I. Ryan: Physiocrat: There is one exception which would be if one were ontologically infallible. This would then give a solid foundation for truth under determinism. Yet this is obviously false since it is possible for me to argue, and believe to be true, that 2+2=3 which demonstrates that I must have varying degrees of determined fallibility (assuming determinism to be true). And since fallible determinism gives no foundation for truth we must again reject determinism. If "determinism" were "true", the notion of truth, you claimed, would have no foundation. Is that not circular in a way?
Physiocrat: There is one exception which would be if one were ontologically infallible. This would then give a solid foundation for truth under determinism. Yet this is obviously false since it is possible for me to argue, and believe to be true, that 2+2=3 which demonstrates that I must have varying degrees of determined fallibility (assuming determinism to be true). And since fallible determinism gives no foundation for truth we must again reject determinism.
There is one exception which would be if one were ontologically infallible. This would then give a solid foundation for truth under determinism.
Yet this is obviously false since it is possible for me to argue, and believe to be true, that 2+2=3 which demonstrates that I must have varying degrees of determined fallibility (assuming determinism to be true). And since fallible determinism gives no foundation for truth we must again reject determinism.
If "determinism" were "true", the notion of truth, you claimed, would have no foundation. Is that not circular in a way?
It may have been more precise just to say assuming determinism rather than assuming determinism to be true.
Either way it is still an incoherent concept, even self refuting, rather than circular.
Edit- I've edited my main post to clear that up.
The atoms tell the atoms so, for I never was or will but atoms forevermore be.
Yours sincerely,
Physiocrat
assuming determinism is to assume it as true.
regardless, if a being that is considering whether determinism is true is determined to analyse that its true, then thats what will happen. if the being is determined to analyse that its false, then thats what will happen. so there is no contradiction. the determined being will simply do what it will do.
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
nirgrahamUK: assuming determinism is to assume it as true. regardless, if a being that is considering whether determinism is true is determined to analyse that its true, then thats what will happen. if the being is determined to analyse that its false, then thats what will happen. so there is no contradiction. the determined being will simply do what it will do.
But how do you ultimately evaluate the truth value? You assume that determinism allows the giving of a justifiable truth value which is question begging. In the absence of ontological infallibility there is no way of evaluating a truth value under determinism as I outlined earlier.
what do you mean by 'allows' the giving of a justifiable truth value? Surely an agent who is bound in causal chains, yet that has the 'power' to determine whether a proposition is justifiably true had that power. what is it about being bound by causality that would necessarily eviscerate this power?
nirgrahamUK:Surely an agent who is bound in causal chains, yet that has the 'power' to determine whether a proposition is justifiably true had that power.
if they have that power to "determine whether a proposition is justifiably true", then it is determinism working hand in hand with free will. In other words, will (determinism) is intervened upon by reason (free will).
nirgrahamUK:what is it about being bound by causality that would necessarily eviscerate this power?
I wouldn't say reason, ie. choice/free will, necessarily eviscerates will-power (cause-effect), but rather is a means to harmonize with it.
nirgrahamUK: what do you mean by 'allows' the giving of a justifiable truth value? Surely an agent who is bound in causal chains, yet that has the 'power' to determine whether a proposition is justifiably true had that power. what is it about being bound by causality that would necessarily eviscerate this power?
Since being tied up in causal chains excludes the possibility of choice which is logically prior to justification with caveat of ontological infallibility again. Without LFW one cannot weigh arguments on either sides and come to a conclusion: he merely comes to the conclusion caused by the laws of nature.
Physiocrat: But how do you ultimately evaluate the truth value? You assume that determinism allows the giving of a justifiable truth value which is question begging. In the absence of ontological infallibility there is no way of evaluating a truth value under determinism as I outlined earlier.
I think that this might just be a situation which displays some of the absurdities that one encounters when one starts to doubt whether "determinism" is "true".
