It is a common conception in Austrian School social thought to conceive human action in terms of the acts we take that are oriented toward the market economy or various aspects of it.
The concept of human action is the concept of purposeful activity, and Austrian School social thought primarily analyzes our purposeful activity as that activity is directed toward the market economy.
By "means" of a minimum wage law, I intend to increase the wages of wage earners. Economics demonstrates the necessary consequences of human "economic" acts such as these.
But are human "economic" acts the only kinds of human acts?
The answer would appear to be no.
Mises held that thinking itself is an action:
"...thinking itself [is] an action, proceeding step by step from the less satisfactory state of insufficient cognition to the more satisfactory state of better insight." (HA, 3rd rev. ed., p.99)
Why is thinking an action?
Because "trying to figure something out" or "trying to solve a problem" are conscious goal-directed activities (actions). So are the activities which are "trying to control my emotions" or "trying to overcome my fear of spiders."
These actions are actions because they are an attempt to replace the state of affairs that exists presently for the individual with another state of affairs.
Roughly speaking, these "thought actions" are actions that the actor in some sense directs toward himself. We might conceive that he attempts to effect some change in his own mind. These are "self-directed" actions. We may, as a beginning point, refer to such actions as "psychological" actions, meaning actions directed toward the mind of the actor himself.
Let's assume we agree there are other forms of action besides economic or catallactic actions. We agree with Mises that thinking is itself an action.
If we agree with this, then on what basis would we conclude that actions we direct toward other people are not actions? For example helping someone, harming someone, coercing someone, lying to someone.
Are these activities not actions? If not, why not?
Is there a class of actions in which we direct our attention not specifically toward the market economy (the subject matter of economic science), and not specifically toward our own minds (as in thinking), but toward other people ? A conceivable class of actions we direct toward other people or other conscious beings ?
If there are actions we direct toward other people, these actions amount to our conduct with respect to other people, which is the subject matter or subject realm of ethics. Thus, as a starting point, we could refer to such actions as "ethical actions." These are interpersonal actions--essentially actions we direct toward another consciousness by virtue of the fact that we believe the recipient of our actions is a conscious being of the same nature as ourselves.
So the first question is whether or not there are other forms of action besides "economic" or "catallactic" actions. And if there are, may we classify these other actions based on the object(s) of our actions?
The second question is the following:
Austrian economics claims that there is an inescapable logic of action, and that this logic of action applied to catallactic actions (actions oriented toward the market economy), yields the incontestable consequences that result from various catallactic actions. (i.e, what minimum wage laws necessarily entail, what tariffs necessarily entail, what an increase in the quantity of money necessarily entails, etc...)
If there are other forms of action besides catallactic actions, the question naturally arises whether there is a logic of these other forms of action as well?
Or is there only a logic of action when action is "economic" in nature, but no logic of action when we turn our actions away from the market economy and towards other people or towards our own minds?
Thus, two important questions for Austrian School social thought:
1. Are there other forms of action besides action oriented toward the market economy? If not, why not.
2. If there is a logic of economic or catallactic action, then is there a logic of other forms of action, or no? If not, why not.
These questions are implicit in Mises's conception of praxeology as the formal analysis of all forms of human action.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
Adam Knott:2. If there is a logic of economic or catallactic action, then is there a logic of other forms of action, or no? If not, why not.
It seems to me that if there were no logic to a given form of action, we would have no way to logically make decisions on how to act in that realm. In the realm of what you're tentatively calling "psychological action," for instance...
Assume I had a chip implanted in my brain that was programmed to automatically release a poison to instantly kill me if I thought of a blue elephant. If I didn't know better (if I were less acquainted with the logic of this realm of action), I might naively think "not a blue elephant." I would die because of my ignorance that the necessary entailment of thinking "not a blue elephant" is to think of a blue elephant in that very same moment, with that very same thought.
If that's not pure enough, how about changing blue elephant to a gestalt figure-and-ground image? Here's the image I'll be referring to in the example:
Similar to the above, assume I had a chip implanted in my brain that was programmed to instantly kill me if I pictured in my mind's eye a white vase of exactly that shape on a black background. To distract myself, in an effort to think of something as far as possible from that image, I might naively try think of the exact opposite: two black faces facing each other on a white background, in exactly that shape (because that's as un-vase-like as you can get - so un-vase-like in fact, that...) ...it forms exactly that forbidden white vase. So I would die, because of my ignorance that the necessary entailment of picturing a figure is picturing its background.
Correct or not, I don't know, but there does seem to be a logic of psychological action, at least.
Why anarchy fails
I don't think you can meaningfully classify different types of action based on their objects. All action shares the same logical structure: using means to achieve ends, or substituting a more satisfactory state of affairs for a less satisfactory one. I don't see how the content of the object/end can create any meaningful distinctions.
