nandnor: Damn guys, this is getting awfully off topic. Maybe i need to explain it further. What I mean is, why keep the libertarian ethical argument in ones head when reasoning how to act. That argument is often a (or the) counter balance for doing otherwise useful stuff (making money from the state, using state power for self interests, exploiting the non-libertarian aspects of intellectual and regular property, etc). ...given that ignoring it is not hypocritical or contradictory at all, why not do so?
Damn guys, this is getting awfully off topic.
Maybe i need to explain it further. What I mean is, why keep the libertarian ethical argument in ones head when reasoning how to act. That argument is often a (or the) counter balance for doing otherwise useful stuff (making money from the state, using state power for self interests, exploiting the non-libertarian aspects of intellectual and regular property, etc).
...given that ignoring it is not hypocritical or contradictory at all, why not do so?
Nandnor:
I don't think the question you are asking here is that difficult, but it's not exactly the same as the question you asked in the OP, which mentioned justification.
The reason one might keep a libertarian ethical argument in one's head is because they have to make a choice in a situation where the results of that choice are not immediately apparent, but can only be known through abstract or theoretical knowledge. In some circumstances, one doesn't know which choice or path is in one's self-interest without some theoretical framework to guide one's choices. So we can consider "the libertarian ethical argument in one's head" as the particular theory each libertarian is working with, that instructs him/her that following xyz path, or making X choice in a given circumstance, is in their self-interest.
For example, we seem to know whether driving in the right or left lane of a two lane highway is in our self-interest. There is nearly unanimous agreement on this type of choice.
But there is less agreement on whether attending a government university is in one's self-interest or not. Apparently, abstract reasoning is needed to make these kinds of choices. One has to keep a particular theory "in one's head" as an aid in making choices where the results of the choice are remote, perhaps counter-intuitive, not immediately apparent, etc.... (Menger calls it "knowledge extending beyond immediate experience")
The reason that libertarians, utilizing libertarian social theory, generally try to abstain from or avoid things such as: making money from the state, using state power for self interests, exploiting the non-libertarian aspects of intellectual and regular property, etc., is that libertarian social theory tells them that doing such things is counter to their own rightly understood self-interest. Some of the consequences of doing these things are not immediately apparent. Some of the consequences are remote---beyond immediate experience. Thus an abstract theory is required to understand the consequences of doing these things.
So understanding why libertarians refer to an intellectual construct or theory that guides their actions is not particularly difficult.
But this is not the same thing as the question as to what "justifies" libertarianism. When we say "justify," we now introduce intersubjectivity...
Question: What is your justification for what you just did? Because I'm not happy about it, and am considering retaliation.
Or again: I believe your expressed plan will have "bad" consequences (consequences detrimental to my interests). Thus: Justify your plan to me. Tell my why I should support it.
That is "justification." It deals with intersubjectivity, usually intersubjective conflict.
Concepts such as justification and argumentation, as these concepts are used in libertarian ethics, are used, as Hoppe writes, in an attempt to establish "that intersubjectively meaningful norms must exist." (TOS, p.130)(underline and italics added)
The question you ask above can be answered without referring to the concept of justification and a theory of intersubjective norms. Your question above can be answered in terms of the theory of action, in terms of methodological individualism, and whether the individual's means can bring about the ends he strives to attain.
The question you ask in the OP, as it specifically asks about justification, introduces the concept of intersubjectivity, since the theories that utilize the concept of justification generally refer to a system incorporating the idea of intersubjectivity.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
E. R. Olovetto: zefreak: E. R. Olovetto: zefreak: Solid_Choke: Arguments using epistemological premises AND ethical premises ARE NOT epistemological arguments (in the way that I stipulated it). Also, I didn't say that application of Jasay's reasoning leads one to accept the NAP. Instead it shows that statists (and anyone who would restrict liberty) aren't in a position to know what they must know in order for their arguments to pull their own weight. They literally require what is unthinkable in order to justify statism. Of course they could reject any attempt to justify statism altogether and simply do it whether they have a reason or not and the epistemological arguments for libertarianism would have nothing to say about it. You must look beyond epistemology to justify getting up in the morning, but epistemological arguments tear the hell out of statism while basically leaving libertarianism relatively untouched. I agree with this, although I think epistemological arguments do much more than leave libertarianism 'relatively untouched'. It destroys a central tenant of libertarianism, the NAP. Why? Stuff like this is why I usually don't bother with these 10+ page threads on natural rights. Also, why do you say "a central [tenet]" rather than "the central tenet", as if there is something else? I would argue that the NAP by itself cannot be the foundation for Rothbardian ethics. The Homesteading Principle plays as large a part of forming his ethics as the NAP. I don't agree with Rothbard on some things... Anyhow, I'm sorry but you are confused. Neo-Lockean homesteading, property rights, proportionality, etc. are all corollary to (deduced from) the non-aggression principle.
zefreak: E. R. Olovetto: zefreak: Solid_Choke: Arguments using epistemological premises AND ethical premises ARE NOT epistemological arguments (in the way that I stipulated it). Also, I didn't say that application of Jasay's reasoning leads one to accept the NAP. Instead it shows that statists (and anyone who would restrict liberty) aren't in a position to know what they must know in order for their arguments to pull their own weight. They literally require what is unthinkable in order to justify statism. Of course they could reject any attempt to justify statism altogether and simply do it whether they have a reason or not and the epistemological arguments for libertarianism would have nothing to say about it. You must look beyond epistemology to justify getting up in the morning, but epistemological arguments tear the hell out of statism while basically leaving libertarianism relatively untouched. I agree with this, although I think epistemological arguments do much more than leave libertarianism 'relatively untouched'. It destroys a central tenant of libertarianism, the NAP. Why? Stuff like this is why I usually don't bother with these 10+ page threads on natural rights. Also, why do you say "a central [tenet]" rather than "the central tenet", as if there is something else? I would argue that the NAP by itself cannot be the foundation for Rothbardian ethics. The Homesteading Principle plays as large a part of forming his ethics as the NAP.
