I don't understand Ayn Rand. She pretty much defined modern libertarianism, with Objectivism. However, the Ayn Rand Institute favors a "dog eat dog" world and has been the basis for neo-conservatism.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Satanic_Bible
She made contributions to Satanism.
Democracy for Breakfast: I don't understand Ayn Rand. She pretty much defined modern libertarianism, with Objectivism. However, the Ayn Rand Institute favors a "dog eat dog" world and has been the basis for neo-conservatism.
Probably a cognitive error on her part when formulating her concept of Capitalism. She understood capitalism as best she could in the absence of Subjective Value. That seemed to be the underlying component she was missing. By the time people started to point htis out to her she seemed to old, stubborn, proud, what have you...
And as far as Libertarianism goes. What was 'Libertarianism' when she was developing objectivism? Did it even exist when she started writing? If it did how mature was it? She didn't have the good fortune or of growing up reading Human Action ect...
Watch this :)
filc:Probably a cognitive error on her part when formulating her concept of Capitalism. She understood capitalism as best she could in the absence of Subjective Value. That seemed to be the underlying component she was missing. By the time people started to point htis out to her she seemed to old, stubborn, proud, what have you...
She knew Rothbard.
Democracy for Breakfast:She knew Rothbard.
I'm pretty sure she knew of Mises as well. But that doesn't mean she understood any of their works or their general arguments. For that matter I think she wrote Fountain Head and Atlas Shrugged before HA was very accessible in the US. MES was also not published until 1962? Much of the Austrian Economics Library was not yet consolidated or widely accessible in the US at the time she was formulating her philosophy. Shoot, I'm lead to believe that even several prominent economists didn't know much of Austrian Economics until the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century.
Putting things in a time-line you could see how Rand may have missed much of this.
Democracy for Breakfast:She made contributions to Satanism.
This is akin to saying that Charles Darwin made contributions to Nazism.
Josh : Democracy for Breakfast:She made contributions to Satanism. This is akin to saying that Charles Darwin made contributions to Nazism.
What's a "dog eat dog world"? And everything she wrote is completely incompatible with neo-conservatism (and I do mean everything; liberals and conservatives construe the meanings of ideas all the time). Your wikipedia article doesn't have Rand listed as any sort of contributor/influence to Satanism. I do generally trust wikipedia, but not if something is lacking a citation, I merely set it aside as "rumor".
Any idea can be taken out of context and misconstrued to mean something entirely different from the author's original intent or meaning.
filc: And as far as Libertarianism goes. What was 'Libertarianism' when she was developing objectivism? Did it even exist when she started writing? If it did how mature was it? She didn't have the good fortune or of growing up reading Human Action ect..
And as far as Libertarianism goes. What was 'Libertarianism' when she was developing objectivism? Did it even exist when she started writing? If it did how mature was it? She didn't have the good fortune or of growing up reading Human Action ect..
I think that at one point she admitted she was a libertarian, although I'm not sure to what degree. I know that ultimately she refused to be characteristic under the same name as the anarcho-capitalists (i.e. Murray Rothbard), because she believed them to be misguided (she believed that anarchism was synonymous with collectivism). I don't believe she was very open to new ideas, other than her own (that's what I get from George Reisman's introduction to Capitalism).
Libertarianism kind of existed before Rand (see "Radicals for Capitalism" for a good history of this). Branden reports that when Rand was coming up with a term for her philosophy, he offered up "libertarianism", but she didn't like it, as she thought it sounded 'made up'.
She would never admit to being a libertarian, nor would any of the Orthodox Objectivists. (in fact, associated with libertarians can get you excommunicated, it seems). She, in fact, denounced libertarians because they didn't all conform to Objectivist views (some libertarians came to libertarianism from other philosophies) and she accused us of 'stealing her ideas'.
She knew Rothbard, but didn't like him because he was an anarchist. She met Mises and they didn't get along, tho she always promoted his economic views. Objectivist pretty much always followed austrian school economics (no idea what they thought of chicago shool econ).
emb021: Objectivist pretty much always followed austrian school economics (no idea what they thought of chicago shool econ).
Objectivist pretty much always followed austrian school economics (no idea what they thought of chicago shool econ).
Well, Alan Greenspan was both an objectivist and a monetarist.
Am not sure what economic school that Greenspan would place himself in.
Chicago School doesn't have a problem with the Fed, per say.
Greenspan had an article in Rand's book "Capitalism: the Unknown Ideal" where he spoke in favor of the gold standard. Ron Paul says he once asked him if he takes back what he said in it (this when he was still the Fed Chair). Apparently, Greenspan still agreed with what was in it, for what's that worth.
If you don't understand Ayn Rand, then it is probably because you have not read her works. If you think that ARI promotes a "dog-eat-dog" world then you definitely do not understand Rand's philosophy or ARI's mission.
