Zavoi: AJ:What if she simply says, "Don't do that"? That is not an ethical statement, but it does seem to make Bob's further advances immoral. "Don't do that" is an ethical statement. It's equivalent to saying "You should not do that" or "It is objectively bad for you to do that" (although, again, nobody actually talks like that).
AJ:What if she simply says, "Don't do that"? That is not an ethical statement, but it does seem to make Bob's further advances immoral.
"Don't do that" is an ethical statement. It's equivalent to saying "You should not do that" or "It is objectively bad for you to do that" (although, again, nobody actually talks like that).
So she would be logically contradicting herself if she said, "It's not objectively bad for you to do that, but still don't do it"?
Why anarchy fails
Zavoi:
What if A says first, "I don't like that (or this)," and secondly, "if you (B) do this, then I will take action." ?
Then, A expresses his displeasure, and puts forth two options: B may cease doing what he is doing or what he planned to do, or, B may continue, and possibly face the consequences A implies.
Here, in my opinion, A doesn't necessarily make a statement about what is "objectively" good or bad. He says he doesn't like something, and if something continues, he will take action. This refers to A's preferences or likes and dislikes, and his planned actions to address his dislikes.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
Zavoi, you ought to clean your room. Is this a moral statement?
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
@ the OP
Law is a set of norms (rules, modes of action) which define a person's jurisdiction (who may and may not decide what is to be done) over property.
Natural in this case, means what is grounded in the nature of things. The core idea of the natural law tradition is that law can not be created (is not an artificial institution, is not man-made, is not the result of mere declaration, ect). It is already in existence and only needs to be discovered. Because natural law is the result of human nature, it couldn't be undone if one wanted to undo it.
Ought (Should) - In a legal context, it refers to an enforceable obligation. It is a norm which one governs, constrains, or forms an individual's actions.
Right/Wrong (Just/Unjust) - Giving each man his due vs. not giving each man his due.
Objective Value - Objective and subjective are properties of observations. If you have two individuals who observe the same object and give an account of their observation, to the extent that their accounts agree, their accounts are objective. To the extent that they disagree, they are subjective. Another word for obective could be inter-subjective. Other labels for this type of distinction could be absolute (holding in all cases) and conditional (holding only in some cases depending on conditions)
Man's nature - The characteristics of human beings which substantially differentiate him from other animals. IMO, the key characteristics are his reason and his action.
This is just my rough attempt to define the concepts you bring up, hastily thrown together in 15 minutes.
Objective Value - Objective and subjective are properties of observations. If you have two individuals who observe the same object and give an account of their observation, to the extent that their accounts agree, their accounts are objective. To the extent that they disagree, they are subjective. Another word for obective could be inter-subjective.
Juan:Objective Value - Objective and subjective are properties of observations. If you have two individuals who observe the same object and give an account of their observation, to the extent that their accounts agree, their accounts are objective. To the extent that they disagree, they are subjective. Another word for obective could be inter-subjective. Totally wrong. You and your friend might agree that pigs fly. That doesn't make it an objective fact.
I guess I could have said true accounts. If two people gave true accounts of an observation...
Stephen Forde:If two people gave true accounts of an observation...
Objectively true or subjectively true? I think we're back to the starting point.
AJ: Stephen Forde:If two people gave true accounts of an observation... Objectively true or subjectively true? I think we're back to the starting point.
No. You think "we're back to the starting point". Whoever 'we are', I assume you and Stephen. Did you ask Stephen this or are you deciding this for him? Is that what being subjective is all about?
Juan:Wow. Broken record zefreak is yet again at it.
What, you mean posting?
zefreak: Zavoi, you ought to clean your room. Is this a moral statement?
Moral statement, yes. Moral truth... perhaps?
Welcome back Zefreak!!!
Natural law, are those laws that can be derived logically from what objectively is.
twistedbydsign99:Natural law, are those laws that can be derived logically from what objectively is.
You mean laws like, "If you do X action, consequence Y will logically follow as a result?" Sounds like a good thing to me.
AJ:You mean laws like, "If you do X action, consequence Y will logically follow as a result?" Sounds like a good thing to me.
Its a neutral thing, I only half answered your question.
1. Derivation of something logical requires a deriver, an interpreter
2. The answer I gave doesn't satisfy your requirement of "meaningful" because this again requires an interpreter
Absent the interpreter aka objective, you are left with logical derivation.
Let me try this:
Obj => necessarily true for everyone
Sub => Necessarily true for at least one person
I think he is confusing inter-subjective for objective, the latter relating the mind to the external world as you said.
