From Roderick Long's "Review of Leland Yeager's Ethics as a Social Science," p.9-10:
Whatever I choose, I choose either as a consumer’s good (a first-order good) or as a producer’s good (a higher-order good). Utilitarianism of any sort regards morality as a producer’s good, a means of producing happiness; but indirect utilitarianism maintains, in effect, that the most effective way to promote happiness is to treat morality as if it were a consumer’s good, even though it isn’t one. But is it really possible to adopt the attitude that indirect utilitarianism recommends? When I choose morality “as if” it were a consumer’s good, either it really becomes a consumer’s good for me, or else it remains a producer’s good and I am only pretending. There is no third possibility. Suppose it does become a consumer’s good for me. In that case, I am no longer a consistent utilitarian, since in my actions I reveal a preference for morality as an end in itself. Yeager recommends treating a principle as inherently binding at the everyday level while recognizing its contingency on utilitarian outcomes at the reflective level (pp. 294–95); but doesn’t this just amount to advising us to form inconsistent preferences? And if the preferences on which I ordinarily act do treat morality as a consumer’s good, in what sense can it be said that I really regard it as a producer’s good? On the other hand, suppose that morality remains a producer’s good for me. Following Mises, we may say that every action embodies a means-end scheme; in that case, even when I choose to act morally, my choice commits me to rejecting morality in counterfactual situations—cooked-up cases—where immorality would be a more effective means to the end, and this commitment is a blot on my character now. (Hence the Kantian insistence on the importance of maxims rather than actions.)It has often been claimed that indirect utilitarianism is unstable, and must collapse either into direct utilitarianism on the one hand or into “rules fetishism” on the other. This can be interpreted as a psychological claim about the likely results of trying to maintain a utilitarian attitude, in which case its truth or falsity is an empirical matter. By transposing the familiar stability objection into a praxeological key, however, what I’ve been trying to show is that indirect utilitarianism is not just causally but conceptually unstable. If I treat morality as a consumer’s good, I must reject utilitarianism on pain of inconsistency; if I treat morality as a producer’s good, I thereby exhibit a moral character or disposition that utilitarian considerations themselves condemn. But I must treat morality in one way or the other; hence utilitarianism is praxeologically self-defeating. The praxeologist cannot be a direct utilitarian, since praxeological reasoning itself shows us that the utilitarian’s goal depends on social cooperation, which in turn requires the kind of stable and consistent commitment to principles that a direct utilitarian cannot have. Nor can the praxeologist be an indirect utilitarian, since praxeological considerations force a choice between treating morality as a producer’s good (in which case we’re back with direct utilitarianism) and treating it as a consumer’s good (in which case utilitarianism prescribes its own rejection). We may have utilitarian reasons for adopting moral commitments, but once we have adopted them, we can no longer regard them as resting on purely utilitarian foundations—because so regarding them would alter their status as commitments.
AnalyticalAnarchism.net - The Positive Political Economy of Anarchism
Here is Robert P. Murphy's review of the same book. "Is Utilitarianism Viable?"
Hi, my name’s Bob, and I’m a recovering utilitarian. It’s been a few months now since I admitted the truth to myself. You see, I used to believe that all moral issues could be reduced to a simple maximization of utility. Many of my closest friends told me I had a problem, but I refused to listen. They meant well, but they just didn’t get it. Or so I thought.
No.
Sage:Yeager recommends treating a principle as inherently binding at the everyday level while recognizing its contingency on utilitarian outcomes at the reflective level (pp. 294–95); but doesn’t this just amount to advising us to form inconsistent preferences?
This whole analysis ignores time structure and time preference. If someone has a very high time preference, they may "sin" now and say to hell with the future (if they think it will benefit them in the short term). The flipside is that if a consequentialist believes he will live forever and has a time preference approaching zero, morality may become entirely a consumer's good, that is, he may choose to become a de facto deontologist. But in that case the distinction between morality being a consumer's good or producer's good (and hence between deontology and consequentialism) loses its meaning, so there would be nothing inconsistent about a consequentialist even in that extreme case.
Why anarchy fails
As a semantic note, consequentialism is not utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is based on the concept of maximizing utility or good for (individuals/society), consequentialism maintains that at least part of the moral substance of an action is whether its consequences are beneficial or not. The two doctrines have some similarities, and vast differences. I reject utilitarianism as lacking substantive content; but I am a consequentialist in that there are elements of justice and culture which can be cited as wrong or right based (sometimes solely) upon their ultimate consequences. Procedural justice and social attitudes (pluralism vs. atavism, rationalism vs. mysticism, etc.) can only be judged by their consequences and can not rationally be assessed by any other means; as their function is to attain the substantive aims of morality (individual development, prosperity, social harmony).
