Lilburne: But with objective natural rights that derive "ought" from "is", people are asserting something which may not even make logical sense, let alone be actually true. Bringing what is potentially complete incoherence into the light of day is not extreme skepticism.
But with objective natural rights that derive "ought" from "is", people are asserting something which may not even make logical sense, let alone be actually true.
Bringing what is potentially complete incoherence into the light of day is not extreme skepticism.
But you have not proven anything is completely incoherent. All I have seen is that you have explain that since there is free will then natural law can be transgressed against. I don't think that anyone denies that because there is the NAP, that means there is no murders. With free will, any amount of variation is possible. You can either be a natural rights theorist or some variation of ulitiarianism but even in utilitiarianism individuals act against the maximization of social pleasure, are we to deduce from that situation that utilitarianism is 'incoherent?' What is truly nonsense is to think that one can be amoral and yet engage in debate on the goodness/badness of other moral systems for engaging in such endeavors is establishing a certain moral system. Its a performative contradiction, and yes I know Anarcho-Mercantilist you reject the performative contradiction but really that is just your excuse to allow you to believe such things. And you Lilburne, don't you have an article establishing libertarian morality through psuedo-Humeian format?
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
Anarchist Cain:But you have not proven anything is completely incoherent. All I have seen is that you have explain that since there is free will then natural law can be transgressed against. I don't think that anyone denies that because there is the NAP, that means there is no murders. With free will, any amount of variation is possible.
If we physically can transgress 'natural law', then can you specify the actions which does not transgress 'natural law'?
Anarchist Cain:You can either be a natural rights theorist or some variation of ulitiarianism but even in utilitiarianism individuals act against the maximization of social pleasure, are we to deduce from that situation that utilitarianism is 'incoherent?'
You did not quality which actions constitute as "acting within one's nature." Conversely, I do not know what you mean by "acting against one's 'nature'."
Anarchist Cain:What is truly nonsense is to think that one can be amoral and yet engage in debate on the goodness/badness of other moral systems for engaging in such endeavors is establishing a certain moral system.
The term 'amoralism' is ambiguous.
Life is filled with misinterpretations, misrepresentations, and prodigal folklore.
Anarchist Cain:What is truly nonsense is to think that one can be amoral and yet engage in debate on the goodness/badness of other moral systems for engaging in such endeavors is establishing a certain moral system. Its a performative contradiction
That's pretty much akin to saying that one can't be an atheist and take part in discussions of religion, or that one can't be an anarchist and partake in discussions relating to politics.
"You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows"
Bob Dylan
GilesStratton:That's pretty much akin to saying that one can't be an atheist and take part in discussions of religion, or that one can't be an anarchist and partake in discussions relating to politics.
Actually not because an atheist does not announce that god is real through implied linguistics nor does being an anarchist mean an individual must become a political hermit.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:If we physically can transgress 'natural law', then can you specify the actions which does not transgress 'natural law'?
non-violent voluntary interaction and exchange.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:The term 'amoralism' is ambiguous.
Only because you fail to define it. Amoralism is defined as lacking a distinction between right and wrong.
Anarchist Cain: Actually not because an atheist does not announce that god is real through implied linguistics
Actually not because an atheist does not announce that god is real through implied linguistics
What the hell? When did any one imply that "an atheist [announces] that god is real thought implied linguistics"? And, what does that even mean?
Anarchist Cain: Giles Stratton: one can't be an anarchist and partake in discussions relating to politics. nor does being an anarchist mean an individual must become a political hermit.
Giles Stratton: one can't be an anarchist and partake in discussions relating to politics.
one can't be an anarchist and partake in discussions relating to politics.
nor does being an anarchist mean an individual must become a political hermit.
And, the above quoted attemped counterargument is argumentatively empty.
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
Anarchist Cain: Only because you fail to define it. Amoralism is defined as lacking a distinction between right and wrong.
So, if you are an amoralist, then you could not comment on the rightness or the wrongness of the proposition that 1 plus 1 equals 2?
I. Ryan:So, if you are an amoralist, then you could not comment on the rightness or the wrongness of the proposition that 1 plus 1 equals 2?
concerning morality...A-moral...
I. Ryan:What the hell? When did any one imply that "an atheist [announces] that god is real thought implied linguistics"? And, what does that even mean?
By being amoral one cannot say 'natural law is wrong' for that would make a good/bad value judgement about morals which contradicts amoralism. By thinking that God doesn't exist does not thereby imply that is actually is a deity.
I. Ryan: Anarchist Cain: Only because you fail to define it. Amoralism is defined as lacking a distinction between right and wrong. So, if you are an amoralist, then you could not comment on the rightness or the wrongness of the proposition that 1 plus 1 equals 2?
You had defined 'amoralism' as "mathematical non-cognitivism," which means that mathematical sentences do not express 'propositions'. However, almost all mathematicians express their sentences as 'propositions'. Therefore, we can logically label almost all mathematicians as 'moralists' in the sense of "mathematical cognitivism."