To the extent that Rand's ideas have informed Neo-conservativsm or Libertarianism is the extent to which those movements have hijacked her ideas. Rand explicitly denied any affiliation with Libertarians on several occasions, and it is safe to say that she would not have endorsed Neo-cons in any way. If either of these groups try to credit her with their founding ideas, then they too have failed to understand her philosophy.
In the same way it is disingenuous to say that Rand "made contributions to Satanism." Again, any resemblance in ideas between Objectivism (Rand's philosophy) and Satanism is because the latter was influenced from the former (as the Wikipedia article you linked to says: "The author claims the influence of Ragnar Redbeard and Ayn Rand among others."). This does not mean that Rand was a Satanist, or that she agreed with any of the (erroneous) conclusions and principles that Satanists hold. As someone else rightly pointed out, Darwin did not "make contributions" to Nazi ideology; the Nazis took some of his ideas and got the wrong conclusions.
If you are interested in understanding Rand's philosophy, try Objectivism: the Philosophy of Ayn Rand by Leonard Peikoff.
Robert Reynolds: To the extent that Rand's ideas have informed Neo-conservativsm or Libertarianism is the extent to which those movements have hijacked her ideas. Rand explicitly denied any affiliation with Libertarians on several occasions, and it is safe to say that she would not have endorsed Neo-cons in any way. If either of these groups try to credit her with their founding ideas, then they too have failed to understand her philosophy.
Sorry, but like many libertarians, I DO understand her philosophy, and its partually due to read her works that I became a libertarian.
Libertarianism did not 'hijack' her ideas. Many of her ideas existed already and were the basis of classical liberal and later libertarian thinking. Keep in mind that her thinking on economics was pretty much just to copy Austrian School economics. Its also important to keep in mind that libertarianism is a political philosophy that allows many people to come under it. Thus you have constitutionists, minarchist, and anarcho-capitalists. You have Austrian School, Chicago School, etc economics. You have natural rights people and those who don't agree with the idea. You have people who come to it because of their Christian beliefs, and those with no religious beliefs.
There is a reason an early history of the libertarian movement is titled "It Usually Begins with Ayn Rand", and why many on the non-orthodox Objectivists are quite comfortable appearing at libertarian events. Read a good book on the history of the libertarian movements (such as "Radicals for Capitalism" and you will understand how she fits within the libertarian movement. And she most certainly does.
Really, the only reason Rand rejected libertarianism was that she felt that you had to accept her philosophy in total, and many libertarians don't. And sadly, the Orthodox Objectivists just blindly follow that lead, in some cases making some ridiculous claims about libertarianism.
Robert Reynolds:To the extent that Rand's ideas have informed Neo-conservativsm or Libertarianism is the extent to which those movements have hijacked her ideas.
Wow, haven't heard of Libertarians hijacking Rands ideas.
Then you haven't read Rand or the Orthodox Oists.
One of the reasons Rand condemned libertarians (and libertarianism) is that she thinks we ripped off her ideas. Again, she failed to realize that many of the ideas were already around. Just read, for instance "God of the Machine" and "Discovery of Freedom" by 2 female libertarian contemporaries (and brief associates) of Rand that shows early ideas of libertarianism.
emb021:One of the reasons Rand condemned libertarians (and libertarianism) is that she thinks we ripped off her ideas.
Just because Rand SAYS that libertarian's stole her idea's doesn't mean that they did. :)
Plus many people who we would consider to be 'libertarian' at that time may have been calling themselves liberals or classical liberals.
filc: emb021:One of the reasons Rand condemned libertarians (and libertarianism) is that she thinks we ripped off her ideas. Just because Rand SAYS that libertarian's stole her idea's doesn't mean that they did. :)
Uh, that was kinda my point.
Doubt it.
The term "classical liberal" had pretty much died out, except amount the older generation (Mises & Hayek, et al) of that time.
Most people calling themselves liberals were pretty much socialist. It would have been some amoung the so-called "Old Right" who might identify with some libertarian ideas. But most of the people would should call themselves libertarians did so at the time (70s/80s).
If you read "Ayn Rand Answers", which were taken from her Q/A session after the Ford Hall Forums, they quote a response she gave (warning, its been shown that the book was heavily edited) a denunciation of libertarianism. This is usually the basis for this, plus an article in one of the later Rand collections by one of the Orthodox who denounced libertarianism as a 'perversion of liberty', if you can believe it.
I'm not necessarily denying what your saying. I havn't done research into extensively nor do I care to. I just got very confused with the wording of your post after Roberts. I thought you were trying to make an argument, like Robert, that Libertarianism is a spawn of Objectivism.
filc: I'm not necessarily denying what your saying. I havn't done research into extensively nor do I care to. I just got very confused with the wording of your post after Roberts. I thought you were trying to make an argument, like Robert, that Libertarianism is a spawn of Objectivism.
the idea that libertarianism is the 'spawn of Objectivism' is that when libertarianism 'really' got started in the 60s & 70s, many of the people who became libertarians did so because they read Ayn Rand and like what she said, tho most didn't become Objectivists. Rand was probably the single author most read by those in the movement. Others writting on libertarianism seemed to echo the same themes (Hosper's "Libertarianism", Rothbards "For a New Liberty"). Hence, as I noted, an early work on the movement is titled "It Usually Begins With Ayn Rand".
