wilderness: Natural rights are. Life is. Liberty is. Property is. Without these rights that are, then no defining will happen. No exploring can even occur without these rights. How do you explore human nature or otherwise without living (life), choosing [(liberty) i.e. without being able to choose to explore this, that, or other], or person [(property) i.e. without being the human that you are? can't As for natural law: A=A (law of noncontradiction), etc...
Natural rights are.
Life is.
Liberty is.
Property is.
Without these rights that are, then no defining will happen. No exploring can even occur without these rights. How do you explore human nature or otherwise without living (life), choosing [(liberty) i.e. without being able to choose to explore this, that, or other], or person [(property) i.e. without being the human that you are? can't
As for natural law: A=A (law of noncontradiction), etc...
Those who claim the "independence of reason and mind," who claim that "the mind discovers, not creates, the laws of logic (in the normative sense)," who claim that "reason exists outside the mind," who claim that "intrinsic properties exist independently of our thinking," and who claim that "essences exist independently of our senses," should learn that our 'senses' do not reflect the structure of 'reality'. Although we should 'reject' the "realist/idealist" dichotomy, the "reflectionist/impositionist" dichotomy, the "physicalist/phenomenalist" dichotomy, the "objectivist/subjectivist" dichotomy, the "essentialist/nominalist" dichotomy, the "cognitivist/non-cognitivist" dichotomy, the "rationalist/empiricist" dichotomy, and the "a priori/a posteriori" dichotomy out of the mere ambiguity of the labels; we should nevertheless take account of how the 'senses' do not actually reflect the actual structure of 'reality', of how "the map is not the territory," and of how our 'senses' only 'perceive' a biased aspect of 'reality'.
Our universe is composed of random interactions between sub-atomic particles—quarks, leptons, photons, etc. However, we can 'conceive' objects beyond that because our 'senses' are designed to match specific patterns and arrangements of those particles. The universe is just a random collection of particles interacting randomly and chaotically. However, our 'mind' and 'senses' "de-randomize" those particles because the sensory receptors are evolved to detect consistencies, correlations, structures, causality, etc. We 'discover' the order, consistency, and the laws of the universe merely because our 'mind' and 'senses' finds patterns.
The law of non-contradiction presupposes that the human 'senses' 'perceive' objects beyond the elementary particles. Without human 'sensation', an apple is a mere collection of subatomic particles, and an orange is a mere collection of subatomic particles. When we say "the apple does not contradict itself in the sense that apples will not suddenly turn into oranges," we are merely talking of how our 'mind' and 'senses' separate the "collection of particles in the apple" with the "collection of particles in the orange." Therefore, the "law of non-contradiction" (in the descriptive sense) is just a description that "two ideas within the mind do not contradict with each other."
We should take account that the laws of logic, mathematics, and ethics have two meanings: one in the descriptive sense, and the other in the normative sense. Those who conflate the descriptive with the normative senses lack an understanding between the descriptive explanation of the rules of language and instrumental application of the laws of logic. How can we logically deduce that we should apply the normative law of non-contradiction from our description that the "objects within the universe do not contradict themselves"? That sounds just as absurd as "we should prescribe the law of gravity (as a normative law of logic) from our description of the idea that 'objects tend to attract one another'."
To remain consistent, only solution is to separate the two meanings of the laws of logic. The laws of logic, in the descriptive sense, means the idea that "an idea either exists ordoes not exist" or "two ideas within the mind do not contradict with each other." The laws of logic, in the normative sense, means that the laws of logic are useful for human reason, and that humans created or invented the laws of logic as mere tools for sound reasoning.
Some people believe that our 'perceptions' of the laws of logic, mathematics, and ethics—in the normative senses—reflect the structure of 'reality'. As we have shown above, the laws of logic—in the normative sense—are mere human creations useful for sound reasoning. We will claim otherwise:
'Reason' does not presuppose the law of identity.
'Reason' does not presuppose the law of the excluded middle.
