Justin Spahr-Summers:I was pointing out that you did respond, where others have yet to do so.
I pretty much agree with zefreak's responses.
Dictionary definitions of philosophical terms are notoriously sketchy.
You know both mine and Lilburne's views,
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
zefreak: Justin Spahr-Summers: What makes surviving a desirable end? Survivability is a desirable end to me, and I don't pick my ends, only my means. It is a generally desirable end for most people, but I in no way presume it to be universal.
Justin Spahr-Summers: What makes surviving a desirable end?
What makes surviving a desirable end?
Survivability is a desirable end to me, and I don't pick my ends, only my means. It is a generally desirable end for most people, but I in no way presume it to be universal.
A conscious entity that does not hold survivability as a desirable end will very soon cease to exist. A man's life isn't automatically self-sustaining... if he ceases to eat, drink, etc., he will die. Life is an end in itself, as it is, by definition, impossible to value something without first being alive.
Life and reality are neither logical nor illogical; they are simply given. But logic is the only tool available to man for the comprehension of both.—Ludwig von Mises
Life and reality are neither logical nor illogical; they are simply given. But logic is the only tool available to man for the comprehension of both.
Justin Spahr-Summers:A conscious entity that does not hold survivability as a desirable end will very soon cease to exist. A man's life isn't automatically self-sustaining... if he ceases to eat, drink, etc., he will die. Life is an end in itself, as it is, by definition, impossible to value something without first being alive.
Good point.
"It may well be asked why life should be an objective ultimate value, why man should opt for life (in duration and quality).(5) In reply, we may note that a proposition rises to the status of an axiom when he who denies it may be shown to be using it in the very course of the supposed refutation.(6) Now, any person participating in any sort of discussion, including one on values, is, by virtue of so participating, alive and affirming life. For if he were really opposed to life, he would have no business in such a discussion, indeed he would have no business continuing to be alive. Hence, the supposed opponent of life is really affirming it in the very process of his discussion, and hence the preservation and furtherance of one’s life takes on the stature of an incontestable axiom." - Chpter 6, ETOL
(5)On the value of life not depending on whether it is perceived as one of happiness, see Philippa R. Foot, Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 41.(6)Elsewhere, I have written: “if a man cannot affirm a proposition without employing its negation, he is not only caught in an inextricable self-contradiction; he is conceding to the negation the status of an axiom.” Rothbard, Individualism, p. 8. Also see R.P. Phillips, Modern Thomistic Philosophy (Westminster, Md.: Newman Bookshop, 1934-35), vol. 2, pp. 36-37.
For others:
"[22] And there is a further point: the very existence of a difference of opinion seems to imply that there is something objective about which disagreement can take place; for otherwise, there would be no contradictions in the different "opinions" and no worry about these conflicts. For a similar argument in refutation of moral subjectivism see G.E. Moore, Ethics (Oxford, 1963 [1912)), pp. 63ff."
Finally on a general note; I'll be traveling and elsewhere (not that anyone particularly cares) for 2+ weeks in 12hrs time, so if I don't respond before that's why. I'm packing. lol. In the meantime: Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics - David Gordon Review
Justin Spahr-Summers: zefreak: Justin Spahr-Summers: What makes surviving a desirable end? Survivability is a desirable end to me, and I don't pick my ends, only my means. It is a generally desirable end for most people, but I in no way presume it to be universal. A conscious entity that does not hold survivability as a desirable end will very soon cease to exist. A man's life isn't automatically self-sustaining... if he ceases to eat, drink, etc., he will die. Life is an end in itself, as it is, by definition, impossible to value something without first being alive.
This is just smoke and mirrors, and I have critiqued Rand on this very point in an old thread. First, I reject that life is an end in itself. Sure, life may very well be an instrumental means to many ends, but that does not make it an end in itself.
I also criticize your assertion on its not including the element of time into your formulation. It is perfectly conceivable that I could have a number of ends [maintaining personal integrity (however defined), spending my waking moments with a loved one] while not actively sustaining my life as an end. In fact, up until the point of expiration, I can continue holding ends without necessitating that life is anything other than a means.
"Life is an end in itself, as it is - non sequitur - impossible to value something without first being alive.
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
"Now, any person participating in any sort of discussion, including one on values, is, by virtue of so participating, alive and affirming life. For if he were really opposed to life, he would have no business in such a discussion, indeed he would have no business continuing to be alive. Hence, the supposed opponent of life is really affirming it in the very process of his discussion, and hence the preservation and furtherance of one’s life takes on the stature of an incontestable axiom."
Rothbard is a slippery sophist when it comes to ethics.
He is presenting a false dichotomy, where one either affirms life or opposes it. This is not the stance I, or anyone rejecting the 'life as objective end' axiom, is taking.
Assume that I am an individual for whom life is not an end (I'm not). By rejecting the status of life as an end, I am not affirming its negation the way Rothbard implies!
The negation of 'life is an end' can be interpreted two ways. It is either (formally) 'life is not an end' or, as Rothbard interprets it (slippery bastard) 'death is an end'. How do we know this is what he means? It is only via this interpretation that
"For if he were really opposed to life, he would have no business in such a discussion, indeed he would have no business continuing to be alive. Hence, the supposed opponent of life is really affirming it in the very process of his discussion"
makes any sense! If I am simply affirming that 'life is not an end' then that does not imply that I am 'opposed to life', or that I must 'affirm death', or even that I can't use life as a means to ends that I actually do value.
J. Grayson Lilburne:That someone does indeed regard something as right or wrong can be considered a fact ABOUT someone's values. So insofar as a moral statement is an expression of those facts (as if someone said "that killing, in fact, is counter to my values"), it is meaningful.
Strictly speaking, at least in libertarian ethics, a more accurate moral statement would be "murder [not killing] is immoral," where "murder" is defined as "a killing that is counter to the victim's values." So, it is not being claimed that we can disregard people's subjective values when evaluating an action's morality; indeed, whether or not a particular act of killing is moral is intimately connected to the victim's values. However, the implication "If the killing is against the victim's values, then it is immoral" is itself objectively true, according to the objective-ist libertarian theory.
J. Grayson Lilburne:Insofar as it attempts to describe something beyond the conscience, mentality, etc of the moral agent and those who share the agent's moral judgments, it is meaningless.
What must something describe in order to be meaningful? Of course, if you try to define "moral" so that it describes something in the real world, then you will get no further than a simple description of people's states-of-mind. However, a statement doesn't have to describe the real world in order to be meaningful; it could (e.g., "1+2=3") just explain a relationship between concepts.
zefreak:(Even moralists who argue via epistemology IE Argumentation Ethics (assuming their reasoning is valid, which I don't think it is) assume that self-contradiction is morally wrong.)
zefreak:...shared disgust of performative contradiction.
