A question for natural rights advocates and/or Rothbardians (or anyone well acquainted with the theories).If natural rights for humans are property rights, derived from our nature, part of which is our consciousness and our necessity to reason and to act, then what about when we are asleep or otherwise incapacitated (under anesthesia or high on DMT). Do we lose our rights then? Why?
I don't see why rights would be automatically thrown out the window while asleep.
The human is still a rational thinking being, he/she is just shut down at the moment.
But I suppose that this would also bring up another question, does a person in a permanent vegatative state have property rights?
Robbery: The nation's fastest growing career!
Duties: Giving the people their bread and circuses, extracting payment by force, validating legitimacy, etc.
Job Outlook: Ever increasing and shows no signs of stopping!
I think the answer is that rights depend on moral agency, which in turn depends on rational capacity. Since a sleeping person does not lose their rational capacity, they don't lose their rights.
On the rights of the rationally impaired, see this, 52:40.
AnalyticalAnarchism.net - The Positive Political Economy of Anarchism
If I am not at my house because I am at my workplace, does my house not belong to me anymore?
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
I think we all know intuitively what the right answer is... don't be afraid to use your intuitions. Its typically how libertarian thinkers handle weird situations.
Obviously as long as you are asleep you are not able to exercise your rights, but if you ever wake up, look out!
The fallacies of intellectual communism, a compilation - On the nature of power
So it's like other property rights? Once we homestead our body, then we retain title to it even while we're away?
hashem:So it's like other property rights? Once we homestead our body, then we retain title to it even while we're away?
Mind and body are not separate entities in my opinion.
That's fine, I was just trying to establish an answer consistent with natural law and Rothbardianism to explain if/why we have rights while asleep...
hashem: That's fine, I was just trying to establish an answer consistent with natural law and Rothbardianism to explain if/why we have rights while asleep...
If right's are defined when a human demonstrates that he has them, then what about when a human is just sitting there doing nothing? Spacing out?
They still have the capability of showing that they have right's, they are just not currently demonstrating it.
A human that is sleeping would seem to be no different.
If you are going to be extremely rigid about the definition of when someone has rights, then it seems like the only way that a person could have right's for their whole life is if they are continually, nonstop, demonstrating that they a rational beings capable of demonstrating rights.
I think you're right. Case in point, natural law and Rothbardianism aren't like your last paragraph.
It slipped my mind that some rights can't be abandoned, intentionally or accidentally, explicitly or implicitly. Such as the right to self-ownership. This should have been obvious because the other scenario taken to it's logical extreme is a reductio ad absurdum (nobody having rights while they sleep = humans extinct).
It's morally wrong to initiate sexual intercourse with women who are asleep, if that's what you're asking. Nice try though.
;-)
ErikNikolai: It's morally wrong to initiate sexual intercourse with women who are asleep, if that's what you're asking. Nice try though. ;-)
Damnit now you tell me!
twistedbydsign99: Mind and body are not separate entities in my opinion.
If you were to fully apply the implications of that assertion to the method of your inquiries within the demarcation of the science of praxeology, of economics et cetera, you would thereby entirely extirpate the heretofore existence of the autonomity of that science, the science of praxeology. It would thereby become, to you, yet an other branch of the science of physics.
No one would dispute the fact that the science of biology, geology, medicine, vel cetera analyze physical phenomena. Yet, simultaneously, no one would suggest, as two examples, that we should or could, atleast at the current stage of the development of our corpus of knowledge regarding the world, attempt to describe the nature of the transitions between the various stages of the evolution of a species or the functioning of the lymphotic system of an animal via a series of references to the equations and laws of mechanics, a branch of the science of physics.
I. Ryan: If you were to fully apply the implications of that assertion to the method of your inquiries within the demarcation of the science of praxeology, of economics et cetera, you would thereby entirely extirpate the heretofore existence of the autonomity of that science, the science of praxeology. It would thereby become, to you, yet an other branch of the science of physics. No one would dispute the fact that the science of biology, geology, medicine, vel cetera analyze physical phenomena. Yet, simultaneously, no one would suggest, as two examples, that we should or could, atleast at the current stage of the development of our corpus of knowledge regarding the world, attempt to describe the nature of the transitions between the various stages of the evolution of a species or the functioning of the lymphotic system of an animal via a series of references to the equations and laws of mechanics, a branch of the science of physics.