E. R. Olovetto: zefreak: Solid_Choke: Arguments using epistemological premises AND ethical premises ARE NOT epistemological arguments (in the way that I stipulated it). Also, I didn't say that application of Jasay's reasoning leads one to accept the NAP. Instead it shows that statists (and anyone who would restrict liberty) aren't in a position to know what they must know in order for their arguments to pull their own weight. They literally require what is unthinkable in order to justify statism. Of course they could reject any attempt to justify statism altogether and simply do it whether they have a reason or not and the epistemological arguments for libertarianism would have nothing to say about it. You must look beyond epistemology to justify getting up in the morning, but epistemological arguments tear the hell out of statism while basically leaving libertarianism relatively untouched. I agree with this, although I think epistemological arguments do much more than leave libertarianism 'relatively untouched'. It destroys a central tenant of libertarianism, the NAP. Why? Stuff like this is why I usually don't bother with these 10+ page threads on natural rights. Also, why do you say "a central [tenet]" rather than "the central tenet", as if there is something else?
zefreak: Solid_Choke: Arguments using epistemological premises AND ethical premises ARE NOT epistemological arguments (in the way that I stipulated it). Also, I didn't say that application of Jasay's reasoning leads one to accept the NAP. Instead it shows that statists (and anyone who would restrict liberty) aren't in a position to know what they must know in order for their arguments to pull their own weight. They literally require what is unthinkable in order to justify statism. Of course they could reject any attempt to justify statism altogether and simply do it whether they have a reason or not and the epistemological arguments for libertarianism would have nothing to say about it. You must look beyond epistemology to justify getting up in the morning, but epistemological arguments tear the hell out of statism while basically leaving libertarianism relatively untouched. I agree with this, although I think epistemological arguments do much more than leave libertarianism 'relatively untouched'. It destroys a central tenant of libertarianism, the NAP.
Solid_Choke: Arguments using epistemological premises AND ethical premises ARE NOT epistemological arguments (in the way that I stipulated it). Also, I didn't say that application of Jasay's reasoning leads one to accept the NAP. Instead it shows that statists (and anyone who would restrict liberty) aren't in a position to know what they must know in order for their arguments to pull their own weight. They literally require what is unthinkable in order to justify statism. Of course they could reject any attempt to justify statism altogether and simply do it whether they have a reason or not and the epistemological arguments for libertarianism would have nothing to say about it. You must look beyond epistemology to justify getting up in the morning, but epistemological arguments tear the hell out of statism while basically leaving libertarianism relatively untouched.
Arguments using epistemological premises AND ethical premises ARE NOT epistemological arguments (in the way that I stipulated it). Also, I didn't say that application of Jasay's reasoning leads one to accept the NAP. Instead it shows that statists (and anyone who would restrict liberty) aren't in a position to know what they must know in order for their arguments to pull their own weight. They literally require what is unthinkable in order to justify statism. Of course they could reject any attempt to justify statism altogether and simply do it whether they have a reason or not and the epistemological arguments for libertarianism would have nothing to say about it. You must look beyond epistemology to justify getting up in the morning, but epistemological arguments tear the hell out of statism while basically leaving libertarianism relatively untouched.
I agree with this, although I think epistemological arguments do much more than leave libertarianism 'relatively untouched'. It destroys a central tenant of libertarianism, the NAP.
Why? Stuff like this is why I usually don't bother with these 10+ page threads on natural rights. Also, why do you say "a central [tenet]" rather than "the central tenet", as if there is something else?
I would argue that the NAP by itself cannot be the foundation for Rothbardian ethics. The Homesteading Principle plays as large a part of forming his ethics as the NAP.
I don't agree with Rothbard on some things... Anyhow, I'm sorry but you are confused. Neo-Lockean homesteading, property rights, proportionality, etc. are all corollary to (deduced from) the non-aggression principle.
No they aren't. They are non-sequitors. Can you show me where in Rothbards writing (I've read the Ethics of Liberty twice) he actually derives the homesteading principle or proportionality instead of merely asserting it? How does he go from self-ownership to "so when you mix your labor with an object you own it"?
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
Read from the second heading "Property in Bodies", especially footnote 9, referencing Hoppe and Rothbard. I think that is what you are looking for probably. link
Rothbard:The libertarian creed rests upon one central axiom: that no man or group of men may aggress against the person or property of anyone else. This may be called the "nonaggression axiom." "Aggression" is defined as the initiation of the use or threat of physical violence against the person or property of anyone else. Aggression is therefore synonymous with invasion.
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
wilderness: Well throughout the history of natural law, natural law has always meant intellectual law. It is logic and epistemology, metaphysics, etc... It wasn't until Spinoza and Hobbes came along and changed the definition of natural to mean where the beasts roam and that the state is legitimate cause it is bringing civilization out of the beastly inclinations of nature. They completely perverted what natural meant in natural law for their own manipulative ends. History is a war of definitions over the labels, at times, and sometimes it can be tracked down on who started spreading the lies, in this case, Hobbes and Spinoza.
