurements can change the object measured but that's a technological problem, not a fundamental philosophical fact.
Also, it's true that measurements can change the object measured but that's a technological problem, not a fundamental philosophical fact.
True it is a technological problem so we haven't tested the fundaments to know if they are truly fact. But when all the rational arguments and the evidence shown using the current technology matches up we do have a strong case.
Juan: wilderness: One well known experiment involves, the tester of an electrons velocity and position can't be measured at the same time. You can't measure velocity if you can't measure position...since velocity is defined as rate of change of position wrt time. Not to mention that there's no agreement as to what an electron is and what EM radiation is. It seems 'particles' are at least partly waves and measuring the position of a wave is not straightforward. Bottom line : experiments don't necessarily mean what you may think they mean.
wilderness: One well known experiment involves, the tester of an electrons velocity and position can't be measured at the same time.
You can't measure velocity if you can't measure position...since velocity is defined as rate of change of position wrt time. Not to mention that there's no agreement as to what an electron is and what EM radiation is. It seems 'particles' are at least partly waves and measuring the position of a wave is not straightforward. Bottom line : experiments don't necessarily mean what you may think they mean.
yeap
Juan: wilderness: So the choice of measurement such as wanting to measure velocity right now will give you a velocity result but not a position result. How do you measure velocity ?
wilderness: So the choice of measurement such as wanting to measure velocity right now will give you a velocity result but not a position result.
How do you measure velocity ?
With a technological instrument.
Juan: wilderness: This does not mean physical reality does not exist. This means that physical reality is subject to what measurement instruments we choose to use, in other words, value. I'm not sure what you mean by that.
wilderness: This does not mean physical reality does not exist. This means that physical reality is subject to what measurement instruments we choose to use, in other words, value.
I'm not sure what you mean by that.
I'm saying that whatever measurement instrument we desire to use at the time will limit our results based on what that measuring instrument, well, measures. There are two current technological instruments being used that are grand in size. Now they are not currently operational for after some tests they needed to do some repairs. Maybe you have heard of these machines in Europe. One is the Large Hadron Collider: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Large_Hadron_Collider but it will have numerous measuring instruments. Some measuring instruments are left out, some have been used in the project. It is based on which measuring devices the scientists have found to be the most valuable for their long term plans on testing theories and hypothesis. They would also like to make an even larger collider, but they are investing their time in this one currently and if fruitful, maybe they will move on to even larger ones in time. Each of these colliders are also testing the technology and their measurement capacities so it's not highly valued to jump to scales that are way larger than what the scientists are currently capable of understanding. This collider is presumed to at least provide some promising results according to some current understandings such as possibly seeing the Higgs Boson (a particle), but the scientists are also saying not all that will happen will be in accord with their current theorems. Which in science is good cause that means they think it is a high probably that they will discover something new.
Juan: wilderness: I'm actually making the case that reality is more existential then you might be giving me credit for. I think physical reality is wonderfully proven and does exist. Where I part ways, it seems, is that you might be overlapping "reality" with only physical reality. I know physical reality exists, but I also know reality is much more than physical reality. Yes, but I'm objecting to your introduction of subjectivism in physics, which apparently you think opens the door to introduce subjectivity in other spheres - if I understood you correctly.
wilderness: I'm actually making the case that reality is more existential then you might be giving me credit for. I think physical reality is wonderfully proven and does exist. Where I part ways, it seems, is that you might be overlapping "reality" with only physical reality. I know physical reality exists, but I also know reality is much more than physical reality.
Yes, but I'm objecting to your introduction of subjectivism in physics, which apparently you think opens the door to introduce subjectivity in other spheres - if I understood you correctly.
Yes, physics is subjective. But it's experiments and hypothesis in many cases have been proven over and over again that it builds a strong case that those findings are true. But I am saying they are not True, but true. For science itself doesn't not claim absolutism. It's most wonderful understanding is that something can come along and change everything even long held theories due to some new discovery that would change the whole paradigm even in physics. You can use objective in physics if you want, but commonly objective has become such an overused concept to mean truth and subjectivism has been given such a dirty value that inclines fallacy. Objectivity is no more true than subjectivity. These concepts are outdated and have lost their meaning at times. I would rather use other terms than subjectivity and objectivity to try to provide clarity to what I mean. These two concepts are full of baggage that even right now I don't see the harm in allowing subjectivity in physics. To me that just means physics is still dynamic and open to a world of possibilities in new discoveries. If you want to understand more about what I mean I would check out: Metaphysics of Quality.