This is due to most people at the time NOT being aware of the libertarian/classical liberal tradition that stretched back several hundred of years, and included people like Jefferson, Albert Jay Nock, Lysander Spooner, Benjamin Tucker, Mises, Hayak, Hazlitt, and even contemporaries of Rand like Isabel Patterson ("God of the Machine") and Rose Wilder Lane ("Discovery of Freedom"). This changed as these people became better known, and their works were printed (or reprinted or rediscovered) and read. Since Rand herself wasn't always familiar with these people (she was associated with Patterson & Mises, not sure about Lane, probably knew of Hayak & Hazlitt), and since many in the libertarian movement seemed (to her) to be 'copying' her, but not giving her credit or pushing Objectivism, she didn't like it.
This is why works like "Radicals of Capitalism" and such are important, so people can understand the background of libertarianism amoung the classical liberal, old right, paleo/proto-libertarians that came before the main movement, and not think the movement just poped up in the 60/70s due to Rand.
I love the works of Ayn Rand, and I think that the core Objectivist tenets are quite sound; however, their conclusions don't always follow from their premises (ironic, since they're always telling others to check theirs). Rand-worship, in particular, is something that makes absolutely no sense, given her philosophy.
It was interesting to see the mention of The Satanic Bible in the OP. That was actually my first real individualist reading, and from there I branched out into Rand, Nietzsche, and eventually Austrianism. I have to agree with the others in this thread, though... just because LaVey got some inspiration from Rand does not mean in any way that LaVeyan Satanism must logically follow from Objectivism.
One Randian thought that I absolutely agree with is that capitalism has to be justified on moral grounds—its moral basis has to be elucidated first, not as an afterthought. To support it out of utilitarianism (or anything similar) implies that the most utilitarian system should be used, regardless of its implications on liberty and egoism. I understand that consequentialist arguments can be helpful when talking to welfare statists or bleeding hearts or whatever the case may be, but capitalism can't stand upon them alone.
One of these days, I'm going to write an essay about Objectivism, because I honestly don't think Rand-worshippers have the right to the name. I also think that explaining Objectivism more clearly to libertarians (e.g., everyone here) would make it more appealing and take away a lot of the cultishness.
Life and reality are neither logical nor illogical; they are simply given. But logic is the only tool available to man for the comprehension of both.—Ludwig von Mises
Life and reality are neither logical nor illogical; they are simply given. But logic is the only tool available to man for the comprehension of both.
I was politically apathetic before I read Rand's stuff. I quickly read everythign she wrote. It wasn't long before one thing lead to another and I was reading Austrian material left and right. For me it was pretty much in this order.
Ayn Rand -> Ron Paul -> Rest of AE.
Fiction is a wonderful thing, I wish there was more fiction founded on capitalism as offered, even it erroneous in some ways. I also strongly agree to Rand's notion that man has the capabiltiies in him of being a heroic figure. I wish we all lived life in such a positive manner. Such things are very insipring. Instead we have various religious dogma's which teaches us that we should constantly live life in shame, fear, and regret. Regardless of our actions whether good or bad.
I think kids would benefit more if their hero's were capitalist humans making a real positive difference in the world, as opposed to some fictitious superhero wearing tights or some sports superstar.
Justin Spahr-Summers: I love the works of Ayn Rand, and I think that the core Objectivist tenets are quite sound; however, their conclusions don't always follow from their premises (ironic, since they're always telling others to check theirs). Rand-worship, in particular, is something that makes absolutely no sense, given her philosophy.
That's true, but that's more a case of some crazy individuals rather than anything about Objectivism. I'm sure they exist even today, but the Objectivists I've ever talked to had no element of "Rand-worship" whatsoever. But then again I haven't really talked to that many, so I may be completely off-base on that.
There are different kinds of Objectivists.
The Orthodox Objectivists (these are usually aligned with the Ayn Rand Institute run by Leonard Pekoff (sp?), her 'heir'. These people are very anti-libertarian. They have 'excommunicated' Objectivists who have dared to even appear or present at libertarian events (ex: David Kelley). SOLO Passion is an on-line form that many of these people go to.
The non-Orthodox aren't so rigid. They may or may not be aligned with David Kelley's Atlas Society and certain non-Orthodox forums like Objectivist living. They are quite welcoming to libertarians and general fans of Rand.
For me, it was a combination of reading Ayn Rand, Harry Browne, and Robert Ringer in college that turned me into a libertarian. This lead me to reading reason, getting the Laissez-Faire Books catalog and reading Rothbard, Mises, and the like. While I like Rand's fiction, and reading Steve Dikto's work, and most of her non-fiction, it was reading her later fiction that kind of turned me off from Objectivism. Rand seemed to get really bitter in her later years, which was reflected in her writting. Her attitude that seemed to be that if you were a 'true Objectivist', you would only like this and this and this, and NOT like this and this and this. I didn't care for that, and that was the begining of my journey from being an Objectivist to being a libertarian.