Do they? My understanding was that they show that certain actions lead to self-contradiction, and then they simply refer to these actions as "immoral" as shorthand for "self-contradiction-implying." It's not that there's an independent category "immoral" that happens to include self-contradiction - some people as a matter of fact don't actually care about contradicting themselves.
zefreak: Short version, are moral urges (the feeling of disapprobation and, conversely, approval that arises from a given state of affairs) different in kind from feelings that arise from circumstances that would hardly be considered moral or immoral, such as breaking a computer or valued item? Is the difference merely one of degree (an admittedly large degree, to be sure)? Is there a necessary distinction between moral sentiment and sentiment?
Short version, are moral urges (the feeling of disapprobation and, conversely, approval that arises from a given state of affairs) different in kind from feelings that arise from circumstances that would hardly be considered moral or immoral, such as breaking a computer or valued item? Is the difference merely one of degree (an admittedly large degree, to be sure)?
Is there a necessary distinction between moral sentiment and sentiment?
Why does the fact that people have similar feelings about certain things imply that the things are of the same kind? If I react similarly to being told that 2+3=4 as to being told that Beethoven's music is bad, does that mean that both statements have the same (objective/subjective) truth status?
Esuric:It is objectively proven when the citizens hang him upside down and stab him repeatedly.
Can we similarly prove that "being a witch in Salem in the 1600s" is immoral?
Conza88:Now, any person participating in any sort of discussion, including one on values, is, by virtue of so participating, alive and affirming life. For if he were really opposed to life, he would have no business in such a discussion, indeed he would have no business continuing to be alive. Hence, the supposed opponent of life is really affirming it in the very process of his discussion, and hence the preservation and furtherance of one’s life takes on the stature of an incontestable axiom.
Whence, then, comes the reason for valuing the lives of others?
Zavoi: Why does the fact that people have similar feelings about certain things imply that the things are of the same kind? If I react similarly to being told that 2+3=4 as to being told that Beethoven's music is bad, does that mean that both statements have the same (objective/subjective) truth status?
Obviously not, but that wasn't my argument.
zefreak: Justin Spahr-Summers: A conscious entity that does not hold survivability as a desirable end will very soon cease to exist. A man's life isn't automatically self-sustaining... if he ceases to eat, drink, etc., he will die. Life is an end in itself, as it is, by definition, impossible to value something without first being alive. This is just smoke and mirrors, and I have critiqued Rand on this very point in an old thread. First, I reject that life is an end in itself. Sure, life may very well be an instrumental means to many ends, but that does not make it an end in itself. I also criticize your assertion on its not including the element of time into your formulation. It is perfectly conceivable that I could have a number of ends [maintaining personal integrity (however defined), spending my waking moments with a loved one] while not actively sustaining my life as an end. In fact, up until the point of expiration, I can continue holding ends without necessitating that life is anything other than a means.
Justin Spahr-Summers: A conscious entity that does not hold survivability as a desirable end will very soon cease to exist. A man's life isn't automatically self-sustaining... if he ceases to eat, drink, etc., he will die. Life is an end in itself, as it is, by definition, impossible to value something without first being alive.
Your ability to hold ends and determine the purpose to which to direct your life implies that you view your life as valuable. "Maintaining personal integrity" and "spending waking moments with a loved one" are consequent ends. If I value either of the aforementioned, I value them because I perceive them to be beneficial to my continued existence. Life is not merely a means to obtain ends (such as benefit-to-myself), because the concept of ends supposes a living, conscious entity.
Zavoi:Whence, then, comes the reason for valuing the lives of others?
There is more to personally gain from cooperation than from coercion.
Justin Spahr-Summers: Life is not merely a means to obtain ends (such as benefit-to-myself), because the concept of ends supposes a living, conscious entity.
Life is not merely a means to obtain ends (such as benefit-to-myself), because the concept of ends supposes a living, conscious entity.
I'm sorry if you don't see it, but this is a non sequitur.
Life is not a means to *end*, because *end* presupposes life.
I don't see how this is logically valid.
A is not a means to B, because A is necessary for B?
Why?
zefreak: Justin Spahr-Summers: Life is not merely a means to obtain ends (such as benefit-to-myself), because the concept of ends supposes a living, conscious entity. I'm sorry if you don't see it, but this is a non sequitur. Life is not a means to *end*, because *end* presupposes life. I don't see how this is logically valid. A is not a means to B, because A is necessary for B? Why?
You're right, I phrased that sentence badly. No ends are valid without the context of a living being. If you wish to "maintain personal integrity" or "spend waking moments with a loved one," it is because you stand to gain a psychic profit from it, but only a living being can psychically profit from the achievement of ends or psychically lose from the failure to achieve given ends. If your end is death, you still assert that this given end is worthwhile, and your psychic "profit" is the knowledge that you will no longer suffer psychic loss by continuing to live. In other words, even the end of death itself is judged by comparing it against the standard of life. No actor can desire his own psychic loss, and psychic gains are only realizable in the context of life (even if it's the few moments before death).
Justin Spahr-Summers: Zavoi: Whence, then, comes the reason for valuing the lives of others? There is more to personally gain from cooperation than from coercion.
Zavoi: Whence, then, comes the reason for valuing the lives of others?
Not necessarily, there is nothing to gain from cooperation when the others in question desire one dead.
Abstract liberty, like other mere abstractions, is not to be found.
- Edmund Burke
laminustacitus: Justin Spahr-Summers: Zavoi: Whence, then, comes the reason for valuing the lives of others? There is more to personally gain from cooperation than from coercion. Not necessarily, there is nothing to gain from cooperation when the others in question desire one dead.
True, but he was asking why one should ever value the life of another (or that's how I read it, anyways). Two actors should value each other because they can obtain more in cooperation than they can from war. If one of them refuses to realize this, then naturally the situation is different.
