Upon examination, I have recently found that virtue ethics has had a greater and greater appeal to me.
As I understand philosophy, ethics is a subgroup of axiology, the study of values (good and bad). Thus, ethics is ultimately the study of objectively good and bad actions. Unfortunately, the ethical theories that I adhere to (rationalist approaches to human rights) do not take objective good and bad, instead, they simply attempt to prove in a negative manner.
Virtue ethics seems to strike at the root of the problem, by attempting to examine what is good and bad. The way it's been explained to me is that one approach to virtue ethics is to look at the "ness" of a particular object. For example, what makes a dog a good dog? Most people would say loyalty, obediance, intelligence, liveliness, etc. This would be "dogness." Likewise, one could ask "what makes a human a good human?" And the answer could be in a human's "human-ness:" courage, intelligence, rationality, strength, etc.
These are just some random thoughts thrown together rather quickly, but hopefully I shall be expanding my understanding of the subject and posting more often about it.
Political Atheists Blog
So you've become an objective ethicist?
Either way, I am interested in your journey.
Personally I've moved away from it and towards more 'rationalist' theories, by which I mean more epistemological, negative approaches (those to which you're attached now.) I still think virtue ethics is largely true, but that epistemological approaches are more fruitful.
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
I've long believed in some form of an objective ethical system, I just haven't really been able to put my finger on one. The one problem I have with rationalist approaches to rights is "why be rational?" What's so awful about a logically contradictory action if you're a nihilist? In other words, rationalist approaches to rights deal with pretty straightforward logic and they're undoubtedly true (e.g. you can't kill someone and then claim you cannot be killed) but they don't deal with objectively good and bad actions. They simply deal with logical and illogical actions. The presumption in these theories seem to be that one should be logical. So why be logical? I think virtue ethics might have an answer to this question.
Plato's theory of forms provides a key insight which leads to virtue ethics. From my understanding, Plato's theory of forms has to do with the ideal. For example, none of us have ever actually seen or experienced the perfect circle, yet we know what a perfect circle is (e.g. all points on a circle are equidistant from the center and the circumference divided by the diameter is pi, pi being another example of a perfect form). The theory of forms can be applied to discover virtues by asking "what is the perfect human?" In essence, this is asking what are the distinct properties of being human or what is "human-ness."
The perfect human who perfectly fulfills the distinct properties of being human would be courageous, brave, intelligent, reasonable, rational, logical, and physically fit, among other things. These are virtues. Humans should try to be virtuous because by doing so they would achieve the goals of their "human-ness."
I'm not sure I'm being clear here, but essentially my argument is that virtues stem from Platonic forms. By definition, a circle should try to have all of its points equidistant from the circle's center. A general rule emerges here: by defintion, x should try to be y (y being x's ideal Platonic form). So humans should try to become ideally human.
To tie up this post, an ideal human would be perfectly logical. This leads us back to the beginning of the post. If humans should attempt to be perfectly logical, then they definitely should follow rationalist approaches to rights and not initiate aggression or advocate aggression against one another.
EDIT: Okay, well there are some more thoughts wandering around in my head that I'd like to express, but they don't really fit into the body of this post, so I'll just add them on to the end here. Virtue ethics, combines with ethical egoism, utilitarianism, natural rights, and rationalist rights, to form what I call for lack of a better term "the ultimate ethical system." I believe that all of these ethical systems come together perfectly to form the ultimate argument for freedom and liberty. If you are virtuous, then you must follow rationalist rights and you must be egoistic. If you are egoistic, then you must be a utilitarian and follow natural rights. If you are a utilitarian, you must follow property rights and be egoistic. All of these systems ultimately feed on each other and show why a truly free society is the only moral system of organizing human activity.
is it possible to be an 'ideal human'? and can it be ones moral responsibility to do that which is impossible?
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Is it possible to be an ideal circle? No. But, by definition, a circle aims to be an ideal circle.