Eioul:That's true, but that's more a case of some crazy individuals rather than anything about Objectivism. I'm sure they exist even today, but the Objectivists I've ever talked to had no element of "Rand-worship" whatsoever. But then again I haven't really talked to that many, so I may be completely off-base on that.
Well, Leonard Peikoff is a really good example of a Rand-worshipper. I'll be honest—I don't actually know a whole lot about the guy (partly because he's devoted his existence to Rand), but I've seen quotes and such by him that completely blow me away. For instance, talking about The Passion of Ayn Rand, "Peikoff pronounced that the biography was motivated by 'venomous hatred' and agreed with Schwartz that its entire contents were 'non-cognitive'; unlike Schwartz, however, he proclaimed that he had never read it and never intended to." I can't speak for the book itself, but the movie made from it was very good and very true-to-life. Orthodox Objectivism might as well be Orthodox Christianity with Rand inserted in the place of Christ.
But again, I agree with the gist of what you said. I really don't think Objectivism itself is to blame for this... some people just go a bit crazy. There are other Objectivist conclusions that I don't think follow from its tenets, however—it'll be something I'll have to explain more in my would-be essay.
Well, Peikoff is pretty much the leader of the Orthodoxy. He runs the Ayn Rand Institute and was Rand's legal heir and claimed intellectual heir.
The picadillo over the Brandens is a good indication if a person is part of the Orthodoxy or not.
emb021:Well, Peikoff is pretty much the leader of the Orthodoxy. He runs the Ayn Rand Institute and was Rand's legal heir and claimed intellectual heir.
Right, I understand. I guess I was kind of trying to point out how crazy he is, and he still has supporters that claim they're all Objectivists. So there's definitely more than just a few nutjobs inside the movement.
Justin Spahr-Summers: One Randian thought that I absolutely agree with is that capitalism has to be justified on moral grounds—its moral basis has to be elucidated first, not as an afterthought. To support it out of utilitarianism (or anything similar) implies that the most utilitarian system should be used, regardless of its implications on liberty and egoism. I understand that consequentialist arguments can be helpful when talking to welfare statists or bleeding hearts or whatever the case may be, but capitalism can't stand upon them alone.
1. If you desire liberty, the most "utilitarian", to you, system is the system which disseminates the most freedom.
2. The claim that "utilitarianism [...] implies that the most utilitarian system should be used, regardless of its implications on liberty and egoism" implies that "utility" is objective.
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
Justin Spahr-Summers: emb021: Well, Peikoff is pretty much the leader of the Orthodoxy. He runs the Ayn Rand Institute and was Rand's legal heir and claimed intellectual heir. Right, I understand. I guess I was kind of trying to point out how crazy he is, and he still has supporters that claim they're all Objectivists. So there's definitely more than just a few nutjobs inside the movement.
emb021: Well, Peikoff is pretty much the leader of the Orthodoxy. He runs the Ayn Rand Institute and was Rand's legal heir and claimed intellectual heir.
Well, there are even more examples of his nuttiness. I believe things like demands that all 'true Objectivist' would only vote Democrat (?!?), and such like that.
emb021: Well, there are even more examples of his nuttiness. I believe things like demands that all 'true Objectivist' would only vote Democrat (?!?), and such like that.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JoAWCwm-UXw
That guy is disgusting. He makes O'reilly seem reasonable.
Nope. I simply think any "cultishness" is exaggerated and pretty much rumor, at the very least in 2009. Now if you have some evidence to show otherwise, I'd look at it. I've never seen anyone, anywhere, speak of being a "true Objectivist". And obviously if someone understood Objectivism, it would be clear that it is a philosophy to live a good life (i.e. your own life and values), not a philosophy that tells you what to do.
I. Ryan:1. If you desire liberty, the most "utilitarian", to you, system is the system which disseminates the most freedom. 2. The claim that "utilitarianism [...] implies that the most utilitarian system should be used, regardless of its implications on liberty and egoism" implies that "utility" is objective.
I'm sorry, but I think individual utilitarianism is just a roundabout way of expounding rational/ethical egoism. If I want liberty, the system that satisfies my self-interest the most is that which "disseminates the most freedom."
Folks, you must listen to this: http://mises.org/media/2824 ! It is a must. JoAnn Rothbard recaping the Rothbard`s Ayn Rand experience. Very humorous.
Justin Spahr-Summers: I'm sorry, but I think individual utilitarianism is just a roundabout way of expounding rational/ethical egoism. If I want liberty, the system that satisfies my self-interest the most is that which "disseminates the most freedom."
Why are you sorry?
Marko:Folks, you must listen to this: http://mises.org/media/2824 ! It is a must. JoAnn Rothbard recaping the Rothbard`s Ayn Rand experience. Very humorous.
Thanks for bringing attention to this, so great !
