I'm wondering if deontology is rephrased consequentialism essentially. If you have certain things that are your duty to perform regardless of the consequences, you must at some point have differentiated what is "duty." Without looking at consequences how do you differentiate what is duty from what is not duty, before the official standard of duty exists?
Because God said so.
twistedbydsign99: I'm wondering if deontology is rephrased consequentialism essentially. If you have certain things that are your duty to perform regardless of the consequences, you must at some point have differentiated what is "duty." Without looking at consequences how do you differentiate what is duty from what is not duty, before the official standard of duty exists?
Twisted:
In other words, at some point, wasn't there a reason given or arrived at in terms of consequences, why one performs one's duty?
I.e., either: If you do not do your duty, then X negative consequence will occur. Or, if you do your duty, X positive consequence will occur?
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
This point has been made before, but is a valid (and effective) criticism of secular deontology.
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
zefreak:This point has been made before, but is a valid (and effective) criticism of secular deontology.
Well I guess the god issue could muddy up the water. Effectively I guess deontology must be an appeal to authority otherwise it is just consequentialism.
Adam Knott: Twisted: In other words, at some point, wasn't there a reason given or arrived at in terms of consequences, why one performs one's duty? I.e., either: If you do not do your duty, then X negative consequence will occur. Or, if you do your duty, X positive consequence will occur?
Yea, exactly.
The only system-builder I know among living philosophers to attempt to deal with this question is Butchvarov. He says his goal is to provide ethics for atheists. I can't do justice to his ideas, but you might consider looking at his books.
I'm wondering if deontology is rephrased consequentialism essentially.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
OK perhaps I am missing something but really the point is that you are not looking at consequence, ultimately. Let me tweak the scenario slightly. Lets say that I can kill one innocent man to prevent the fire bombing of one million. Lets also suppose I am a deontologist so I will follow my "duty" and NOT commit this murder. One million perish. The "consequence" of my (in)action is greater because I have acted out of duty (and not out of consequences). Obviously the consequentialist will murder the one innocent man to save the one million. Now, if my sense of duty is derived from consequences , then how can the difference in outcomes in this scenario between the deontologist and consequentialist be reconciled?
KW:Now, if my sense of duty is derived from consequences
You don't kill people on principle, no matter what. Not even if you are being threatened by nuclear annihilation. If everyone dies because you didn't kill bobby, you didn't do anything wrong by deontologic standards. For one reason or another, you can't be held accountable for the consequences of your actions and/or the consequences don't matter at all/as much as the action in and of itself. Its kind of hard to talk about deontology without a specific deontologic moral theory (like the categorical imperative), since the justifications for the CI are very specific and esoteric, hence all the slashes above. Yeah I would venture to say that no one is a deontologist anymore.
Snowflake: KW:Now, if my sense of duty is derived from consequences Its not. Its derived from actions in and of themselves. Not many people are strict deontologists. You don't kill people on principle, no matter what. Not even if you are being threatened by nuclear annihilation. If everyone dies because you didn't kill bobby, you didn't do anything wrong by deontologic standards. For one reason or another, you can't be held accountable for the consequences of your actions and/or the consequences don't matter at all/as much as the action in and of itself. Its kind of hard to talk about deontology without a specific deontologic moral theory (like the categorical imperative), since the justifications for the CI are very specific and esoteric, hence all the slashes above. Yeah I would venture to say that no one is a deontologist anymore.
The point being that deontology requires an external obligation or duty. This is essentially an appeal to authority (God, Nature, whatever) hence why secular deontologists are committing an intellectual error. A moral fictionalist who follows the NAP is still a consequentialist because he is choosing the moral framework (NAP) based on whatever criteria suits him, but not as an obligation external to him. Strict Rule Utilitarianism can be seen as deontological moral fictionalism.
zefreak:This is essentially an appeal to authority (God, Nature, whatever) hence why secular deontologists are committing an intellectual error
Snowflake: zefreak:This is essentially an appeal to authority (God, Nature, whatever) hence why secular deontologists are committing an intellectual error Categorical Imperative. Unless you count pure rationalism as "nature".
The Categorical Imperative is begging the question. Yes, if there is an action that is always and everywhere necessary (for what end? Why?) that is an end in and of itself then it can be construed as a duty. Of course, Kant was never able (in my mind) to formulate a single cogent example. He developed a system of meta-ethics (his Categorical Imperative) that has no relation to the secular world-view.