Justin Spahr-Summers: zefreak: Justin Spahr-Summers: Life is not merely a means to obtain ends (such as benefit-to-myself), because the concept of ends supposes a living, conscious entity. I'm sorry if you don't see it, but this is a non sequitur. Life is not a means to *end*, because *end* presupposes life. I don't see how this is logically valid. A is not a means to B, because A is necessary for B? Why? You're right, I phrased that sentence badly. No ends are valid without the context of a living being. If you wish to "maintain personal integrity" or "spend waking moments with a loved one," it is because you stand to gain a psychic profit from it, but only a living being can psychically profit from the achievement of ends or psychically lose from the failure to achieve given ends. If your end is death, you still assert that this given end is worthwhile, and your psychic "profit" is the knowledge that you will no longer suffer psychic loss by continuing to live. In other words, even the end of death itself is judged by comparing it against the standard of life. No actor can desire his own psychic loss, and psychic gains are only realizable in the context of life (even if it's the few moments before death).
Ok then, rephrasing your assertion as 'No ends are valid without the context of a living being' has the benefit of being true but only proves that life is a necessary means but does not show that acting in such a way as to endanger ones life, or to put it another way, not acting in such a way as to sustain it, is in anyways violating the 'objective end' of life or hypocritical.
I still do not see how your bringing up the necessity of life for ends to emerge leads to any sort of objective end or normativity.
zefreak:Ok then, rephrasing your assertion as 'No ends are valid without the context of a living being' has the benefit of being true but only proves that life is a necessary means but does not show that acting in such a way as to endanger ones life, or to put it another way, not acting in such a way as to sustain it, is in anyways violating the 'objective end' of life or hypocritical. I still do not see how your bringing up the necessity of life for ends to emerge leads to any sort of objective end or normativity.
Actors always have ends. Ends can only be attained within the context of life. Therefore, life is valuable in and of itself because sustained life allows one to accomplish more and more ends (and, as time passes, ends that they did not previously hold or were not as urgent as well).
Justin Spahr-Summers: zefreak: Ok then, rephrasing your assertion as 'No ends are valid without the context of a living being' has the benefit of being true but only proves that life is a necessary means but does not show that acting in such a way as to endanger ones life, or to put it another way, not acting in such a way as to sustain it, is in anyways violating the 'objective end' of life or hypocritical. I still do not see how your bringing up the necessity of life for ends to emerge leads to any sort of objective end or normativity. Actors always have ends. Ends can only be attained within the context of life. Therefore, life is valuable in and of itself because sustained life allows one to accomplish more and more ends (and, as time passes, ends that they did not previously hold or were not as urgent as well).
zefreak: Ok then, rephrasing your assertion as 'No ends are valid without the context of a living being' has the benefit of being true but only proves that life is a necessary means but does not show that acting in such a way as to endanger ones life, or to put it another way, not acting in such a way as to sustain it, is in anyways violating the 'objective end' of life or hypocritical. I still do not see how your bringing up the necessity of life for ends to emerge leads to any sort of objective end or normativity.
What of individuals who are driven to suicide by constant psychological torment? Sure, they have to be alive in order to end their life, but in this circumstance they have a high-priority end (the elimination of suffering) towards which the act of sustaining life is counter-productive.
Or how about someone who will dispose of their life for some 'higher' end? Sure, the psychic benefit of any end must be attained while alive, and perhaps this person does achieve some benefit in the process of dying.
To qualify your assertion, perhaps we could say that life is valuable to the actor to the extent that he has ends that are valued, so far as his sustained life does not hamper or restrain his desired state of affairs. Of course, this still relegates life to that of a means (whose value is contingent on other ends).
zefreak:Rothbard is a slippery sophist when it comes to ethics.
zefreak, let's please not call Murray N. Rothbard such a disparaging name as that. For all my disagreements with his writings on meta-ethics, he was a great man, is a guiding light to this Institute, and his memory deserves our respect.
Thank you for your otherwise SPLENDID contributions to this thread.
J. Grayson Lilburne: zefreak:Rothbard is a slippery sophist when it comes to ethics. zefreak, let's please not call Murray N. Rothbard such a disparaging name as that. For all my disagreements with his writings on meta-ethics, he was a great man, is a guiding light to this Institute, and his memory deserves our respect. Thank you for your otherwise SPLENDID contributions to this thread.
I apologize. I respect the man for his humor and insight, and I should let my disagreements be merely that, and not muddy his character. I'll be more careful in the future.
zefreak: Justin Spahr-Summers:Actors always have ends. Ends can only be attained within the context of life. Therefore, life is valuable in and of itself because sustained life allows one to accomplish more and more ends (and, as time passes, ends that they did not previously hold or were not as urgent as well). What of individuals who are driven to suicide by constant psychological torment? Sure, they have to be alive in order to end their life, but in this circumstance they have a high-priority end (the elimination of suffering) towards which the act of sustaining life is counter-productive.
Justin Spahr-Summers:Actors always have ends. Ends can only be attained within the context of life. Therefore, life is valuable in and of itself because sustained life allows one to accomplish more and more ends (and, as time passes, ends that they did not previously hold or were not as urgent as well).
However, nobody can know with certainty that they would not stand to psychically gain at some point in the future if they continued to live. In this sense, life is still objectively valuable because it still provides the opportunity for psychic gain down the line.
zefreak:Or how about someone who will dispose of their life for some 'higher' end? Sure, the psychic benefit of any end must be attained while alive, and perhaps this person does achieve some benefit in the process of dying.
Well, I (as an atheist) would say that their disposal of their own life for a higher end is ill-founded, because, again, we cannot measure the psychic gain that they could potentially obtain had they continued to live. I would even argue that the devotion of one's life to a higher being is probably a rather inefficient and ineffective method of obtaining satisfaction. This is based on the assumption that a higher being does not exist, of course, and I don't want this to devolve into a debate about religion, so we should table this scenario for the time being.
zefreak:To qualify your assertion, perhaps we could say that life is valuable to the actor to the extent that he has ends that are valued, so far as his sustained life does not hamper or restrain his desired state of affairs. Of course, this still relegates life to that of a means (whose value is contingent on other ends).
Well, the point is not that every actor does acknowledge the intrinsic value of life, but that they should, because life is the only method by which he can continue to fulfill as many of his desired ends as possible. In this way, objective ethics does not preclude actors from achieving whatever personal ends they may have that are not detrimental to their life (the end in itself and ultimate standard of value).
When I said 'higher' end I did not mean specifically a spiritual or religious purpose, but any end which the individual holds as more valuable than his own life. As an atheist, I know that after I die I won't care one bit about my loved ones, my family or even my character when I was alive, yet, while I'm alive, I could reasonably make the choice to die for the sake of my loved ones, family or character. This would be a perfectly rational (though admittedly high time-preference!) action given my preferences.
As for your final paragraph, you seem to be applying some utilitarian calculus in order to determine whether their 'net' utility by satisfying ends is maximized. You are assuming that it is ones duty to fulfill as many desired ends as possible and thus maximize utility.