'Reason' does not presuppose the law of non-contradiction.
Therefore, 'reason' does not presuppose 'natural law' ethics.
Some will detract our above claims by defending Hoppe's In Defense of Extreme Rationalism or asserting that "communication necessitates both sides to presuppose the law of identity." However, the use of the laws of logic does not require communication between two persons. For example, Robinson Crusoe can apply the laws of logic for reasoning by himself.
Also, we can communicate with one another by means others than language. For example, we can communicate with one another by techlepathy or merging multiple brains into one.
We should not confuse ourselves by asserting that "'natural law' ethics cannot 'exist' in the non-metaphysical sense." For instance, we can assume 'natural law' ethics as 'true' and apply it into the real-world.
In addition, we should not assume that "natural rights can only exist if natural law exists," nor assume that "rights can only exist if natural rights exist." We can still logically believe in 'rights' even if we disbelieve in 'natural rights' or 'natural law'.
I know that this is a rambling, but I have disproven the metaphysical existence of the normative 'natural law' ethics.
Life is filled with misinterpretations, misrepresentations, and prodigal folklore.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: the laws of logic are useful for human reason, and that humans created or invented the laws of logic as mere tools for sound reasoning.
the laws of logic are useful for human reason, and that humans created or invented the laws of logic as mere tools for sound reasoning.
The two lines that I quoted above are circular.
Why are such "laws of logic . . . useful for human reason"? Why are such "laws of logic . . . tools for sound reasoning"? What determines the definition of "sound reasoning"?
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
I. Ryan: What determines the definition of "sound reasoning"?
What determines the definition of "sound reasoning"?
"Sound reasoning" is just "accurate human reasoning."
Anarcho-Mercantilist: Our universe is composed of random interactions between sub-atomic particles—quarks, leptons, photons, etc. However, we can 'conceive' objects beyond that because our 'senses' are designed to match specific patterns and arrangements of those particles. The universe is just a random collection of particles interacting randomly and chaotically. However, our 'mind' and 'senses' "de-randomize" those particles because the sensory receptors are evolved to detect consistencies, correlations, structures, causality, etc. We 'discover' the order, consistency, and the laws of the universe merely because our 'mind' and 'senses' finds patterns.
Why do you believe that the universe is composed of random interactions? And, if our mind can "match specific patterns and arrangements", then does that not imply nonrandomness? If a regularity of phenomena does not originally exist, then how can our mind "discover" such regularity?
Anarcho-Mercantilist: "Sound reasoning" is just "accurate human reasoning."
The original lines and that line are circular because they are references that reference each other.
I. Ryan:Why do you believe that the universe is composed of random interactions? And, if our mind can "match specific patterns and arrangements", then does that not imply nonrandomness? If a regularity of phenomena does not originally exist, then how can our mind "discover" such regularity?
Humans can recognize an apple, even though the apple has no regularity by itself. The apple is composed of atoms, which is composed of vibrating electrons and other subatomic partices that move and interact irregularly. Humans "discover" such regularity of an apple because our 'senses' abstract such irregular phenomenon by recognizing specific patterns and arrangements from the photons reflected from the surface of the apple.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: Humans "discover" such regularity of an apple because our 'senses' abstract such irregular phenomenon by recognizing specific patterns and arrangements from the photons reflected from the surface of the apple.
Humans "discover" such regularity of an apple because our 'senses' abstract such irregular phenomenon by recognizing specific patterns and arrangements from the photons reflected from the surface of the apple.
That is an extreme simplification. The visual appearance of an object is merely one of the many differentiae. And, it is short-sighted to believe that sensuous differentiae cause the nature of the categories themselves. Instead, the categories themselves reference a consistency of the recognizable causal relations of a set of objects and the sensuous differentiae evolved in order to allow such one to differentiate such categories.
For example, the term "iron" references a set of objects that all behave identically. If an object does not behave that way, then one cannot accurately reference such an object as "iron".