Juan: wilderness: Society and ideas get more tricky and I don't think we will find an idea under the microscope any time soon. True, but still moral facts can be 'real' and 'objective' just like physical reality is 'real'.
wilderness: Society and ideas get more tricky and I don't think we will find an idea under the microscope any time soon.
I agree. I'm glad you said this. It helps convey what I mean by how objectivity and subjectivity have become very unuseful and I don't value these concepts. They are full of so many meanings and cultural baggage the clarity in 'what is objectivity' and 'what is subjectivity' is gone in my opinion. lol... look at this post. It took so long for me to explain just because those two concepts were involved so I had to make sure you were understanding in what way I was trying to use those concepts.
I recall a comedian saying, that collectivists basically want to force you into a gang bang - you figure out the assumptions
Anyways, I think the homesteading argument is not only weak but also intellectually arrogant. Why should others accept such weak prescribed rules that will guide an entire society? Of course it doesn't matter if you're a collectivist or libertarian in this sense, the problem remains.
If we picture a piece of 'free land'. Why should the muscular but less intelligent accept that the more intelligent 'homesteaded' the land right before he arrived? Nothing would keep him from just taking the land by force, using it as he saw fit... Or?
A "might makes right" argument is untenable because it goes against the very idea of ethics, namely, resolving conflicts. If might really does make right, then there is nothing stopping the displaced landowners from forcing their way back on to the land, except the practical matter of acquiring the armed strength necessary to do so. The people that invaded the land in the first place, by taking a "might makes right" position, have denied themselves any means (other than violence) of objecting to being forced back off, and so their claim over the land is simply not relevant.
This is what I mean by intellectual arrogance. You fail to see things from the 'muscles' point of view and so you discard valid standpoints without proper arguments.
Zavoi: A "might makes right" argument is untenable because it goes against the very idea of ethics, namely, resolving conflicts.
A "might makes right" argument is untenable because it goes against the very idea of ethics, namely, resolving conflicts.
I dare say I've met people to whom violence did solve their conflicts - pathetic often ignorant people, but still...
Zavoi: The people that invaded the land in the first place, by taking a "might makes right" position, have denied themselves any means (other than violence) of objecting to being forced back off, and so their claim over the land is simply not relevant.
But what if those means serves them fine?
In my perspective then intellect has to argue that the muscle should submit to their ruling for the benefit of both.
It is up to the one clammoring to initiate force to show cause as to why force is required.
Jacob Hedegaard: If we picture a piece of 'free land'. Why should the muscular but less intelligent accept that the more intelligent 'homesteaded' the land right before he arrived? Nothing would keep him from just taking the land by force, using it as he saw fit... Or?
You're absolutely right that it doesn't matter to the naturally strong which kind of land distribution rule they ought to follow - unless the cost associated with deliberately breaking it becomes too high. This is the case whenever an offender may face serious blackballing or outright force by others due to his breaking the rules of property.How are the rules of property defined? In a statist society, they are shaped by codified law. But codified law only defines the reaction of state organs to an offense, not the reaction of the general public. As a rule of thumb, the codified laws of property should somewhat match the intersubjective consensus among the general public or else they would be largely ignored, such as marijuana bans. The intersubjective consensus is sort of a compromise between dominant perceptions of morality and justice, shaped by countless factors among which we find education, social status, personal wealth and philosophical knowledgeability.Thus, we can say that the intersubjective consensus ultimately regulates the distribution of property. Does that mean "might makes right", the most enforceable view of justice is "right"? No. We cannot derive an "ought" from an "is". Libertarian property theory is well thought out, universally applicable and, generally, practicable. That doesn't mean it's "right", though. No ought from an is.If libertarian property theory is to be successful, its obvious benefits need to influence the intersubjective consensus in its favor. Then, the strong will have an incentive to spare the property-owning weak - avoiding economic disadvantages. Unfortunately, much time is being spent on trying to prove that "our theory" is "objective" instead of communicating its already evidenced benefits to the outside world. That's why nobody has an incentive to defend us from the tax man.
Sphairon: The intersubjective consensus is sort of a compromise between dominant perceptions of morality and justice, shaped by countless factors among which we find education, social status, personal wealth and philosophical knowledgeability.Thus, we can say that the intersubjective consensus ultimately regulates the distribution of property. Does that mean "might makes right", the most enforceable view of justice is "right"? No. We cannot derive an "ought" from an "is". Libertarian property theory is well thought out, universally applicable and, generally, practicable. That doesn't mean it's "right", though. No ought from an is. If libertarian property theory is to be successful, its obvious benefits need to influence the intersubjective consensus in its favor. Then, the strong will have an incentive to spare the property-owning weak - avoiding economic disadvantages.