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Man that is fun. I need to dig more through the audio section, there are some real gems
I. Ryan:Why are you sorry?
Because, due to the aforementioned, I can't view individual utilitarianism as a legitimate form of utilitarianism. Either one is a utilitarian or an egoist (other options notwithstanding)... not both.
Justin Spahr-Summers: Because, due to the aforementioned, I can't view individual utilitarianism as a legitimate form of utilitarianism. Either one is a utilitarian or an egoist (other options notwithstanding)... not both.
If you believe that "utilitarianism" is inherently or necessarily a collectivist ideology, how do you explain the "utilitarianism" of Ludwig von Mises, an individualist?
I. Ryan:If you believe that "utilitarianism" is inherently or necessarily a collectivist ideology, how do you explain the "utilitarianism" of Ludwig von Mises, an individualist?
Mises seemingly failed to recognize either rational egoism or ethical egoism. He thought that all men were rational a priori and that ends were not open to analysis. So, where he advocated individualism, it was because of its perceived benefit to everyone involved (utilitarianism). If I advocate individualism, it's because of its perceived benefit to me. That doesn't mean that utilitarian arguments are useless—I know that most statists aren't going to have a moral revolution just by reading Atlas Shrugged—but it means that utilitarianism is the wrong moral premise upon which to base capitalism.
Justin Spahr-Summers: He thought that all men were rational a priori
He thought that all men were rational a priori
If, according to the definition that Mises used, a person desires to perform an action because he desires to obtain what he believes that action will cause, he is "rational". So to just say "[he] thought that all men [are] rational a priori" is very misleading. In fact, I do not even know why you mentioned it.
Justin Spahr-Summers: and that ends were not open to analysis.
and that ends were not open to analysis.
He wrote that the ultimate desires of each individual are "not open to analysis". Each other desire of each individual, which comprises the majority of the desires of each individual, are indeed "open to analysis". For, if X prevents Y and an individual performs X but desires Y, one can criticize the contradictory nature of that situation.
Justin Spahr-Summers: So, where he advocated individualism, it was because of its perceived benefit to everyone involved (utilitarianism)
So, where he advocated individualism, it was because of its perceived benefit to everyone involved (utilitarianism)
In the system of Mises, the doctrine "utilitarianism" merely states that (a) the existence of the division of labor along with any further intensification of the division of labor benefits each individual involved and (b) that, therefore, it is a means, not an ends, and (c) that, therefore, the self-interest of an individual translates to the social-interest of the individual. In other words, if one desires to strengthen oneself, one should desire to strengthen society.
Ludwig von Mises; Theory and History, pp. 54-60, added boldfaced print: The essential teachings of utilitarian philosophy as applied to the problems of society can be restated as follows: Human effort exerted under the principle of the division of labor in social cooperation achieves, other things remaining equal, a greater output per unit of input than the isolated efforts of solitary individuals. Man's reason is capable of recognizing this fact and of adapting his conduct accordingly. Thus social cooperation becomes for almost every man the great means for the attainment of all ends. An eminently human common interest, the preservation and intensification of social bonds, is substituted for pitiless biological competition, the significant mark of animal and plant life. Man becomes a social being. He is no longer forced by the inevitable laws of nature to look upon all other specimens of his animal species as deadly foes. Other people become his fellows. For animals the generation of every new member of the species means the appearance of a new rival in the struggle for life. For man, until the optimum size of population is reached, it means rather an improvement than a deterioration in his quest for material well-being. Notwithstanding all his social achievements man remains in biological structure a mammal. His most urgent needs are nourishment, warmth, and shelter. Only when these wants are satisfied can he concern himself with other needs, peculiar to the human species and therefore called specifically human or higher needs. Also the satisfaction of these depends as a rule, at least to some extent, on the availability of various material tangible things. As social cooperation is for acting man a means and not an end, no unanimity with regard to value judgments is required to make it work. It is a fact that almost all men agree in aiming at certain ends, at those pleasures which ivory-tower moralists disdain as base and shabby. But it is no less a fact that even the most sublime ends cannot be sought by people who have not first satisfied the wants of their animal body. The loftiest exploits of philosophy, art, and literature would never have been performed by men living outside of society. Moralists praise the nobility of people who seek a thing for its own sake. "Deutsch sein heisst eine Sache um ihrer selbst willen tun," declared Richard Wagner,[1] and the Nazis, of all people, adopted the dictum as a fundamental principle of their creed. Now what is sought as an ultimate end is valued according to the immediate satisfaction to be derived from its attainment. There is no harm in declaring elliptically that it is sought for its own sake. Then Wagner's phrase is reduced to the truism: Ultimate ends are ends and not means for the attainment of other ends. Moralists furthermore level against utilitarianism the charge of (ethical) materialism. Here too they misconstrue the utilitarian doctrine. Its gist is the cognition that action pursues definite chosen ends and that consequently there can be no other standard for appraising conduct but the desirability or undesirability of its effects. The precepts of ethics are designed to preserve, not to destroy, the "world." They may call upon people to put up with undesirable short-run effects in order to avoid producing still more undesirable long-run effects. But they must never recommend actions whose effects they themselves deem undesirable for the sole purpose of not defying an arbitrary rule derived from intuition. The formula fiat justitia, pereat mundus is exploded as sheer nonsense. An ethical doctrine that does not take into full account the effects of action is mere fancy. Utilitarianism does