Juan:Sonny, you already showed that your philosophical skills boil down to pasting a link to a wikipedia's article....
Or maybe I post those links for your benefit, as discussions in this area typically require a basic understanding of background material that you clearly lack.
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
twistedbydsign99:A duty is an obligation to perform or not perform an act regardless of consequence. Sorry it took awhile to respond, busy at work.
Can you define obligation?
And consequence?
Thanks. Just want to make this clear.
Juan: zefreak:The king of quack philosophy still trolling? No zefreak, you and your amoralist/positivist rubbish are the only one trolling here.
zefreak:The king of quack philosophy still trolling?
Is anyone else tired of people trolling the term trolling? Nope? Carry on, I guess.
"Look at me, I'm quoting another user to show how wrong I think they are, out of arrogance of my own position. Wait, this is my own quote, oh shi-" ~ Nitroadict
Conza88: Can you define obligation? And consequence?
Obligation is similar to a responsibility, to not perform your responsibilities is bad, similarly what you are obligated to do.
Consequence is the result/effect of an action
Wikipedia:According to [Kant's] reasoning, we first have a perfect duty not to act by maxims that result in logical contradictions when we attempt to universalize them. The moral proposition A: "It is permissible to steal" would result in a contradiction in conceivability. The notion of stealing presupposes the existence of property, but were A universalized, then there could be no property, and so the proposition has logically negated itself.
This isn't an effective example of a contradiction in conceivability, because "It is permissible to steal" implies "It is permissible to deprive someone of their property." But property is generally held to mean "objects that it would not be permissible to deprive someone of." Therefore:
"It is permissible to steal"
reduces to
"It is permissible to deprive someone of objects that are not permissible to deprive someone of."
It's clearly an internally contradictory statement all by itself, without even looking at conceivability (which it of course also fails, as all internally contradictory statements must). For Kant's purposes, we would need a moral proposition that is not internally contractory but does result in a contradiction in conceivability.
Why anarchy fails
so a thief performs a contradiction. so what?
wilderness: so a thief performs a contradiction. so what?
This is a question for Hoppe and Van Dunn
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
Are you, like AJ, not going to be ever to give knowledge? Are you going to leave it up to other people always?
A contradiction can never be performed. What the thief does is not immoral OR any immorality is based on faulty premises.
Eioul: What the thief does is not immoral OR any immorality is based on faulty premises.
What the thief does is not immoral OR any immorality is based on faulty premises.
thank you. it is only a assumption with various possibilites as to why when not based on a principle.
wilderness: Are you, like AJ, not going to be ever to give knowledge? Are you going to leave it up to other people always?
Sorry. I thought the point I was making would be understood.
OK:
The argumentation ethics puts forth "contradiction" or "performative contradiction" as the penalty one must suffer if they advance a nonlibertarian ethic during the course of argumentation. That is, the argumentation ethics says: If you argue for a nonlibertarian ethic, then you will contradict yourself. In other words, the inescapable consequence of arguing for a nonlibertarian ethic is contradiction or performative contradiction. Essentially this is consequentialism. And I would argue it is also utilitarianism and instrumentalism. One who adheres to the argumenation ethics is provided with information that one of the ways to avoid a contradiction is to avoid arguing for a nonlibertarian ethic. On the other hand, if one believes the argumentation ethic, and if one wanted to achieve a contradiction, one can argue for a nonlibertarian ethic, and one knows with certainty one will be performing a contradiction, because in the argumentation ethics, the inescapable consequence (the necessary accompaniment) of arguing for a nonlibertarian ethic is contradiction.
The argumentation ethics essentially links two phenomena: 1) arguing for a nonlibertarian ethic, and 2) contradiction. It says that if you do #1,then #2 will certainly also be present. Thus, the argumentation ethics, in a sense, puts forth a "law" of action, since it claims to link two phenomena of action (of consciousness) with absolute certainty.
But you made an important point. You wrote in essence: So what if someone contradicts themselves?
The implication is this: if we grant for the sake of argument that the argumentation ethics is valid (something far from self-evident), the argumentation ethics only has the intended effect to the extent one is trying to avoid a contradiction.
When you asked "so what?", what this says in effect is: why or how is a "contradiction" painful or unpleasant, such that a thief (or a nonlibertarian) would want to try to avoid it?
