I have sought the assistance of both my ethics and logic professors with regards to clarifying the paragraph below. Neither were able to assist me.
Can you help explain it to me?
"Murray N Rothbard argued that Hume's argument that values cannot be derived from facts is unpersuasive. Some allege that nothing can be in the conclusion of an argument that was not in one of the premises; and that therefore, an "ought" conclusion cannot follow from descriptive premises. But a conclusion follows from both premises taken together; the "ought" need not be present in either one of the premises so long as it has been validly deduced. Rothbard concluded that to say that it cannot be so deduced simply begs the question"
Cheers,
Loweleif
EDIT: -.- Your breaking my balls NirgrahamUK.
I can't remember where I got the above quote, however, the source for that quote would be the quote below.
The Ethics of Liberty by Murray N. Rotbhard.
Page 14, Footnote 15.
"Hurme in fact failed to prove that values cannot be derived from facts. It is frequently alleged that nothing can be in the conclusion of an argument which was not in one of the premises; and that therefore, an "ought" conclusion cannot follow from descriptive premises. But a conclusion follows from both premises taken together; the "ought" need not be present in either one of the premises so long as it has been validly deduced. To say that it cannot be so deduced simply begs the question. See Philippa R. Foot, Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978),pp. 99-105."
Please source your quote....
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
nirgrahamUK: Please source your quote....
Found it.
http://mises.org/rothbard/ethics/two.asp#_ftnref15
[15]Hume in fact failed to prove that values cannot be derived from facts. It is frequently alleged that nothing can be in the conclusion of an argument which was not in one of the premises; and that therefore, an "ought" conclusion cannot follow from descriptive premises. But a conclusion follows from both premises taken together; the "ought" need not be present in either one of the premises so long as it has been validly deduced. To say that it cannot be so deduced simply begs the question. See Philippa R. Foot, Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 99–105.
loweleif:Hume in fact failed to prove that values cannot be derived from facts. It is frequently alleged that nothing can be in the conclusion of an argument which was not in one of the premises; and that therefore, an "ought" conclusion cannot follow from descriptive premises. But a conclusion follows from both premises taken together; the "ought" need not be present in either one of the premises so long as it has been validly deduced. To say that it cannot be so deduced simply begs the question.
If that was Hume's derivation, Rothbard's critique is on target.
However, the issue of whether values can be derived from facts is silly to begin with, unless we specify whose values. Since value (noun) means "something that someone places importance on," the notion of values divorced from that "someone" is incoherent - unless we use some non-common-sense definition of value.
Why anarchy fails
loweleif:Hurme in fact failed to prove that values cannot be derived from facts.
This is an accurate statement, but it was not what Hume was saying or trying to prove. An "ought" is an imperative to act. Hume was saying you can not start with a description of things and then derive how an individual should act. The way a person acts, given what is, depends on their values. Are a persons values necessarily derived from a description of what is? I don't know I haven't been convinced either way. My opinion is that a persons values come from many places and that we naturally associate with those that are most similar to us if we are in the absence of a state and then those groups that most correctly hold proper values will be the most successful.
No, Hume is right."The ought need not be present in either one of the premises so long as it has been validly deduced"Rothbard is basically saying that "you can derrive something as long as its possible to derive it".
When you're doing a priori theorizing, the definitions of the symbols you use in your derrivation have to be equivalent to your conclusion. If you don't do this, it ain't a priori, it's just fluff.
I mean the libertarian formulation of ethics is highly rhetorical. Even if we concede that someone "owns" themslves etc etc it does not follow that we ought to respect those rights, since we can't say anything about what ownership is equivalent to (other than itself and its definition of course).
Libertarian ethics is not metaphysical; it makes a leap from concepts of ownership to the moral duty to respect this ownership.
loweleif:But a conclusion follows from both premises taken together; the "ought" need not be present in either one of the premises so long as it has been validly deduced.
It can't be validly deduced, except from another "ought". Deriving "ought" from "is" is akin to deriving "has" from "is", like saying, "All bachelors are men; all men are human; therefore all bachelors have humans." It simply does not follow.
Where have you been, Lilburne? We missed you
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
zefreak: Where have you been, Lilburne? We missed you
I have indeed been somewhat out of the ethics discussion loop lately. I rotate from being obsessed with ethics (and philosophy in general), economics, and history. And lately I've been in full-on history mode.
Lilburne: zefreak: Where have you been, Lilburne? We missed you I have indeed been somewhat out of the ethics discussion loop lately. I rotate from being obsessed with ethics (and philosophy in general), economics, and history. And lately I've been in full-on history mode.
Fair enough, I find myself going through the same process; I've been focusing more on economics recently myself. I'm currently reading through Hayek's History of Economic Thought, which will be followed by Lachmann's Capital and its Structure. Very interesting stuff. Of course, I recently purchased Hume's posthumous "Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary" which may draw me back into philosophy.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Juan:Hume doesn't have any argument. He just declared that 'objective' morality is not possible since it can't be derived from 'facts'. That begs a lot of question that Hume never answered. Hume's dictum is just an article of faith.