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
Juan:Alternatively... Obj => necessarily true for everyone Objective means related to objects external to the subject/observer. Objects that have their own nature and are what they are - not what the observer may mistakenly believe about them. Sub => Necessarily true for at least one person Subjective means experienced by a subject/observer.
But this is not without problems. We only know of external reality only through experience. So given your definitions, everything would be subjective. Also, how would you know if anything was really objective? (I think that some things are necessarily universally inter-subjective, but I'm not sure if that would be the same thing)
Jon: I think he is confusing inter-subjective for objective, the latter relating the mind to the external world as you said.
I don't see how inter-subjective and objective are necessarily mutually exclusive.
Because you're butchering the word if you think that mere agreement at the subjective level suffices to give rise to anything reminiscent of objectivity, i.e. mind-indepence. Inter-subjectivity can be a hint that one is in grasp of some objective truth but is not the same thing.
Stephen:But this is not without problems. We only know of external reality only through experience.
So given your definitions, everything would be subjective.
Jon Irenicus: Because you're butchering the word if you think that mere agreement at the subjective level suffices to give rise to anything reminiscent of objectivity, i.e. mind-indepence. Inter-subjectivity can be a hint that one is in grasp of some objective truth but is not the same thing.
Ok, I concede the point. My first example was poor.
Juan: If you are looking at a cow, you are experiencing a subjective/personal vision/image of a cow. However, the cow is a real object. It's a fact that the cow exists. The cow is objective. Is it true that there's a cow out there ? Yes, it is true = the assertion describes reality. Et cetera
If you are looking at a cow, you are experiencing a subjective/personal vision/image of a cow. However, the cow is a real object. It's a fact that the cow exists. The cow is objective. Is it true that there's a cow out there ? Yes, it is true = the assertion describes reality. Et cetera
How can the observers know that the cow is not another flying pig?
Juan: They are not directly related either.
They are not directly related either.
In the field of ethics, how do we know which norms are objective?
Juan: So at this point one can be an skeptic and believe that the only thing that really exists is your personal experience. Or you can assume that your experiences are caused by a real world out there, composed of objects (and persons).
I love epistemology.
Couldn't help but notice the Frank Herbert quote. Have you read the Dune series?
twistedbydsign99: AJ:You mean laws like, "If you do X action, consequence Y will logically follow as a result?" Sounds like a good thing to me. Its a neutral thing, I only half answered your question. 1. Derivation of something logical requires a deriver, an interpreter 2. The answer I gave doesn't satisfy your requirement of "meaningful" because this again requires an interpreter Absent the interpreter aka objective, you are left with logical derivation.
You wrote, "Natural law, are those laws that can be derived logically from what objectively is." If you mean laws like, "If you do X action, consequence Y will logically follow as a result," you have answered my question.
The requirement of "logically meaningful" was merely intended to exclude vagaries such as, "Rights just are," and to ensure that any specific definitions provided would be logically coherent.
For example, no longer addressing your comment but addressing objective ethicists, if we define "objective" and "value" in the following ways:
Then it is not clear how "objective value" can be a logically coherent concept, because it is unclear how value - being something dependent on someone's belief - can be "true independent of anyone's beliefs" (objective).
The point here is that simply placing two logically well-defined terms together does not guarantee that the resulting term will still be logically well-defined. In the example above, the resulting term is internally contradictory even though each constituent term is well-defined.
This is surely a familiar concept to everyone here: "non-coercive" is well-defined, and "socialism" is well-defined, but if a man came along talking of a great thing called "non-coercive socialism," would we not demand to know how he defined each term so as to allow for "non-coercive socialism" to be a logically coherent concept? It seems - by the normal definitions - to be internally contradictory, so we would not hesitate either to call it incoherent, or ask for definitional clarification.
Note that I am not claiming these to be the definitions objective ethicists or natural rights theorists use. That would be a strawman. I have in fact been looking for their base definitions, but have been unable to find them. Hence the OP.
Juan:So at this point one can be a skeptic and believe that the only thing that really exists is your personal experience.Or you can assume that your experiences are caused by a real world out there, composed of objects (and persons).
You might find this interesting.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meditations_on_First_Philosophy#Meditation_I:_Concerning_Those_Beings_That_Can_Be_Called_into_Doubt
David Gordon's recent Mises Daily critiquing Cowen's Autistic slant:
"But though his arguments just canvassed have great value, I sense in them a danger. If pushed too far, his line of thought could lead to an undue subjectivism, in which people's perceptions and classifications, rather than what actually occurs, would be the sole issues of importance...
But this is not the key indication of what I take to be Cowen's unduly subjectivist turn. This emerges rather from his suggestion that Nozick's argument rests on a questionable appeal to an "authentic" world, bereft of human ideas. Cowen suggests that we have no access to a world-in-itself; our perception is inevitably structured by our concepts and theories.