So whether you are trying to implement a minimum wage, thinking, or coercing someone, the structure of the action is the same: using means to achieve a psychic profit.
AnalyticalAnarchism.net - The Positive Political Economy of Anarchism
Catallactics, as Mises said, is only the hitherto best developed branch of praxeology. The actions studied in Crusoe "economics" and even a barter economy, even though they are not really what Mises is talking about when he says "market economy" and thus are not really subjects of catallactics, ARE actions, and thus are subjects of praxeology. Catallactics (economics), in the narrow sense, is the study of systems in which economic calculation in terms of money prices are possible. Praxeology, however, is concerned with all actions, even those outside of the realm of monetary calculation.
As Mises wrote in chapter 14 of HA:
"Catallactics is the analysis of those actions which are conducted on the basis of monetary calculation. "
Sage: I don't think you can meaningfully classify different types of action based on their objects. All action shares the same logical structure: using means to achieve ends, or substituting a more satisfactory state of affairs for a less satisfactory one. I don't see how the content of the object/end can create any meaningful distinctions. So whether you are trying to implement a minimum wage, thinking, or coercing someone, the structure of the action is the same: using means to achieve a psychic profit.
Sage:
Good points.
The structure of the action is the same.
Then, are all means equivalent with respect to achieving a psychic profit ?
Adam Knott:Then, are all means equivalent with respect to achieving a psychic profit ?
what do you mean by that? at first glance it looks like a silly question....
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
nirgrahamUK: Adam Knott:Then, are all means equivalent with respect to achieving a psychic profit ? what do you mean by that? at first glance it looks like a silly question....
NirUK:
I'm not interested in a moralistic exchange about formal social science. If you can't ask a simple question without introducing moralistic or pejorative adjectives, you may need to find another discussion partner.
Also, your previous question, was that addressed to the world in general? Or did you have a specific person you were addressing it to?
i asked a genuine question. i introduced no moralistic adjective. the pejorative was the weakest i could think of.
you pose a question about whether all means are equivalent with respect to achieving a psychic profit. clearly the answer is no.
nirgrahamUK: you pose a question about whether all means are equivalent with respect to achieving a psychic profit. clearly the answer is no.
Sage put forth the following idea:
The structure of action is always the same: using means to achieve a psychic profit.
If various means are not equivalent with respect to our psychic profit (if different means affect our psychic profit differently), then this seems to be a meaningful basis for distinguishing various means (objects) of action.
I read Sage as contending that the objects of action cannot be meaningfully classified.
So my question to Sage was addressing this issue.
you couldn't do it on classes/categories of objects but definite/marginal objects.
Well, I suppose you could say that means that achieve the goal produce a psychic profit, and means that fail to achieve the goal produce a psychic loss (with degrees in between). So implementing a minimum wage to increase employment would result in a psychic loss.
Adam Knott:I read Sage as contending that the objects of action cannot be meaningfully classified.
Let me clarify my position: I think you can classify actions based on their objects, but that regardless of the object, the logical structure of the action is the same. So although engaging in exchange and coercing someone have different objects, they still fall under the same general category.
"So implementing a minimum wage to increase employment would result in a psychic loss."
I think you are largely encapsulating, in an extremely succinct way, the essential proposition of formal social science as this was envisioned by Menger, Mises, Hayek, Robbins, and others.
We construct a formal system in which means that achieve their ends produce a psychic profit, and means that fail to achieve their end produce a psychic loss.
Then we suppose a means that cannot possibly achieve its end. We then deduce that this means therefore must result in a psychic loss.
If we change psychic profit to "happiness," and psychic loss to "unhappiness," we have basically outlined a logical science of happiness.
This is the formal and logical science of happiness Mises is referring to.
"Action is the search for improvement of conditions from the point of view of the personal value judgments of the individual concerned......Man's aim is to substitute what he considers a better state of affairs for a less satisfactory one. He strives for the substitution of a more satisfactory state of affairs in place of a less satisfactory state of affairs. And in the satisfaction of this desire, he becomes happier than he was before."
(Mises, The Free Market and its Enemies. p.14)
"...a logical science of happiness." What are the implications of that?
If we take this to mean that economics (catallactics) teaches us the logical laws of happiness with respect to exchanges, I suppose you're asking - if as Sage says the structure of all action is the same* - why there couldn't be logical laws of happiness with respect to non-catallactic actions, such as coercion.
*Granted I may have missed his point entirely.
However, on first glance, the concept of "X increases happiness" (or "psychic profit") seems just another way to say that X is suited to the ends aimed at. Is there something more there?
Jason:
"If we take this to mean that economics (catallactics) teaches us the logical laws of happiness with respect to exchanges, I suppose you're asking - if as Sage says the structure of all action is the same* - why there couldn't be logical laws of happiness with respect to non-catallactic actions, such as coercion."