Perhaps when you use the word 'should' you intend the non-normative 'its the best means towards obtaining your end' sense of the term. If this is the case, your argument is probably true for most people. It is in most people's best interest (they can fulfill their subjective ends) to stay alive. There are people for whom this cannot be said to be true with confidence. Regardless, you are equivocating between the normative and non-normative use of the word 'should' and the usage of the word that makes any sense within the context you use it cannot provide a basis for objective or universal ethics.
zefreak:When I said 'higher' end I did not mean specifically a spiritual or religious purpose, but any end which the individual holds as more valuable than his own life. As an atheist, I know that after I die I won't care one bit about my loved ones, my family or even my character when I was alive, yet, while I'm alive, I could reasonably make the choice to die for the sake of my loved ones, family or character. This would be a perfectly rational (though admittedly high time-preference!) action given my preferences.
The point I am making is that such a choice cannot be rational* (regardless of the final decision made when emotions, etc., are taken into account), because there is simply no way to know whether your immediate psychic loss will or will not be offset by psychic gain in the future.
* To use the definition of rational egoism, anyways, which is that a rational action is one that maximizes one's self-interest.
zefreak:As for your final paragraph, you seem to be applying some utilitarian calculus in order to determine whether their 'net' utility by satisfying ends is maximized. You are assuming that it is ones duty to fulfill as many desired ends as possible and thus maximize utility.
Well, I can see how my phrasing could connote that, but it's not what I intended. I rather meant that, as life goes on, there are more opportunities for psychic gain (as well as loss, of course) around each turn. One could achieve more ends, one could achieve an end that takes more time, one could discover new ends that they wish to obtain, etc. The point is that a longer period of time provides more opportunities for psychic gain, not necessarily that the number of ends achieved is proportionally related to net psychic gain.
zefreak:Perhaps when you use the word 'should' you intend the non-normative 'its the best means towards obtaining your end' sense of the term. If this is the case, your argument is probably true for most people. It is in most people's best interest (they can fulfill their subjective ends) to stay alive. There are people for whom this cannot be said to be true with confidence. Regardless, you are equivocating between the normative and non-normative use of the word 'should' and the usage of the word that makes any sense within the context you use it cannot provide a basis for objective or universal ethics.
Life is the only way to achieve any end. It is in this sense that it has objective value. For as long as an actor works to sustain himself, his life is prolonged and he therefore is provided with more opportunities for psychic gain which may or may not be greater than any gains previously realized. Since life is necessary for any value to exist (as life is necessary for any ends to exist), the good is that which is directed toward self-sustaining, life-providing action. The evil is that which is directed toward self-destruction, because it is an act of abolishing ends and values.
Justin Spahr-Summers: The point I am making is that such a choice cannot be rational* (regardless of the final decision made when emotions, etc., are taken into account), because there is simply no way to know whether your immediate psychic loss will or will not be offset by psychic gain in the future. * To use the definition of rational egoism, anyways, which is that a rational action is one that maximizes one's self-interest.
Sure it can. Rational egoism asserts that rational action is one that maximizes one's self-interest conditional on the knowledge they have. If I am unaware of an opportunity that is better than my known choices, I am not irrational for choosing the best possibility out of my known choices. One doesn't need perfect information to be rational.
Justin Spahr-Summers: Well, I can see how my phrasing could connote that, but it's not what I intended. I rather meant that, as life goes on, there are more opportunities for psychic gain (as well as loss, of course) around each turn. One could achieve more ends, one could achieve an end that takes more time, one could discover new ends that they wish to obtain, etc. The point is that a longer period of time provides more opportunities for psychic gain, not necessarily that the number of ends achieved is proportionally related to net psychic gain.
Sure, yet each individual discounts future psychic gain at an unknown rate. There is no possible way given uncertainty to maximize psychic gain across time. A suicidal man might be aware that if he just continues living he might experience happiness, perhaps enough happiness for the future self to offset the dis-utility of his previous depression (after accounting for hindsight bias, etc). If he commits suicide, then he has weighed the elimination of present dis-utility as more important than the possibility of future happiness.
Justin Spahr-Summers: Life is the only way to achieve any end. It is in this sense that it has objective value. For as long as an actor works to sustain himself, his life is prolonged and he therefore is provided with more opportunities for psychic gain which may or may not be greater than any gains previously realized. Since life is necessary for any value to exist (as life is necessary for any ends to exist), the good is that which is directed toward self-sustaining, life-providing action. The evil is that which is directed toward self-destruction, because it is an act of abolishing ends and values.
I disagree with your analysis. Firstly, life is necessary for any valuation to exist. This is an important distinction because you imply that life 'creates value', when it does nothing of the sort (outside of the individuals head). Life creates the conditions necessary for a valuation to be made regarding means and ends, but that is different from creating 'value', the maximization of which is 'good'. Interpreting death as 'abolishing ends and values' is an interesting turn of phrase, but more accurately it ends that which conceives and is motivated by ends and values. I think value in this context is loaded as it is so often used in and outside ethics as 'something inherently good to be maximized' where in praxeology it is 'what an individual maximizes'.
I think a more accurate rendition of your final statement is "the reasonable is that which is directed toward self-sustaining, life-providing action. The irrational is that which is directed toward self-destruction, because it is an act contrary to the stated ends of the individual (unless it isn't)."
zefreak: Justin Spahr-Summers: The point I am making is that such a choice cannot be rational* (regardless of the final decision made when emotions, etc., are taken into account), because there is simply no way to know whether your immediate psychic loss will or will not be offset by psychic gain in the future. * To use the definition of rational egoism, anyways, which is that a rational action is one that maximizes one's self-interest. Sure it can. Rational egoism asserts that rational action is one that maximizes one's self-interest conditional on the knowledge they have. If I am unaware of an opportunity that is better than my known choices, I am not irrational for choosing the best possibility out of my known choices. One doesn't need perfect information to be rational.
I agree, but whereas in other circumstances, a psychic loss in the present could be "made up for" in the future, death is game over. You have no way to "recuperate" if your decision was made in error. Therefore, we can conclude that it is incredibly unlikely that death will maximize one's self-interest.
zefreak: Justin Spahr-Summers: Well, I can see how my phrasing could connote that, but it's not what I intended. I rather meant that, as life goes on, there are more opportunities for psychic gain (as well as loss, of course) around each turn. One could achieve more ends, one could achieve an end that takes more time, one could discover new ends that they wish to obtain, etc. The point is that a longer period of time provides more opportunities for psychic gain, not necessarily that the number of ends achieved is proportionally related to net psychic gain. Sure, yet each individual discounts future psychic gain at an unknown rate. There is no possible way given uncertainty to maximize psychic gain across time. A suicidal man might be aware that if he just continues living he might experience happiness, perhaps enough happiness for the future self to offset the dis-utility of his previous depression (after accounting for hindsight bias, etc). If he commits suicide, then he has weighed the elimination of present dis-utility as more important than the possibility of future happiness.
