Mises and Rothbard both characterized super-abundant useful things as "general conditions". However, there is a distinction in other words they used related to this concept.
Mises seemed to follow Menger in characterizing super-abundant useful things (like air) as non-economic goods and scarce things as economic goods. Here is the relevant passage from Human Action:
It is customary to call the end the ultimate good and the means goods. In applying this terminology economists mainly used to think as technologists and not as praxeologists. They differentiated between free goods and economic goods. They called free goods those things which, being available in superfluous abundance, do not need to be economized. Such goods are, however, not the object of any action. They are general conditions of human welfare; they are parts of the natural environment in which man lives and acts. Only the economic goods are the substratum of action. They alone are dealt with in economics.
Rothbard on the other hand denied super-abundant useful things the appellation of "means" or "goods".
From this example of action, many implications can be deduced. In the first place, all means are scarce, i.e., limited with respect to the ends that they could possibly serve. If the means are in unlimited abundance, then they need not serve as the object of at tention of any human action. For example, air in most situations is in unlimited abundance. It is therefore not a means and is not employed as a means to the fulfillment of ends. It need not be al located, as time is, to the satisfaction of the more important ends, since it is sufficiently abundant for all human requirements. Air, then, though indispensable, is not a means, but a general condi tion of human action and human welfare.
I'm integrating this concept into the first issue of Human Action Comics, and I'm torn between the two terminologies. I can see why Rothbard made his revision. Mises seems to be inconsistent when he says that non-economic goods are not the object of action, but yet still calls them goods. As he wrote elsewhere in HA, "goods... are elements of human meaning and conduct". So if suber-abundant things are not objects of action, then they are not "elements of human meaning and conduct", and therefore not goods.
But then I think, "okay, while it's true that I don't economize air (that is, try to optimize its allocation) because it is not scarce. But I CAN choose to breathe it or to hold my breath. Is not such a choice an action? And is not the air that I breathe when I choose to stop holding my breath the object of that action?
Which terminology do others here think is best and why?
Lilburne:
I agree with you that Mises's passage is a little confusing.
But I believe his entire passage could be made more clear by just changing one word. Thus:
"It is customary to call the end the ultimate good and the means goods. In applying this terminology economists mainly used to think as technologists and not as praxeologists. They differentiated between free goods and economic goods. They called free goods those things which, being available in superfluous abundance, do not need to be economized. Such things are, however, not the object of any action. They are general conditions of human welfare; they are parts of the natural environment in which man lives and acts. Only the economic goods are the substratum of action. They alone are dealt with in economics."
Just changing this one word, substituting "things" for "goods", I believe gets us closer to Mises's meaning. Then I would interpret Mises to be saying that those things that are available in superfluous abundance, in general, are not the object of an individual's action, and thus not dealt with in economics. Only those specific increments or "pieces" of things that are the object of an individual's action are to be termed "goods" and are the subject matter of economics.
Mises is, as I read him, making, or trying to make, a distinction between, for example, water in general, air in general, diamonds in general, etc...., and those specific increments of water, air, or diamonds that are the object of an individual's action. And you can see how this would tie in to Menger's solution to the paradox of value. Mises is saying that the former class of things, the superabundant things "in general" are not the object of individual action, and thus are not to be conceived as economic goods. By contrast, increments of things which are the object of action (a cup of water, the air we purchase in a scuba diving tank, and the diamond we purchase in a jewelry store) are thus to be termed "goods" and dealt with by economics.
This is what I believe Mises is getting at.
When you write: "Mises seems to be inconsistent when he says that non-economic goods are not the object of action, but yet still calls them goods."
This may be technically correct. But if you read the passage you provided closely, you can see that Mises says "Such goods are,...." He is taking the terminology "as he finds it" from the economists who were thinking as technologists, and who were calling superabundant things "free goods."
He should have just written something such as "such things", and I believe your objection is fixed. Alternatively, he could have written: such "goods" are,.... and thus by quotations, shown that he didn't consider such things economic goods and the subject matter of economics.
On the other hand, I don't think Rothbard's mistakes are fixed as easily.
Rothbard is conceiving things more in terms of whether they are "objectively" in relative abundance or relative scarcity. He is tending to conceive things not in terms of whether an increment of some substance is the object of an individual's action, but rather whether some substance exists in relative objective abundance on the face of the earth. And he is saying essentially that objectively abundant things are not means.