Ideal forms do not exist in reality, but in theory only.
krazy kaju: Thus, ethics is ultimately the study of objectively good and bad actions.
Thus, ethics is ultimately the study of objectively good and bad actions.
So I do not enact a straw-man, I will ask to you: what does "objectively" mean?
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
krazy kaju:Is it possible to be an ideal circle? No. But, by definition, a circle aims to be an ideal circle.Ideal forms do not exist in reality, but in theory only.
the problem does not enter in just at the point where we admit that the 'ideal human' is unachievable. it enters in when you make it immoral to do otherwise than what is impossible.
the great thing about the NAP is you can achieve it. just don't initiate force against people. its within your power to do, or not do. its within your power to be ethical, or to not be ethical).
nirgrahamUK:is it possible to be an 'ideal human'? and can it be ones moral responsibility to do that which is impossible?
See Long's "Happiness in Austro-Athenian Perspective," where he discusses the tension between accommodationism (making eudaimonia too easy to achieve) and utopianism (making it too hard or impossible to achieve).
AnalyticalAnarchism.net - The Positive Political Economy of Anarchism
krazy kaju:The perfect human who perfectly fulfills the distinct properties of being human would be courageous, brave, intelligent, reasonable, rational, logical, and physically fit, among other things. These are virtues. Humans should try to be virtuous because by doing so they would achieve the goals of their "human-ness."
You are not saying that there is an objectively perfect human in the same sense that their is an objectively perfect circle, correct? Because I disagree with you regarding what constitutes the "perfect human." Also, you say that a perfect human perfectly fulfills the distinct properties of being human. But hatred and sadness are properties of being human too. What happens when properties such as happiness and sadness conflict with each other? How does the perfect human fulfill the properties of happiness and sadness? Correct me if I am misunderstanding what your saying.
Sage: nirgrahamUK:is it possible to be an 'ideal human'? and can it be ones moral responsibility to do that which is impossible? See Long's "Happiness in Austro-Athenian Perspective," where he discusses the tension between accommodationism (making eudaimonia too easy to achieve) and utopianism (making it too hard or impossible to achieve).
Or if you like reading with your ears, An Aristotelian Ethics of Virtue by Long
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Juan:if you admit that 'vices' are part of human nature, then is the perfect human both perfectly virtuous and perfectly vicious
Can A be A and Non-A?
Eric:you say that a perfect human perfectly fulfills the distinct properties of being human. But hatred and sadness are properties of being human too. What happens when properties such as happiness and sadness conflict with each other? How does the perfect human fulfill the properties of happiness and sadness?
"It's sometimes said that a fully virtuous person would experience no inner conflicts and would perform all her duties cheerfully; but that seems dubious. Aristotle, to whom this view is often mistakenly attributed, points out that the courageous person ought to feel some fear when facing danger. Of course she shouldn’t be paralysed with fear; she should recognise that the requirements of courage are more important than bodily security. But she would fail to be giving bodily security its due as a genuinely important value if she faced danger without a qualm. But fear inherently involves a desire to avoid facing whatever it is one fears; so what Aristotle shows us is that the courageous person will quite properly have a desire to do something (run away) that she nevertheless should not do.
"Here's another example; I owe this one to Karen Stohr. Suppose that you are a fully virtuous person and the task falls to you of breaking some bad news to a friend. Now clearly you can’t perform that duty cheerfully; any decent person dislikes bearing bad news. So even the virtuous person – nay, especially the virtuous person – will desire not to perform this duty. Now it would obviously be a moral failing to give in to that desire, but it would also be a moral failing not to have it. Thus even within an individual there will be conflicts one ought to have, desires one should have but shouldn’t act on. But here too, this local conflict is licensed by a broader framework of unitary values."
(Long, p.14)
Juan: 1) human nature is not that easy to define..
It is about on par as defining horse or lion nature.
Juan: 2) if you admit that 'vices' are part of human nature, then is the perfect human both perfectly virtuous and perfectly vicious ?