The intersubjective consensus is sort of a compromise between dominant perceptions of morality and justice, shaped by countless factors among which we find education, social status, personal wealth and philosophical knowledgeability.Thus, we can say that the intersubjective consensus ultimately regulates the distribution of property. Does that mean "might makes right", the most enforceable view of justice is "right"? No. We cannot derive an "ought" from an "is". Libertarian property theory is well thought out, universally applicable and, generally, practicable. That doesn't mean it's "right", though. No ought from an is.
If libertarian property theory is to be successful, its obvious benefits need to influence the intersubjective consensus in its favor. Then, the strong will have an incentive to spare the property-owning weak - avoiding economic disadvantages.
Not quite... A majority of brawn will still be able to surpress the brains regardless of 'natural rights' - which if you think about it doesn't make much sense anyway - or any other intellectual invention.
The problem remains.
Knight_of_BAAWA: It is up to the one clammoring to initiate force to show cause as to why force is required.
Because he says so? Because he feels like it? The expensive words, the heavy books and the long hours in lectures won't help you, if that's the case.
Knight_of_BAAWA:It is up to the one clammoring to initiate force to show cause as to why force is required.
Jacob Hedegaard:Because he says so? Because he feels like it? The expensive words, the heavy books and the long hours in lectures won't help you, if that's the case.
When you have something OTHER than "a lot of people think that initiating force is fine", please let me know. It's entirely irrelevant that some people hold to it.
Knight_of_BAAWA: Knight_of_BAAWA:It is up to the one clammoring to initiate force to show cause as to why force is required. Jacob Hedegaard:Because he says so? Because he feels like it? The expensive words, the heavy books and the long hours in lectures won't help you, if that's the case.*yawn* When you have something OTHER than "a lot of people think that initiating force is fine", please let me know. It's entirely irrelevant that some people hold to it.
Maybe you could be so kind as to share why it is irrelevant?
After all, history does show this point to be relevant...
He's asking why the use of force makes it a valid argument... strictly speaking, force has no justificatory relevance as far as arguments go. And if the advocate of force realises it, they also realise their arguments are groundless. At which point they resort to force, and are treated as mere technical obstacles, i.e. much like animals. But most advocates of force are interested in the intellectual coherence of their ideas, and this is what's being discussed here. It's also relevant to courts which have to decide whether or not to legitimate a particular decision, hence the discussion is not as theoretical as you might think, in any developed society (as opposed to jungle.)
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
First of all, where do you get the idea that "weak intellectuals" would be doing the homesteading? Huh? Homesteading has been going on for centuries by all manner of people. Courts and their armed subsidiaries enforce the rights. What is arrogant is going up to a person who has expended effort and action on something, and saying "I am stronger" or "I am smarter" or whatever, and saying it is therefore "mine". Why? Because you felt like it? You presumably claim the right to your body and to resources to survive, so what is your reason for excluding others from them? That you're somehow "better"? In what regard that is relevant? It's rarely the "strong" that rule anyway. They are mere cannon fodder for the state. So I take it you mean the "better". So basically the question should be, "why should arrogant, self-serving individuals accept my claim to a resource over which I have expended effort"? Argumentatively because they need to provide a coherent account of it and in terms of force, because they will be repelled if they try...
Jacob Hedegaard:Maybe you could be so kind as to share why it is irrelevant? After all, history does show this point to be relevant...
Jacob Hedegaard:This is what I mean by intellectual arrogance. You fail to see things from the 'muscles' point of view and so you discard valid standpoints without proper arguments.
The issue is not some sort of collective conflict between "strong people" and "smart people." The conflict is between people who believe that the fact that someone is physically able to do something implies that they are ethically right in doing so, and those who don't. People who take the former position—which I refer to as "might makes right"—must also then believe that if the displaced landowners can force the invaders off the land, they would be ethically right in doing so. If they resist, then they are, as Jon Irenicus said, "mere technical obstacles, i.e. much like animals."
If in a conflict you say that it is necessary for your adversary to provide argumentative justification for their claim (as you have done), then you are assuming that mere force is insufficient to ethically settle the conflict, because if it were sufficient, then argumentative justification would not be necessary. If on the other hand you do not request argumentative justification from your adversary, then they need not supply any, and you cannot coherently argue against their use of force against you. (This is my understanding of Hoppe's argument.)