The physics of atoms does not explain the physics of planets. The perhelion of mercury for example. Just because you know the lower laws it does not mean it is sufficient to understand the next layer up, but it is necessary.
twistedbydsign99: The physics of atoms does not explain the physics of planets. The perhelion of mercury for example. Just because you know the lower laws it does not mean it is sufficient to understand the next layer up, but it is necessary.
I do not really understand what point you meant to advance in your response, above. I, in the post that you quoted, just meant to imply that whether the mind and the body are separate or whether they are distinct, praxeology, as an autonomous science, considers them to be the former, separate. So, unless you can reduce economics to biology, to mechanics, vel cetera, you must acquiesce to the method of praxeology, to consider that the mind and the body are separate, that the mind controls the body.
twistedbydsign99: Just because you know the lower laws it does not mean it is sufficient to understand the next layer up, but it is necessary.
Just because you know the lower laws it does not mean it is sufficient to understand the next layer up, but it is necessary.
If you entirely and completely understand the laws and concepts of the lowest level of description, viz. physics, you necessarily entirely and completely understand the laws and concepts of any of the higher levels of description, e.g. biology, praxeology.
However, in such a situation, the separate "levels of description" would be obsolete. We employ the separate "levels of description" merely because our knowledge is incomplete. Each new "level of description" employs a simplified, abridged version of the foundation of the previous "level of description".
twistedbydsign99: The physics of atoms does not explain the physics of planets.
The physics of atoms does not explain the physics of planets.
"The physics of atoms does not explain the physics of planets" only because our knowledge of the "physics of atoms" is incomplete.
Actually, I would say that's contextual. If it's asked for before hand...
Market anarchist, Linux geek, aspiring Perl hacker, and student of the neo-Aristotelians, the classical individualist anarchists, and the Austrian school.
wombatron: ErikNikolai: It's morally wrong to initiate sexual intercourse with women who are asleep, if that's what you're asking. Nice try though. ;-) Actually, I would say that's contextual. If it's asked for before hand...
I can see that going horribly wrong...
Some guy has sex with some drunk passed out girl and then later he claims she said he could right before she passed out, lol.
I. Ryan:I do not really understand what point you meant to advance in your response, above. I, in the post that you quoted, just meant to imply that whether the mind and the body are separate or whether they are distinct, praxeology, as an autonomous science, considers them to be the former, separate. So, unless you can reduce economics to biology, to mechanics, vel cetera, you must acquiesce to the method of praxeology, to consider that the mind and the body are separate, that the mind controls the body.
Does it truly matter if your agent of action is a mind or a mindbody? I feel that the mind body combination removes some of the trouble surrounding rights changing as our state changes.
I. Ryan:"The physics of atoms does not explain the physics of planets" only because our knowledge of the "physics of atoms" is incomplete.
Not exactly, the group behaviors of atoms is different that the behavior of an atom. The group behavior of cells is different that the group behavior of proteins. To what degree could you say you know how a cell works based on your knowledge of proteins? The system has a different description than its component parts right? We would not attribute the concept of "thinking" to a neuron, but we would to a mass of them.
twistedbydsign99: Does it truly matter if your agent of action is a mind or a mindbody? I feel that the mind body combination removes some of the trouble surrounding rights changing as our state changes.
If the agent described is a "mindbody", the notion, as an example, of control, of property, is nonsensical. If the nature of my mind derives solely from the nature of my body, my mind is my body and my body is my mind. If, then, I claim that I own myself, that I possess exclusive control of myself, my statement is incoherent. For, if I control myself, what controls me who controls myself? and what controls what controls me who controls myself? et cetera, ad infinitum. In order to form a coherent notion of control, of property, one must somehow extirpate that infinite regression. In order to do so, you must assume that a "first cause" of movement exists, a consciousness existent apart from the body that it controls.
twistedbydsign99: Not exactly, the group behaviors of atoms is different that the behavior of an atom. The group behavior of cells is different that the group behavior of proteins. To what degree could you say you know how a cell works based on your knowledge of proteins? The system has a different description than its component parts right? We would not attribute the concept of "thinking" to a neuron, but we would to a mass of them.