not teach that people should strive only after sensuous pleasure (though it recognizes that most or at least many people behave in this way). Neither does it indulge in judgments of value. By its recognition that social cooperation is for the immense majority a means for attaining all their ends, it dispels the notion that society, the state, the nation, or any other social entity is an ultimate end and that individual men are the slaves of that entity. It rejects the philosophies of universalism, collectivism, and totalitarianism. In this sense it is meaningful to call utilitarianism a philosophy of individualism. The collectivist doctrine fails to recognize that social cooperation is for man a means for the attainment of all his ends. It assumes that irreconcilable conflict prevails between the interests of the collective and those of individuals, and in this conflict it sides unconditionally with the collective entity. The collective alone has real existence; the individuals' existence is conditioned by that of the collective. The collective is perfect and can do no wrong. Individuals are wretched and refractory; their obstinacy must be curbed by the authority to which God or nature has entrusted the conduct of society's affairs. The powers that be, says the Apostle Paul, are ordained of God.[2] They are ordained by nature or by the superhuman factor that directs the course of all cosmic events, says the atheist collectivist. Two questions immediately arise. First: If it were true that the interests of the collective and those of individuals are implacably opposed to one another, how could society function? One may assume that the individuals would be prevented by force of arms from resorting to open rebellion. But it cannot be assumed that their active cooperation could be secured by mere compulsion. A system of production in which the only incentive to work is the fear of punishment cannot last. It was this fact that made slavery disappear as a system of managing production. Second: If the collective is not a means by which individuals may achieve their ends, if the collective's flowering requires sacrifices by the individuals which are not outweighed by advantages derived from social cooperation, what prompts the advocate of collectivism to assign to the concerns of the collective precedence over the personal wishes of the individuals? Can any argument be advanced for such exaltation of the collective but personal judgments of value? Of course, everybody's judgments of value are personal. If a man assigns a higher value to the concerns of a collective than to his other concerns, and acts accordingly, that is his affair. So long as the collectivist philosophers proceed in this way, no objection can be raised. But they argue differently. They elevate their personal judgments of value to the dignity of an absolute standard of value. They urge other people to stop valuing according to their own will and to adopt unconditionally the precepts to which collectivism has assigned absolute eternal validity. The futility and arbitrariness of the collectivist point of view become still more evident when one recalls that various collectivist parties compete for the exclusive allegiance of the individuals. Even if they employ the same word for their collectivist ideal, various writers and leaders disagree on the essential features of the thing they have in mind. The state which Ferdinand Lassalle called god and to which he assigned paramountcy was not precisely the collectivist idol of Hegel and Stahl, the state of the Hohenzollern. Is mankind as a whole the sole legitimate collective or is each of the various nations? Is the collective to which the German-speaking Swiss owe exclusive allegiance the Swiss Confederacy or the Volksgemeinschaft comprising all German-speaking men? All major social entities such as nations, linguistic groups, religious communities, party organizations have been elevated to the dignity of the supreme collective that overshadows all other collectives and claims the submission of the whole personality of all right-thinking men. But an individual can renounce autonomous action and unconditionally surrender his self only in favor of one collective. Which collective this ought to be can be determined Only by a quite arbitrary decision. The collective creed is by necessity exclusive and totalitarian. It craves the whole man and does not want to share him with any other collective. It seeks to establish the exclusive supreme validity of only one system of values. There is, of course, but one way to make one's own judgments of value supreme. One must beat into submission all those dissenting. This is what all representatives of the various collectivist doctrines are striving for. They ultimately recommend the use of violence and pitiless annihilation of all those whom they condemn as heretics. Collectivism is a doctrine of war, intolerance, and persecution. If any of the collectivist creeds should succeed in its endeavors, all people but the great dictator would be deprived of their essential human quality. They would become mere soulless pawns in the hands of a monster. The characteristic feature of a free society is that it can function in spite of the fact that its members disagree in many judgments of value. In the market economy business serves not only the majority but also various minorities, provided they are not too small in respect of the economic goods which satisfying their special wishes would require. Philosophical treatises are published-though few people read them, and the masses prefer other books or non-if enough readers are foreseen to recover the costs.
The essential teachings of utilitarian philosophy as applied to the problems of society can be restated as follows:
Human effort exerted under the principle of the division of labor in social cooperation achieves, other things remaining equal, a greater output per unit of input than the isolated efforts of solitary individuals. Man's reason is capable of recognizing this fact and of adapting his conduct accordingly. Thus social cooperation becomes for almost every man the great means for the attainment of all ends. An eminently human common interest, the preservation and intensification of social bonds, is substituted for pitiless biological competition, the significant mark of animal and plant life. Man becomes a social being. He is no longer forced by the inevitable laws of nature to look upon all other specimens of his animal species as deadly foes. Other people become his fellows. For animals the generation of every new member of the species means the appearance of a new rival in the struggle for life. For man, until the optimum size of population is reached, it means rather an improvement than a deterioration in his quest for material well-being.