Jacob Hedegaard: Not quite... A majority of brawn will still be able to surpress the brains regardless of 'natural rights' - which if you think about it doesn't make much sense anyway - or any other intellectual invention. The problem remains.
If the majority only cares about muscles and strength, has no inclinations towards rational thought whatsoever and is not willing to adhere to any kind of standard either, then yes, society at large will probably never reach a higher level. But people generally do adhere to some kind of morality, and if it's only from a holy book. Since not everyone adheres to the same moral code, but willingness to interact exists, an intersubjective consensus emerges - i.e., A believes that walking in sandals is godless, B believes that oranges are the devil's work, but on neutral ground, they'll tolerate sandals and oranges to facilitate trade. That's a simplified example of an IC.It doesn't always work that peacefully, though. When European settlers met Indian natives on their west bound journey, they had fundamentally different concepts of property and homesteading. This could apparently not be resolved, and thus war ensued. So yes, reaching an agreement concerning property may remain difficult after all.One last thing: in your debates with others here, you're arguing a "can". They are arguing an "ought to". You're asking why A cannot expropriate B, they're answering that A ought to not exproriate B. In reality, most things can be done even if they are considered highly immoral. The only thing we can do is point out why they should not be done (inner consistency, false premises, false privileging), and hope that it is convincing enough to shift the IC in our favor.
Jon Irenicus: At which point they resort to force, and are treated as mere technical obstacles, i.e. much like animals.
At which point they resort to force, and are treated as mere technical obstacles, i.e. much like animals.
Agreed, but couldn't this be in their self-interest?
Jon Irenicus: First of all, where do you get the idea that "weak intellectuals" would be doing the homesteading? Huh? Homesteading has been going on for centuries by all manner of people. Courts and their armed subsidiaries enforce the rights.
First of all, where do you get the idea that "weak intellectuals" would be doing the homesteading? Huh? Homesteading has been going on for centuries by all manner of people. Courts and their armed subsidiaries enforce the rights.
So if you have some sort of philosophical fumbling that lies behind it, right is armed forces?
Jon Irenicus: What is arrogant is going up to a person who has expended effort and action on something, and saying "I am stronger" or "I am smarter" or whatever, and saying it is therefore "mine".
What is arrogant is going up to a person who has expended effort and action on something, and saying "I am stronger" or "I am smarter" or whatever, and saying it is therefore "mine".
How much effort and action should be put into something before he can call it his?
Jon Irenicus: You presumably claim the right to your body and to resources to survive, so what is your reason for excluding others from them?
You presumably claim the right to your body and to resources to survive, so what is your reason for excluding others from them?
I don't, and this is actually my point. I don't expect other to help me to survive or respect certain ideas that will enable me to do so. I don't see why I should be able to claim 'resources to survive'. Nature and thereby human life is a free market.
Sphairon: If the majority only cares about muscles and strength, has no inclinations towards rational thought whatsoever and is not willing to adhere to any kind of standard either, then yes, society at large will probably never reach a higher level. But people generally do adhere to some kind of morality, and if it's only from a holy book. Since not everyone adheres to the same moral code, but willingness to interact exists, an intersubjective consensus emerges - i.e., A believes that walking in sandals is godless, B believes that oranges are the devil's work, but on neutral ground, they'll tolerate sandals and oranges to facilitate trade. That's a simplified example of an IC.It doesn't always work that peacefully, though. When European settlers met Indian natives on their west bound journey, they had fundamentally different concepts of property and homesteading. This could apparently not be resolved, and thus war ensued. So yes, reaching an agreement concerning property may remain difficult after all.
If the majority only cares about muscles and strength, has no inclinations towards rational thought whatsoever and is not willing to adhere to any kind of standard either, then yes, society at large will probably never reach a higher level. But people generally do adhere to some kind of morality, and if it's only from a holy book. Since not everyone adheres to the same moral code, but willingness to interact exists, an intersubjective consensus emerges - i.e., A believes that walking in sandals is godless, B believes that oranges are the devil's work, but on neutral ground, they'll tolerate sandals and oranges to facilitate trade. That's a simplified example of an IC.It doesn't always work that peacefully, though. When European settlers met Indian natives on their west bound journey, they had fundamentally different concepts of property and homesteading. This could apparently not be resolved, and thus war ensued. So yes, reaching an agreement concerning property may remain difficult after all.
Seems we agree more, than I thought - and btw thanks for a very reasoned contribution. I haven't read Hoppe, so I can't say how the IC is defined, but I use something similarly. Feel free to elaborate, comment or correct.