“Laws: We know what they are, and what they are worth! They are spider webs for the rich and mighty, steel chains for the poor and weak, fishing nets in the hands of the government.” - Proudhon
AJ:This whole analysis ignores time structure and time preference.
I don't see how that's relevant. Even if someone has really low time preference, they either treat morality as a means (a producer's good) or as an end (a consumer's good). If the former, they must accept direct utilitarianism, which utilitarians themselves reject as absurd. If the latter, then they have abandoned utilitarianism, since they value morality as an end in itself, rather than as a means which produces good consequences. Hence utilitarianism is praxeologically incoherent.
Utilitarianism is actually shallow consequentialism.
And no one can escape consequentialism even if they wished to. Whoever claims he is not an consequentialist is actually one but are not aware of the fact.
Sage:If the former, they must accept direct utilitarianism, which utilitarians themselves reject as absurd.
Surely some do, but I don't think Mises rejected pure utilitarianism (insofar as that means consequentialism).
No wittgenstein people here?
By what standard do we judge ethics? Consistency? How do you presuppose objective ethics are rationally apprehendable?
From Wiki:
"Wittgenstein first asks the reader to perform a thought experiment: to come up with a definition of the word "game".[6] While this may at first seem a simple task, he then goes on to lead us through the problems with each of the possible definitions of the word "game". Any definition which focuses on amusement leaves us unsatisfied since the feelings experienced by a world class chess player are very different from those of a circle of children playing Duck Duck Goose. Any definition which focuses on competition will fail to explain the game of catch, or the game of solitaire. And a definition of the word "game" which focuses on rules will fall on similar difficulties.
The essential point of this exercise is often missed. Wittgenstein's point is not that it is impossible to define "game", but that we don't have a definition, and we don't need one, because even without the definition, we use the word successfully. [7] Everybody understands what we mean when we talk about playing a game, and we can even clearly identify and correct inaccurate uses of the word, all without reference to any definition that consists of necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the concept of a game. It is important to note that the German word for "game", "Spiele/Spiel", has a different sense than in English; the meaning of "Spiele" also extends to the concept of "play" and "playing." This German sense of the word may help readers better understand Wittgenstein's context in the remarks regarding games.[8]
ktibuk:And no one can escape consequentialism even if they wished to. Whoever claims he is not an consequentialist is actually one but are not aware of the fact.
Do you have an argument for this?
AJ:Surely some do, but I don't think Mises rejected pure utilitarianism (insofar as that means consequentialism).
Of course Mises was a utilitarian. My point is that utilitarianism is praxeologically self-defeating.
Sage:Even if someone has really low time preference, they either treat morality as a means (a producer's good) or as an end (a consumer's good).
All goods, including consumers' goods, are means not ends. See Man, Economy, and State chapter 1, section 3.
Long:Yeager recommends treating a principle as inherently binding at the everyday level while recognizing its contingency on utilitarian outcomes at the reflective level (pp. 294–95); but doesn’t this just amount to advising us to form inconsistent preferences?
Yeager's conception makes sense to me. It's akin to non-moral maxims that, on an everyday level are acted upon as if inherently binding, like "look both ways before you cross the street." When I do that on an everyday level, I do it just because "that's simply one of my rules". If I reflect on it, I recognize its contingent nature, and its ultimate purpose. But on an everyday, level, I act as if it were inherently binding.
Long:Following Mises, we may say that every action embodies a means-end scheme; in that case, even when I choose to act morally, my choice commits me to rejecting morality in counterfactual situations—cooked-up cases—where immorality would be a more effective means to the end, and this commitment is a blot on my character now
If an actor regards "immoral" action as the most effective means to his end, then he will undertake "immoral" action BY DEFINITION. I don't see what that's supposed to disprove.
Long:if I treat morality as a producer’s good, I thereby exhibit a moral character or disposition that utilitarian considerations themselves condemn
How so?
Sage:Of course Mises was a utilitarian. My point is that utilitarianism is praxeologically self-defeating.
Mises's "utilitarianism" didn't involve moral arguments about what is right/wrong. He didn't say that any individual ought to regard the greatest good for the greatest number paramount. He did not try to impose his ends on others, or scientifically improve ends as objectively "right." He recognized that practically ALL political parties promised greater material comfort for the masses. GIVEN the ends implied by that, he aimed to show to policy-makers (including voters) what societal arrangements are conducive to them. I don't see what's self-defeating in that.
well,Lilburne, therefore Mises was not a utilitarian as that word is understood in the history of philosophy..... Indeed he strikes me as a non-cognitivist.
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Sage: From Roderick Long's "Review of Leland Yeager's Ethics as a Social Science," p.9-10: Whatever I choose, I choose either as a consumer’s good (a first-order good) or as a producer’s good (a higher-order good).
Whatever I choose, I choose either as a consumer’s good (a first-order good) or as a producer’s good (a higher-order good).