Ludwig von Mises: Whatever the true nature of the universe and of reality may be, man can learn about it only what the logical structure of his mind makes comprehensible to him. Reason, the sole instrument of human science and philosophy, does not convey absolute knowledge and final wisdom. It is vain to speculate about ultimate things. What appears to man’s inquiry as an ultimate given, defying further analysis and reduction to something more fundamental, may or may not appear such to a more perfect intellect. We do not know. Man cannot grasp either the concept of absolute nothingness or that of the genesis of something out of nothing. The very idea of creation transcends his comprehension. The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, whom Pascal in his Mémorial opposed to that of the “philosophes et savants,” is a living image and has a clear and definite meaning for the faithful believer. But the philosophers in their endeavors to construct a concept of God, his attributes, and his conduct of world affairs, became involved in insoluble contradictions and paradoxes. A God whose essence and ways of acting mortal man could neatly circumscribe and define would not resemble the God of the prophets, the saints, and the mystics. The logical structure of his mind enjoins upon man determinism and the category of causality. As man sees it, whatever happens in the universe is the necessary evolution of forces, powers, and qualities which were already present in the initial stage of the X out of which all things stem. All things in the universe are interconnected, and all changes are the effects of powers inherent in things. No change occurs that would not be the necessary consequence of the preceding state. All facts are dependent upon and conditioned by their causes. No deviation from the necessary course of affairs is possible. Eternal law regulates everything. In this sense determinism is the epistemological basis of the human search for knowledge.[1] Man cannot even conceive the image of an undetermined universe. In such a world there could not be any awareness of material things and their changes. It would appear a senseless chaos. Nothing could be identified and distinguished from anything else. Nothing could be expected and predicted. In the midst of such an environment man would be as helpless as if spoken to in an unknown language. No action could be designed, still less put into execution. Man is what he is because he lives in a world of regularity and has the mental power to conceive the relation of cause and effect. Any epistemological speculation must lead toward determinism. But the acceptance of determinism raises some theoretical difficulties that have seemed to be insoluble. While no philosophy has disproved determinism, there are some ideas that people have not been able to bring into agreement with it. Passionate attacks have been directed against it because people believed that it must ultimately result in absurdity.
Whatever the true nature of the universe and of reality may be, man can learn about it only what the logical structure of his mind makes comprehensible to him. Reason, the sole instrument of human science and philosophy, does not convey absolute knowledge and final wisdom. It is vain to speculate about ultimate things. What appears to man’s inquiry as an ultimate given, defying further analysis and reduction to something more fundamental, may or may not appear such to a more perfect intellect. We do not know.
Man cannot grasp either the concept of absolute nothingness or that of the genesis of something out of nothing. The very idea of creation transcends his comprehension. The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, whom Pascal in his Mémorial opposed to that of the “philosophes et savants,” is a living image and has a clear and definite meaning for the faithful believer. But the philosophers in their endeavors to construct a concept of God, his attributes, and his conduct of world affairs, became involved in insoluble contradictions and paradoxes. A God whose essence and ways of acting mortal man could neatly circumscribe and define would not resemble the God of the prophets, the saints, and the mystics. The logical structure of his mind enjoins upon man determinism and the category of causality. As man sees it, whatever happens in the universe is the necessary evolution of forces, powers, and qualities which were already present in the initial stage of the X out of which all things stem. All things in the universe are interconnected, and all changes are the effects of powers inherent in things. No change occurs that would not be the necessary consequence of the preceding state. All facts are dependent upon and conditioned by their causes. No deviation from the necessary course of affairs is possible. Eternal law regulates everything.
In this sense determinism is the epistemological basis of the human search for knowledge.[1] Man cannot even conceive the image of an undetermined universe. In such a world there could not be any awareness of material things and their changes. It would appear a senseless chaos. Nothing could be identified and distinguished from anything else. Nothing could be expected and predicted. In the midst of such an environment man would be as helpless as if spoken to in an unknown language. No action could be designed, still less put into execution. Man is what he is because he lives in a world of regularity and has the mental power to conceive the relation of cause and effect.
Any epistemological speculation must lead toward determinism. But the acceptance of determinism raises some theoretical difficulties that have seemed to be insoluble. While no philosophy has disproved determinism, there are some ideas that people have not been able to bring into agreement with it. Passionate attacks have been directed against it because people believed that it must ultimately result in absurdity.
I think that we just have to accept determinism like we accept induction, the external world, and whatever, simply as an "ultimate given".
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
maybe you should say more about ontological infallability because I am not sure I know what you mean.
A being that is determined to always get correct results over a set of challenges, can be said to be infallable over that set. perhaps you are saying that humans are such.
ontological infallability = realism
I might not be using it the way Physiocrat is using the term, and the question was posed to him so forgive me for stepping in.
nirgrahamUK: maybe you should say more about ontological infallability because I am not sure I know what you mean. A being that is determined to always get correct results over a set of challenges, can be said to be infallable over that set. perhaps you are saying that humans are such.