Sphairon:One last thing: in your debates with others here, you're arguing a "can". They are arguing an "ought to". You're asking why A cannot expropriate B, they're answering that A ought to not exproriate B. In reality, most things can be done even if they are considered highly immoral. The only thing we can do is point out why they should not be done (inner consistency, false premises, false privileging), and hope that it is convincing enough to shift the IC in our favor.
Exactly! My 'search' is to figure, if people don't do as they ought to - and we might not always expect them to - what then? My claim is, that the way out is to say, that if properrty rights are violated then it will end up hurting both the violated and then violater.
First of all, every incentive to innovate and for that matter produce in general is eradicated if it's up for graps.
But second, and to me most importantly, there's always a bigger fist, and this creates a consensus of respect for rights as a good thing. As a consensus the gruop/society/family will back it up like a musketeer pledge, because what could happen to one could happen to all. So from my point of view property rights is merely a practical matter.
Knight_of_BAAWA: Jacob Hedegaard:Maybe you could be so kind as to share why it is irrelevant? After all, history does show this point to be relevant...You have to show that it is, and no, history doesn't. So please: disabuse yourself of the notion that it's relevant just because some savages believe it.
Guess who?: No, you were banned for a day for refusing to back your claim. You feel that repeating your stance is enough; it's not. You got a little nudge in the direction of hopefully letting you know that such behavior is not tolerated here.
No, you were banned for a day for refusing to back your claim. You feel that repeating your stance is enough; it's not. You got a little nudge in the direction of hopefully letting you know that such behavior is not tolerated here.
And btw, 1918, 1921 and 1933 are historic landmarks that back my claim.
/ Jacob - who was hoping for a more sober debate here on Mises.org
Jacob Hedegaard: So from my point of view property rights is merely a practical matter.
So from my point of view property rights is merely a practical matter.
From everything you've explained and what Sphairon has mentioned (and you are agreeing with Sphairon it seems), then "merely" downplays the importance of "a practical matter". For as you stated "...this creates a consensus of respect for rights as a good thing." Meaning: It is a moral argument. This plays right into what Juan said earlier, which I thought was fantastic: "Saying that A can force B to do what A wishes is not a moral argument, at best you're stating a fact."
Jacob Hedegaard: Seems we agree more, than I thought - and btw thanks for a very reasoned contribution. I haven't read Hoppe, so I can't say how the IC is defined, but I use something similarly. Feel free to elaborate, comment or correct.
We most certainly agree, one cannot reasonably argue against the fact that the strong can in fact oppress the weak if they wish to do so. I don't know why there is that much resistance to this simple insight. You didn't even make a "might makes right" claim, you just stated a fact.Do I emit the Hoppean vibe? Haha. I don't know what Hoppe thinks of the intersubjective consensus. If you want more of this style of thought, check out confederalsocialist on YouTube. Personally, I think the intersubjective consensus is a set of values that a critical mass of people agree upon in a given area, thus stabilizing relations and providing certainty of the law. Definitions may vary, though.First of all, every incentive to innovate and for that matter produce in general is eradicated if it's up for graps. That's a very good economic argument for private property that, I think, is quite striking and intuitive.As a consensus the gruop/society/family will back it up like a musketeer pledge, because what could happen to one could happen to all.Another fine practical point.No, you were banned for a day for refusing to back your claim. You feel that repeating your stance is enough; it's not. You got a little nudge in the direction of hopefully letting you know that such behavior is not tolerated here.That, on the other hand, was quite poor.
Sphairon:No, you were banned for a day for refusing to back your claim. You feel that repeating your stance is enough; it's not. You got a little nudge in the direction of hopefully letting you know that such behavior is not tolerated here.That, on the other hand, was quite poor.
Indeed, but it isn't my words ;)
I can imagine whose words those were. But I better stop before I go to Ban Town myself.
All action is self-interested in a very loose sense - but what of it?
Um, having reasons is not philosophical fumbling. And yeah, if an advocate of force wants to say their position is correct, they'd best have actual reasons for it.
Depends on what is being transformed. Rothbard suggested the relevant technological unit as an appopriate measurement, and Hoppe for local standards as recognised by courts. The point is there must be some connection between the owner and the resource, as opposed to, none.
Yes, you do. If you don't, may I just come and take your computer or do what I will with your body? You will resist, or...? If everyone is out to kill you and doesn't "respect certain ideas" how do you plan on surviving? The ideas matter significantly. And as to why you should be able to claim resources to survive, it's pretty much because they're necessary for it. Either way, someone will always claim them, and if the so-called strong wish to usurp the resources of others they will have to anyway (even with the chimera of so-called "usage rights")... so it makes their claim all the more hypocritical and they must provide a reason for why it's OK for them but not anyone else, You're saying nature is a free-for-all, not a free market, the latter of which depends on well-defined boundaries of ownership.