In the above argument, you remain trapped within the paradigm of levels of description. If, as I mentioned in my previous post, one were to entirely and completely understand the laws and concepts of the lowest level of description, one would necessarily entirely and completely understand the laws and concepts of any of the higher levels of description. But those higher levels of description would become obsolete. For we only employ "levels of description" because our knowledge is incomplete. And, with only one level of description, the notion of a "level" becomes incoherent. If we could reduce biology to physics, biology would not be an autonomous science anymore, it would merely be an arbitrary and meaningless demarcation within physics.
twistedbydsign99: [...] the group behaviors of atoms is different that the behavior of an atom. [...] The system has a different description than its component parts right?
[...] the group behaviors of atoms is different that the behavior of an atom. [...] The system has a different description than its component parts right?
Is a nation more than merely a collection of individuals?
twistedbydsign99: To what degree could you say you know how a cell works based on your knowledge of proteins?
To what degree could you say you know how a cell works based on your knowledge of proteins?
Are the proteins the only components of the cell?
Libertarian_for_Life: wombatron: ErikNikolai: It's morally wrong to initiate sexual intercourse with women who are asleep, if that's what you're asking. Nice try though. ;-) Actually, I would say that's contextual. If it's asked for before hand... I can see that going horribly wrong... Some guy has sex with some drunk passed out girl and then later he claims she said he could right before she passed out, lol.
Welcome to college ahaha.
I. Ryan:If the agent described is a "mindbody", the notion, as an example, of control, of property, is nonsensical. If the nature of my mind derives solely from the nature of my body, my mind is my body and my body is my mind. If, then, I claim that I own myself, that I possess exclusive control of myself, my statement is incoherent. For, if I control myself, what controls me who controls myself? and what controls what controls me who controls myself? et cetera, ad infinitum. In order to form a coherent notion of control, of property, one must somehow extirpate that infinite regression. In order to do so, you must assume that a "first cause" of movement exists, a consciousness existent apart from the body that it controls.
I wonder, could you own your body in the same way you own your mind? Apriori?
I. Ryan:Is a nation more than merely a collection of individuals?
By definition a nation is nothing more, but does a collection of people do things that cannot be attributed to an individual? Such as justice? Is justice the property of one person? Or can you only find justice in the collection. I'm not saying nation isn't reducible to people, just that in reduction you lose some things. I thought of another good example, language isn't the property of an individual right?
twistedbydsign99:I wonder, could you own your body in the same way you own your mind? Apriori?
I think so. Control denotes ownership. Since you control your body, you own it. This is the fact of ownership, not to be conflated with the right of ownership.
twistedbydsign99: I wonder, could you own your body in the same way you own your mind? Apriori?
I believe that the claim that one owns the mind of oneself, which means the thoughts of oneself, is, at the least, metaphorical and, at the most, non-sensical.
1. If one controls the thoughts of oneself, what, if it does not refer to the thoughts, does "one" refer to?
2. If one controls the thoughts of oneself, what controls oneself who controls the thoughts of oneself? and what controls what controls oneself who controls the thoughts of oneself? et cetera, ad infinitum. In that inquiry, therefore, one necessarily encounters a regressus ad infinitum, a regression which human reason cannot exhaust.
If you desire to maintain the use of the notion of "control", you must, in order to avoid the infinite regression outlined in #2, assume that a "final controller" of the movements of the body of an actor exists. The "final controller" is what we refer to when we refer to the "consciousness" of the body of an actor.
What human society could possibly exist that failed to defend its members while unconscious?
scineram: What human society could possibly exist that failed to defend its members while unconscious?
That's what I was getting at earlier when I responded, "It slipped my mind...This should have been obvious because the other scenario taken to it's logical extreme is a reductio ad absurdum (nobody having rights while they sleep = humans extinct)."
I. Ryan: twistedbydsign99: I wonder, could you own your body in the same way you own your mind? Apriori? I believe that the claim that one owns the mind of oneself, which means the thoughts of oneself...