Ontological infallibility- a human must be determined to get correct results over a set of all possible challenges. If it's less than all possible sets then you'd need to LFW to determine under which set the human is acting which again presupposes LFW truth.
im perplexed at your definition which is quite different from wilderness's idea of what you mean. how is your 'ontological infallibality' different from 'infallability' which we obviousy do not have over all possible challenges....?
Physiocrat: Ontological infallibility- a human must be determined to get correct results over a set of all possible challenges. If it's less than all possible sets then you'd need to LFW to determine under which set the human is acting which again presupposes LFW truth.
If he is determined to do it, how is it, from your position, able to even be "correct" or not?
nirgrahamUK: im perplexed at your definition which is quite different from wilderness's idea of what you mean. how is your 'ontological infallibality' different from 'infallability' which we obviousy do not have over all possible challenges....?
That's the whole point. It's such an impossible attribute to attain or have that even the last get out clause of determinism has been truly smashed which leaves LWF as the only option.
Physiocrat: It may have been more precise just to say assuming determinism rather than assuming determinism to be true.
As Nir said, to "assum[e] determinism" is just to "assum[e] determinism to be true".
Physiocrat: nirgrahamUK: im perplexed at your definition which is quite different from wilderness's idea of what you mean. how is your 'ontological infallibality' different from 'infallability' which we obviousy do not have over all possible challenges....? That's the whole point. It's such an impossible attribute to attain or have that even the last get out clause of determinism has been truly smashed which leaves LWF as the only option.
in other words, due to epistemological fallibility....?
I. Ryan: Physiocrat: Ontological infallibility- a human must be determined to get correct results over a set of all possible challenges. If it's less than all possible sets then you'd need to LFW to determine under which set the human is acting which again presupposes LFW truth. If he is determined to do it, how is it, from your position, able to even be "correct" or not?
I'm not sure how you could actually justify yourself to be ontologically infallible, I was merely positing as the only get out avenue for determinism.
With regards the Mises quote he seems to have created a false dichotomy: either everything is determined or everything is random. I think it is possible to retain some uncaused elements without reducing the world to chaos; with man's free will one can still give reasons why he acts as he does such as is desires but that his desires do to not cause his act.
Incidentally I believe determinism also suffers from the regression fallacy which is one of the reasons I'm a theist (Christian more precisely)
wilderness: Physiocrat: nirgrahamUK: im perplexed at your definition which is quite different from wilderness's idea of what you mean. how is your 'ontological infallibality' different from 'infallability' which we obviousy do not have over all possible challenges....? That's the whole point. It's such an impossible attribute to attain or have that even the last get out clause of determinism has been truly smashed which leaves LWF as the only option. in other words, due to epistemological fallibility....?
Determinism is finally smashed due to epistemological fallibility.
Physiocrat:Determinism is finally smashed due to epistemological fallibility.
right.
So when you were saying ontological infallibility I think, to put it into different words, you were saying: the reality of the individual is infallible. Yet, you were rejecting this, which is why you say that's your point, because the individual is not infallible due to epistemological concerns.
what are you saying? that determinism would imply fallibility or infallibility? it seems like you are switching.....besides which determinish implies neither. so i must assume you are saying that one of infalabilty or fallability somehow disprove determinism, but i can't tell which one of the two you think does it, nor how.....
yours @confused !
help a brother out
Physiocrat: I'm not sure how you could actually justify yourself to be ontologically infallible, I was merely positing as the only get out avenue for determinism.
Well, I am just saying that it is not a possible "out avenue for determinism", it is just an incoherent concept.
Physiocrat: With regards the Mises quote he seems to have created a false dichotomy: either everything is determined or everything is random. I think it is possible to retain some uncaused elements without reducing the world to chaos; with man's free will one can still give reasons why he acts as he does such as is desires but that his desires do to not cause his act.
If you change it to that "[m]an cannot even conceive the image of an undetermined" section of anything, I think that it becomes clearer.
Physiocrat: Incidentally I believe determinism also suffers from the regression fallacy which is one of the reasons I'm a theist (Christian more precisely)
Why is it a fallacy?
Ludwig von Mises: Change can be conceived as the outcome either of the operation of mechanistic causality or of purposeful behavior; for the human mind there is no third way available.[...]Causality leads to a regressus in infinitum which reason can never exhaust. Teleology is found wanting as soon as the question is raised of what moves the prime mover.