If it can be shown that contradictions are harmful to the people who hold or maintain them, then perhaps people will try to avoid contradictions. In Hoppe's theory, this would mean they tried to avoid arguing for nonlibertarian ethics, since Hoppe and Van Dunn believe they have demonstrated that doing so is contradictory. In other words, arguing for a nonlibertarian ethics and contradicting oneself are two aspects of the same thing. If you try to avoid contradicting yourself, you will, by virtue of this, try to avoid arguing for a nonlibertarian ethic (if you accept the teachings of the argumentation ethics).
What would aid the argumentation ethics (granting that the overall theory is valid), is a demonstration or explanation of how contradictions are harmful to those maintaining them.
You wrote: So a thief performs a contradiction. so what?
That is: so what? Why should a thief or anyone try to avoid contradicting themselves?
The argumentation ethics doesn't say exactly, as far as I'm aware. I think this is an excellent question to ask Hoppe and Van Dunn.
You asked the same question that Walt Whitman asked, as it was quoted to me by a well-known professor:
"Do I contradict myself? Very well, I contradict myself. I am large, I contain multitudes."
Adam Knott: When you asked "so what?", what this says in effect is: why or how is a "contradiction" painful or unpleasant, such that a thief (or a nonlibertarian) would want to try to avoid it?
No. so what meant they commit an unjust act and I will not find anything worthwhile that will better justice by learning about injustice only.
Adam Knott: What would aid the argumentation ethics (granting that the overall theory is valid), is a demonstration or explanation of how contradictions are harmful to those maintaining them.
You can't talk to somebody that doesn't want dialogue.
Adam Knott: You wrote: So a thief performs a contradiction. so what? That is: so what? Why should a thief or anyone try to avoid contradicting themselves?
If they are already a thief, then how can they learn and undo what they have already done? Don't answer "time-machine".
wilderness:If they are already a thief, then how can they learn and undo what they have already done?
Recognize his contradictory moral theory. You can't undo the past.
twistedbydsign99: Obligation is similar to a responsibility, to not perform your responsibilities is bad, similarly what you are obligated to do. Consequence is the result/effect of an action
Thanks for that. I'm not too sure I understand the question posed though. I inserted the definitions below to try make it clearer, but I guess I'm missing something.
twistedbydsign99: I'm wondering if deontology is rephrased consequentialism essentially. If you have certain things that are your duty to perform regardless of the consequences, you must at some point have differentiated what is "duty." Without looking at consequences how do you differentiate what is duty from what is not duty, before the official standard of duty exists?
I'm wondering if deontology is rephrased consequentialism essentially. If you have certain things that are your duty to perform regardless of the consequences, you must at some point have differentiated what is "duty." Without looking at consequences how do you differentiate what is duty from what is not duty, before the official standard of duty exists?
"I'm wondering if deontology is rephrased consequentialism essentially. If you have certain things that are your obligation to perform or not perform an act regardless of the result/effect of an action, you must at some point have differentiated what is "an obligation to perform or not perform an act regardless of result/effect of an action."
Without looking at result/effect of an action how do you differentiate what is an obligation to perform or not perform an act from what is not an obligation to perform or not perform an act, before the official standard of an obligation to perform or not perform an act exists?"
"If you have certain things that are your obligation to perform or not perform an act regardless of the result/effect of an action" - When would that be exactly? You mean contracts etc?
"Without looking at result/effect of an action how do you differentiate what is an obligation to perform or not perform an act from what is not" - Property rights, philosophy of self ownership I'd imagine.
"before the official standard of an obligation to perform or not perform an act exists?" - I'm not sure what this means.
Conza88: "If you have certain things that are your obligation to perform or not perform an act regardless of the result/effect of an action" - When would that be exactly? You mean contracts etc? "Without looking at result/effect of an action how do you differentiate what is an obligation to perform or not perform an act from what is not" - Property rights, philosophy of self ownership I'd imagine. "before the official standard of an obligation to perform or not perform an act exists?" - I'm not sure what this means.
I read the definitions substituted text and found it too long winded to follow haha, so I think I will try to re-clarify with the example above. So if it is ones duty to never kill, then as has been noted self defense and the saving of many by killing one can never occur. Because the act of not killing is accepted regardless of the consequences of dying or losing everyone on earth but one person. So the question I was posing was how does one determine the duty of "never kill" without examining the consequences of actions. If you have to look at the consequences of an action to determine duty, then deontology is just a redefinition of consequentialism.
twistedbydsign99:So the question I was posing was how does one determine the duty of "never kill" without examining the consequences of actions.
Establish the correct epistemology, question the premises of the statement, use logic and base it on first principles.
Well "duty" - I take it as; "An act or a course of action that is required of one by position, social custom, law, or religion"
That law would be natural law.