Notwithstanding all his social achievements man remains in biological structure a mammal. His most urgent needs are nourishment, warmth, and shelter. Only when these wants are satisfied can he concern himself with other needs, peculiar to the human species and therefore called specifically human or higher needs. Also the satisfaction of these depends as a rule, at least to some extent, on the availability of various material tangible things.
As social cooperation is for acting man a means and not an end, no unanimity with regard to value judgments is required to make it work. It is a fact that almost all men agree in aiming at certain ends, at those pleasures which ivory-tower moralists disdain as base and shabby. But it is no less a fact that even the most sublime ends cannot be sought by people who have not first satisfied the wants of their animal body. The loftiest exploits of philosophy, art, and literature would never have been performed by men living outside of society.
Moralists praise the nobility of people who seek a thing for its own sake. "Deutsch sein heisst eine Sache um ihrer selbst willen tun," declared Richard Wagner,[1] and the Nazis, of all people, adopted the dictum as a fundamental principle of their creed. Now what is sought as an ultimate end is valued according to the immediate satisfaction to be derived from its attainment. There is no harm in declaring elliptically that it is sought for its own sake. Then Wagner's phrase is reduced to the truism: Ultimate ends are ends and not means for the attainment of other ends.
Moralists furthermore level against utilitarianism the charge of (ethical) materialism. Here too they misconstrue the utilitarian doctrine. Its gist is the cognition that action pursues definite chosen ends and that consequently there can be no other standard for appraising conduct but the desirability or undesirability of its effects. The precepts of ethics are designed to preserve, not to destroy, the "world." They may call upon people to put up with undesirable short-run effects in order to avoid producing still more undesirable long-run effects. But they must never recommend actions whose effects they themselves deem undesirable for the sole purpose of not defying an arbitrary rule derived from intuition. The formula fiat justitia, pereat mundus is exploded as sheer nonsense. An ethical doctrine that does not take into full account the effects of action is mere fancy.
Utilitarianism does not teach that people should strive only after sensuous pleasure (though it recognizes that most or at least many people behave in this way). Neither does it indulge in judgments of value. By its recognition that social cooperation is for the immense majority a means for attaining all their ends, it dispels the notion that society, the state, the nation, or any other social entity is an ultimate end and that individual men are the slaves of that entity. It rejects the philosophies of universalism, collectivism, and totalitarianism. In this sense it is meaningful to call utilitarianism a philosophy of individualism.
The collectivist doctrine fails to recognize that social cooperation is for man a means for the attainment of all his ends. It assumes that irreconcilable conflict prevails between the interests of the collective and those of individuals, and in this conflict it sides unconditionally with the collective entity. The collective alone has real existence; the individuals' existence is conditioned by that of the collective. The collective is perfect and can do no wrong. Individuals are wretched and refractory; their obstinacy must be curbed by the authority to which God or nature has entrusted the conduct of society's affairs. The powers that be, says the Apostle Paul, are ordained of God.[2] They are ordained by nature or by the superhuman factor that directs the course of all cosmic events, says the atheist collectivist.
Two questions immediately arise. First: If it were true that the interests of the collective and those of individuals are implacably opposed to one another, how could society function? One may assume that the individuals would be prevented by force of arms from resorting to open rebellion. But it cannot be assumed that their active cooperation could be secured by mere compulsion. A system of production in which the only incentive to work is the fear of punishment cannot last. It was this fact that made slavery disappear as a system of managing production.
Second: If the collective is not a means by which individuals may achieve their ends, if the collective's flowering requires sacrifices by the individuals which are not outweighed by advantages derived from social cooperation, what prompts the advocate of collectivism to assign to the concerns of the collective precedence over the personal wishes of the individuals? Can any argument be advanced for such exaltation of the collective but personal judgments of value?
Of course, everybody's judgments of value are personal. If a man assigns a higher value to the concerns of a collective than to his other concerns, and acts accordingly, that is his affair. So long as the collectivist philosophers proceed in this way, no objection can be raised. But they argue differently. They elevate their personal judgments of value to the dignity of an absolute standard of value. They urge other people to stop valuing according to their own will and to adopt unconditionally the precepts to which collectivism has assigned absolute eternal validity.