Change can be conceived as the outcome either of the operation of mechanistic causality or of purposeful behavior; for the human mind there is no third way available.[...]Causality leads to a regressus in infinitum which reason can never exhaust. Teleology is found wanting as soon as the question is raised of what moves the prime mover.
So I do not see why adopting a teleological view of it helps. Neither of them allows you to escape the regression.
nirgrahamUK: what are you saying? that determinism would imply fallibility or infallibility? it seems like you are switching.....besides which determinish implies neither. so i must assume you are saying that one of infalabilty or fallability somehow disprove determinism, but i can't tell which one of the two you think does it, nor how..... yours @confused ! help a brother out
To know or justify whether a statement X is true it either requires libertarian freedom of the will or man to be epistemologically infallible to use Wilderness's term. Now obviously, determinism is only consistent with epistemological infallibility since LWF is the antonym of determinism. Now since I can prove that I am fallible, 2+2=3, then we must throw out determinism. Therefore LFW is true.
Physiocrat:To know or justify whether a statement X is true it either requires libertarian freedom of the will or man to be epistemologically infallible to use Wilderness's term.
no, 'to know' whether a statement X is true, it requires A) X to be true B) the subject to think that its true.
'to justify' the subjects belief we only ask that the subject have reasons, i.e. justifications. determinism doesnt get in the way of that either...
LWF is useless as Ryan says, and is not 'freedom worth having' (to use Dennetts terminology). We have free will in so far as there are a range of options for our determined mind-brains to choose between, and its us, i.e. our brain-minds. that are the locus wherein the calculations as to 'what to do' work themselves out in....
To back-track a bit:
Physiocrat: you could only conclude what you were determined to do which gives no foundation for truth
you could only conclude what you were determined to do which gives no foundation for truth
Why does that "giv[e] no foundation for truth"?
Imagine that you could rewind your life back to when you were 5 years old. If your life restarted from that point would anything be different over the course of your life? This assumes every other thing remains the same. I'm not entirely sure a single thing would change.
Physiocrat: The edifice of responsibility and subsequently law are built on it.
The edifice of responsibility and subsequently law are built on it.
Not fundamentally:
Ludwig von Mises: A factor that often entered the controversies concerning determinism was misapprehension as to its practical consequences.All nonutilitarian systems of ethics look upon the moral law as something outside the nexus of means and ends. The moral code has no reference to human well-being and happiness, to expediency, and to the mundane striving after ends. It is heteronomous, i.e., enjoined upon man by an agency that does not depend on human ideas and does not bother about human concerns. Some believe that this agency is God, others that it is the wisdom of the forefathers, some that it is a mystical inner voice alive in every decent man’s conscience. He who violates the precepts of this code commits a sin, and his guilt makes him liable to punishment. Punishment does not serve human ends. In punishing offenders, the secular or theocratic authorities acquit themselves of a duty entrusted to them by the moral code and its author. They are bound to punish sin and guilt whatever the consequences of their action may be.Now these metaphysical notions of guilt, sin, and retribution are incompatible with the doctrine of determinism. If all human actions are the inevitable effect of their causes, if the individual cannot help acting in the way antecedent conditions make him act, there can no longer be any question of guilt. What a haughty presumption to punish a man who simply did what the eternal laws of the universe had determined!The philosophers and lawyers who attacked determinism on these grounds failed to see that the doctrine of an almighty and omniscient God led to the same conclusions that moved them to reject philosophical determinism. If God is almighty, nothing can happen that he does not want to happen. If he is omniscient, he knows in advance all things that will happen. In either case, man cannot be considered answerable.1 The young Benjamin Franklin argued “from the supposed attributes of God” in this manner: “That in erecting and governing the world, as he was infinitely wise, he knew what would be best; infinitely good, he must be disposed; and infinitely powerful, he must be able to execute it. Consequently all is right.”2 In fact, all attempts to justify, on metaphysical and theological grounds, society’s right to punish those whose actions jeopardize peaceful social cooperation are open to the same criticism that is leveled against philosophical determinism.Utilitarian ethics approaches the problem of punishment from a different angle. The offender is not punished because he is bad and deserves chastisement but so that neither he nor other people will repeat the offense. Punishment is not inflicted as retribution and retaliation but as a means to prevent future crimes. Legislators and judges are not the mandataries of a metaphysical retributive justice. They are committed to the task of safeguarding the smooth operation of society against encroachments on the part of antisocial individuals. Hence it is possible to deal with the problem of determinism without being troubled by inane considerations of practical consequences concerning the penal code.