2) if you admit that 'vices' are part of human nature, then is the perfect human both perfectly virtuous and perfectly vicious ?
Vice is a part of being human in the same way as disease is part of being human. Should we embrace disease because it is "natural"? No, we should fight it.
"I cannot prove, but am prepared to affirm, that if you take care of clarity in reasoning, most good causes will take care of themselves, while some bad ones are taken care of as a matter of course." -Anthony de Jasay
Sage:(Long, p.14)
Your obsession with quoting and referencing Long in nearly every post has become nauseating to me.
I can't help it! He's already said everything I want to say. Well, almost everything. If I'm talking about political obligation or resource economics, then I'd be quoting someone else.
Sage: "It's sometimes said that a fully virtuous person would experience no inner conflicts and would perform all her duties cheerfully; but that seems dubious. Aristotle, to whom this view is often mistakenly attributed, points out that the courageous person ought to feel some fear when facing danger. Of course she shouldn’t be paralysed with fear; she should recognise that the requirements of courage are more important than bodily security. But she would fail to be giving bodily security its due as a genuinely important value if she faced danger without a qualm. But fear inherently involves a desire to avoid facing whatever it is one fears; so what Aristotle shows us is that the courageous person will quite properly have a desire to do something (run away) that she nevertheless should not do. "Here's another example; I owe this one to Karen Stohr. Suppose that you are a fully virtuous person and the task falls to you of breaking some bad news to a friend. Now clearly you can’t perform that duty cheerfully; any decent person dislikes bearing bad news. So even the virtuous person – nay, especially the virtuous person – will desire not to perform this duty. Now it would obviously be a moral failing to give in to that desire, but it would also be a moral failing not to have it. Thus even within an individual there will be conflicts one ought to have, desires one should have but shouldn’t act on. But here too, this local conflict is licensed by a broader framework of unitary values."
That makes sense. Do most people who adhere to virtue ethics believe that there is an objective ideal perfect person in the sense that there is an objective ideal perfect circle? Or do they acknowledge that each individual will try to create their own ideal person?
Sage:I can't help it! He's already said everything I want to say.
Such a shame that you have nothing to add to the debate.
Don't worry, I'll be standing on his shoulders before you know it.
In which case you'd, uh, have to start worrying...
Eric:Do most people who adhere to virtue ethics believe that there is an objective ideal perfect person in the sense that there is an objective ideal perfect circle? Or do they acknowledge that each individual will try to create their own ideal person?
As I understand it, what counts as flourishing would be different for each person, because there are both universal and particular aspects, and because virtues are not standardized rules that apply to everyone regardless of their specific circumstances.
liberty student:Such a shame that you have nothing to add to the debate
Really? Remember your an admin. Stop trying to purposely incite people.
Roderick Long:Suppose that you are a fully virtuous person and the task falls to you of breaking some bad news to a friend. Now clearly you can’t perform that duty cheerfully; any decent person dislikes bearing bad news. So even the virtuous person – nay, especially the virtuous person – will desire not to perform this duty. Now it would obviously be a moral failing to give in to that desire, but it would also be a moral failing not to have it.
It's a moral failing not to have certain desires?
If desires are uncontrollable, that aspect of morality would then be out of one's control, would it not? Or is the point that desires can be cultivated or engineered? Seems dubious to me.
Why anarchy fails
AJ:If desires are uncontrollable, that aspect of morality would then be out of one's control, would it not? Or is the point that desires can be cultivated or engineered? Seems dubious to me.
Well which desire is beyond one's control? Desire springs from the mind itself. It is its origin. Being its creator, does that not then infer it can also be its destroyer?
Laughing Man:Stop trying to purposely incite people.
Sage took no offense to it, and that was the appropriate response.
Laughing Man:Well which desire is beyond one's control? Desire springs from the mind itself. It is its origin. Being its creator, does that not then infer it can also be its destroyer?
So, I guess, people aren't born gay then.