Anarcho-Mercantilist: Humans can recognize an apple, even though the apple has no regularity by itself. The apple is composed of atoms, which is composed of vibrating electrons and other subatomic partices that move and interact irregularly.
Humans can recognize an apple, even though the apple has no regularity by itself. The apple is composed of atoms, which is composed of vibrating electrons and other subatomic partices that move and interact irregularly.
How do you know that "vibrating electrons and other subatomic particles . . . move and interact irregularly"?
If the fundamentals constituents of an object behave irregularly, then how can the collection of those fundamental constituents (i.e., the object) behave regularly?
Anarcho-Mercantilist: our 'senses' abstract [. . .] irregular phenomenon by recognizing specific patterns and arrangements [. . .]
our 'senses' abstract [. . .] irregular phenomenon by recognizing specific patterns and arrangements [. . .]
The above quote is a blatant contradiction. We recognize the patterns (i.e., regularity) of irregular phenomenon? How does one recognize the regularity of an irregular thing?
Anarcho-Mercantilist: 'Reason' does not presuppose the law of identity. 'Reason' does not presuppose the law of the excluded middle. 'Reason' does not presuppose the law of non-contradiction.
We should reject these. And yet we should not.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:who claim that "intrinsic properties exist independently of our thinking," and who claim that "essences exist independently of our senses,"
If nothing objective exists then you should stop speaking, because no one cares what your or anyone elses opinion on their personal reality is.
twistedbydsign99: Anarcho-Mercantilist:who claim that "intrinsic properties exist independently of our thinking," and who claim that "essences exist independently of our senses," If nothing objective exists then you should stop speaking, because no one cares what your or anyone elses opinion on their personal reality is.
Indeed, po mo self refuting claptrap.
The atoms tell the atoms so, for I never was or will but atoms forevermore be.
Yours sincerely,
Physiocrat
Although we should 'reject' the "realist/idealist" dichotomy, the "reflectionist/impositionist" dichotomy, the "physicalist/phenomenalist" dichotomy, the "objectivist/subjectivist" dichotomy, the "essentialist/nominalist" dichotomy, the "cognitivist/non-cognitivist" dichotomy, the "rationalist/empiricist" dichotomy, and the "a priori/a posteriori" dichotomy out of the mere ambiguity of the labels;
This is precisely what is wrong with your philosophy. You use the problem of semantics to argue against *conceptual* distinctions, which is misleading. These things cannot completely be reduced to an issue of linguistics because there are actual distinctions between concepts and viewpoints. The ambiguity of labels does not render conceptual distinction null. In a nutshell, in your own way you're essentially just spitting up the broken pieces of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, in which "language games" determine everything and philosophy as a whole is more or less subservient to linguistics.
You would probably get along well with some of the post-modernist youtubers like Azrienoch in this respect, since such a Wittgensteinian linguistic anti-realism has been post-modernized by such people, despite the fact that Wittgenstein is associated with analytic philosophy and his earlier philosophy inspired logical positivism (which is problematic for similar reasons in its attempt to murder metaphysics and morality with sophistic arguments).
That depends on the definition of 'objective'. As you previously stated in the animal rights thread:
twistedbydsign99:are you saying its objectively true that there is no objective morality, or are you saying its just your opinion? If its true then prove it.
twistedbydsign99:What is subjective is goal choice, and what is objective is the way one should go about obtaining them. There are certain universal goals/wants and therefore objective morality. All men prefer life for example. All men prefer to act in the best of their capacities is another. From those two universal goals you can prescribe ways in which all men should act.
I am not using your definition of 'objective'. Therefore, I made the mistake for not being clear enough.
scineram: Anarcho-Mercantilist: 'Reason' does not presuppose the law of identity. 'Reason' does not presuppose the law of the excluded middle. 'Reason' does not presuppose the law of non-contradiction. We should reject these. And yet we should not.