Well throughout the history of natural law, natural law has always meant intellectual law. It is logic and epistemology, metaphysics, etc... It wasn't until Spinoza and Hobbes came along and changed the definition of natural to mean where the beasts roam and that the state is legitimate cause it is bringing civilization out of the beastly inclinations of nature. They completely perverted what natural meant in natural law for their own manipulative ends. History is a war of definitions over the labels, at times, and sometimes it can be tracked down on who started spreading the lies, in this case, Hobbes and Spinoza.
It isn't logic and epistemology. Its a doctrine. A clumsily-defined, never agreed upon, unproven doctrine. That has been used to "justify" far more than liberty. Its no different than religion. The good thing is liberty doesn't need to be justified, coercion does.
Angurse: It isn't logic and epistemology. Its a doctrine.
It isn't logic and epistemology. Its a doctrine.
Intellect isn't a doctrine.
Angurse: A clumsily-defined, never agreed upon, unproven doctrine.
A clumsily-defined, never agreed upon, unproven doctrine.
thing is intellect isn't a doctrine.
Angurse: That has been used to "justify" far more than liberty.
That has been used to "justify" far more than liberty.
Meanwhile it takes an intellectual grasping of what liberty is to develop an epistemology upon liberty.
It doesn't matter the source of liberty for the sake of this post. I am not bringing up metaphysics directly. Intellect doesn't necessarily need be the origin/source of liberty. I'm not talking about the source of liberty.
To be aware of what anything is involves the intellect/mind. Grasp whatever it is, intellectually, and in this case, liberty and then develop an epistemology, understand the logic, etc...
Angurse: Its no different than religion.
Its no different than religion.
strawman
Angurse: The good thing is liberty doesn't need to be justified, coercion does.
The good thing is liberty doesn't need to be justified, coercion does.
Yes. In the natural law tradition negative liberty need not to be justified. I refrain in peace why in my innocence do I need to justify anything? Your preaching to the choir.
If by liberty you mean freedom from violence or coercion then it is a positive obligation and does need to be justified. Liberty, coercion, indeed all normative propositions must be justified as the suppose obligation.
Yes, intellect not natural law. The presumption of liberty, like Innocence, isn't natural law. You are either purposefully conflating vastly different ideas or are very confused.
zefreak:If by liberty you mean freedom from violence or coercion then it is a positive obligation and does need to be justified. Liberty, coercion, indeed all normative propositions must be justified as the suppose obligation.
Obligations correspond with rights, liberty is a lack of rights and therefore obligations. The burden of proof is simply on the actor.
Angurse: Yes, intellect not natural law.
Yes, intellect not natural law.
I've had this happen with you before. You become intellectually dishonest at times. You move words around to suit your needs. Of course not "yes". I am not saying something you agree with. Do I need to let you know that? This will be, hopefully, my last post in this discussion with you therefore. I can't stand dishonest people. Intellect is natural in the natural law tradition. Intellectual law, natural law - same thing. lex-ratio : look that concept up.
Angurse: The presumption of liberty, like Innocence, isn't natural law. You are either purposefully conflating vastly different ideas or are very confused.
The presumption of liberty, like Innocence, isn't natural law. You are either purposefully conflating vastly different ideas or are very confused.
I've brought this up many times before. I had as a signature some time ago lex-ratio. This is a well-thought out intellectual interpretation that has a centuries old tradition. Intellect is natural in the natural law tradition. sorry you don't know that.
for those that want at least one source here.
E. R. Olovetto: Read from the second heading "Property in Bodies", especially footnote 9, referencing Hoppe and Rothbard. I think that is what you are looking for probably. link Rothbard:The libertarian creed rests upon one central axiom: that no man or group of men may aggress against the person or property of anyone else. This may be called the "nonaggression axiom." "Aggression" is defined as the initiation of the use or threat of physical violence against the person or property of anyone else. Aggression is therefore synonymous with invasion.
It should be obvious, but the quote you offer doesn't derive any theory of property (specifically Lockean homesteading) from self-ownership. Furthermore, the article linked merely asserts that lockean homesteading is the most socially enabling and practical system of property. It does NOT derive it from self-ownership.
Angurse: zefreak:If by liberty you mean freedom from violence or coercion then it is a positive obligation and does need to be justified. Liberty, coercion, indeed all normative propositions must be justified as the suppose obligation. Obligations correspond with rights, liberty is a lack of rights and therefore obligations. The burden of proof is simply on the actor.
I'm not quite sure we disagree. Perhaps we are arguing past each other. In your understanding, can liberty be infringed upon? If person A punches person B, could person A claim that person B infringed upon his liberty, and must justify his infringement? Or does person B have full liberty of action as does person A (but this is liberty in an ontological and non-normative sense), and person A must justify his claim that B must abstain from certain actions?
We have and you are still just as confused. All natural rights philosophers either have an ultimate value or assume some truth is self-evident. Read the paper you provided. Take for instance, the "natural law" espoused by Aquinas he just assumed norms of behaviour, and then built his first rule of morality off of it.
There isn't such a thing as "intellectual law."
zefreak:I'm not quite sure we disagree. Perhaps we are arguing past each other. In your understanding, can liberty be infringed upon? If person A punches person B, could person A claim that person B infringed upon his liberty, and must justify his infringement? Or does person B have full liberty of action as does person A (but this is liberty in an ontological and non-normative sense), and person A must justify his claim that B must abstain from certain actions?