I believe that the claim that one owns the mind of oneself, which means the thoughts of oneself...
Your objection is based on the premise that the mind is the thoughts. While that's not impossible (thoughts are brain activity, and therefore can be controlled), it doesn't follow that we therefore can't control it (indeed, the opposite is true). Rather, the mind produces thoughts. One's body might produce a third leg, it doesn't follow that one therefore can't control, or therefore doesn't own that leg. Thoughts, however, can't justifiably be absolutely owned for reasons outlined by Stephen Kinsella, and also because once they are produced, they are no longer subject to control (ownership).
It also assumes that you can't control something that you are. But I am my arm (among other things) and I control my arm.
Finally, it ignores the distinction between the fact of ownership and the right to it. Right to ownership doesn't follow directly and necessarily from the fact of control.
This is part of the answer, but not the full answer.
I believe this is:
Sleep and comaIf someone is asleep they are, for all intents and purposes, still a productive member of society. Hurting someone who is asleep (or taking their property) is just as detrimental to society as hurting someone who is awake. The same is true for someone who is in a coma, if it can be reasonable assumed that they will wake up.
From: Morality, From a Societal Perspective (by me)
I'd say no. "You" are your mind. C.S. Lewis had a famous line - "You don't have a soul, you are a soul. You have a body." Just swap out soul for mind, consciousness, or ego.
hashem: While that's not impossible (thoughts are brain activity, and therefore can be controlled), it doesn't follow that we therefore can't control it (indeed, the opposite is true).
While that's not impossible (thoughts are brain activity, and therefore can be controlled), it doesn't follow that we therefore can't control it (indeed, the opposite is true).
If you claim that the "thoughts are brain activity" and, therefore, that the thoughts "can be controlled", what exactly, if it is not either (a) the other thoughts or (b) the other brain activity, "control[s]" them?
hashem: Your objection is based on the premise that the mind is the thoughts. [...] Rather, the mind produces thoughts. [...]
Your objection is based on the premise that the mind is the thoughts. [...] Rather, the mind produces thoughts. [...]
In my previous post, I wrote "If one controls the thoughts of oneself, what, if it does not refer to the thoughts, does "one" refer to?". If you want to dispute that the mind of oneself is the thoughts of oneself, you must address that question, directly or indirectly.
I already addressed and answered this question:
I. Ryan: If you desire to maintain the use of the notion of "control", you must, in order to avoid the infinite regression outlined in #2, assume that a "final controller" of the movements of the body of an actor exists. The "final controller" is what we refer to when we refer to the "consciousness" of the body of an actor.
hashem: Finally, it ignores the distinction between the fact of ownership and the right to it. Right to ownership doesn't follow directly and necessarily from the fact of control.
I never said that it does. I never even mentioned the "right to ownership".
hashem: Thoughts, however, can't justifiably be absolutely owned for reasons outlined by Stephen Kinsella, and also because once they are produced, they are no longer subject to control (ownership).
Thoughts, however, can't justifiably be absolutely owned for reasons outlined by Stephen Kinsella, and also because once they are produced, they are no longer subject to control (ownership).
In the above passage, you conflated the actual thought with the content of that thought. In the writings of Stephan Kinsella, he addressed only whether one can "own" the content of a thought, not whether one can "own" the actual thought itself. In my recent posts, I addressed only whether one can "own" the actual thought itself, not whether one can "own" the content of that thought.
I. Ryan:[You claim] the thoughts "can be controlled", what exactly, if it is not either (a) the other thoughts or (b) the other brain activity, "control[s]" them?...what exactly, if it is not...
It is, though. The brain controls itself, as far as I know (which isn't saying much). :) A brain can control itself; indeed, the brain does control itself.
I hear the objection often that something can't own/control itself, but I'm not convinced that's necessarily true, or that it's even fundamentally sound.
hashem:It is, though. The brain controls itself, as far as I know (which isn't saying much). :) A brain can control itself; indeed, the brain does control itself.
I think the brain works off of its current state and the state of its sensory perceptions to put itself in a new state. I'd say that is control. I've heard it said that thoughts preceed emotions as well.