A factor that often entered the controversies concerning determinism was misapprehension as to its practical consequences.All nonutilitarian systems of ethics look upon the moral law as something outside the nexus of means and ends. The moral code has no reference to human well-being and happiness, to expediency, and to the mundane striving after ends. It is heteronomous, i.e., enjoined upon man by an agency that does not depend on human ideas and does not bother about human concerns. Some believe that this agency is God, others that it is the wisdom of the forefathers, some that it is a mystical inner voice alive in every decent man’s conscience. He who violates the precepts of this code commits a sin, and his guilt makes him liable to punishment. Punishment does not serve human ends. In punishing offenders, the secular or theocratic authorities acquit themselves of a duty entrusted to them by the moral code and its author. They are bound to punish sin and guilt whatever the consequences of their action may be.Now these metaphysical notions of guilt, sin, and retribution are incompatible with the doctrine of determinism. If all human actions are the inevitable effect of their causes, if the individual cannot help acting in the way antecedent conditions make him act, there can no longer be any question of guilt. What a haughty presumption to punish a man who simply did what the eternal laws of the universe had determined!The philosophers and lawyers who attacked determinism on these grounds failed to see that the doctrine of an almighty and omniscient God led to the same conclusions that moved them to reject philosophical determinism. If God is almighty, nothing can happen that he does not want to happen. If he is omniscient, he knows in advance all things that will happen. In either case, man cannot be considered answerable.1 The young Benjamin Franklin argued “from the supposed attributes of God” in this manner: “That in erecting and governing the world, as he was infinitely wise, he knew what would be best; infinitely good, he must be disposed; and infinitely powerful, he must be able to execute it. Consequently all is right.”2 In fact, all attempts to justify, on metaphysical and theological grounds, society’s right to punish those whose actions jeopardize peaceful social cooperation are open to the same criticism that is leveled against philosophical determinism.Utilitarian ethics approaches the problem of punishment from a different angle. The offender is not punished because he is bad and deserves chastisement but so that neither he nor other people will repeat the offense. Punishment is not inflicted as retribution and retaliation but as a means to prevent future crimes. Legislators and judges are not the mandataries of a metaphysical retributive justice. They are committed to the task of safeguarding the smooth operation of society against encroachments on the part of antisocial individuals. Hence it is possible to deal with the problem of determinism without being troubled by inane considerations of practical consequences concerning the penal code.
nirgrahamUK: Physiocrat:To know or justify whether a statement X is true it either requires libertarian freedom of the will or man to be epistemologically infallible to use Wilderness's term. no, 'to know' whether a statement X is true, it requires A) X to be true B) the subject to think that its true. 'to justify' the subjects belief we only ask that the subject have reasons, i.e. justifications. determinism doesnt get in the way of that either... LWF is useless as Ryan says, and is not 'freedom worth having' (to use Dennetts terminology). We have free will in so far as there are a range of options for our determined mind-brains to choose between, and its us, i.e. our brain-minds. that are the locus wherein the calculations as to 'what to do' work themselves out in....
I was using the terms interchangeably to avoid confusion. I failed. Render it to know instead.
Now since I've cleared up the confusion could you justify how determinism allows for the possibility of the knowledge of truth?
Also why is it not worth having? I would argue being morally responsible agents was quite a good thing to be.
What is LFW?
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
E. R. Olovetto: What is LFW?
Libertarian Free Will. Defined as the ability to choose A or non-A.
Why not just say FW or free will?
E. R. Olovetto: Why not just say FW or free will?
Or "choice"? Is there a difference between "free choice" and "choice"?
I. Ryan: E. R. Olovetto: Why not just say FW or free will? Or "choice"? Is there a difference between "free choice" and "choice"?
Maybe if you are thinking in terms of Mises' hegemonial vs. contractual society. My actual concern was with the word "libertarian" being attached to "free will".
AJ:The words themselves, by any reasonable interpretation I can think of, do not seem prima facie coherent, so as I said I await a coherent definition.
Can you elaborate on this? That is, take some common definitions and show how they're incoherent?
AnalyticalAnarchism.net - The Positive Political Economy of Anarchism
E. R. Olovetto: Maybe if you are thinking in terms of Mises' hegemonial vs. contractual society. My actual concern was with the word "libertarian" being attached to "free will".