Yes, liberty can be infringed upon. Neither have the right to punch one another.
Angurse: We have and you are still just as confused.
We have and you are still just as confused.
I'm not confused. strawman. Can you say anything of substance other than saying "confused" or "religion" when it's not true?
Angurse: All natural rights philosophers either have an ultimate value or assume some truth is self-evident. Read the paper you provided.
All natural rights philosophers either have an ultimate value or assume some truth is self-evident. Read the paper you provided.
It's not a paper. It's a book.
Theory is different than understanding the workings of intellect and how a human comes to understand reality. A theory may develop out of this, but epistemology is different from metaphysics and logic, etc...
Angurse: Take for instance, the "natural law" espoused by Aquinas he just assumed norms of behaviour, and then built his first rule of morality off of it.
Take for instance, the "natural law" espoused by Aquinas he just assumed norms of behaviour, and then built his first rule of morality off of it.
Aquinas developed a particular theory, but he still used his intellect. All people use their intellect. It is human nature. I'm simply letting you know what natural means in the natural law tradition. It means intellect. That does not espouse a particular theory. It is an understanding of definitions. Obviously you bringing this up about Aquinas is to point out you are focused upon differing theories of natural law, but I'm not talking about any one theory. I'm referring to the definition of natural in said tradition. There is another concept called positive law which focuses upon will. Natural law derives it's understanding from the intellect as opposed to positivism which derives it's way from will power alone ie. government legislation.
Angurse: There isn't such a thing as "intellectual law."
Law is made up of principles and axioms. The human intellect discovers such things. Some people wonder where these patterns/principles come from ie God, purely the material universe, etc... but I am not saying where these patterns come from. But they are here. There are principles to be discovered. They are present. The human intellect is able to grasp these principles. To know anything, being human, is to involve the intellect. There is a process how knowledge comes about ie. via the senses, input from principles to help provide form to some final theory, etc... Some of these laws or ethics may find an origin in the heart, as some people like to point out here in this forum, but again, that's fine, but it takes an intellect to grasp the origins of anything. The intellect performs metaphysical exercises. My skin doesn't understand principles, my intellect does. It's a simple understanding of definitions, your conflating definitions about natural/intellect with the various theories that people have development across time using their intellect. I haven't espoused a particular theory other than I did note negative liberty at one point, but that's a concept and I can't say that one concept classifies as a whole theory. It doesn't. I also did bring up where two varying theories can be developed from. One of intellect to reason then will. Another (positivism) that begins with will then tries to reason out what has happened afterwards.
Wilderness,
What you are arguing for is completely removed from the topic of "natural law." Yes, Aquinas used his intellect to create a theory, as did Hobbes. So what? You seem to have missed "natural law" as a specific concept and now confined yourself to defending "natural" as being equal to intellect. Who cares? That isn't the topic. All natural law theories fail. Natural law simply doesn't exist, there isn't any pattern or principles out there to be discovered. Now if you want to say that ethics stem from the "heart" then we are on the same page, but to say such a thing is to completely admit that there isn't an objective ethic and therefore natural law, at least in the traditional sense of the term.
Angurse: Wilderness, What you are arguing for is completely removed from the topic of "natural law." Yes, Aquinas used his intellect to create a theory, as did Hobbes. So what? You seem to have missed "natural law" as a specific concept and now confined yourself to defending "natural" as being equal to intellect. Who cares?
What you are arguing for is completely removed from the topic of "natural law." Yes, Aquinas used his intellect to create a theory, as did Hobbes. So what? You seem to have missed "natural law" as a specific concept and now confined yourself to defending "natural" as being equal to intellect. Who cares?
well in the natural law tradition natural means intellect. i don't know why that would bother you. it's a simple fact to comprehend.
Angurse: That isn't the topic.
That isn't the topic.
Yes it is.
Angurse: All natural law theories fail.
All natural law theories fail.
the intellect fails?
Angurse: Natural law simply doesn't exist, there isn't any pattern or principles out there to be discovered.
Natural law simply doesn't exist, there isn't any pattern or principles out there to be discovered.
no principles eh? ok dude.
Angurse: Now if you want to say that ethics stem from the "heart" then we are on the same page,
Now if you want to say that ethics stem from the "heart" then we are on the same page,
I'm not talking about the origin of ethics or anything. You say "stem". I wasn't referring to "stem". You are obviously the one confused. I am not directly talking about the metaphysics of ethics.
Angurse: ...but to say such a thing is to completely admit that there isn't an objective ethic
...but to say such a thing is to completely admit that there isn't an objective ethic
whatever objective mean... i don't know. so I'm not going to understand you here.
Angurse: ...and therefore natural law,
...and therefore natural law,
and therefore the intellect...
Angurse: ...at least in the traditional sense of the term.
...at least in the traditional sense of the term.
Law is discovered by the intellect. No matter where the origins of the law.
Your repeating the same sheer ignorance. Natural law refers to a theory that says there is a law (of human conduct) that is valid everywhere. This law has never been discovered or proven to exist. It has merely been posited. Even claiming its discovered by intellect just begs the question.
Angurse: zefreak:I'm not quite sure we disagree. Perhaps we are arguing past each other. In your understanding, can liberty be infringed upon? If person A punches person B, could person A claim that person B infringed upon his liberty, and must justify his infringement? Or does person B have full liberty of action as does person A (but this is liberty in an ontological and non-normative sense), and person A must justify his claim that B must abstain from certain actions? Yes, liberty can be infringed upon. Neither have the right to punch one another.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Then liberty as you see it places a positive obligation on the would-be aggressor. The notion of a 'negative right' is really just a way of formulating a positive right. Your 'negative right' to liberty is really a positive obligation on everyone else.