One question:
What is an end in itself? Why? If justified by a further value, it is no longer an end in and of itself. If it isn't justified by a further value, then what? If nothing, it is an unjustified premise and nothing more; if circular, it loses its validity.
Juan:the king of the skeptics is still preaching ?
The king of quack philosophy still trolling?
Can you define "duty" ?
Thanks.
zefreak:The Categorical Imperative is begging the question.
zefreak:Yes, if there is an action that is always and everywhere necessary (for what end? Why?) that is an end in and of itself then it can be construed as a duty. Of course, Kant was never able (in my mind) to formulate a single cogent example.
zefreak:He developed a system of meta-ethics (his Categorical Imperative) that has no relation to the secular world-view.
Its not that I'm a kantian, or a deontologist, I just think the NAP is a very strongly deontological.
Snowflake: Wiki "According to his reasoning, we first have a perfect duty not to act by maxims that [result] in logical contradictions when we attempt to universalize them. The moral proposition A: "It is permissible to steal" would result in [conseqeunce B]: a contradiction in conceivability. The notion of stealing presupposes the existence of property, but were A universalized, then there could be no property, and so the proposition has logically negated itself."
Wiki "According to his reasoning, we first have a perfect duty not to act by maxims that [result] in logical contradictions when we attempt to universalize them. The moral proposition A: "It is permissible to steal" would result in [conseqeunce B]: a contradiction in conceivability. The notion of stealing presupposes the existence of property, but were A universalized, then there could be no property, and so the proposition has logically negated itself."
To avoid contradictions (negative consequence X), do not act by such and such maxim (do not engage in action Y).
In order to achieve a logical contradiction (desired consequence X), act by such and such maxim (engage in action Y).
OP:
"Without looking at consequences how do you differentiate what is duty from what is not duty, before the official standard of duty exists?"
(also, propositions do not act. Thus, they cannot negate themselves)
Snowflake: zefreak:The Categorical Imperative is begging the question. What question?
The Categorical Imperative postulates that universality is a moral obligation, that specific characteristics do not enter into the equation. One, this is an unwarranted assertion. It is a normative claim regarding rationality that, although commonly, perhaps universally accepted, is still logically unjustified.
Secondly, any statement or proposition can be framed to meet the criteria of universality.
IE "All Caucasian males above the age of 20 with the username zefreak including a certain genetic makeup and combination of bodily features can own property"
It is arbitrary in the same way, albeit to a greater degree, as the "first use principle" that Kinsella proposes. Why isn't the "second" user or "third" user the legitimate owner of property? Because of practical difficulties. Social institutions from law to morals are subject to evolutionary processes just like everything else.
Snowflake: zefreak:Yes, if there is an action that is always and everywhere necessary (for what end? Why?) that is an end in and of itself then it can be construed as a duty. Of course, Kant was never able (in my mind) to formulate a single cogent example. Wiki "According to his reasoning, we first have a perfect duty not to act by maxims that result in logical contradictions when we attempt to universalize them. The moral proposition A: "It is permissible to steal" would result in a contradiction in conceivability. The notion of stealing presupposes the existence of property, but were A universalized, then there could be no property, and so the proposition has logically negated itself."
This is not a good example of a Categorical Imperative (although it is persuasive to those that don't know better). It is a logical contradiction, but does not actually clarify anything.
If stealing is defined as the immoral (illegitimate) use or possession of an object, then of course it is a contradiction to say that stealing is moral.
Of course, this does not exclude me from taking your car and claiming that it is not stealing or theft because it has not been shown that my possession is immoral, nor that your possession signified exclusive use.
In other words, he is framing the issue in language that results in a logical contradiction based on definitions alone, but this does not actually restrict any action. There is no logical contradiction in the proposition "It is permissible to possess and use material that was or is currently possessed or used by another".
Snowflake: zefreak:He developed a system of meta-ethics (his Categorical Imperative) that has no relation to the secular world-view. Why not? Its not that I'm a kantian, or a deontologist, I just think the NAP is a very strongly deontological.
I hope I have given you an idea of why I find the Categorical Imperative to be problematic. I have not run into an example of a Categorical Imperative that can actually hold its own under critical scrutiny. It may be a logically consistent theory, but without the existence of "ends within themselves" it has no relevance.