OK, well, does it suffice to call what he called "libertarian free will" just "choice"? Is it possible to be able to choose but not have "free will"? If not, I think that we should just call it "choice".
I. Ryan: E. R. Olovetto: Maybe if you are thinking in terms of Mises' hegemonial vs. contractual society. My actual concern was with the word "libertarian" being attached to "free will". OK, well, does it suffice to call what he called "libertarian free will" just "choice"? Is it possible to be able to choose but not have "free will"? If not, I think that we should just call it "choice".
I understand what E.R. said because libertarian is a meta-political. As for what the rest of what you said call it choice, free-will, or spinnin' this way, not that way. It doesn't matter what you call "it", especially if "it" is what everybody else has recognized to be real, is talking about, and defining too.
edit: Now if libertarian is what keeps "it" real, then Physiocrat has a point too.
wilderness: OK, well, does it suffice to call what he called "libertarian free will" just "choice"? Is it possible to be able to choose but not have "free will"? If not, I think that we should just call it "choice". I understand what E.R. said because libertarian is a meta-political. As for what the rest of what you said call it choice, free-will, or spinnin' this way, not that way. It doesn't matter what you call "it", especially if "it" is what everybody else has recognized to be real, is talking about, and defining too.
Well, my problem is not just with what string of graphemes that we use. My problem is that, if it is not possible to be able to choose but to not have "free will" or to not have "free will" but to choose, we should just pick one and stick with it.
I. Ryan: wilderness: I understand what E.R. said because libertarian is a meta-political. As for what the rest of what you said call it choice, free-will, or spinnin' this way, not that way. It doesn't matter what you call "it", especially if "it" is what everybody else has recognized to be real, is talking about, and defining too. Well, my problem is not with what string of graphemes that we use. My problem is that, if it is not possible to be able to choose but to not have "free will", we should stop messing up the situation and instead just adopt one of the terms.
wilderness: I understand what E.R. said because libertarian is a meta-political. As for what the rest of what you said call it choice, free-will, or spinnin' this way, not that way. It doesn't matter what you call "it", especially if "it" is what everybody else has recognized to be real, is talking about, and defining too.
Well, my problem is not with what string of graphemes that we use. My problem is that, if it is not possible to be able to choose but to not have "free will", we should stop messing up the situation and instead just adopt one of the terms.
Did you put one too many'"not's' in what I underlined? If it is not possible to choose but to not have free will?
I think you might be trying to say that there is choice but not free-will, maybe? I mean you haven't necessarily concluded that. It's a question on your part and the part of the whole discussion at hand in this thread in general. I'll assume yes that's what you're bringing up.
By choose, it can be semantically inclined to define what is the nature of a mental ability. Whereas free-will, is the nature of that choice plus will (will being a base action of all biological life whereas not all biological life chooses). Free-will is defining the nature of will-power that is freed from what is external to the individual such as extortion or mechanics. Maybe it could also be said that a drunk lacks free-will too.
Example: A rock falls and pushes the person. The person's free-will (nor choice) wasn't involved. It was the will of the rock that exerted mechanical force upon the person that actually moved the person. Free-will is volition as opposed to nolition.
I see both terms actually existing. One is not better than the other and I can see that they overlap in their relation to reality.
Let's stick with free will. The injection of jargon, LFW, made it even harder to follow the arguments. Ultimately, "choice" may be better, but I think "free will" keeps the proper frame of reference (the individual) clear. This was what I was talking about, from Human Action:
There are two different kinds of social cooperation: cooperation by virtue of contract and coordination, and cooperation by virtue of command and subordination or hegemony. Where and as far as cooperation is based on contract, the logical relation between the cooperating individuals is symmetrical. They are all parties to interpersonal exchange contracts. John has the same relation to Tom as Tom has to John. Where and as far as cooperation is based on command and subordination, there is the man who commands and there are those who obey his orders. The logical relation between these two classes of men is asymmetrical. There is a director and there are people under his care. The director alone chooses and directs; the others--the wards--are mere pawns in his actions. [p. 196] The power that calls into life and animates any social body is always ideological might, and the fact that makes an individual a member of any social compound is always his own conduct. This is no less valid with regard to a hegemonic societal bond. It is true, people are as a rule born into the most important hegemonic bonds, into the family and into the state, and this was also the case with the hegemonic bonds of older days, slavery and serfdom, which disappeared in the realm of Western civilization. But no physical violence and compulsion can possibly force a man against his will to remain in the status of the ward of a hegemonic order. What violence or the threat of violence brings about is a state of affairs in which subjection as a rule is considered more desirable than rebellion. Faced with the choice between the consequences of obedience and of disobedience, the ward prefers the former and thus integrates himself into the hegemonic bond. Every new command places this choice before him again. In yielding again and again he himself contributes his share to the continuous existence of the hegemonic societal body. Even as a ward in such a system he is an acting human being, i.e., a being not simply yielding to blind impulses, but using his reason in choosing between alternatives.