The two different uses of the word liberty (normative and ontological) and the equivocation between them form the foundation of my critique of the common understanding of Jasay. Jasay's epistemological argument justifies liberty, but not 'negative rights' or libertarian ethics. It justifies the pure liberty of action. It posits the elimination of obligations that are not epistemically justified, such as "you should not smoke", "you should not drive over the speed limit", and (controversially) "you should not abuse me/harm me/kill me".
Jasay's argument can be used against 'statist morality', but not the state as an organization. If said organization admits "neither of us have an obligation, neither me to you nor you to me. Our actions are not moral, but neither are they immoral." then Jasay's argument is irrelevant.
If I didn't get my point across, I will be glad to clarify. I am in a hurry and perhaps being overly-short and oversimplifying.
Angurse: Your repeating the same sheer ignorance. Natural law refers to a theory that says there is a law (of human conduct) that is valid everywhere.
Your repeating the same sheer ignorance. Natural law refers to a theory that says there is a law (of human conduct) that is valid everywhere.
Intellect is what realizes metaphysically anything. The theory of knowledge, the epistemology, involves the intellect making the realization. That's what natural means in natural law. Yes, it involves a theory or theories. But even as some say, 'morals are written on the heart' - and - therefore it is the intellect that reads what is written thereof. If that's the way ones theory goes. How I come to this knowledge, my epistemology based on the metaphysics of what is - is - that the intellect is what is realizing, performing metaphysics, and coming up with an epistemology - based on logic there will not be any contradictions in the development of any theory.
You are not discussing what I am discussing. I can see that. I have given you knowledge, so, it is not something of ignorance in which I speak. I am giving knowledge. That means I am not being ignorant. But your assertions have been vacuous from the beginning of this discussion. Deploying "religion" "ignorance" "confused" and other strawmen. I ponder your need for deception, but oh well.
You can disagree with my knowledge but that would only mean it is upon you to either simply disagree or refute. Disagree is simple disagreement. Refutation would involve a theory based on principles and facts that differ from what I am talking about. Yet you find it wrong for somebody to punch, in other words, aggress against a person's liberty. I do too. Therefore it is your epistemology that seems to differ from mine. I understand intellect is what realizes what is. I don't know how you can express any reason to me otherwise because that would involve your intellectual discernment too. So I don't know, quite frankly, what you are going on about.
Angurse: This law has never been discovered or proven to exist. It has merely been posited. Even claiming its discovered by intellect just begs the question.
This law has never been discovered or proven to exist. It has merely been posited. Even claiming its discovered by intellect just begs the question.
No it doesn't. Intellect discovers anything that you argue even against me. It is the involvement of your intellect that tries to put forth an assumption. That's all you've done is assume. You deny principles so all that you are left with is using my premise and deducting from the universal premise thereof based only upon possiblities. Since you don't put forth your own premise and give me knowledge, you are left with what is called an assumption. I am coming from a position of certainity and you are coming from a position of possiblities and opinion.
All based on human action ie. argumentation.
zefreak: Then liberty as you see it places a positive obligation on the would-be aggressor. The notion of a 'negative right' is really just a way of formulating a positive right. Your 'negative right' to liberty is really a positive obligation on everyone else. The two different uses of the word liberty (normative and ontological) and the equivocation between them form the foundation of my critique of the common understanding of Jasay. Jasay's epistemological argument justifies liberty, but not 'negative rights' or libertarian ethics. It justifies the pure liberty of action. It posits the elimination of obligations that are not epistemically justified, such as "you should not smoke", "you should not drive over the speed limit", and (controversially) "you should not abuse me/harm me/kill me". Jasay's argument can be used against 'statist morality', but not the state as an organization. If said organization admits "neither of us have an obligation, neither me to you nor you to me. Our actions are not moral, but neither are they immoral." then Jasay's argument is irrelevant. If I didn't get my point across, I will be glad to clarify. I am in a hurry and perhaps being overly-short and oversimplifying.
The point is you don't have any right to liberty, no negative rights, no positive rights, nor obligations associated. You have no obligation not to aggress as I already said, nor do you have a right to. Nor was the point ever to argue against the state as an organisation, at least in correspondence with the OP
Wildeness,
Why do you keep writing about "intellect?" As you correctly stated, we aren't talking about the same thing. I'm trying to stick to natural law/objective morality ala the OP, that simply hasn't been proven. Just as if the OP said "If objective morality luminiferous aether doesnt exist, what justifies libertarianism the propagation of light?"
It doesn't matter if intellect was used in an attempt discover or verify aether, as it hasn't. People even still try now. Like those who believe(d) in the aether, you simply haven't given a single fact showing what you are so certain of. Rather, you have showed that other people believed it as well, and they used their intellect. So was Lorentz, so was Morely, so what? No proof is no proof. (And calling the lack of aether aether! is just wrong)
Angurse: Wildeness, Why do you keep writing about "intellect?" As you correctly stated, we aren't talking about the same thing. I'm trying to stick to natural law/objective morality ala the OP, that simply hasn't been proven. Just as if the OP said "If objective morality luminiferous aether doesnt exist, what justifies libertarianism the propagation of light?" It doesn't matter if intellect was used in an attempt discover or verify aether, as it hasn't. People even still try now. Like those who believe(d) in the aether, you simply haven't given a single fact showing what you are so certain of. Rather, you have showed that other people believed it as well, and they used their intellect. So was Lorentz, so was Morely, so what? No proof is no proof. (And calling the lack of aether aether! is just wrong)
Angurse are you a positivist? Does proof, in your mind, mean empirical validation?