Adam Knott: Snowflake: Wiki "According to his reasoning, we first have a perfect duty not to act by maxims that result in logical contradictions when we attempt to universalize them. The moral proposition A: "It is permissible to steal" would result in a contradiction in conceivability. The notion of stealing presupposes the existence of property, but were A universalized, then there could be no property, and so the proposition has logically negated itself." To avoid contradictions (negative consequence X), do not act by such and such maxim (do not engage in action Y). In order to achieve a logical contradiction (desired state X), act by such and such maxim (engage in action Y).
Snowflake: Wiki "According to his reasoning, we first have a perfect duty not to act by maxims that result in logical contradictions when we attempt to universalize them. The moral proposition A: "It is permissible to steal" would result in a contradiction in conceivability. The notion of stealing presupposes the existence of property, but were A universalized, then there could be no property, and so the proposition has logically negated itself."
Wiki "According to his reasoning, we first have a perfect duty not to act by maxims that result in logical contradictions when we attempt to universalize them. The moral proposition A: "It is permissible to steal" would result in a contradiction in conceivability. The notion of stealing presupposes the existence of property, but were A universalized, then there could be no property, and so the proposition has logically negated itself."
In order to achieve a logical contradiction (desired state X), act by such and such maxim (engage in action Y).
Right, justificationism is normative philosophy in itself. People may like to be logical but it has certainly not been shown to be a moral obligation.
zefreak:The Categorical Imperative postulates that universality is a moral obligation, that specific characteristics do not enter into the equation. One, this is an unwarranted assertion. It is a normative claim regarding rationality that, although commonly, perhaps universally accepted, is still logically unjustified.
zefreak:I hope I have given you an idea of why I find the Categorical Imperative to be problematic. I have not run into an example of a Categorical Imperative that can actually hold its own under critical scrutiny. It may be a logically consistent theory, but without the existence of "ends within themselves" it has no relevance.
Snowflake: zefreak:The Categorical Imperative postulates that universality is a moral obligation, that specific characteristics do not enter into the equation. One, this is an unwarranted assertion. It is a normative claim regarding rationality that, although commonly, perhaps universally accepted, is still logically unjustified. Well yes I agree that there is nothing special about rationalism that it might have the power to bestow objective moral goodness on whoever uses it, but Kant was saying that if something is right in one circumstance it had to be right in other circumstances otherwise it wouldn't be objectively ethical.
Any action can be made to be universal by being really, really specific. Universability cannot be used to critique any action or position, even if one agrees with the principle. All it means is that any particular action, in a particular place and moment and circumstance, if moral, will always be moral. You cannot logically extrapolate that such action is or must be moral in other places, moments or circumstances.
Snowflake: zefreak:I hope I have given you an idea of why I find the Categorical Imperative to be problematic. I have not run into an example of a Categorical Imperative that can actually hold its own under critical scrutiny. It may be a logically consistent theory, but without the existence of "ends within themselves" it has no relevance. No relevance to utilitarians anyway...
No relevance to the secular world-view, which I consider largely synonymous with Occam's Razor and skepticism.
zefreak: Right, justificationism is normative philosophy in itself. People may like to be logical but it has certainly not been shown to be a moral obligation.
Justificationism. I haven't heard that before. Is that your term Zefreak?
I would probably hold that justificationism (if we're talking about the same thing), ultimately collapses into utilitarianism (consequentialism, instrumentalism, etc...)
One could argue that this approach is based on an initial separation of the thought realm from the physical realm. The idea of contradiction then perhaps being conceived as something happening in the thought realm, and thus, not a "consequence" in the physical sense. (i.e., the idea that "consequences" are things that happen out there in the physical realm) Thus, when justificationism speaks about someone contradicting themselves, by this view, this isn't consequentialism, because "consequences" are physical things (external things) whereas contradictions are mental things....
But consequentialism is introduced when we provide instructions on how to avoid a contradiction, regardless of whether a contradiction is conceived to be physical, mental, or something else. The "justification" ethics theories I am familiar with are theories on how to avoid contradictions. They are utilitarian or instrumental constructs that instruct libertarians on how to avoid contradicting themselves, with the obvious but usually implicit notion that contradictions are negative consequences.