I don't think the so-called real world is very "authentic" at all. No one who refuses to plug into the machine is in fact choosing or defending pure authenticity. (p. 144)
But Nozick's argument does not depend on a direct realist theory of perception. Quite the contrary, it need only appeal to our ordinary notion of the actual world. So long as there is a distinction between doing something and imagining it, and we think this distinction important, Nozick's argument works. Cowen, by neglecting this point, is in danger of having constructed a defense of individuality that severs us from the world."
Wilderness, I read that one, too - very interesting article.
I'd like to start a thread on the "experience machine" thought experiment Cowen mentions (I disagree with several of Cowen's remarks about it). It reminds me of the "what if you could take a pill that would make you believe your children would be well taken care of after you die" thought experiment. Basically, I like thought experiments because they stretch the debate in interesting ways.
AJ:So she would be logically contradicting herself if she said, "It's not objectively bad for you to do that, but still don't do it"?
That statement does seem odd, but I suppose it could be charitably interpreted as "I find your action distasteful but I don't deny your right to do it."
Still, if we look past the ambiguity of the language and focus on the meaning behind it, it is clear that Alice either does or does not disagree with Bob about the truth of some statement. In other words, it is either true or false that
There is a statement S such that Alice believes S and Bob believes ~S (or vice-versa).
If this is false, then there is no real debate at all between Alice and Bob; though they might have the outward appearance of arguing, all they are really doing is misunderstanding each other or simply fighting (AdamKnott, this applies to your proposed statement as well). Since the purpose of our discussion is to determine who, of Alice and Bob, is correct, it is needless to consider this case any further.
If, however, this is true, then the S that Alice believes must be the same S that Bob disbelieves. (It can't be "I [Alice] like chocolate" vs. "I [Bob] don't like chocolate" because these statements do not fit the form S vs. ~S.) So, if S is a statement about whether someone should(n't) do something, then it cannot be a mere statement of somebody's individual preference. Rather, it must state some preference-independent fact that there can be disagreement about.
I hope that was clear. It makes perfect sense to me, but I find it difficult to communicate it.
Zavoi, bold added by AJ: AJ:So she would be logically contradicting herself if she said, "It's not objectively bad for you to do that, but still don't do it"? That statement does seem odd, but I suppose it could be charitably interpreted as "I find your action distasteful but I don't deny your right to do it."
The bold above matches the bold below, right? If so, you're interpreting "Don't do it" (command) as "I find your action distasteful" (subjective statement). However, earlier you appear to have interpreted "Don't do that" as an objective ethical statement:
Zavoi: "Don't do that" is an ethical statement. It's equivalent to saying "You should not do that" or "It is objectively bad for you to do that" (although, again, nobody actually talks like that).
Can you sort out these statements more clearly?
Zavoi:Still, if we look past the ambiguity of the language and focus on the meaning behind it, it is clear that Alice either does or does not disagree with Bob about the truth of some statement.
Even acknowledging the ambiguity of language, I don't see that a command ("Don't do that") has any statement necessarily contained within it. Even if we assume it has a statement contained within it, it could be something like, "Don't do that, or else I'll scream."
Zavoi:If this is false, then there is no real debate at all between Alice and Bob; though they might have the outward appearance of arguing, all they are really doing is misunderstanding each other or simply fighting
Isn't that what you are attempting to demonstrate? I.e., the fact that there is a debate (over an issue of objective truth or falsehood)? I'm afraid I've lost track of what you're aiming at proving with the Alice and Bob example. Could you please restate the conclusion you would like to reach based on that example?
Zavoi:Since the purpose of our discussion is to determine who, of Alice and Bob, is correct, it is needless to consider this case any further.
I thought the purpose of the current discussion was to determine whether it is even coherent to say "Alice is objectively correct/incorrect" or "Bob is objectively correct/incorrect" when they make moral statements.
AJ: The bold above matches the bold below, right? If so, you're interpreting "Don't do it" (command) as "I find your action distasteful" (subjective statement). However, earlier you appear to have interpreted "Don't do that" as an objective ethical statement: Zavoi: "Don't do that" is an ethical statement. It's equivalent to saying "You should not do that" or "It is objectively bad for you to do that" (although, again, nobody actually talks like that). Can you sort out these statements more clearly?
That's what I mean about the ambiguity of the language. Depending on the context, the same sequence of words can mean something different. By itself, "Don't do that" is ambiguous, but depending on what else Alice says, we can interpret it as either hypothetical ("Don't do that if you don't want me to scream"), or categorical ("Don't do that in any circumstance"), or a statement of individual preference ("I don't like that").