Conceded. But then in this case, a rational man could still commit suicide out of regard for his own life (if that makes sense). I'll have to try to flesh this out more later.
zefreak:I think a more accurate rendition of your final statement is "the reasonable is that which is directed toward self-sustaining, life-providing action. The irrational is that which is directed toward self-destruction, because it is an act contrary to the stated ends of the individual (unless it isn't)."
Every action intended to be self-sustaining implies that the actor finds himself worth sustaining (i.e., values his life). If an actor is rational (or "reasonable"), all of his actions will be directed toward self-sustenance. Since all of his actions are thus directed, in some part or another, by the valuation of his life, his life can properly be said to be his ultimate value, or an end in itself.
J. Grayson Lilburne:To a certain degree yes, but to say that supports objective ethics is to commit the genetic fallacy.
Jon Irenicus:If someone asks for a quote to be removed, please don't be discourteous... and remove it.
Thank you Jon for being reasonable.
Remove the quote Lilburne.
Justin Spahr-Summers:The evil is that which is directed toward self-destruction, because it is an act of abolishing ends and values.
Not if your end is to huddle up to 72 virgins in heaven.
Z.
zefreak: Do you think that the 'moral' urge that wells within your stomach at the sight of the poor and downtrodden varies from the reaction you would get from dropping a vase or breaking your laptop in kind as well as degree?
If it were merely a difference in degree, then moral sensations would be categorically of higher or lower intensity than other sensations, which clearly isn't the case. The question of whether there's a difference in kind comes down to a theory of perception, which is a psychological question that seems not to be germane to this discussion.
Purely on impression, though, I would say "yes" - at least in that I can distinguish the two types of sensations in my conscious awareness. Or did you mean something different by "varies...in kind"?
Why anarchy fails
Great post, Lilburne. Too bad I was sleeping when all action was happening. Making up for lost time:
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zefreak:It is the natural consequence of a cultural worldview that is insufficiently naturalistic and fears reductionism.
Zefreak, could you elaborate on this? (What does reductionism have to do with it?)
fakename:This means that the statement "you ought to do something" doesn't have a truth value. But it is a statement so it must have truth conditions. But truth conditions are possible truth values. So that statement has no truth conditions which is just weird...
"Don't kill me." The truth value is...? The truth conditions are...? You may object that a command is not a statement, but language isn't that straightforward. How do we know that moral statements aren't the same as commands, or attempts at commanding even when a command wouldn't make sense?
Knight_of_BAAWA: J. Grayson Lilburne:If you mean by "wrt rights", universal, absolute, objective rights, then I don't see what the difference would be...No, you wouldn't. Mainly because you're confusing objective in the ontological sense with objective in the epistemic sense.
J. Grayson Lilburne:If you mean by "wrt rights", universal, absolute, objective rights, then I don't see what the difference would be...
What would be an example of the word objective used in the ontological sense, then in the epistemic sense?
Justin Spahr-Summers: To subjective ethicists: why do you believe that man needs a code of values? What purpose does it serve?
To subjective ethicists: why do you believe that man needs a code of values? What purpose does it serve?
I won't presume people need a code of values, but the purpose a code of values can serve is "taking short-term pain for long-term gain." In other words, it helps one maintain a lower time preference (assuming that is something said person desires to have).
Justin Spahr-Summers:But how can we assert that trade and cooperation are "good" or—to be more precise—desirable ends without some objective standard by which to determine that?
Mises, in EP: "We originally want or desire an object not because it is agreeable or good, but we call it agreeable or good because we want or desire it."
Justin Spahr-Summers:If an actor is rational (or "reasonable"), all of his actions will be directed toward self-sustenance. Since all of his actions are thus directed, in some part or another, by the valuation of his life, his life can properly be said to be his ultimate value, or an end in itself.
Not all his actions. For example, earlier you wrote:
Justin Spahr-Summers:"Maintaining personal integrity" and "spending waking moments with a loved one" are consequent ends. If I value either of the aforementioned, I value them because I perceive them to be beneficial to my continued existence.
First of all, "spending waking moments with a loved one" certainly needn't be conducive to my continued existence (let's be clear that here you mean continued survival - if not, please specify).
Second, if it were anything it would be the reverse: I value my continued existence because I perceive it to be a requirement for my continued "spending [of] waking moments."
Third, most likely the question of whether I value my continued survival is not even in my mind when I am "spending waking moments with a loved one." If the verb to value X is to mean something other than "to - at this moment - consciously perceive X as conducive to my happiness," please specify. Otherwise, what you're saying doesn't seem to hold.
Summing up the thread, it's almost a cliche that debate on this matter can quickly become convoluted, but it needn't be. I'm going to repeat the Mises quote above because it is deeply clarifying:
"We originally want or desire an object not because it is agreeable or good, but we call it agreeable or good because we want or desire it." (Mises, Epistemological Problems of Economics)
To zefreak, Rand never fully asserted Life is the ultimate end for man as a moral creature. In fact, Rand many times throughout her writings pointed out that the act of avoiding death does not ensure life. That is to mean that a man's measure of value defines what Life is. Life can be merely biological functioning, but when considering how we as humans live then it's clear that we don't measure the mere beating of our hearts or the squeezing of our glands as Life. Instead, we as humans find other things to attach to the meaning of Life: value or those artifacts that are expressions of it (actions, objects, emotions).
"The power of liberty going forward is in decentralization. Not in leaders, but in decentralized activism. In a market process." -- liberty student
z1235: Justin Spahr-Summers:The evil is that which is directed toward self-destruction, because it is an act of abolishing ends and values. Not if your end is to huddle up to 72 virgins in heaven.
I addressed spiritual/religious ends elsewhere.
AJ: Justin Spahr-Summers: To subjective ethicists: why do you believe that man needs a code of values? What purpose does it serve? I won't presume people need a code of values, but the purpose a code of values can serve is "taking short-term pain for long-term gain." In other words, it helps one maintain a lower time preference (assuming that is something said person desires to have).