This is a huge mistake in my estimation. And we can see this easily. Rothbard writes:
"Air, then, though indispensable, is not a means, but a general condi tion of human action and human welfare."
Consider the following simple examples:
What do we fill balloons with? What do we stoke a fire with? What do we blow out a candle with? What do we fan ourselves with?
Do we not use air as a means for all these things?
To me it seems obvious that we do, and that Rothbard in plainly stating that air is not a means is reverting back to a way of thinking that pre-dates marginal utility economics. He is making a categorical statement about "air in general", thus showing a serious lack of theoretical insight. As you know, the paradox of value was solved in the realization that the acting individual does not compare the value of diamonds "in general" to that of water "in general". Rather, the acting individual is faced with a choice between definite increments, quantities, or units of things.
But Rothbard, in claiming categorically that air is not a means, reverts back to pre-marginal utility economic theory, and conceives things not in terms of the discrete units or increments that the acting individual is confronted with, but instead in terms of whole classes of things.
I think you can see the validity of what I am arguing, because in your critique of Rothbard's natural-law ethics, you pointed out several times how Rothbard eschewed the methodological individualism he had supported in Man, Economy, and State, by speaking in terms of what is good for "man as a class" as opposed to what is good for a particular individual.
Above, Rothbard exhibits this same habitual tendency, and conceives things not in terms of how they are utilized by the acting individual in his action, but instead, in terms of their "objective qualities" So he doesn't conceive that air is a means when a person uses air towards his end, because he is conceiving that it is an objective quality of air in most situations that it exists in abundance.
Thus, without really referring to individual action and the utility things have to the acting individual, Rothbard writes:
"air in most situations is in unlimited abundance"
He is describing the "objective state" of things. He is not describing an individual utilizing things.....
I would argue that this is why Rothbard basically disavowed praxeology and utilitarianism in The Ethics of Liberty. I personally believe he never fully understood the Austrian system based on subjective utility.
In the passage you quote, Rothbard also writes:
"In the first place, all means are scarce, i.e., limited with respect to the ends that they could possibly serve."
Rothbard here clearly defines as scarce, those things which are limited in the ends they could possibly serve.
But by this definition, air is scarce. Because air cannot serve the end of constructing a brick house, of solving a riddle, or of steering a car.
Rothbard's definition of scarcity contradicts his example of a scarce object---air.
Thus Rothbard, in this brief passage, seems to be both factually wrong (that air is not a means), and in contradiction of his own definition of scarcity.
I don't think these problems can be solved by changing one word. : - )
Adam
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
apart from air were there any other super abudndant goods listed by rothbart/mises?
i guess while air may be superabundant...economic action to change mans effect on it has been ongoing.
i dont know if a distinction of super clean air or high visibility in the air etc is a case for scarcity.
air quality perhaps.
I think 'economic good' and 'non-economic good' is fine terminology since it allows for material that could potentially be scarce to go from 'economic good' to 'non-economic good' and back again, dependant on the individuals you are theorising over and their environmental circumstances.
You can of course do similar, having material go back and forth from 'general condition' to 'economic good' and back....
in the final analysis the Menger/Mises terminology just has for it that even under conditions where air is superabundant and people are not economizing it in their means-action schemes, if you stopped them about their day and asked them whether air was 'good' for them, they would likely assent, and if you hypothesised that the air would go away or lose its sustaining qualities you could likely instil fear into people over the loss of this up till then 'general condition'/'non-economic good'; this may be true trite a point to decide the issue.......
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
I actually had a liberal tell me that health care was a non-scarce good (super-abundant). How can you even carry out an intelligent debate with someone that can't even understand basic truths?
Health are is super abundant. We should share.
Cars are super abundant. We should share.
Labour is super abundant. We should share.
Are you sure he is a libertarian?
[I agree entirely with Adam Knott. There are no such things as general conditions, which is premarginalist terminology. Rothbard is a marginalist, so Menger's terminology is more appropriate. Why he talked of general conditions is beyond me.]
thelion: Health are is super abundant. We should share. Cars are super abundant. We should share. Labour is super abundant. We should share. Are you sure he is a libertarian? [I agree entirely with Adam Knott. There are no such things as general conditions, which is premarginalist terminology. Rothbard is a marginalist, so Menger's terminology is more appropriate. Why he talked of general conditions is beyond me.]
Duplicate post.