Jacob Hedegaard:And btw, 1918, 1921 and 1933 are historic landmarks that back my claim.
If you're hoping for a more sober debate, perhaps you should begin by checking your ideas and realizing that just because something is happening now doesn't mean that it's actually a function of the discussion. Further, you are the one who has to back your claim. You are claiming it is relevant--so show it. Don't whine because I'm pointing out your failure to show cause. Not. My. Problem.
Sphairon:one cannot reasonably argue against the fact that the strong can in fact oppress the weak if they wish to do so. I don't know why there is that much resistance to this simple insight.
Jacob Hedegaard:My 'search' is to figure, if people don't do as they ought to - and we might not always expect them to - what then ?
My claim is, that the way out is to say, that if properrty rights are violated then it will end up hurting both the violated and then violater.
But second, and to me most importantly, there's always a bigger fist, and this creates a consensus of respect for rights as a good thing.
As a consensus the gruop/society/family will back it up like a musketeer pledge, because what could happen to one could happen to all.
Sphairon: Personally, I think the intersubjective consensus is a set of values that a critical mass of people agree upon in a given area, thus stabilizing relations and providing certainty of the law. Definitions may vary, though.
Personally, I think the intersubjective consensus is a set of values that a critical mass of people agree upon in a given area, thus stabilizing relations and providing certainty of the law. Definitions may vary, though.
What I'm finding interesting is an application of an analogy devised by Pirsig in his metaphysics of quality that mirrors what you're saying. Jacob is discussing "force" in a brutish way to help him arrive to his conclusions (Jacob not being "brutish", don't misunderstand me, I mean the kind of force he is discussing). I'm not focused on his strategy, but how this discussion is emerging to what I find interesting. Force is a biological notion. The "muscle" as Jacob mentioned. In Pirsig's analogy there are these levels of value patterns. Biological being a level and thus the force Jacob is mentioning. And now you, Sphairon, bring up "intersubjective consensus" which is the next level called social. These levels being value patterns thereby what your discussing Sphairon can also be called social value patterns or social values. The intersubjective consensus is a social value or social pattern (labeled either way). Now the next level is called intellectual values or intellectual patterns (of value). And so what we have going on is this. Jacob's force is biological (muscle). Sphairon you mention that if a society is going to come to a consensus, the consensus is a "set of values... agree(d) upon...". The society could agree upon force or the society could agree about intellectual values. For an intersubjective consensus to agree upon biological values in their actions without consideration of intellectual values, then the social values are not recognizing these intellectual values (they are present just not being used/recognized for people are reasoning creatures). These levels are morally hierarchical, but at the same time each preceding level is a foundation for the next emerging "higher" level. Higher as in more moral. Thus the foundation levels must be present for the more moral levels to emerge. What this means in this context is with intersubjective consensus intellectual patterns will emerge. Now what those intellectual patterns will be is another question. But as intellectual patterns are considered in the consensus more and more and not a variation that uses intellectual values to support biological virtues of force (muscle), then the discusses and values in the society become more about the intellectual values and less about biological values. The biological values will not disappear for the "police" or some kind of protectorate will always need to be present to counter criminal biological values of coercive violations. So the police using biological tactics of force to counter the criminals biological values of force is a prevention of the lower level corrupting the higher levels. It is a matter of direction. Criminals rising up (so to speak) the levels emerging from lower morality whereas the police are emergences of the higher level to prevent the criminal aspects of biological forces from toppling more moral values such as society and intellect. Of course the police could be corrupted and considered criminals and it is the intersubjective consensus that would determine if such acts have happened. And where is the intersubjective consensus or social patterns getting such insights on events? The intellect. And the more the intellectual patterns are exercised and brought to consensus, then this is the same as saying the more the higher moral standards of intellectual patterns are introduced into the social consensus. And property rights are an intellectual pattern that is fruitful indeed and the intersubjective consensus (social patterns of value) taking heed of such an intellectual pattern results in moral arguments that are better than arguments based on a lower biological pattern such as "force/muscle".
this strikes me as nonsense.