Almost all 'amoralists' (as in 'ethical non-cognitivists') who practice mathematics express mathematical sentences as 'propositions'. However, they leave out possibility of this for 'ethical' sentences. Why do they avoid setting truth values to 'ethical' sentences when they do not avoid setting truth values to mathematical sentences?
The answer is: The 'ethical non-cognitivists' do not define 'true' and 'false' as 'right' and 'wrong', respectively. That's it.
'Ethical non-cognitivism' does not imply 'amoralism' (in AC's sense of the term), nor does it imply 'moral subjectivism' (in Juan's sense of the term). 'Ethical non-cognitivism' only deals with the definition of 'truth'. Therefore, your usage of 'amoralism' has nothing to do with Lilburne's and zefreak's conceptions of 'morality', and has everything to do with 'ethical non-cognitivism'.
Anarchist Cain: By being amoral one cannot say 'natural law is wrong' for that would make a good/bad value judgement about morals which contradicts amoralism. By thinking that God doesn't exist does not thereby imply that is actually is a deity.
How is that a value judgment?
I. Ryan:How is that a value judgment?
How is saying if something is good or bad a value judgement?
Anarcho-Mercantilist: You had defined 'amoralism' as "mathematical non-cognitivism," which means that mathematical sentences do not express 'propositions'. However, almost all mathematicians express their sentences as 'propositions'. Therefore, we can logically label almost all mathematicians as 'moralists' in the sense of "mathematical cognitivism." Almost all 'amoralists' (as in 'ethical non-cognitivists') who practice mathematics express mathematical sentences as 'propositions'. However, they leave out possibility of this for 'ethical' sentences. Why do they avoid setting truth values to 'ethical' sentences when they do not avoid setting truth values to mathematical sentences? The answer is: The 'ethical non-cognitivists' do not define 'true' and 'false' as 'right' and 'wrong', respectively. That's it. 'Ethical non-cognitivism' does not imply 'amoralism' (in AC's sense of the term), nor does it imply 'moral subjectivism' (in Juan's sense of the term). 'Ethical non-cognitivism' only deals with the definition of 'truth'. Therefore, your usage of 'amoralism' has nothing to do with Lilburne's and zefreak's conceptions of 'morality', and has everything to do with 'ethical non-cognitivism'.
I do not even have a usage of "amoralism". I was merely responding to Anarchist Cain's definition.
Not quite. An amoralist couldn't say that natural law is morally wrong. He could still say natural law is wrong, as in incorrect.
Anarchist Cain: How is saying if something is good or bad a value judgement?
Anarchist Cain: 'natural law is wrong' . . . that would make a good/bad value judgement
'natural law is wrong' . . . that would make a good/bad value judgement
And, 2+2=5 is also wrong . . . how is that a good/bad value judgment?
I. Ryan:And, 2+2=5 is also wrong . . . how is that a good/bad value judgment?
We are not talking about math, we are talking about ethical systems [ morality ]
Angurse:Not quite. An amoralist couldn't say that natural law is morally wrong. He could still say natural law is wrong, as in incorrect.
No, you are still making a judgement on the correctness or incorrectness of a moral system thereby engaging in bring about a moral system. The only thing an amoralist can engage in without contradicting themselves is saying 'I am an amoralist' and then stop talking about morality beyond that.
Anarchist Cain: We are not talking about math, we are talking about ethical systems [ morality ]
You claimed that the proposition that "the natural law theory is wrong" is a value judgment. I claimed that the proposition that "2+2=5" is not a value judgment. If you want to continue to claim the first proposition, then you will need to explain what the difference is.
I. Ryan:You claimed that the proposition that "the natural law theory is wrong" is a value judgment. I claimed that the proposition that "2+2=5" is not a value judgment. If you want to continue to claim the first proposition, then you will need to explain what the difference is.
Natural Law - a moral system of goodness/badness
2+2= 5 - An unrealistic math problem.
Concerning Amoralism, it concerns morality, not math. If you cannot tell the difference between morality and math then discussing this topic further is a waste of my time.
Anarchist Cain: Natural Law - a moral system of goodness/badness 2+2= 5 - An unrealistic math problem. Concerning Amoralism, it concerns morality, not math. If you cannot tell the difference between morality and math then discussing this topic further is a waste of my time.
They are both propositions. If you cannot explain the difference, then you lose.
I. Ryan: They are both propositions. If you cannot explain the difference, then you lose.
Actually Natural law isn't a proposition. Saying 'Natural law' is not a declarative statement that can be true or false. Saying 2+2=5 actually is a proposition.
Anarchist Cain:No, you are still making a judgement on the correctness or incorrectness of a moral system thereby engaging in bring about a moral system.
No. Decreeing whether something is incorrect or correct, isn't the same as declaring is as being morally wrong or right, the terms are being used in a different context. And commenting on such matters doesn't mean one is engaging in contradiction.
Uh, no. I meant that the claim that "the natural law theory is wrong" or "the natural law theory is incorrect" is a proposition. That should have been obvious because I wrote:
I. Ryan: You claimed that the proposition that "the natural law theory is wrong" is a value judgment.
You claimed that the proposition that "the natural law theory is wrong" is a value judgment.