Objectivists (Ayn Rand) staunchly believe in the classical laws of logic that they will attribute anyone who sees any problem with some of the laws as a 'logical positivist'. Therefore, the Objectivists label me as a 'logical positivist' because I see potential problems with the law of non-contradiction. However, I do not 'reject' the law in the sense that I regard contradictions as consistent.
Brainpolice: Although we should 'reject' the "realist/idealist" dichotomy, the "reflectionist/impositionist" dichotomy, the "physicalist/phenomenalist" dichotomy, the "objectivist/subjectivist" dichotomy, the "essentialist/nominalist" dichotomy, the "cognitivist/non-cognitivist" dichotomy, the "rationalist/empiricist" dichotomy, and the "a priori/a posteriori" dichotomy out of the mere ambiguity of the labels; This is precisely what is wrong with your philosophy. You use the problem of semantics to argue against *conceptual* distinctions, which is misleading. These things cannot completely be reduced to an issue of linguistics because there are actual distinctions between concepts and viewpoints. The ambiguity of labels does not render conceptual distinction null. In a nutshell, in your own way you're essentially just spitting up the broken pieces of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, in which "language games" determine everything and philosophy as a whole is more or less subservient to linguistics. You would probably get along well with some of the post-modernist youtubers like Azrienoch in this respect, since such a Wittgensteinian linguistic anti-realism has been post-modernized by such people, despite the fact that Wittgenstein is associated with analytic philosophy and his earlier philosophy inspired logical positivism (which is problematic for similar reasons in its attempt to murder metaphysics and morality with sophistic arguments).
I do not 'reject' them in the sense that I do not find any 'conceptual' distinctions. I only 'reject' the usage of those labels. For an example of how those labels can cause problems, go to YouTube and find the 2007 debate on "subjective vs. objective morality." I learned it the hard way that the main controversy within the debate revolves around the confusing definitions of "subjective" and "objective." Yes, I do not deny that there exists some conceptual distinctions. However, the debate will be much less controversial and smaller if the terminology is clarified.
After that, I looked into more 'controversies' and discovered that the dichotomy between 'physicalism' and 'phenominalism' has too much semantic confusion. In late 2008, I had labeled myself as a 'physicalist', 'phenomenalist', and a 'Berkeleyan idealist'—all at the same time—which many think they are incompatible.
Soon, I realized that most 'controversies' in philosophies will be resolved much faster if we clarified the terminology. I have not even heard of Wittgenstein or read general semantics before 2009.
I realized that additionally, the term 'realism' is ambiguous. It could mean a shorthand for 'naive realism', 'physicalism', or it could mean 'mereological essentialism'—which, in turn, are also ambiguous. Brainpolice, I heard that you had labeled yourself as a 'realist' in the sense of an 'anti-solipsist' and an anti-'naive realist'. The term 'anti-realist', for example, can mean an 'ontological solipsist', 'Berkeleyan idealist', etc. In fact, just like the 2007 YouTube 'subjectivist/objectivist' controversy, different definitions of 'realism' and 'idealism' are shared by many different people. I have not yet seen a consensus of the interpretation of the terms 'realism' or 'idealism'.
However, I agree, that this does not mean that there exists some conceptual differences between some 'idealists' and 'realists'. I meant that we should reject the usage of those labels (not the concepts) because many people interpret those terms in many different ways.
In addition, I heard that you had labeled yourself both as a 'moral fictionalist' and a 'moral realist'. This seems contradictory, but your 'nominalist' views had influenced you to be a 'fictionalist' since 'morality' do not exist 'tangibly'. However, you also had identified yourself as a 'moral realist' because you believe that you can use the word 'truth' methodologically.
We should explain our philosophies unambiguously instead of fighting the label war.
(I have no influence from any of the developers of "logical positivism." I have only read Wittgenstein's later work Philosophical Investigations. However, I learned nothing from that work.)
. . .
Brainpolice:This is precisely what is wrong with your philosophy. You use the problem of semantics to argue against *conceptual* distinctions, which is misleading.