"If we wish to preserve a free society, it is essential that we recognize that the desirability of a particular object is not sufficient justification for the use of coercion."
Esuric:Angurse are you a positivist? Does proof, in your mind, mean empirical validation?
Right now I'd take any form of validation, logical, empirical, whatever... If you are going to call something a law should you not base it on something verifiable in some manner?
Angurse:Right now I'd take any form of validation, logical, empirical, whatever... If you are going to call something a law should you not base it on something verifiable in some manner?
There are causal chains, that is, each action has a reaction or an effect. Suppression of freedoms always lead to some kind of revolution, and this is true of any society in any epoch. Now, this doesn't mean that humanity will one day know absolute freedom and be free from coercion, but it does mean that there will always be those who are willing to fight for it, in the intellectual arena or whatever. This obviously isn't the proof you demand, and I can't give it to you because human action cannot be expressed in a mathematical formula; the physicists have an easier endeavor. But what you can say is that supporting freedom, at any and all costs, is at the very least admirable, and bettering the condition of society has to be 'the right thing to do.' Why? Well, I believe in God.
This is why Hayek says that classical liberals believe in socialist ends but not in socialist means.
Esuric:There are causal chains, that is, each action has a reaction or an effect. Suppression of freedoms always lead to some kind of revolution, and this is true of any society in any epoch. Now, this doesn't mean that humanity will one day know absolute freedom and be free from coercion, but it does mean that there will always be those who are willing to fight for it, in the intellectual arena or whatever. Now, this obviously isn't the proof you seek, and I can't give it to you because human action cannot be expressed in a mathematical formula; the physicists have an easier endeavor. But what you can say is that supporting freedom, at any and all costs, is at the very least admirable, and bettering the condition of society has to be 'the right thing to do.' Why? Well, I believe in God.
I don't necessarily disagree with what you've said at all. In fact, I think the complexity of human action makes the idea of an objective ethic an utter impossibility.
Angurse: zefreak: Then liberty as you see it places a positive obligation on the would-be aggressor. The notion of a 'negative right' is really just a way of formulating a positive right. Your 'negative right' to liberty is really a positive obligation on everyone else. The two different uses of the word liberty (normative and ontological) and the equivocation between them form the foundation of my critique of the common understanding of Jasay. Jasay's epistemological argument justifies liberty, but not 'negative rights' or libertarian ethics. It justifies the pure liberty of action. It posits the elimination of obligations that are not epistemically justified, such as "you should not smoke", "you should not drive over the speed limit", and (controversially) "you should not abuse me/harm me/kill me". Jasay's argument can be used against 'statist morality', but not the state as an organization. If said organization admits "neither of us have an obligation, neither me to you nor you to me. Our actions are not moral, but neither are they immoral." then Jasay's argument is irrelevant. If I didn't get my point across, I will be glad to clarify. I am in a hurry and perhaps being overly-short and oversimplifying. The point is you don't have any right to liberty, no negative rights, no positive rights, nor obligations associated. You have no obligation not to aggress as I already said, nor do you have a right to. Nor was the point ever to argue against the state as an organisation, at least in correspondence with the OP
Then we agree. I wasn't attacking you, but I know the two uses of liberty are often conflated and I was just making sure.
nandnor:The Lilburne manifesto and other answers just seemed to say "'cause it feels right". This seems like a mystical fantasy to me, not unlike any religion or cult. I think that having that as the basis for libertarianism puts it on the level of a religion, nothing else.
nandor,
If you regularly refrained from stealing your grandmother's social security check for no other reason than that such self-restraint "felt right", would you call such an impulse "mystical fantasy" tantamount to religion? Moral feelings are a fundamental part of our psychology; there's nothing mystical about them.
Lilburne:Moral feelings are a fundamental part of our psychology; there's nothing mystical about them.
The question, though, is why is it trans-societal? There are universal laws of man which extend to all places and all times; but are there any such moral laws (without talking about religion)? And if monotheistic religion is the sole reason, then maybe we've been too quick to dismiss the virtues of such religions.
Esuric:And if monotheistic religion is the sole reason, then maybe we've been too quick to dismiss the virtues of such religions.
Are you implying the non-monotheistic ancient Greeks were devoid of morality?
Esuric:The question, though, is why is it trans-societal?
Moral feelings are trans-societal because empathy is a natural, evolved feature of the human psyche.
Lilburne:Are you implying the non-monotheistic ancient Greeks were devoid of morality?
I should have been more general.
Lilburne:Moral feelings are trans-societal because empathy is a natural, evolved feature of the human psyche.
That's just a fancy way to say it's been handed down to us by society. Unless you're saying it's genetic, somehow.
Lilburne:empathy is a natural, evolved feature of the human psyche.
Esuric:That's just a fancy way to say it's been handed down to us by society. Unless you're saying it's genetic, somehow.
That's exactly what I'm saying.
"A neurological approach to empathy":
"The data reviewed in this essay show that the intuition of Adam Smith – that individuals are endowed with an altruistic mechanism that makes them share the “fortunes” of others – is strongly supported by neurophysiological data. When we observe others, we enact their actions inside ourselves and we share their emotions.