Maybe it's possible to not need a code of values (debatable), but the fact remains that everyone has one. Consequently, we need to ask why this is, and whether an objective code of values is indeed possible.
AJ: Justin Spahr-Summers:But how can we assert that trade and cooperation are "good" or—to be more precise—desirable ends without some objective standard by which to determine that? Mises, in EP: "We originally want or desire an object not because it is agreeable or good, but we call it agreeable or good because we want or desire it."
And yet, that response of mine was a reply to this:
zefreak: Justin Spahr-Summers: To subjective ethicists: why do you believe that man needs a code of values? What purpose does it serve? It facilitates trade and cooperation?
It facilitates trade and cooperation?
Which seemingly asserts that men need a code of values for the purposes of trade and cooperation, but this is circular reasoning, because it is impossible to value trade and cooperation in the first place without such a code.
AJ: Justin Spahr-Summers:If an actor is rational (or "reasonable"), all of his actions will be directed toward self-sustenance. Since all of his actions are thus directed, in some part or another, by the valuation of his life, his life can properly be said to be his ultimate value, or an end in itself. Not all his actions.
Not all his actions.
This, then, is the difference between a rational actor and an irrational actor.
AJ: Justin Spahr-Summers:"Maintaining personal integrity" and "spending waking moments with a loved one" are consequent ends. If I value either of the aforementioned, I value them because I perceive them to be beneficial to my continued existence. First of all, "spending waking moments with a loved one" certainly needn't be conducive to my continued existence (let's be clear that here you mean continued survival - if not, please specify).
It does not increase one's survivability or length of life, agreed. Neither does it harm it, however, and it enhances the enjoyment one receives from life.
AJ:Second, if it were anything it would be the reverse: I value my continued existence because I perceive it to be a requirement for my continued "spending [of] waking moments."
This is where I disagree. One enjoys "spending waking moments with a loved one" because it increases the quality or enjoyment of one's continued existence. It's an enjoyable activity precisely because we are capable of realizing our own mortality, that our time is limited, that further opportunities for such in the future may be diminished or eliminated, etc. If we were to imagine an immortal and invincible species, it would have no emotions, because pleasure and pain as sensations only developed as a reaction to what was beneficial or harmful to an organism. Similarly, it would have no reason to act because nothing would be to its ultimate benefit or detriment. We value and we act precisely because we value our life as an end in itself.
AJ:Third, most likely the question of whether I value my continued survival is not even in my mind when I am "spending waking moments with a loved one." If the verb to value X is to mean something other than "to - at this moment - consciously perceive X as conducive to my happiness," please specify. Otherwise, what you're saying doesn't seem to hold.
"Value" implies the question: "valuable for what?" If you say, "valuable for the purposes of my happiness," "happiness" is a meaningless concept without reference to a living being. Consequently, in order for you to find your happiness a worthy end, you have to first find your continued survival (well, at least until to the point of obtaining said happiness) to be a worthy end.
AJ:Summing up the thread, it's almost a cliche that debate on this matter can quickly become convoluted, but it needn't be. I'm going to repeat the Mises quote above because it is deeply clarifying: "We originally want or desire an object not because it is agreeable or good, but we call it agreeable or good because we want or desire it." (Mises, Epistemological Problems of Economics)
And yet this sidesteps the issue entirely, for we are not talking about value-free economics, but rather ethics, in which we attempt to determine what "good" is.
z1235:Not if your end is to huddle up to 72 virgins in heaven.
"If we wish to preserve a free society, it is essential that we recognize that the desirability of a particular object is not sufficient justification for the use of coercion."
AJ: zefreak: Do you think that the 'moral' urge that wells within your stomach at the sight of the poor and downtrodden varies from the reaction you would get from dropping a vase or breaking your laptop in kind as well as degree? If it were merely a difference in degree, then moral sensations would be categorically of higher or lower intensity than other sensations, which clearly isn't the case. The question of whether there's a difference in kind comes down to a theory of perception, which is a psychological question that seems not to be germane to this discussion. Purely on impression, though, I would say "yes" - at least in that I can distinguish the two types of sensations in my conscious awareness. Or did you mean something different by "varies...in kind"?
We experience life at a very high level of abstraction, working at the symbolic rather than functional level. When we perceive a sunset, there are loads of external symbols that are recalled to varying degrees, depending on the individual and the associations built up around the symbol 'sunset'. These associations may make the sunset more 'spiritual' or 'magical', but to cut through the excess baggage and clarify the concept 'sunset' as a strictly physical phenomenon is the goal of the reductionist.
Similarly, the concept 'value' is entangled within so many associations that are built up within the years, that it has become nearly worthless for communicating ideas. You provide the definition "to - at this moment - consciously perceive X as conducive to my happiness". I do not dispute this definition. Perhaps initially our great ancestors had no concept as value except in the way you define it, but over the years, as similar objects were valued for similar reasons (water, shelter, group of people for cooperation), the concept developed an amount of conceptual baggage such that it became 'any object or quality desirable as a means or as an end in itself'.
We can see the above in action with gold, and how many hard money cranks (distinguishing from mere hard money proponents, who like it for its stable supply) have, because it was historically valued as a means of exchange, began to see it as valuable in and of itself.
Notice how value as verb is reducible to individual preference. Value as noun, however, is not. The associations built up and eventually overshadowed the original meaning of the word, so that discussion re: value has became complicated and frustrating for all involved.
On to your question. By 'similar in kind' I mean that, because all statements of value are reducible to preference, from valuing a laptop and not wanting it to break to valuing human life and not wanting it to expire, then our physical and emotional responses are (unless I'm mistaken, but I don't believe so) similar responses. The difference being that most people's preferences regarding typical moral concerns (life, kindness, liberty, incest) are embedded to a higher degree within their worldview, and so the 'moral sentiment' is usually of a correspondingly greater degree.
I would not be too confident in personal experience of moral sentiment and proclaiming 'ah! I can differentiate the two'. It is difficult to separate our actual response from the associations that we have developed around the object of our sentiment. In my own introspection, I cannot differentiate on feeling alone between the discomfort of failing a class or losing something highly valued and that of moral discomfort. It is only when I turn to the object of my sentiment that I can differentiate it as moral or not.
Justin Spahr-Summers: Consequently, we need to ask why this is, and whether an objective code of values is indeed possible.
Consequently, we need to ask why this is, and whether an objective code of values is indeed possible.
The "why" is that it helps one have a lower time preference, just like a "code" of personal finance does (Rule 1: Pay off your credit card in full every month, etc.). I think "objective" in the context of value is an incoherent notion, but that of course depends on how exactly it's defined.