Adam Knott: zefreak: Right, justificationism is normative philosophy in itself. People may like to be logical but it has certainly not been shown to be a moral obligation. Justificationism. I haven't heard that before. Is that your term Zefreak? I would probably hold that justificationism (if we're talking about the same thing), ultimately collapses into utilitarianism (consequentialism, instrumentalism, etc...) One could argue that this approach is based on an initial separation of the thought realm from the physical realm. The idea of contradiction then perhaps being conceived as something happening in the thought realm, and thus, not a "consequence" in the physical sense. (i.e., the idea that "consequences" are things that happen out there in the physical realm) Thus, when justificationism speaks about someone contradicting themselves, by this view, this isn't consequentialism, because "consequences" are physical things (external things) whereas contradictions are mental things.... But consequentialism is introduced when we provide instructions on how to avoid a contradiction, regardless of whether a contradiction is conceived to be physical, mental, or something else. The "justification" ethics theories I am familiar with are theories on how to avoid contradictions. They are utilitarian or instrumental constructs that instruct libertarians on how to avoid contradicting themselves, with the obvious but usually implicit notion that contradictions are negative consequences.
It is not my term, although it has probably fallen out of use, and should not be confused with the justificationism of logical positivism which is a theory of justification. I used it loosely to describe an individual who is interested or involved in the normative side of epistemology, or Theory of Justification.
I would agree with you that justificationism ultimately collapses into consequentialism, as do all normative propositions.
zefreak:Any action can be made to be universal by being really, really specific.
zefreak: All it means is that any particular action, in a particular place and moment and circumstance, if moral, will always be moral. You cannot logically extrapolate that such action is or must be moral in other places, moments or circumstances.
zefreak:No relevance to the secular world-view, which I consider largely synonymous with Occam's Razor and skepticism.
Conza88: Can you define "duty" ? Thanks.
A duty is an obligation to perform or not perform an act regardless of consequence. Sorry it took awhile to respond, busy at work.
Snowflake:Well yes I agree that there is nothing special about rationalism that it might have the power to bestow objective moral goodness on whoever uses it, but Kant was saying that if something is right in one circumstance it had to be right in other circumstances otherwise it wouldn't be objectively ethical.
I think this might be the answer to the question. Deontology is concerned with consequence, it is not concerned with circumstance. I'll have to think about this.
twistedbydsign99:I think this might be the answer to the question. Deontology is concerned with consequence, it is not concerned with circumstance. I'll have to think about this.
Example: Telling a lie is a maxim. An example "action" of this is saying that the sky is blue. The consequences don't matter. The circumstance doesn't matter.
twistedbydsign99: Deontology is concerned with consequence, it is not concerned with circumstance. I'll have to think about this.
Deontology is concerned with consequence, it is not concerned with circumstance. I'll have to think about this.
It is concerned with neither. That's why "Because god said so" is the best response to your post. It would mean that lying is bad in all circumstances and contexts, no exceptions, ever. Lying would always be bad no matter the consequence.
it seems "because god said so" also can confuse the issue as it had to be pointed out in this thread that it can be rationalized without appeal to a god. it seems to bring that quote back up devolves the thread (not the idea, the idea can be an evolvement, but the thread), instead of the evolving conversation/thread. i wouldn't count out what has been said in each post
Snowflake: zefreak:Any action can be made to be universal by being really, really specific. Well its not actions actually... An action is something that you do, like driving a car or blowing your nose. Kant said to act with universal *maxim*, which is not an action in and of itself but rather a category of actions. So telling the truth is a maxim that encompasses many actions such as "the sky is blue" and "I cheated on my test".You don't universalize actions, that would be stupid. Its maxims, the general underlying principles you base your ethics on. zefreak: All it means is that any particular action, in a particular place and moment and circumstance, if moral, will always be moral. You cannot logically extrapolate that such action is or must be moral in other places, moments or circumstances. Why not? Isn't this what objective ethics means? zefreak:No relevance to the secular world-view, which I consider largely synonymous with Occam's Razor and skepticism. Well the categorical imperative is pretty simple and based on rationalism, which would seem to meet the standards set forth by Occam's Razor. Unless your skeptical about rationality then idk how you can have any problems with it.I personally attack the CI on its assumptions about rationalism, and its use thereof. The definitions Kant uses to get from rationality to ethics are not tautologic and therefore arational.