Angurse:No. Decreeing whether something is incorrect or correct, isn't the same as declaring is as being morally wrong or right, the terms are being used in a different context. And commenting on such matters doesn't mean one is engaging in contradiction.
I see what you mean. Saying whither natural law is correct or incorrect is a useless endeavour because you would then need to validate its correctness or incorrectness with value statements.
Anarchist Cain: Concerning Amoralism, it concerns morality, not math. If you cannot tell the difference between morality and math then discussing this topic further is a waste of my time.
Anarchist Cain:The only thing an amoralist can engage in without contradicting themselves is saying 'I am an amoralist' and then stop talking about morality beyond that.
Which one is it now, can they or can they not speak about... anything?
Anarchist Cain: I see what you mean. Saying whither natural law is correct or incorrect is a useless endeavour because you would then need to validate its correctness or incorrectness with value statements.
Do you realize that you can make value judgments that are irrelevant to morality? For example: "I like this chair." Is that a moral judgment?
Angurse: Which one is it now, can they or can they not speak about... anything?
Well making value statements concerning morality is in fact establishing a moral system. I Ryan is saying natural law is WRONG, not that it is incorrect. Saying something is wrong is a value judgement.
Anarchist Cain: Well making value statements concerning morality is in fact establishing a moral system. I Ryan is saying natural law is WRONG, not that it is incorrect. Saying something is wrong is a value judgement.
When did I imply that "right" and "wrong" is different than "correct" and "incorrect"? And, when did I even say that "natural law is wrong" or that "natural law is incorrect"?
Jon Irenicus:It isn't a "demolition". Not even close. It's a barrel of laughs.
Do tell.
Why anarchy fails
I. Ryan:Do you realize that you can make value judgments that are irrelevant to morality? For example: "I like this chair." Is that a moral judgment?
It is a value statement. Saying 'I like this chair' is implying I value this chair thereby implying a series of moral premises. I would ask why you like the chair, do you value comfort? color? Morality is defined as a code of conduct so seeking comfort or other desire can be put under that definition.
Anarchist Cain: Well making value statements concerning morality is in fact establishing a moral system.
Well making value statements concerning morality is in fact establishing a moral system.
Well, no. They can still speak of morality, if just to say nothing more than the concept itself is incorrect. Otherwise you are contending that all amoralists are contradicting themselves by rejecting morals.
Anarchist Cain:I Ryan is saying natural law is WRONG, not that it is incorrect. Saying something is wrong is a value judgement.
Wrong cannot be used as a synonym for incorrect?
I. Ryan:When did I imply that "right" and "wrong" is different than "correct" and "incorrect"?
Is natural law right or wrong? Correct or incorrect?
Angurse:Well, no. They can still speak of morality, if just to say nothing more than the concept itself is incorrect. Otherwise you are contending that all amoralists are contradicting themselves by rejecting morals.
No I am contending that amoralists are suffering from performative contradiction by establishing the rightness or wrongness of moral systems. Explain how morality is correct or incorrect? Morality is define as a code of conduct proposed by a given group or individual. Explain how that is correct or incorrect.
Angurse:Wrong cannot be used as a synonym for incorrect?
No it can't in terms of morality. Perhaps you will see this when trying to justify the correctness or incorrectness of morality itself.
Anarchist Cain: It is a value statement. Saying 'I like this chair' is implying I value this chair thereby implying a series of moral premises. I would ask why you like the chair, do you value comfort? color? Morality is defined as a code of conduct so seeking comfort or other desire can be put under that definition.
Therefore, you believe that every possible human action presupposes a series of moral premises? If so, then what the hell does "moral" mean? If you believe that morality extends to all human actions whatever, then the meaning of the word is lost.
Anarchist Cain: Is natural law right or wrong? Correct or incorrect?
That is incredibly vague. Are you asking whether I think that a specific doctrine of natural law is true? Or, are you asking if natural laws exist? Or, what?
I. Ryan:Therefore, you believe that every possible human action presupposes a series of moral premises? If so, then what the hell does "moral" mean? If you believe that morality extends to all human actions whatever, then the meaning of the word is lost.
Not necessarily. We don't speak of the morals of chair sitting. They are beign debates. We sweat the small stuff and talk about larger issues.
I. Ryan:That is incredibly vague. Are you asking whether I think that a specific doctrine of natural law is true? Or, are you asking if natural laws exist? Or, what?
I am asking if you think natural law is a good and if the system itself is correct.
Anarchist Cain: Not necessarily. We don't speak of the morals of chair sitting. They are beign debates. We sweat the small stuff and talk about larger issues.
All action implies a prior value judgment. If you assert that all value judgments presuppose a moral code, then you implicitly assert that all action presupposes a moral code.
I. Ryan: All action implies a prior value judgment.
All action implies a prior value judgment.
True, action does show whither or not things are good or bad. Preference through action after all.
Anarchist Cain: I am asking if you think natural law is a good and if the system itself is correct.
What system? Many doctrines of natural law exist.