If Brainpolice don't see how to counter our arguments against "natural law" crap, he just keep saying that we are using only semantic tricks. No, we are pointing contradictions in his own philosophy. For example, I was talking about real problems, like archism in the concept of atteritorial DRO's, communitarian ostracism in law enforcement and so on. There is no anarchist model of law enforcement by Brainpolice definition of authoritarianism and I perfectly agree with this. Why deny such an obvious thing, Brainpolice? Are you totally lost your mind trying to avoid moral neo-nihilism? Remeber, if we take Stirners position on secular humanism to it's logical conclusion - we wil reject any moral realism and moral objectivism. Our ethical express propositions are not made true by objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion. Subjective, o r individual morality is our reality and you must realize it. I advocate moral skepticism and, moral relativism: the view that moral knowledge is impossible and that there are no moral truths. We can create moral theories, but they will be subjective, not objective - independent of our mind. I strongly believe in niezschean morality:
All "anarchist" schools are right by calling each other "not true anarchists".
Kregus:We can create moral theories, but they will be subjective, not objective - independent of our mind.
There will always be an element of objectivity, because of a few facts, you are alive and you are arguing.
twistedbydsign99: Kregus:We can create moral theories, but they will be subjective, not objective - independent of our mind. There will always be an element of objectivity, because of a few facts, you are alive and you are arguing.
The words "fact," "reality," "absolute," "relative," "objective," and "subjective" are multiordinal.
Kregus:we wil reject any moral realism and moral objectivism
I do not "accept" nor "reject" all theories labeled under the terms "moral realism" and "moral objectivism"—same thing with "moral non-cognitivism" and "moral subjectivism." If someone labels their philosophy as "moral realism" or "moral objectivism" but I agree with him, then fine, I agree with his philosophy. I only reject the usage of the labels "moral realism" and "moral objectivism" because they have multiple interpretations and no consensus on an unambiguous definition. Therefore, I disagree with your rejection of "moral realism" and "moral objectivism."
Kregus:The interests of others should not restrain us
This seems like the Objectivist (Ayn Rand) argument against "altruism," which they define as the forced obligation to help others. Objectivists do not oppose voluntary altruism in the sense of donating to charity.
Kregus:We should be passionate beings
We should be "passionate" in the sense of voluntary altruism.
Kregus:Masculinity, strength and passion are the highest qualities in a person
You mean that women should reject their femininity, weakness, sensitivity, passiveness, submissiveness, and cowardice?
Kregus:Conventional morality is a crutch to man
Perhaps you have defined "conventional morality" as statist morality or "Christian morality" which forces humans to have paternalistic obligations.
Kregus:I reject Christianity, democracy and socialism
Stirner rejected Christianity because he thought that "god is evil"; not because "god does not exist." You have believed otherwise, as ascribed in the second sentence.
What? It should prove amusing. I shall get a scare quote meter installed to see who tops it.
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
Anarcho-Mercantilist:The words "fact," "reality," "absolute," "relative," "objective," and "subjective" are multiordinal
I don't know about multiordinal, but biordinal. It depends on if we are talking about a optimization problem or a logic problem. The words "objective" and "fact" in the realm of logic problems is not multiordinal as you stated.
Anarcho-Mercantilist,
Is there any specific reason why you failed to respond to my previous posts?
Nothing personal, AM, but your reasoning is dead wrong and off the mark. First, the laws of logic aren't mere heuristics, they are fundamental attributes of human thinking itself (Maybe due to our evolution, but I'm not a neurologist, so I won't speculate beyond that point.) as to not have these laws, a human mind couldn't identify itself or that which it is not part of itself (existence). Second, just because they don't pre-exist the human condition as some sort of physical law doesn't mean that they are non-existent for if your reasoning was true then sound does not exist as it is merely the vibration of molecules and atoms (or in simpler terms: because the structure does not pre-exist the components, that does not mean the structure is any less real for it.).
"The power of liberty going forward is in decentralization. Not in leaders, but in decentralized activism. In a market process." -- liberty student