Yes.
"However, on first glance, the concept of "X increases happiness" (or "psychic profit") seems just another way to say that X is suited to the ends aimed at."
I thought Sage's post was showing a way to connect those two ideas:
"Well, I suppose you could say that means that achieve the goal produce a psychic profit, and means that fail to achieve the goal produce a psychic loss (with degrees in between). So implementing a minimum wage to increase employment would result in a psychic loss."
NirUK: I'm not interested in a moralistic exchange about formal social science. If you can't ask a simple question without introducing moralistic or pejorative adjectives, you may need to find another discussion partner.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Adam Knott:If we change psychic profit to "happiness," and psychic loss to "unhappiness," we have basically outlined a logical science of happiness.
Do you think this could be developed to produce a justification of libertarian rights?
Adam Knott: It is a common conception in Austrian School social thought to conceive human action in terms of the acts we take that are oriented toward the market economy or various aspects of it. The concept of human action is the concept of purposeful activity, and Austrian School social thought primarily analyzes our purposeful activity as that activity is directed toward the market economy. By "means" of a minimum wage law, I intend to increase the wages of wage earners. Economics demonstrates the necessary consequences of human "economic" acts such as these. But are human "economic" acts the only kinds of human acts? The answer would appear to be no. Mises held that thinking itself is an action: "...thinking itself [is] an action, proceeding step by step from the less satisfactory state of insufficient cognition to the more satisfactory state of better insight." (HA, 3rd rev. ed., p.99) Why is thinking an action? Because "trying to figure something out" or "trying to solve a problem" are conscious goal-directed activities (actions). So are the activities which are "trying to control my emotions" or "trying to overcome my fear of spiders." These actions are actions because they are an attempt to replace the state of affairs that exists presently for the individual with another state of affairs. Roughly speaking, these "thought actions" are actions that the actor in some sense directs toward himself. We might conceive that he attempts to effect some change in his own mind. These are "self-directed" actions. We may, as a beginning point, refer to such actions as "psychological" actions, meaning actions directed toward the mind of the actor himself. Let's assume we agree there are other forms of action besides economic or catallactic actions. We agree with Mises that thinking is itself an action. If we agree with this, then on what basis would we conclude that actions we direct toward other people are not actions? For example helping someone, harming someone, coercing someone, lying to someone. Are these activities not actions? If not, why not? Is there a class of actions in which we direct our attention not specifically toward the market economy (the subject matter of economic science), and not specifically toward our own minds (as in thinking), but toward other people ? A conceivable class of actions we direct toward other people or other conscious beings ? If there are actions we direct toward other people, these actions amount to our conduct with respect to other people, which is the subject matter or subject realm of ethics. Thus, as a starting point, we could refer to such actions as "ethical actions." These are interpersonal actions--essentially actions we direct toward another consciousness by virtue of the fact that we believe the recipient of our actions is a conscious being of the same nature as ourselves. So the first question is whether or not there are other forms of action besides "economic" or "catallactic" actions. And if there are, may we classify these other actions based on the object(s) of our actions? The second question is the following: Austrian economics claims that there is an inescapable logic of action, and that this logic of action applied to catallactic actions (actions oriented toward the market economy), yields the incontestable consequences that result from various catallactic actions. (i.e, what minimum wage laws necessarily entail, what tariffs necessarily entail, what an increase in the quantity of money necessarily entails, etc...) If there are other forms of action besides catallactic actions, the question naturally arises whether there is a logic of these other forms of action as well? Or is there only a logic of action when action is "economic" in nature, but no logic of action when we turn our actions away from the market economy and towards other people or towards our own minds? Thus, two important questions for Austrian School social thought: 1. Are there other forms of action besides action oriented toward the market economy? If not, why not. 2. If there is a logic of economic or catallactic action, then is there a logic of other forms of action, or no? If not, why not. These questions are implicit in Mises's conception of praxeology as the formal analysis of all forms of human action.
An interesting passage from Jesus Huerta de Soto's article "Ludwig von Mises's Human Action as a Textbook of Economics." (2004)
"This approach [School of Public Choice], which today has reached a high level of development under the auspices of theorists like James M. Buchanan (winner of the Nobel Price for Economics in 1986), fits in perfectly with the broad praxeological conception of economics developed by Mises, who considered that the goal of our science was to build a general theory of human action in all its varieties and contexts (including, therefore, political actions). (p.55) (emphasis added)
It's fairly rare to see an express reference made, by an Austrian economist, to a specific class of non-catallactic actions as de Soto does here....
Sage:Do you think this could be developed to produce a justification of libertarian rights?
I'd say maybe, but only to other libertarians. A violation of those rights might give another interested party a psychic benefit.