Can we deduce from this that the mirror mechanism is the mechanism from which altruistic behavior evolved? This is obviously a very hard question to answer. Yet, it is very plausible that the mirror mechanism played a fundamental role in the evolution of altruism. The mirror mechanism transforms what others do and feel in the observer’s own experience. The disappearance of unhappiness in others means the disappearance of unhappiness in us and, conversely, the observation of happiness in others provides a similar feeling in ourselves. Thus, acting to render others happy – an altruistic behavior – is transformed into an egoistic behavior – we are happy."
Lilburne: Lilburne:empathy is a natural, evolved feature of the human psyche. Esuric:That's just a fancy way to say it's been handed down to us by society. Unless you're saying it's genetic, somehow. That's exactly what I'm saying. "A neurological approach to empathy": "The data reviewed in this essay show that the intuition of Adam Smith – that individuals are endowed with an altruistic mechanism that makes them share the “fortunes” of others – is strongly supported by neurophysiological data. When we observe others, we enact their actions inside ourselves and we share their emotions. Can we deduce from this that the mirror mechanism is the mechanism from which altruistic behavior evolved? This is obviously a very hard question to answer. Yet, it is very plausible that the mirror mechanism played a fundamental role in the evolution of altruism. The mirror mechanism transforms what others do and feel in the observer’s own experience. The disappearance of unhappi120 Giacomo Rizzolatti and Laila Craighero ness in others means the disappearance of unhappiness in us and, conversely, the observation of happiness in others provides a similar feeling in ourselves. Thus, acting to render others happy – an altruistic behavior – is transformed into an egoistic behavior – we are happy."
"The data reviewed in this essay show that the intuition of Adam Smith – that individuals
are endowed with an altruistic mechanism that makes them share the
“fortunes” of others – is strongly supported by neurophysiological data. When we
observe others, we enact their actions inside ourselves and we share their emotions.
Can we deduce from this that the mirror mechanism is the mechanism from
which altruistic behavior evolved? This is obviously a very hard question to answer.
Yet, it is very plausible that the mirror mechanism played a fundamental
role in the evolution of altruism. The mirror mechanism transforms what others
do and feel in the observer’s own experience. The disappearance of unhappi120
Giacomo Rizzolatti and Laila Craighero
ness in others means the disappearance of unhappiness in us and, conversely, the
observation of happiness in others provides a similar feeling in ourselves. Thus,
acting to render others happy – an altruistic behavior – is transformed into an
egoistic behavior – we are happy."
Cool, I'll into it.
Lilburne: Lilburne:empathy is a natural, evolved feature of the human psyche. Esuric:That's just a fancy way to say it's been handed down to us by society. Unless you're saying it's genetic, somehow. That's exactly what I'm saying. "A neurological approach to empathy": "The data reviewed in this essay show that the intuition of Adam Smith – that individuals are endowed with an altruistic mechanism that makes them share the “fortunes” of others – is strongly supported by neurophysiological data. When we observe others, we enact their actions inside ourselves and we share their emotions. Can we deduce from this that the mirror mechanism is the mechanism from which altruistic behavior evolved? This is obviously a very hard question to answer. Yet, it is very plausible that the mirror mechanism played a fundamental role in the evolution of altruism. The mirror mechanism transforms what others do and feel in the observer’s own experience. The disappearance of unhappiness in others means the disappearance of unhappiness in us and, conversely, the observation of happiness in others provides a similar feeling in ourselves. Thus, acting to render others happy – an altruistic behavior – is transformed into an egoistic behavior – we are happy."
Thanks for that! I've been interested in mirror neurons ever since I came across them as an answer to a certain problem in philosophy of mind, specifically the "how do we know that other people are actors" question. Lilburne, have you read anything of Thomas Metzinger's? He uses cognitive science and neurobiology to inform a materialist theory of consciousness. He references empirical studies on split brain syndrome, the false hand illusion, OBE delusions and lucid dreaming and attempts to explain this phenomena. The result is imperfect but definitely a major step in the right direction.
Angurse: Why do you keep writing about "intellect?"
Why do you keep writing about "intellect?"
Because that's what I'm talking about. fairly simple.
edit:
Angurse: wilderness: throughout the history of natural law, natural law has always meant intellectual law. Its a doctrine.
wilderness: throughout the history of natural law, natural law has always meant intellectual law.
Its a doctrine.
wilderness:Intellect isn't a doctrine.
---
that's what this discussion has been about.
Angurse: It doesn't matter if intellect was used in an attempt discover or verify aether, as it hasn't. People even still try now. Like those who believe(d) in the aether, you simply haven't given a single fact showing what you are so certain of.
It doesn't matter if intellect was used in an attempt discover or verify aether, as it hasn't. People even still try now. Like those who believe(d) in the aether, you simply haven't given a single fact showing what you are so certain of.
I am certain that natural means intellect in the context of natural law of human nature. That's all I've said. You've been going on tangents.
Angurse: Rather, you have showed that other people believed it as well, and they used their intellect. So was Lorentz, so was Morely, so what? No proof is no proof. (And calling the lack of aether aether! is just wrong)
Rather, you have showed that other people believed it as well, and they used their intellect. So was Lorentz, so was Morely, so what? No proof is no proof. (And calling the lack of aether aether! is just wrong)
strawman (this whole aether tangent)
Your deception in this whole discussion has amounted to numerous strawmens and tangents.