Sage:
The problem with Long's analysis here is that it rests on objective economics conceptions. That is, the distinction between consumer's goods and producer's goods is not, strictly speaking, a praxeological distinction, but an "objective" distinction of economic (catallactic, market, production, etc.) science. In other words, Long is utilizing a distinction of economics having to do with various objects related to production for the market---as distinct from---a distinction of praxeology which deals in formal categories.
Praxeology and economics are not identical. Objective distinctions taken from traditional economic science are not necessarily applicable in praxeology which is a more universal science. A distinction between spotted and striped, while applicable to some sub-classes of living things, is not part of the universal definition of living things. Then, one could not claim something such as "whatever lives, lives as striped or spotted."
Similarly, one cannot necessarily claim in praxeology that whatever is chosen is chosen for production or consumption.
*****
Regarding choice, as Mises writes, "Not what a man chooses, but that he chooses counts for praxeology."
(Money, Method, and the Market Process, p.20, emphasis added)
As I believe Lilburne correctly pointed out, anything 'chosen' by an actor is chosen as a means to an end, and praxeology is concerned with choosing as such---means as such---not "consumer's" means versus "producer's" means.
The distinction in praxeology is not between goods I choose for X, and goods I choose for Y.
The distinction in praxeology is, goods (means) X, I choose for purpose (end) Y.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
J. Grayson Lilburne: Sage:Of course Mises was a utilitarian. My point is that utilitarianism is praxeologically self-defeating. Mises's "utilitarianism" didn't involve moral arguments about what is right/wrong. He didn't say that any individual ought to regard the greatest good for the greatest number paramount. He did not try to impose his ends on others, or scientifically improve ends as objectively "right." He recognized that practically ALL political parties promised greater material comfort for the masses. GIVEN the ends implied by that, he aimed to show to policy-makers (including voters) what societal arrangements are conducive to them. I don't see what's self-defeating in that.
Lilburn:
I agree, and I also think that Long provides a definition of utilitarianism in the same article that is consistent with what you are writing about Mises:
"Universalistic utilitarianism's ethical criterion is the welfare of society as a whole; egoistic utilitarianism's ethical criterion is the individual agent's own welfare."
"The term "utilitarianism" is sometimes restricted to the universalist version only, but I here follow Yeager in applying the term more broadly."
Here, Long acknowledges a conception of utilitarianism that is concerned with the individual actor's own welfare, i.e., what it is in the individual's self-interest to do or not do. (what means it is in the individual's self-interest to adopt or avoid)
Mises's concern was, as you write, given the ends an individual has, what means can bring about, or cannot possibly bring about, the given end.
As only individuals act, then praxeology instructs individuals on what means to adopt or avoid if they want to attain their end. This is "egoistic utilitarianism" by Long's definition.
As I understand things, virtue ethics, eudaimonia ethics, and flourishing ethics, are all forms of egoistic utilitarianism, to the extent that they provide information to an individual of the general form: If you want to: [be virtuous, attain eudaimonia, flourish, etc.], then you should/ought do [x.y,z...]. If you don't do [x,y,z,...], then you won't [be virtuous, attain eudaimonia, flourish, etc...].
To the extent these ethics theories provide information of this nature, they are theories of action by Mises's defintion:
"The starting point of experimental knowledge is the cognition that an A is uniformly followed by a B. The utilization of this knowledge either for production of B or for the avoidance of the emergence of B is called action. The primary objective of action is either to bring about B or to prevent its happening."
(UF, p.20)
I would add that B can be conceived as "co-present" with A, and need not be conceived as temporally remote from A.
When an individual utilizes theoretical knowledge to bring about his own virtue, eudaimonia, flourishing, etc., he "acts" in the Misesian sense, and the theory of the relationship between these given ends and the means an individual adopts to attain them is a theory of action.
Snowflake: No wittgenstein people here? By what standard do we judge ethics? Consistency? How do you presuppose objective ethics are rationally apprehendable? From Wiki: "Wittgenstein first asks the reader to perform a thought experiment: to come up with a definition of the word "game".[6] While this may at first seem a simple task, he then goes on to lead us through the problems with each of the possible definitions of the word "game". Any definition which focuses on amusement leaves us unsatisfied since the feelings experienced by a world class chess player are very different from those of a circle of children playing Duck Duck Goose. Any definition which focuses on competition will fail to explain the game of catch, or the game of solitaire. And a definition of the word "game" which focuses on rules will fall on similar difficulties. The essential point of this exercise is often missed. Wittgenstein's point is not that it is impossible to define "game", but that we don't have a definition, and we don't need one, because even without the definition, we use the word successfully. [7] Everybody understands what we mean when we talk about playing a game, and we can even clearly identify and correct inaccurate uses of the word, all without reference to any definition that consists of necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the concept of a game. It is important to note that the German word for "game", "Spiele/Spiel", has a different sense than in English; the meaning of "Spiele" also extends to the concept of "play" and "playing." This German sense of the word may help readers better understand Wittgenstein's context in the remarks regarding games.[8]
Yes, we can use words with fuzzy or complex definitions whose boundaries are not fully comprehended by the users. Fuzzy words are serviceable precisely because we do not think in words (although we do employ them in our thought processes). We use words in communication as a means to sketch concepts well enough for the listener to get the gist.