There are two different kinds of social cooperation: cooperation by virtue of contract and coordination, and cooperation by virtue of command and subordination or hegemony.
Where and as far as cooperation is based on contract, the logical relation between the cooperating individuals is symmetrical. They are all parties to interpersonal exchange contracts. John has the same relation to Tom as Tom has to John. Where and as far as cooperation is based on command and subordination, there is the man who commands and there are those who obey his orders. The logical relation between these two classes of men is asymmetrical. There is a director and there are people under his care. The director alone chooses and directs; the others--the wards--are mere pawns in his actions. [p. 196]
The power that calls into life and animates any social body is always ideological might, and the fact that makes an individual a member of any social compound is always his own conduct. This is no less valid with regard to a hegemonic societal bond. It is true, people are as a rule born into the most important hegemonic bonds, into the family and into the state, and this was also the case with the hegemonic bonds of older days, slavery and serfdom, which disappeared in the realm of Western civilization. But no physical violence and compulsion can possibly force a man against his will to remain in the status of the ward of a hegemonic order. What violence or the threat of violence brings about is a state of affairs in which subjection as a rule is considered more desirable than rebellion. Faced with the choice between the consequences of obedience and of disobedience, the ward prefers the former and thus integrates himself into the hegemonic bond. Every new command places this choice before him again. In yielding again and again he himself contributes his share to the continuous existence of the hegemonic societal body. Even as a ward in such a system he is an acting human being, i.e., a being not simply yielding to blind impulses, but using his reason in choosing between alternatives.
I don't see how adding "libertarian" is anything but superfluous. I don't like the term "anarcho-capitalist" for various reasons, and "libertarian" only has meaning in contrast to "anti-human" ideologies.
E. R. Olovetto:I don't see how adding "libertarian" is anything but superfluous. I don't like the term "anarcho-capitalist" for various reasons, and "libertarian" only has meaning in contrast to "anti-human" ideologies.
on libertarian: that seems true. I mean if free-will or choice, I mean we could simply just say human action, but anyways, that does seem to be the case "superfluous". Yet, what I saw by the libertarian add-on was a criminal has free-will or choice still. They choose to murder, etc... But then that runs counter to violition and they are special pleading. Labeling it with libertarian dismisses the need to explain any further, as we know we are talking about a person that has free-will and strives to universally honor that inherent capability.
on anarcho-capitalist: that seems to be a different story because in real terms (1)anarchy: no-ruler, everybody here for the most part agrees with; (2) capitalist, everybody here again same thing. What I do see with this term is the negative connotations that have piled onto this term. It's a grand term if the discussioners don't demean the concept over the semantic issue. This one seems more of a preference than anything to make arguments better and not lose the other person cause 'anarch" is ringing in their ear so they miss out on the whole concept being discussed. Now if Glenn Beck and some others keep saying they are libertarian then it would drop into this negativity too and then we'd have to explain what it means in the face of another person holding all kinds of preconceptual neo-con thoughts on what libertarian now means to them.
Labeling it with libertarian dismisses the need to explain any further, as we know we are talking about a person that has free-will and strives to universally honor that inherent capability.
This is attaching Libertarian values to the epistemic fact though. All I know is how Phys. defined LFW is exactly now mountains of texts define simply "free will".
Re: AC (sorry not much time), libertarianism or voluntarism doesn't prohibit "voluntary government" or primitive communal societies. It is more than just the negativity attached to the words. It is separating personal values from legal doctrine.
In my opinion, the concept of free will is usually undefined.
The determinist argues that unless an event is uncaused, it is not freely chosen, since it was determined by its cause; but any explanation of a choice as a non-random event--and a random choice is no choice at all--must invoke some physical or mental cause. Thus, the concept of free will is simply undefined.
Of course, this does not mean that all our choices are predetermined, because the universe may yet be undeterministic.