The futility and arbitrariness of the collectivist point of view become still more evident when one recalls that various collectivist parties compete for the exclusive allegiance of the individuals. Even if they employ the same word for their collectivist ideal, various writers and leaders disagree on the essential features of the thing they have in mind. The state which Ferdinand Lassalle called god and to which he assigned paramountcy was not precisely the collectivist idol of Hegel and Stahl, the state of the Hohenzollern. Is mankind as a whole the sole legitimate collective or is each of the various nations? Is the collective to which the German-speaking Swiss owe exclusive allegiance the Swiss Confederacy or the Volksgemeinschaft comprising all German-speaking men? All major social entities such as nations, linguistic groups, religious communities, party organizations have been elevated to the dignity of the supreme collective that overshadows all other collectives and claims the submission of the whole personality of all right-thinking men. But an individual can renounce autonomous action and unconditionally surrender his self only in favor of one collective. Which collective this ought to be can be determined Only by a quite arbitrary decision. The collective creed is by necessity exclusive and totalitarian. It craves the whole man and does not want to share him with any other collective. It seeks to establish the exclusive supreme validity of only one system of values.
There is, of course, but one way to make one's own judgments of value supreme. One must beat into submission all those dissenting. This is what all representatives of the various collectivist doctrines are striving for. They ultimately recommend the use of violence and pitiless annihilation of all those whom they condemn as heretics. Collectivism is a doctrine of war, intolerance, and persecution. If any of the collectivist creeds should succeed in its endeavors, all people but the great dictator would be deprived of their essential human quality. They would become mere soulless pawns in the hands of a monster.
The characteristic feature of a free society is that it can function in spite of the fact that its members disagree in many judgments of value. In the market economy business serves not only the majority but also various minorities, provided they are not too small in respect of the economic goods which satisfying their special wishes would require. Philosophical treatises are published-though few people read them, and the masses prefer other books or non-if enough readers are foreseen to recover the costs.
Ludwig von Mises; Theory and History, p. 61: In ethics a common ground for the choice of rules of conduct is given so far as people agree in considering the preservation of social cooperation the foremost means for attaining all their ends. Thus virtually any controversy concerning the rules of conduct refers to means and not to ends. It is consequently possible to appraise these rules from the point of view of their adequacy for the peaceful functioning of society. Even rigid supporters of an intuitionist ethics could not help eventually resorting to an appraisal of conduct from the point of view of its effects upon human happiness.
In ethics a common ground for the choice of rules of conduct is given so far as people agree in considering the preservation of social cooperation the foremost means for attaining all their ends. Thus virtually any controversy concerning the rules of conduct refers to means and not to ends. It is consequently possible to appraise these rules from the point of view of their adequacy for the peaceful functioning of society. Even rigid supporters of an intuitionist ethics could not help eventually resorting to an appraisal of conduct from the point of view of its effects upon human happiness.
Ludwig von Mises; Human Action, pp. 143-144, added boldfaced print: Within the frame of social cooperation there can emerge between members of society feelings of sympathy and friendship and a sense of belonging together. These feelings are the source of man's most delightful and most sublime experiences. They are the most precious adornment of life; they lift the animal species man to the heights of a really human existence. However, they are not, as some have asserted, the agents that have brought about social relationships. They are fruits of social cooperation, they thrive only within its frame; they did not precede the establishment of social relations and are not the seed from which they spring. The fundamental facts that brought about cooperation, society, and civilization and transformed the animal man into a human being are the facts that work performed under the division of labor is more productive than isolated work and that man's reason is capable of recognizing this truth. But for these facts men would have forever remained deadly foes of one another, irreconcilable rivals in their endeavors to secure a portion of the scarce supply of means of sustenance provided by nature. Each man would have been forced to view all other men as his enemies; his craving for the satisfaction of his own appetites would have brought him into an implacable conflict with all his neighbors. No sympathy could possibly develop under such a state of affairs.
Within the frame of social cooperation there can emerge between members of society feelings of sympathy and friendship and a sense of belonging together. These feelings are the source of man's most delightful and most sublime experiences. They are the most precious adornment of life; they lift the animal species man to the heights of a really human existence. However, they are not, as some have asserted, the agents that have brought about social relationships. They are fruits of social cooperation, they thrive only within its frame; they did not precede the establishment of social relations and are not the seed from which they spring.
The fundamental facts that brought about cooperation, society, and civilization and transformed the animal man into a human being are the facts that work performed under the division of labor is more productive than isolated work and that man's reason is capable of recognizing this truth. But for these facts men would have forever remained deadly foes of one another, irreconcilable rivals in their endeavors to secure a portion of the scarce supply of means of sustenance provided by nature. Each man would have been forced to view all other men as his enemies; his craving for the satisfaction of his own appetites would have brought him into an implacable conflict with all his neighbors. No sympathy could possibly develop under such a state of affairs.
Justin Spahr-Summers: If I advocate individualism, it's because of its perceived benefit to me. That doesn't mean that utilitarian arguments are useless—I know that most statists aren't going to have a moral revolution just by reading Atlas Shrugged—but it means that utilitarianism is the wrong moral premise upon which to base capitalism.
If I advocate individualism, it's because of its perceived benefit to me. That doesn't mean that utilitarian arguments are useless—I know that most statists aren't going to have a moral revolution just by reading Atlas Shrugged—but it means that utilitarianism is the wrong moral premise upon which to base capitalism.
I am not sure what the intended connection between those statements is.