and again a confusion between 'norms' and 'morals'
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
wilderness: Sphairon: Personally, I think the intersubjective consensus is a set of values that a critical mass of people agree upon in a given area, thus stabilizing relations and providing certainty of the law. Definitions may vary, though. What I'm finding interesting is an application of an analogy devised by Pirsig in his metaphysics of quality that mirrors what you're saying. Jacob is discussing "force" in a brutish way to help him arrive to his conclusions (Jacob not being "brutish", don't misunderstand me, I mean the kind of force he is discussing). I'm not focused on his strategy, but how this discussion is emerging to what I find interesting. Force is a biological notion. The "muscle" as Jacob mentioned. In Pirsig's analogy there are these levels of value patterns. Biological being a level and thus the force Jacob is mentioning. And now you, Sphairon, bring up "intersubjective consensus" which is the next level called social. These levels being value patterns thereby what your discussing Sphairon can also be called social value patterns or social values. The intersubjective consensus is a social value or social pattern (labeled either way). Now the next level is called intellectual values or intellectual patterns (of value). And so what we have going on is this. Jacob's force is biological (muscle). Sphairon you mention that if a society is going to come to a consensus, the consensus is a "set of values... agree(d) upon...". The society could agree upon force or the society could agree about intellectual values. For an intersubjective consensus to agree upon biological values in their actions without consideration of intellectual values, then the social values are not recognizing these intellectual values (they are present just not being used/recognized for people are reasoning creatures). These levels are morally hierarchical, but at the same time each preceding level is a foundation for the next emerging "higher" level. Higher as in more moral. Thus the foundation levels must be present for the more moral levels to emerge. What this means in this context is with intersubjective consensus intellectual patterns will emerge. Now what those intellectual patterns will be is another question. But as intellectual patterns are considered in the consensus more and more and not a variation that uses intellectual values to support biological virtues of force (muscle), then the discusses and values in the society become more about the intellectual values and less about biological values. The biological values will not disappear for the "police" or some kind of protectorate will always need to be present to counter criminal biological values of coercive violations. So the police using biological tactics of force to counter the criminals biological values of force is a prevention of the lower level corrupting the higher levels. It is a matter of direction. Criminals rising up (so to speak) the levels emerging from lower morality whereas the police are emergences of the higher level to prevent the criminal aspects of biological forces from toppling more moral values such as society and intellect. Of course the police could be corrupted and considered criminals and it is the intersubjective consensus that would determine if such acts have happened. And where is the intersubjective consensus or social patterns getting such insights on events? The intellect. And the more the intellectual patterns are exercised and brought to consensus, then this is the same as saying the more the higher moral standards of intellectual patterns are introduced into the social consensus. And property rights are an intellectual pattern that is fruitful indeed and the intersubjective consensus (social patterns of value) taking heed of such an intellectual pattern results in moral arguments that are better than arguments based on a lower biological pattern such as "force/muscle".
Dear God...
nirgrahamUK: this strikes me as nonsense. and again a confusion between 'norms' and 'morals'
So property rights don't involve morals? interesting thought of yours, but I don't agree.
nibbler491,
lol it was long indeed, but now I can refer you somewhere...
wilderness:So property rights don't involve morals? interesting thought of yours, but I don't agree.
perhaps you will admit to having strawmanned me. check my sig.
nirgrahamUK: wilderness:So property rights don't involve morals? interesting thought of yours, but I don't agree. perhaps you will admit to having strawmanned me. check my sig.
Well, you said what I wrote was nonsense, so, maybe you ought to remind yourself of your sig? Unless your able to provide intellectual discourse, then how am I to know what your talking about? Specifics are encouraged. For in this forum it is the clarity of ideas that come across in a perceivable manner. Unless of course you want to talk about your social life here, that's possible in the lay out of forum. For anybody can read what you type about your social life, but I doubt many of us are here to track another's social life. Yet to actually use force in this type of forum is not possible, unless you count ones fingers hitting the keyboard, but I can't see you do that. I assume you do, but can't see it. And that type of brute force really doesn't infringe on my property. So it's all good aka moral.
i dont see the value in bandying around odd terminology like 'levels', etc. but i wont do a full critique of your 'analogy'
lets look at your final sentances.
wilderness: And property rights are an intellectual pattern that is fruitful indeed and the intersubjective consensus (social patterns of value) taking heed of such an intellectual pattern results in moral arguments that are better than arguments based on a lower biological pattern such as "force/muscle".
And property rights are an intellectual pattern that is fruitful indeed and the intersubjective consensus (social patterns of value) taking heed of such an intellectual pattern results in moral arguments that are better than arguments based on a lower biological pattern such as "force/muscle".
surely its not that one class of arguments are better moral arguments than another. (as you seem to have stated it)
but that one class of arguments are moral arguments and others are not moral arguments.