AJ:Even acknowledging the ambiguity of language, I don't see that a command ("Don't do that") has any statement necessarily contained within it.
If it doesn't contain a statement, then it can be ignored for the purposes of debate.
AJ:Isn't that what you are attempting to demonstrate? I.e., the fact that there is a debate (over an issue of objective truth or falsehood)? I'm afraid I've lost track of what you're aiming at proving with the Alice and Bob example. Could you please restate the conclusion you would like to reach based on that example?
The fact that there is a debate is the premise, from which follows the conclusion that both Alice and Bob accept the objective truth/falsehood of the statement in question.
Now, you might question the assumption that a disagreement exists. Indeed, it's perfectly conceivable for there to be two people who don't have a disagreement about something. However, neither Alice nor Bob are in a position to deny that they disagree about S, because for consistency's sake he/she would then have to stop arguing about S.
Think of this example from the perspective of Bob. He is about to do some action X. However, he anticipates that Alice might object to X by saying "X is bad/immoral/unethical." Therefore, he tries to think of arguments that he can use to refute Alice's statement and justify his own belief that X is not unethical. If, however, Alice does not object, then the need for Bob to use these arguments never arises in the first place, because there is nobody demanding that he supply an argument. Thus, his arguments can take as a premise that Alice has an objection.
It's similar to "Moore's Paradox." A third party (such as you or me) could examine Bob's arguments and object to them on the grounds that the premise (that Alice has an objection) might not be true. However, Alice herself cannot make this counterargument because it would be self-refuting.
Zavoi: AJ:Isn't that what you are attempting to demonstrate? I.e., the fact that there is a debate (over an issue of objective truth or falsehood)? The fact that there is a debate is the premise, from which follows the conclusion that both Alice and Bob accept the objective truth/falsehood of the statement in question.
AJ:Isn't that what you are attempting to demonstrate? I.e., the fact that there is a debate (over an issue of objective truth or falsehood)?
This seems circular. Aren't you already defining "debate" as a disagreement over an issue of objective truth or falsehood?
AJ:This seems circular. Aren't you already defining "debate" as a disagreement over an issue of objective truth or falsehood?
You're right that that's the definition I'm using, but this definition is not arbitrary, because it makes it possible to show (as outlined above) why Bob can take as given the premise "There is debate."
Can you explain how that does not amount to assuming what you're trying to prove?
the opposite choice is to say there is no debate
so between abandoning discource into discovering truth on the one hand , and engaging on it, and finding that the results rely to some extent on the necessary assumptions needed in order to set out to do it.
what's the smarter choice?
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Nir,
I'm curious. Would you consider discourse/dialogue to include participation between all parties involved thus a flowing of differing methods and an exchange of ideas emerging out of an array of questions, comments, etc...? But on the other hand, dialogue is not a student asking questions and a teacher lecturing answers? The former is a wide array of methods. The latter is a simple question-answer drill.
AJ: Can you explain how that does not amount to assuming what you're trying to prove?
To clarify, I mean that Zavoi appears to be assuming the coherency of objective ethics (which is what he set out to prove) by starting with the premise that there is a debate, and defining debate as a disagreement over some objective ethical truth.
In other words, by defining debate in terms of objective ethical truth, the premise ("There is a debate") appears to already entail what he at first set out to prove ("There are objective ethical truths").
AJ: d defining debate as a disagreement over some objective ethical truth. In other words, by defining debate in terms of objective ethical truth
d defining debate as a disagreement over some objective ethical truth.
In other words, by defining debate in terms of objective ethical truth
no debates are disagreements over objective truths. not objective moral truths.
Several pages back in the thread, Zavoi set out to prove the existence of objective ethical truths. I was referring to Zavoi's definition of debate (actually, his exact word was "argument") in that context:
Zavoi, bold and underline mine:If, however, she does object, then she is engaging in an argument, which means that she assumes an objective standard of good and bad.
In other words, Zavoi's definition of argument (which I assume is meant to be synonymous with debate in this context) appears to entail the assumption of the existence of objective ethical truths, or as stated here, "an objective standard of good and bad." My recent comments are saying, in effect, Doesn't your definition entail what you're attempting to prove?
AJ:In other words, by defining debate in terms of objective ethical truth, the premise ("There is a debate") appears to already entail what he at first set out to prove ("There are objective ethical truths").
So do we agree at least that the following argument is valid?
As you said, this implication is valid by the definition of "debate."
Now, for a valid argument, one either accepts the conclusion or rejects the premise(s). Would it be correct to say that you reject this argument on the basis that the premise "Alice is in a debate" is not necessarily true (for the definition of "debate" that I gave)?