Angurse:So, I guess, people aren't born gay then.
No. Homosexuality is just a sexual preference just like any other. We can no more be born gay then we can be born with a 'leather fetish' gene, or a 'masochist' gene.
Laughing Man:No. Homosexuality is just a sexual preference just like any other. We can no more be born gay then we can be born with a 'leather fetish' gene, or a 'masochist' gene.
I'm a sucker for watching someone drown.
Laughing Man: No. Homosexuality is just a sexual preference just like any other. We can no more be born gay then we can be born with a 'leather fetish' gene, or a 'masochist' gene.
If depends how you define the word "homosexuality". If, according to the definition that you use, that one is a "homosexual" simply implies that one performs certain actions, to be "homosexual" is indeed merely a preference "just like any other". But, if, according to the definition that you use, that one is a "homosexual" implies that one possesses a certain psychological state of mind which one may or may not reflect in his action, to be "homosexual" is not merely a preference "just like any other". For, if you change your response from "[w]e can no more be born gay then we can be born with a 'leather fetish' gene, or a 'masochist' gene" to "[w]e can no more be born gay then we can be born with a set of taste buds which respond to sugar more readily than the average set of taste buds", your response becomes absurd.
I. Ryan:If depends how you define the word "homosexuality".
I define it as having sexual satisfaction with the same sex. That is it. There is no differing in the state of mind of homosexuals, that would lead to a belief in polylogism.
I guess those fanatical Christians are right. "Just destroy that gay preference already and Heaven everlasting can be yours."
Angurse:I guess those fanatical Christians are right. "Just destroy that gay preference already and Heaven everlasting can be yours."
Well you can't really destroy preference, and why would you want to try?
Laughing Man:Well you can't really destroy preference
Well which desire preference is beyond one's control? Desire Preference springs from the mind itself. It is its origin. Being its creator, does that not then infer it can also be its destroyer?
Angurse:Well which desire preference is beyond one's control? Desire Preference springs from the mind itself. It is its origin. Being its creator, does that not then infer it can also be its destroyer?
We are talking about Christians trying to destroy homosexual preference. Meaning Christians trying to destroy homosexual preference in the minds of others. I don't think that is possible. If homosexuals wanted to end their preferences. I think it is possible. I've had a friend who was once a lesbian and yet is now going to get married to a guy.
Laughing Man:We are talking about Christians trying to destroy homosexual preference. Meaning Christians trying to destroy homosexual preference in the minds of others.
No. We definitely are not.
Angurse: Laughing Man:Well which desire is beyond one's control? Desire springs from the mind itself. It is its origin. Being its creator, does that not then infer it can also be its destroyer? So, I guess, people aren't born gay then.
What does it mean to be "born gay," anyway?
To paraphrase Marc Faber: We're all doomed, but that doesn't mean that we can't make money in the process. Rabbi Lapin: "Let's make bricks!" Stephan Kinsella: "Say you and I both want to make a German chocolate cake."
Angurse: Laughing Man:We are talking about Christians trying to destroy homosexual preference. Meaning Christians trying to destroy homosexual preference in the minds of others. No. We definitely are not.
What?
You say that, then you say we're not talking about Christians and homosexuals?
Laughing Man:If homosexuals wanted to end their preferences.
This presumes gender identity is a preference.
Daniel:What does it mean to be "born gay," anyway?
I guess something similar to being "born straight." Most of the gay people I've know basically said they "just are" whether that means its caused by genetics, culture, environment, ..., or temperature of their mother's uterus, or a mix I don't know. But it doesn't matter, the point is they cannot just stop.
Angurse: Daniel:What does it mean to be "born gay," anyway? I guess something similar to being "born straight." Most of the gay people I've know basically said they "just are" whether that means its caused by genetics, culture, environment, ..., or temperature of their mother's uterus, or a mix I don't know. But it doesn't matter, the point is they cannot just stop.
What does it mean to be "born straight"?