You seem to be bent on consequences, so I will recommend this.
Radical Privatization and other Libertarian Conundrums by Walter Block
You would come with what is duty by an attempt at logic. But if you use logic, you'd quickly realize that deontology is pretty pointless and at best, arbitrary. If you discovered what your duty was, you'd simply have to do it. It doesn't matter why you made the decision or what will happen. It just matters that it's your duty.
Conza88:stablish the correct epistemology
That is my question essentially, how could you come to know what duty is without looking at consequences.
Conza88:That law would be natural law.
Does natural law differentiate actions by their consequences?
Conza88:You seem to be bent on consequences, so I will recommend this.
Yes because all my arguments seem to be consequentialism. So I am seeking other thought systems.
Eioul:You would come with what is duty by an attempt at logic. But if you use logic, you'd quickly realize that deontology is pretty pointless and at best, arbitrary.
I doubt any deontologist would agree that their duties are arbitrary.
Eioul: You would come with what is duty by an attempt at logic. But if you use logic, you'd quickly realize that deontology is pretty pointless and at best, arbitrary. If you discovered what your duty was, you'd simply have to do it. It doesn't matter why you made the decision or what will happen. It just matters that it's your duty.
What does "duty" have to do with deonotological libertarianism?
"But if you use logic, you'd quickly realize that deontology is pretty pointless and at best, arbitrary"
How so?
Conza88: What does "duty" have to do with deonotological libertarianism? "But if you use logic, you'd quickly realize that deontology is pretty pointless and at best, arbitrary" How so?
I can't answer for him, but i think duty is related if you were to say you should obey NAP regardless of the outcome, which is the same as it is your duty to obey NAP? That is my interpretation.
twistedbydsign99:That is my question essentially, how could you come to know what duty is without looking at consequences.
Again, I'm not sure how "duty" has anything to do with deontological libertarianism, only rights. That is where you should look to get your answer.
twistedbydsign99:Does natural law differentiate actions by their consequences?
Natural law doesn't do anything, only individuals do. Could you rephrase?
twistedbydsign99: Conza88:You seem to be bent on consequences, so I will recommend this. Yes because all my arguments seem to be consequentialism. So I am seeking other thought systems.
So did you read the Walter Block article? Radical Privatization and other Libertarian Conundrums
Or do you want me to quote the part I think is relevant to your issue.
twistedbydsign99:I can't answer for him, but i think duty is related if you were to say you should obey NAP regardless of the outcome, which is the same as it is your duty to obey NAP? That is my interpretation.
As a political ethic, if you violate the NAP you can justifiably be punished to the extent you violated another's rights and then some (proportionality).
A person can consider the consequences, or they can completely ignore the results of their actions.. it doesn't change the fact they violated natural rights, and can be subject to punishment.
From the link I don't think you've read;
On the other hand, given that libertarianism, strictly and narrowly construed, does not forbid killing the innocent, but only requires that such a person be duly punished, its claim to promote utility can still be maintained.
By the way... if you want to make sense of the context people; please read the actual article.
Conza88:On the other hand, given that libertarianism, strictly and narrowly construed, does not forbid killing the innocent, but only requires that such a person be duly punished, its claim to promote utility can still be maintained.
I disagree.
, given that libertarianism, strictly and narrowly construed, does not forbid taxing the innocent citizen, but only requires that such a tax collector be duly punished, its claim to promote utility can still be maintained.
so, being a tax collector is not bad/forbidden? really? does Block routinely call for the end of taxation?, or can he be heard calling out for the punishment of statesmen? of course... the two are not mutually exclusive..., only Block says that Libertarianism is not concerned with the former... but I'm pretty confident I heard him state the former, in a way that indicated he felt it was key to libertarianism.... that the government should not tax.... is that a personal opinion that is not strictly libertarian?
To put it another way.
The NAP, states that it is illegitimate to initiate aggression. i.e. it is forbidden to innitate. i.e. it does forbid killing innocents.
now, as a corollary, force is legitimate in self-defence/restitution; but this legitimacy is not based on further axioms, but just stems from the acts not being excluded by the NAP.since it is not initiating aggression
it is legitimate to 'punish'(i.e. fight off aggressors, take restitution by force against the criminals wishes); but that is not ALL that the NAP has to say on force.
it says that initiating force is illegitimate.
don't kill innocents even if others will punish you.
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Conza88: What does "duty" have to do with deonotological libertarianism?