Nobody has ever given a justifiable derivation of an ought from solely factual premises. Natural rights philosophers tend to eschew syllogisms altogether, often hiding their premises or leaps of logic from undiscerning eyes. Hume's dictum is an article of faith in the same manner as the first law of thermodynamics. After all, it hasn't been proven to the degree that Juan demands of Hume, and we all know how consistent Juan is in the application of his principles.
Nobody has ever given a justifiable derivation of an ought from solely factual premises.
Hume's dictum is an article of faith in the same manner as the first law of thermodynamics.
After all, it hasn't been proven to the degree that Juan demands of Hume, and we all know how consistent Juan is in the application of his principles.
Juan: How do you derive 'ideas' from 'facts' ?
How do you derive 'ideas' from 'facts' ?
This sentence is nonsensical. 'Ideas' are not derived from anything, although they do have a relation to things. To be precise, they are representations of phenomenal experience.
Juan: Do ideas exist 'in the real world' ? Or are ideas just 'subjective' creations of the mind ?
Do ideas exist 'in the real world' ? Or are ideas just 'subjective' creations of the mind ?
The latter. They are constructs that represent phenomenal experience, allowing for efficient understanding of complex relationships. All language is metaphorical, or 'subjective' creations to represent "the real world".
Juan: If you can't find any idea out there in the real world, that is, you can 'observe' ideas, do ideas exist at all ?
If you can't find any idea out there in the real world, that is, you can 'observe' ideas, do ideas exist at all ?
It depends on your definition of exist. Webster would say yes, because they
"have being in a specified place or with respect to understood limitations or conditions <strange ideas existed in his mind>"
I'm not going to play anymore of your silly games, but an important point that seems to escape you is that 'skepticism' is a matter of degree. I am not a complete skeptic, meaning I accept some assumptions on faith, albeit as few as possible and only those instrumental in constructing a model with the greatest amount of explanatory power, see Occam's Razor.
There are no absolute skeptics that I know of, as such a person would be unable to justify the use of logical reasoning or even attempt justification, see Munchhausen Trilemma.
zefreak:This sentence is nonsensical. 'Ideas' are not derived from anything, although they do have a relation to things.
All language is metaphorical, or 'subjective' creations to represent "the real world".
It depends on your definition of exist.
I'm not going to play anymore of your silly games, but an important point that seems to escape you is that 'skepticism' is a matter of degree.
we all know how consistent Juan is in the application of his principles.
"Hume in fact failed to prove that values cannot be derived from facts. It is frequently alleged that nothing can be in the conclusion of an argument which was not in one of the premises; and that therefore, an "ought" conclusion cannot follow from descriptive premises. But a conclusion follows from both premises taken together; the "ought" need not be present in either one of the premises so long as it has been validly deduced. To say that it cannot be so deduced simply begs the question. See Philippa R. Foot, Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978),pp. 99-105."
I have never read any of Rothbard's work, besides a few essays, and quotes like this are one of the reasons why. It betrays such a poor comprehension of basic logic that I struggle to take rothbard seriously.
Lee Kelly:I have never read any of Rothbard's work, besides a few essays, and quotes like this are one of the reasons why. It betrays such a poor comprehension of basic logic that I struggle to take rothbard seriously.
I certainly wouldn't recommend writing off all of Rothbard. He's MUCH better as a historian and an economist than as a philosopher.
Lilburne:I certainly wouldn't recommend writing off all of Rothbard. He's MUCH better as a historian and an economist than as a philosopher.
Lee Kelly:I suspect he is, but I also think there are much better historians and economists than Rothbard, so I find myself with little incentive to read his work.
I think his historical work and Man, Economy, State are invaluable.
First I would like to say thanks for all the interest, but could we please maintain focus on the issue at hand, and for those of you who have personal differences set them aside or continue to debate them via PM because they don't really help solve my original question.
AJ:If that was Hume's derivation, Rothbard's critique is on target.
So it was not Hume's derivation? I can't present the source right now, but I remember Rothbard or another Austrian stating that Hume's argument may in fact have been misinterpreted (I'm pretty sure its in the The Ethics of Liberty), is that why you said if?
AJ:However, the issue of whether values can be derived from facts is silly to begin with, unless we specify whose values. Since value (noun) means "something that someone places importance on," the notion of values divorced from that "someone" is incoherent - unless we use some non-common-sense definition of value.
So your saying it is ok to derive facts from value if we specify whose values? What if we were to specify that who as Humanity (a collective, not an individual)? Are there not some basic values that all humans have? e.g murder is wrong, stealing is wrong, lying is wrong, self-ownership etc
But his work is mostly based on logic. Could you please elaborate (prove your assertion) to me why you think this and other statements, essays etc betray such a poor comprehension of basic logic?
And if you do not feel you have the time could you please send me a link where someone has already done so? Thank you.