Justin Spahr-Summers: Which seemingly asserts that men need a code of values for the purposes of trade and cooperation, but this is circular reasoning, because it is impossible to value trade and cooperation in the first place without such a code.
How is it impossible? I need no code of conduct simply to have the knowledge that I'm not strong enough to beat up Ug and take his stuff, to know that he's offering to trade me a club for my clump of bananas, and to know that I want the club more than the bananas.
Justin Spahr-Summers: AJ: First of all, "spending waking moments with a loved one" certainly needn't be conducive to my continued existence (let's be clear that here you mean continued survival - if not, please specify). It does not increase one's survivability or length of life, agreed. Neither does it harm it, however, and it enhances the enjoyment one receives from life.
AJ: First of all, "spending waking moments with a loved one" certainly needn't be conducive to my continued existence (let's be clear that here you mean continued survival - if not, please specify).
All right, so you're talking about the "enjoyment one receives from life." But below you seem to keep switching between this and just "continued survival." I didn't find any definite equivocations, but it's a little confusing.
Justin Spahr-Summers: One enjoys "spending waking moments with a loved one" because it increases the quality or enjoyment of one's continued existence. It's an enjoyable activity precisely because we are capable of realizing our own mortality, that our time is limited, that further opportunities for such in the future may be diminished or eliminated, etc. If we were to imagine an immortal and invincible species, it would have no emotions, because pleasure and pain as sensations only developed as a reaction to what was beneficial or harmful to an organism. Similarly, it would have no reason to act because nothing would be to its ultimate benefit or detriment. We value and we act precisely because we value our life as an end in itself.
One enjoys "spending waking moments with a loved one" because it increases the quality or enjoyment of one's continued existence. It's an enjoyable activity precisely because we are capable of realizing our own mortality, that our time is limited, that further opportunities for such in the future may be diminished or eliminated, etc. If we were to imagine an immortal and invincible species, it would have no emotions, because pleasure and pain as sensations only developed as a reaction to what was beneficial or harmful to an organism. Similarly, it would have no reason to act because nothing would be to its ultimate benefit or detriment. We value and we act precisely because we value our life as an end in itself.
You start off talking about life enjoyment, but the mortality example seems to be about survival, then the last sentence seems to be about enjoyment again. Which is it?
Also, saying "it is owing to our mortality that we evolved our habit of valuing things" doesn't imply that a man now living only values X because he knows he is going to die.
Justin Spahr-Summers: "Value" implies the question: "valuable for what?" If you say, "valuable for the purposes of my happiness," "happiness" is a meaningless concept without reference to a living being.
"Value" implies the question: "valuable for what?" If you say, "valuable for the purposes of my happiness," "happiness" is a meaningless concept without reference to a living being.
"Meaningless...without reference to a living being" for us as we discuss someone's valuing of something, but not for the valuer. The valuer need not be consciously aware of his own life, mortality, etc. in that moment when he is valuing something. Although he may have evolved such a propensity to value because he is mortal, that doesn't mean he is thinking of his mortality at that moment (and anyway, you're apparently not talking about survival).
Justin Spahr-Summers: Consequently, in order for you to find your happiness a worthy end, you have to first find your continued survival (well, at least until to the point of obtaining said happiness) to be a worthy end.
Consequently, in order for you to find your happiness a worthy end, you have to first find your continued survival (well, at least until to the point of obtaining said happiness) to be a worthy end.
Back to "survival" now? And again, the question of whether I value my survival need not enter my mind at any given moment. Are you constantly thinking about your own survival and how long you have left? I'm certainly not. And what if you were granted immortality starting now (but your loved one remained mortal)?
Justin Spahr-Summers: "We originally want or desire an object not because it is agreeable or good, but we call it agreeable or good because we want or desire it." And yet this sidesteps the issue entirely, for we are not talking about value-free economics, but rather ethics, in which we attempt to determine what "good" is.
"We originally want or desire an object not because it is agreeable or good, but we call it agreeable or good because we want or desire it."
But that's exactly the answer: "good" is just a word we attach to some thing or state of affairs we originally desired. To try to look for the concept of objective "good" in ethics is no less of a tail-chasing venture than Marxists looking for objective "good" in the pricing of labor.
zefreak:These associations may make the sunset more 'spiritual' or 'magical', but to cut through the excess baggage and clarify the concept 'sunset' as a strictly physical phenomenon is the goal of the reductionist.
Ah, in that sense then I agree.
zefreak:Similarly, the concept 'value' is entangled within so many associations that are built up within the years, that it has become nearly worthless for communicating ideas. You provide the definition "to - at this moment - consciously perceive X as conducive to my happiness". I do not dispute this definition. Perhaps initially our great ancestors had no concept as value except in the way you define it, but over the years, as similar objects were valued for similar reasons (water, shelter, group of people for cooperation), the concept developed an amount of conceptual baggage such that it became 'any object or quality desirable as a means or as an end in itself'.
Right, it takes on a multifaceted meaning with all sorts of baggage that becomes very hard to sort out because our language customarily conflates it all into one word. Same with all moral language: ought, justification, duty, etc. Then someone tacks on the word "objective" and people don't want to deny "objective reality" so they go for it. At least, it seems that many people go that route (not implying anyone on here arrived at objective ethics that way, but that that's probably a factor in the general population).
zefreak:Notice how value as verb is reducible to individual preference. Value as noun, however, is not. The associations built up and eventually overshadowed the original meaning of the word, so that discussion re: value has became complicated and frustrating for all involved.
That's a great insight. Language is full of such anomalies. By sticking to the verb form and avoiding noun form we might have a better chance of averting misunderstanding.
zefreak:In my own introspection, I cannot differentiate on feeling alone between the discomfort of failing a class or losing something highly valued and that of moral discomfort.
Going off topic a bit, the discomfort you feel in both cases is of course physical. You feel an acerbic feeling in your stomach, a shearing pain in your spine, a subtle but vile twinge in your chest, a tightness in your throat - these are some of the physical sensations of negative emotions. And I'd agree, there may be no qualitative difference other than the patterns associated with the various "moral" senses being perceived in different parts of the body in different ways (people often report feeling empathy - where else? - near their heart).
zefreak:It is only when I turn to the object of my sentiment that I can differentiate it as moral or not.
Well yes, me too. It's just that I can generally tell that the feeling of empathy is not the same as, say, the feeling of accidentally dropping a $50 bill down a storm drain or something like that. But if you mean, can I tell the difference between my seeing someone drop a 50 down a storm drain and my doing it myself, then maybe not - at least not in that moment if I am really trained on that person. Or even if I'm watching the same thing happen in a movie. The intensity of seeing someone drop it will be less than if I had dropped it myself only insofar as I am not fully empathizing with the other person.