Without any sort of rule or moral obligation, then it wouldn't be deontological. Maybe I shouldn't have used the word duty, but the idea is that if something is a moral rule, you simply must obey it. You are morally obligated to obey. If you justify what your duty is because there is a good consequence, or because it serves a particular purpose, then I don't think it would be considered deontological. I'm not exactly sure what you mean. I'm not claiming to know very much on the subject, so I don't have much more to say on this topic without research.
I'm not sure how there can ever be a moral rule or obligation. How could you ever say what is right or wrong if you don't take into account any ends? (I mean that in a rhetorical way).
nirgrahamUK:I disagree.
Ok. I'm just wondering though, did you read the 20 page outline / article before you did?
Because in essence, the objections he is responding to are fairly out there proposals.
Just some context for those who won't bother with the link, although I'm sure some will find it interesting and helpful against the 'end of world' scenarios often proposed against Libertarians.
11. The MartiansThis challenge is an attempt not to frontally attack libertarianism, but only to show it as totally and irredeemably incompatible with utilitarianism.
Here, the "Martians," an all powerful but evil group of beings, beam down a message to an entirely libertarian earth: "Kill innocent person Joe, or we will blow up your entire planet." But killing an innocent person is the paradigm case of illegitimate behavior under libertarianism. There is (usually) nothing more important to a person than his own life'*. If murder isn't incompatible with this philosophy, then nothing is. On the other hand, blowing up the entire earth does not appear to be too compatible with utilitarianism. "Justice thought the heavens fall," may make a good libertarian motto, but it is hard to square this with the maximization of human well being.There is a way out of this conundrum for the libertarian who wants to maintain ties with utilitarianism. Strictly speaking, one might argue, libertarianism is murder. This is because libertarianism in a theory of punishment, not proper behaviour. The libertarian qua libertarian, then, does should be punished." incompatible with say, "Don't murder." He only says, "If you murder, you Thus, when the Martians beam down their message, it is entirely possible that a utilitarian-libertarian, call him Pete, will kill Joe, and then, after a ticker parade in his honor organized by utilitarians (since he saved the earth and everyone on it from total destruction), will turn himself in for the punishment due to murderers. In this way we can both maintain libertarianism (the murderer is properly punished) and utilitarianism (the planet is saved).
nirgrahamUK:does Block routinely call for the end of taxation?
I'd propose he isn't "strictly and narrowly construing" libertarianism, nor caring about maintaining utility?
Eioul:Without any sort of rule or moral obligation, then it wouldn't be deontological.
The property owner sets the rules for their property. Rules stem from ownership, which depends on your theory of property rights (Lockean / Rothbardian / Hoppean) all stem from self ownership as far as I'm aware.
Eioul:Maybe I shouldn't have used the word duty, but the idea is that if something is a moral rule, you simply must obey it. You are morally obligated to obey.
Morals, like personal morality? That is subjective. Ethics in terms of a political ethics is not however, it deals with "questions as the proper role of violence, the sphere of rights, or the definitions of criminality and aggression."
For eg. you can propose a contract with someone, and promise to do something. But if there is no property transfer, then you have no obligation or duty to keep your promise. You can break it, and it may be considered immoral, but it's not unethical in the political sense. You have no duty or obligation to follow through with that "contract".
Eioul: If you justify what your duty is because there is a good consequence, or because it serves a particular purpose, then I don't think it would be considered deontological.
What duty?
Eioul:"But if you use logic, you'd quickly realize that deontology is pretty pointless and at best, arbitrary"
Conza88:How so?
Eioul:I'm not sure how there can ever be a moral rule or obligation. How could you ever say what is right or wrong if you don't take into account any ends? (I mean that in a rhetorical way).
I regard that as the wrong question to be asking.
The error here on the part of the "contextualist" libertarians is to confuse the question of the moral course of action for the person in such a tragic situation with the totally separate question of whether or not his seizing of lifeboat or plank space by force constitutes an invasion of someone else's property right. For we are not, in constructing a theory of liberty and property, i.e., a "political" ethic, concerned with all personal moral principles. We are not here with concerned whether it is moral or immoral for someone to lie, to be a good person, to develop his faculties, or be kind or mean to his neighbors. We are concerned, in this sort of discussion, solely with such "political ethical" questions as the proper role of violence, the sphere of rights, or the definitions of criminality and aggression. Whether or not it is moral or immoral for "Smith" — the fellow excluded by the owner from the plank or the lifeboat — to force someone else out of the lifeboat, or whether he should die heroically instead, is not our concern, and not the proper concern of a theory of political ethics.[5]