Juan: We all know that. What, exactly, is the point of stating the obvious ?
I felt compelled to do so because every time somebody brings up the issue of enforceability, there is this panicking denial of "no, he can't since we all own ourselves".the strong would be better off if they gave their slaves some freedom are nonsense from the point of view of the 'strong'. Yes. Fortunately, that was not my point.I claimed that blackballing and the probability of tolerated retaliation by victims is what will keep "the strong" from oppressing "the weak". That's the utilitarian side of my argument. The reason why blackballing and tolerated retaliation are possible is a favorable intersubjective consensus. This consensus involves not necessarily utilitarian criteria. Maybe it will resemble an Aristotelian model. Or a Kantian one.
wilderness:Criminals rising up (so to speak) the levels emerging from lower morality whereas the police are emergences of the higher level to prevent the criminal aspects of biological forces from toppling more moral values such as society and intellect.
That's actually quite a fair analogy. Not just that, but your whole post. However, it's not an attempt to justify a given set of values (as some seem to be interpreting it), but an explanation as to how a given set of values may emerge, isn't it? As such, I find it very enlightening and have to agree.The thing is, libertarian philosophy draws heavily from intellectual considerations. That was a problem I had with natural rights a few months ago; I asked myself, if my "natural rights" are not enforceable, then of what use are they? Well, they are useful as a concept. They describe a way how to properly handle human interaction and give plausible explanations derived from plausible axioms as to why it should be exactly that way. This may be ignored from a biological perspective, but force (a "biological argument", if you will) doesn't invalidate the integrity of an intellectual claim. Physical reality (biology) may not match my claim, but I'm still entitled to it. How fast and to what extent it will be enforced depends, again, on the intersubjective consensus.
nirgrahamUK: i dont see the value in bandying around odd terminology like 'levels', etc. but i wont do a full critique of your 'analogy' lets look at your final sentances. wilderness: And property rights are an intellectual pattern that is fruitful indeed and the intersubjective consensus (social patterns of value) taking heed of such an intellectual pattern results in moral arguments that are better than arguments based on a lower biological pattern such as "force/muscle". surely its not that one class of arguments are better moral arguments than another. (as you seem to have stated it) but that one class of arguments are moral arguments and others are not moral arguments.
Yes, some moral arguments are better than others, but it is does involve context. Indeed one can argue that another argument is immoral whereas one's own argument is the moral argument. There's nothing wrong with such an analogy. But I can see how the use of force is moral. I brought up a protectorate of property rights against criminals. The criminals are coming into somebody's house to kill the inhabitant. The inhabitant defends his or her self and kills by force the criminal intruder. The inhabitant had a moral justification to defend him or her self. This is in light of intellectual values of property rights. Yet, what about the State invading another country, such as Iraq, on a false premise. By force the justification was based on a preemptive strike to kill them before they kill us in the U.S. Now this justification for war was not based on the intellectual values of property rights. Yet it has been justified over and over again not just by the Bush administration but also many in the public. The war was right they say. Yet what intellectual value are they basing this war on? None that I know about based on property rights. Was it more about social values stirred within a neocon community that based their efforts to go to war on biological drum beats such as stimulating the fear of the U.S.? sure was. Was this fear propaganda working in concert with social value Statism, which includes nationalistic tones called patriotism? sure was. They said you were a good American if you supported the war. Then they showed the bombs on TV and how many people tuned in maybe even socialized, had some primal biological testosterone stirrings flowing through their veins as they watched people die, and drank some beers as the "Shock and Awe" played over the TV waves? I never have been able to find a good intellectual argument for going to that war, but many still argue it was for the good of the country. I can say the act of war was immoral. But with this explanation I provided I showed with more explanatory power why it was immoral. Good intellectual arguments are better than social arguments of patriotism and even older arguments of "Let's just kill the bastards". I am drawing a moral distinction in these values. Some value the intellect. Other value the social. And lastly some just wanted to kill them cause they heard it was a good thing to do so. They got their adrenaline pumped and went to Iraq to kill them before they came back to the U.S. and killed us. People can be deceived. I've been deceived numerous times, but that's why exercising the intellect may help change events for the better in time. Each of these are values. You mentioned "norms", well, that's what the intersubjective consensus advocates. Whatever the majority of the people involved in the consensus decide to apply is the norm of that societal consensus. Norms don't always mean intellectual, but sometimes they might. Norms just show the median or average pattern being applied. Sometimes a good moral intellectual argument is definitely not the normative value. That intellectual argument is valued by somebody or a small group of people, but it doesn't mean it's the norm.