What differentiates an action from a maxim? Cannot any action be categorized as a maxim? If "telling the truth" is a maxim, why can't "beating up the skinny kid on the playground" or "kidnapping people with red hair"? These can be construed as classes of action, as the former can be considered to encapsulate all actions regarding physical abuse of skinny kids on playgrounds.
I do not think the differentiation of "action" from "maxim" is very useful.
As for your response to my second part (i'm too tired to go through the work of quoting properly), I'll give you an example. (BTW I love reason, in fact it is Hume's critique of Kant's ethics using reason that inspires me)
I shoot someone with red hair. (I do not have red hair). A naive Kantian might posit that "if you can shoot someone, then I can shoot you!"
However, that only holds if the 'universality' is very general, which it does not have to be. I could respond that "It would be wrong for you to shoot me, because red hair is a relevant particular of my universal principle. The action of my shooting the redhead is encapsulated by the maxim that it is ok to shoot redheads and passes the test of universability. It does not logically follow that the above maxim also justifies the shooting of me, as I do not have red hair"
The Categorical Imperative may be rational in the sense that its maxims are derived using reason (I still have not heard some such maxim that is 'necessarily' universal), but the whole structure of the Categorical Imperative is non-rational in nature. The universality principle is a foundational principle, and necessarily unjustified, just as libertarian ethics is largely derived, using reason, from the NAP and self ownership axioms. Rothbardian ethics is rational given the stated axioms, but the axioms themselves are unjustified (the status of said axioms being self-evident is another topic).
zefreak:I do not think the differentiation of "action" from "maxim" is very useful.
why? You didn't provide any knowledge on it's un-usefulness. You simply explained how somebody could be confused as to what the terms mean.
wilderness: zefreak:I do not think the differentiation of "action" from "maxim" is very useful. why? You didn't provide any knowledge on it's un-usefulness. You simply explained how somebody could be confused as to what the terms mean.
If a maxim can be of any specificity, then it is a worthless concept, indistinguishable from simply talking about action. Any specific action (me killing Colonel Mustard in the library with the candlestick) can be reasonably considered a class of action (all actions consisting of those attributes) and therefore a maxim. The concept gets us nowhere. If all (non-contradictory, see the "theft is morally ok" argument where the statement is logically contradictory) maxims are universal, then there is no progression towards an objective morality.
zefreak:What differentiates an action from a maxim? Cannot any action be categorized as a maxim? If "telling the truth" is a maxim, why can't "beating up the skinny kid on the playground" or "kidnapping people with red hair"?
zefreak:I shoot someone with red hair. (I do not have red hair). A naive Kantian might posit that "if you can shoot someone, then I can shoot you!"
zefreak:The universality principle is a foundational principle, and necessarily unjustified
zefreak: just as libertarian ethics is largely derived, using reason, from the NAP and self ownership axioms. Rothbardian ethics is rational given the stated axioms, but the axioms themselves are unjustified (the status of said axioms being self-evident is another topic).
There's the category and then there is the action. Where the term/proposition fits into (what category) and then there's the application. There's the argument and then there's the act without dialogue.
edit: I haven't really studied category imperatives, but it seemed easy enough to understand what Snowflake said.
Is theft universally ok? We take from each other? When do I get to keep anything as everything is taken and I thereby possess nothing. So how can anybody steal from me when I never possess anything as it is ok to steal and not ok to have property? Universally speaking.
hope I didn't mess up in my interpretation Snowflake.
Snowflake:If you put them into their maxim categories it would be violence in both cases.
Category requires a categorizor right? What is his method for categorizing actions if it is not some form of the consequence of performing those actions. If a category is random actions, then it can't really be what is normally called a category. At least not a useful category in any way. Even the bible is not purely categorical, if it was it wouldn't mention heaven and hell the consequences of disobedience and obedience to those rules.
zefreak:The king of quack philosophy still trolling?
Juan:By the way what happened to your completely deranged 'opinion' that everything is ultimately based of faith ? There was a trilemma, a quintilemma or something ?
Hah, we discussed it and then moved on. Do you want a link?
edit: Snowflake, I think you are missing my point, or we are using different definitions of objective ethics. I will respond to your post more thoroughly, but i'm going to play a game first. Priorities, you know :)