Natural means intellect in natural law tradition.
Lilburne,
If it's our evolution which has detemined us and consequently our psychology doesn't your defence of libertarianism to fall to one massive genetic fallacy?
The atoms tell the atoms so, for I never was or will but atoms forevermore be.
Yours sincerely,
Physiocrat
zefreak:He uses cognitive science and neurobiology to inform a materialist theory of consciousness. He references empirical studies on split brain syndrome, the false hand illusion, OBE delusions and lucid dreaming and attempts to explain this phenomena. The result is imperfect but definitely a major step in the right direction.
I have read a few pieces with very different opinions when it comes to split brain syndrome. I have heard some people say that a person acts as though he will have two separate minds, while at the same time other people will say that this is not the case. So I always take what people say on this issue with a grain of salt.
But my question to you is how do you account for qualia? I assume you aren't an eliminativist. I always have trouble grasping how qualia can be accounted for in purely physical terms. One last thing I want to know is what is your response to the zombie argument? Do you think zombies are conceivable?
Esuric: The question, though, is why is it trans-societal? There are universal laws of man which extend to all places and all times; but are there any such moral laws (without talking about religion)?
The question, though, is why is it trans-societal? There are universal laws of man which extend to all places and all times; but are there any such moral laws (without talking about religion)?
Esuric:
In answer to your question, I would say---yes.
What makes moral (or ethical) laws universal is that human actions have co-present accompaniments. Moral or ethical actions, just as economic (catallactic) actions, have necessary accompaniments. The action and the corresponding accompaniment constitute the law.
Two examples I have used in the past which demonstrate the fundamental idea are:
Walking toward one location is always accompanied by walking away from another location.
And, if one makes an automobile more aerodynamic in order to increase fuel efficiency, the automobile must necessarily be harder to bring to a stop.
In these examples, the "means" (walking to a location, increasing the aerodynamic efficiency of a car) have accompaniments which may not have been the primary intention of the person utilizing these means (walking away from a location, making the car harder to bring to a stop).
The laws of human action are of the same nature. When a person seeks to acquire additional units of some good or object, he generally isn't trying to decrease the value he attaches to each unit, but by the law of marginal utility, this is a necessary accompaniment to acquiring additional units.
The law is universal because the action specified (acquiring an additional unit) has a necessary accompaniment.
Moral or ethical laws are universal, because acting in regard to another person has necessary accompaniments just as walking to a location, making a car more aerodynamic, or acquiring additional units of a good.
The question then becomes: What is moral action or ethical action? That is, how do we conceive moral or ethical "acts"?
And, what are the necessary accompaniments to such acts?
When we answer these questions, we are on the way to discovering and formulating moral or ethical laws of human action.
If you are familiar with Mises's writings, you know that he said again and again, that economics (catallactics) is the only elaborated branch of praxeology. There are other realms of praxeology that have not been expounded and elaborated.
Action is goal directed activity; it is "trying to." Moral or ethical action is "trying to" with respect to another person (another mind). Trying to help someone, trying to harm someone, etc...
Psychological action is "trying to" with respect to one's own mind (i.e., thinking or reasoning....."trying to" figure something out, "trying to" solve a problem, "trying to" control one's emotions, etc...)
Thus, there remain entire realms of human action that have not been approached by Menger's exact theoretical science, what Mises calls praxeology, and what Hayek calls the Pure Logic of Choice.
There are universal moral, ethical, and psychological laws. But there is as yet, no science of such laws. The reason is, libertarian ethics has been approached as a normative discipline rather than as a branch of praxeology.
In my opinion, one day this will change.
zefreak:Thanks for that! I've been interested in mirror neurons ever since I came across them as an answer to a certain problem in philosophy of mind, specifically the "how do we know that other people are actors" question. Lilburne, have you read anything of Thomas Metzinger's? He uses cognitive science and neurobiology to inform a materialist theory of consciousness. He references empirical studies on split brain syndrome, the false hand illusion, OBE delusions and lucid dreaming and attempts to explain this phenomena. The result is imperfect but definitely a major step in the right direction.
I'm not familiar with Metzinger. I plan on dedicating one of my future "study obsessions" to cognitive science, starting with Steven Pinker. I'll definitely look into Metzinger then. Thanks!
Eric: zefreak:He uses cognitive science and neurobiology to inform a materialist theory of consciousness. He references empirical studies on split brain syndrome, the false hand illusion, OBE delusions and lucid dreaming and attempts to explain this phenomena. The result is imperfect but definitely a major step in the right direction. I have read a few pieces with very different opinions when it comes to split brain syndrome. I have heard some people say that a person acts as though he will have two separate minds, while at the same time other people will say that this is not the case. So I always take what people say on this issue with a grain of salt. But my question to you is how do you account for qualia? I assume you aren't an eliminativist. I always have trouble grasping how qualia can be accounted for in purely physical terms. One last thing I want to know is what is your response to the zombie argument? Do you think zombies are conceivable?
I am an eliminativist in the sense that I believe there are neural correlates for all experiential phenomena or 'qualia'. I do not think qualia poses a problem for materialism, considering that experience of qualia can be manipulated physically in a controlled setting. I side squarely with Metzinger and Dennett and consider qualia to be a largely unhelpful term that is way too much like Plato's perfect forms.
Obviously, I think that the zombie argument is easily countered. If a zombie is completely indistinguishable from a human being, including sensory organs and brain function, then I think it would be conscious and experience 'qualia'.