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=v8_WMZcymeUC&dq=philippa+foot+virtues+and+vices&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=-KTvJoVIcf&sig=8d4MPBgMp_tvp6Mrgoi7oxnZlts&hl=en&ei=GkjOSsHUAZP84AaX2oWJAw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4#v=onepage&q=&f=false
since Rothbard referenced another's work, if one desires to flesh out the text behind the brief Rothbardian passage it would be great to read Rothbard's source. Unfortunately it doesn't seem to be available, digitally, in full.
loweleif,
Do this experiment with basic logic --
1) Take any set of formula for premises and deduce some conclusion.2) Form a new set of premises which contains all the premises of your first argument plus the conclusion.3) Note that anything which can be deduced from the first set of premises can also be deduced from the second.
Therefore, both sets of premises are semantically equivalent, i.e. two ways of saying the same thing.
Here's an example.
1) P, P -> Q |= Q2) P, Q, P -> Q |= Q3) P, P -> Q =||= P, Q, P -> Q
Rothbard criticises Hume for "begging the question," while not understanding that all valid deductions, if the premises are expected to justify the conclusion, must beg the question or else be invalid.
Lee Kelly:1) P, P -> Q |= Q
the premise that P is true, and the premise that P implies Q entail the conclusion Q
if one concludes 'Q' having deducted from p and p-> Q has one 'begged the question of Q'?
nirgrahamUK:if one concludes 'Q' having deducted from p and p-> Q has one 'begged the question of Q'?
Lee Kelly: Once you drop the notion that sense experience is the fountain of all legitimate knowledge, the is-ought problem really should cease to be a problem.
Once you drop the notion that sense experience is the fountain of all legitimate knowledge, the is-ought problem really should cease to be a problem.
Sure, it ceases to be a problem, and the resulting conclusions cease to be relevant.
Thanks Lee Kelley. Unfortunately, I'm even more confused then when I started this thread.
Lee Kelly:Do this experiment with basic logic --
I think I get the experiment.
I don't see how it ties into the statement below.
Lee Kelly:Rothbard criticises Hume for "begging the question," while not understanding that all valid deductions, if the premises are expected to justify the conclusion, must beg the question or else be invalid.
I also don't remember in logic being taught that all valid deductions (and in a valid deductions is it not necessary that the premises justify the conclusion? Or is that not equivalent to the conclusion following from the premises?) beg the question.
I'm honestly trying to grasp all sides of the issue as well as I can. As much as I like Rothbard I don't consider anyone's work Dogma, and so I genuinely trying to understand this in order to judge for myself whether or not Rothbards counter is correct.
How is this...
twistedbydsign99:Hume was saying you can not start with a description of things and then derive how an individual should act
Different from deriving values from facts? They sound equivalent to me. And if that is correct, then how can Rothbards statement be accurate?
This was some BAD philosophy by Rothbard.
To say that a conclusion is "validly deduced" from a set of premises means that the conclusion IS IN ONE OR MORE OF THE PREMISES.
Yeah, that is correct. It is definitenely not fallacious. A valid argument is one whereby the conclusion is warranted inferentially by the premises.
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
I suspect he is, but I also think there are much better historians and economists than Rothbard, so I find myself with little incentive to read his work.
No, he does a good job making Mises's work more accessible to people and also he touches upon historical studies with perspectives and questions others often do not ask. There may be "better" economists and historians but one would be depriving themselves by omitting Rothbard. Of course, TEOL can be ommitted as far as I am concerned unless one wishes to comprehend where most libertarians are coming from.
Deductions, by themselves, beg the question. That's why you have to establish the truth of the premises so they dont beg the question.
migkillertwo: Deductions, by themselves, beg the question. That's why you have to establish the truth of the premises so they dont beg the question.
http://mises.org/books/EconReasoning.pdf
Conza88: migkillertwo: Deductions, by themselves, beg the question. That's why you have to establish the truth of the premises so they dont beg the question. http://mises.org/books/EconReasoning.pdf
Absolutely irrelevant?
Can someone help me out and give a simple example of starting with two facts and arriving at an "ought" conclusion?
My humble blog
It's easy to refute an argument if you first misrepresent it. William Keizer
Smiling Dave: Can someone help me out and give a simple example of starting with two facts and arriving at an "ought" conclusion?
Good luck. We had an entire thread on just this subject a while ago, and not one surfaced that wasn't guilty of containing hidden ought premises.
Juan:Moral Fact : murder is morally wrong - it follows : you ought not to murder.
Why is murdering wrong?
Abstract liberty, like other mere abstractions, is not to be found.
- Edmund Burke
Juan:Can someone help me out and give a simple example of starting with two facts and arriving at an "ought" conclusion? Moral Fact : murder is morally wrong - it follows : you ought not to murder. Actually the 'ought' part is irrelevant - some things are morally wrong but of course you are free to do them anyway - free will. The issue at hand is whether moral facts exist or not. All this babbling about deriving an "ought" from an "is" is just pseudo-philosophical quibbling.
Most of your reply is over my head, I freely admit. The only part I "got", sort of, is the very first sentence.
I'm not sure Hume and Rothbard were talking about the example you gave. I got the impression they were discussing facts that can be picked up by a dead instrument such as a camera, and the debate is about can "oughts" be deduced from such facts.
laminustacitus: Why is murdering wrong?
Because you shouldn't murder
Seriously Juan, for all your vitriolic hatred towards theists, you sure know how to argue like one. Argument by assertion, is that how philosophy is done these days?