AJ: Justin Spahr-Summers: Consequently, we need to ask why this is, and whether an objective code of values is indeed possible. The "why" is that it helps one have a lower time preference, just like a "code" of personal finance does (Rule 1: Pay off your credit card in full every month, etc.). I think "objective" in the context of value is an incoherent notion, but that of course depends on how exactly it's defined.
What makes a lower time preference desirable? You might answer that all we know is that some men wish for a lower time preference. While perhaps correct praxeologically, this says nothing about why every man alive adheres to some sort of moral code.
AJ: Justin Spahr-Summers: Which seemingly asserts that men need a code of values for the purposes of trade and cooperation, but this is circular reasoning, because it is impossible to value trade and cooperation in the first place without such a code. How is it impossible? I need no code of conduct simply to have the knowledge that I'm not strong enough to beat up Ug and take his stuff, to know that he's offering to trade me a club for my clump of bananas, and to know that I want the club more than the bananas.
You need no code of conduct, but you do need a code of values. It implies that you value some things over others. Obviously, this is axiomatically true, but this is why zefreak's answer is circular reasoning. Men "value some things over others" for the purposes of trade and cooperation, which they value more than other things.
AJ:All right, so you're talking about the "enjoyment one receives from life." But below you seem to keep switching between this and just "continued survival." I didn't find any definite equivocations, but it's a little confusing.
Fair enough. To use Ayn Rand's definition, "Happiness is that state of consciousness which proceeds from the achievement of one's values." If we're talking about a loved one, that person is loved because of his value to the actor. Happiness is obtainable both from self-sustaining action and from those corollary values, such as love, pride, etc. This is a bit further into Objectivism than I wanted to discuss, however, because we'd first need to agree that objective ethics are possible.
AJ: Justin Spahr-Summers: One enjoys "spending waking moments with a loved one" because it increases the quality or enjoyment of one's continued existence. It's an enjoyable activity precisely because we are capable of realizing our own mortality, that our time is limited, that further opportunities for such in the future may be diminished or eliminated, etc. If we were to imagine an immortal and invincible species, it would have no emotions, because pleasure and pain as sensations only developed as a reaction to what was beneficial or harmful to an organism. Similarly, it would have no reason to act because nothing would be to its ultimate benefit or detriment. We value and we act precisely because we value our life as an end in itself. You start off talking about life enjoyment, but the mortality example seems to be about survival, then the last sentence seems to be about enjoyment again. Which is it? Also, saying "it is owing to our mortality that we evolved our habit of valuing things" doesn't imply that a man now living only values X because he knows he is going to die.
They are fundamentally related. Things can only be "for" or "against" us as mortal beings. Pleasure and pain are the most basic, automatic expressions of this. Emotions are higher-level expressions that are based on the values that we hold.
AJ: Justin Spahr-Summers: "Value" implies the question: "valuable for what?" If you say, "valuable for the purposes of my happiness," "happiness" is a meaningless concept without reference to a living being. "Meaningless...without reference to a living being" for us as we discuss someone's valuing of something, but not for the valuer. The valuer need not be consciously aware of his own life, mortality, etc. in that moment when he is valuing something. Although he may have evolved such a propensity to value because he is mortal, that doesn't mean he is thinking of his mortality at that moment (and anyway, you're apparently not talking about survival).
He doesn't need to be consciously aware, but if he holds his life as his standard of value, that which ex-ante furthers his life will be good (valuable), while that which ex-ante inhibits it will be evil.
AJ:And what if you were granted immortality starting now (but your loved one remained mortal)?
And what if you were granted immortality starting now (but your loved one remained mortal)?
I was entertaining similar thought exercises when I first brought up the mortality issue. Since we as a species are, shall we say, genetically conditioned toward mortality, we have automatic mechanisms in place which warn us of danger to our life. Even if a man or mankind were granted immortality, he would still have values, although I'm not sure what code of values would then be appropriate.
AJ:But that's exactly the answer: "good" is just a word we attach to some thing or state of affairs we originally desired. To try to look for the concept of objective "good" in ethics is no less of a tail-chasing venture than Marxists looking for objective "good" in the pricing of labor.
When a “desire,” regardless of its nature or cause, is taken as an ethical primary, and the gratification of any and all desires is taken as an ethical goal (such as “the greatest happiness of the greatest number”)-men have no choice but to hate, fear and fight one another, because their desires and their interests will necessarily clash. If “desire” is the ethical standard, then one man’s desire to produce and another man’s desire to rob him have equal ethical validity; one man’s desire to be free and another man’s desire to enslave him have equal ethical validity; one man’s desire to be loved and admired for his virtues and another man’s desire for undeserved love and unearned admiration have equal ethical validity. And if the frustration of any desire constitutes a sacrifice, then a man who owns an automobile and is robbed of it, is being sacrificed, but so is the man who wants or “aspires to” an automobile which the owner refuses to give him—and these two “sacrifices” have equal ethical status. If so, then man’s only choice is to rob or be robbed, to destroy or be destroyed, to sacrifice others to any desire of his own or to sacrifice himself to any desire of others; then man’s only ethical alternative is to be a sadist or a masochist.
(From The Objectivist Ethics.)
You misunderstood me, Justin, or I misunderstood your question.
"You need no code of conduct, but you do need a code of values. It implies that you value some things over others. Obviously, this is axiomatically true, but this is why zefreak's answer is circular reasoning. Men "value some things over others" for the purposes of trade and cooperation, which they value more than other things."
I have never seen 'code of values' to refer to a scale of values. Rather I have only heard 'code of values' refer to a moral code, and hence took the question to be 'why do people need principles that they live by'. My answer is only circular because you are not clearly defining your terms.
Also, remember I edited my post to clarify my position. Once again, it is not that men 'need' a code of values, which I am interpreting as rules or principles generally shared to live by. I was giving you reasons why such codes are useful to many people, hence why they adopt them.
zefreak:I have never seen 'code of values' to refer to a scale of values. Rather I have only heard 'code of values' refer to a moral code, and hence took the question to be 'why do people need principles that they live by'. My answer is only circular because you are not clearly defining your terms.
Well, yes, but life principles also imply value judgments.
zefreak:Also, remember I edited my post to clarify my position.
Also, remember I edited my post to clarify my position.
I understand, but AJ was referring to the quoted text again.