We can fill in the blanks in most cases because we are all human. But when the matter is critical, precision becomes important. Naturally, a word that needed no precision when it was coined may later require precision in order to function as the centerpiece for a useful debate.
How much precision is enough? When all participants can easily ascertain the intended interpretation of the word in the context used, that is enough precision.
But you haven't made that case. You've just alluded to the fact that there are inconsistent utilitarians.
AJ:But you haven't made that case. You've just alluded to the fact that there are inconsistent utilitarians.
Did you read the OP? The whole point is that utilitarianism is logically inconsistent.
Your reason for dismissing the time structure argument was that there have been impure utilitarians; what about the pure ones?
No, my response was that time preference is irrelevant.
The way I see it, the issue is this: a libertarian cannot be a direct/act utilitarian, because that justifies all sorts of crazy things, e.g. killing one patient to redistribute their organs to five other patients.
But indirect/rule utilitarianism is not a coherent alternative, because it means following a rule even in cases when you could better promote utility by abandoning the rule; in other words, treating the rule as an end in itself (as a deontologist would) rather than as a means which promotes utility. So indirect utilitarianism is self-contradictory, because it ceases to be utilitarianism at all.
Sage:The way I see it, the issue is this: a libertarian cannot be a direct/act utilitarian, because that justifies all sorts of crazy things, e.g. killing one patient to redistribute their organs to five other patients.
If you were a pure utilitarian/consequentialist and you thought it was "crazy" for you to do that, you wouldn't do it. Because for a utilitarian, "crazy" = "net harm for me." Either it benefits you or it doesn't. Killing the donor, you net gain four lives, which may bring psychic benefit to you. Or, if directly taking a life brings you more psychic detriment than the psychic benefit of saving the other four, you refrain. Seems pretty straightforward.
Individualist utilitarianism is not the same as collectivist utilitarianism; the problem is utilitarianism in the context of a collectivist leader who justifies his actions by the Greatest Happiness Principle. Outside the monopolist and collectivist context, pure utilitarianism doesn't have those problems. In fact, the problem lies solely in the collectivism, not in the utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is a proximate cause, but the root cause is collectivism and monopoly statism.
Well, you would have to show why there is something wrong with killing-one-to-save-five (some would argue that it's not wrong, although this example does serve as a good quick-and-dirty appeal to intuition if that's all you want).
Sage:But indirect/rule utilitarianism is not a coherent alternative, because it means following a rule even in cases when you could better promote utility by abandoning the rule; in other words, treating the rule as an end in itself (as a deontologist would) rather than as a means which promotes utility. So indirect utilitarianism is self-contradictory, because it ceases to be utilitarianism at all.
The reason why the indirect utilitarian has adopted the "unbreakable" rule is because they think that doing so will give greater long-run utility than not doing so, and that the latter is preferable after discounting for time preference. So there are no cases where they believe that breaking the rule will maximize expected utility.
Let's say I'm a recovering alcoholic, and I have resolved never to drink alcohol ever again. My final value is good health, and I am teetotaling only as a means to that end. Nevertheless, although I recognize that there may be some cases where drinking alcohol will not in itself harm my health, I also recognize that having even one drink will set the precedent for future violations of the rule, and I don't trust myself to be able to judge the individual cases with enough accuracy to prevent a relapse into alcoholism. Hence I act as if teetotaling were an end in itself, even though I still believe that good health is my ultimate goal.
(I still don't think that morality can be derived from indirect utilitarianism; I just think that Long's argument is too strong, insofar as it would have us believe that indirect utilitarianism is "praxeologically incoherent" even in the case of an individual privately maximizing his/her own utility, while we can see that there's no inconsistency in reasoning like the ex-alcoholic above.)
AJ:Either it benefits you or it doesn't. Killing the donor, you net gain four lives, which may bring psychic benefit to you.
This is my point. Utilitarianism recommends killing the patient if it best promotes utility, but this directly violates the NAP. Hence a libertarian cannot be a direct utilitarian.
Zavoi:Well, you would have to show why there is something wrong with killing-one-to-save-five
Given the context (we're all libertarians), I'm assuming the NAP as a premise.
Zavoi:So there are no cases where they believe that breaking the rule will maximize expected utility.
I think your objection would be correct but for this sentence. It seems highly dubious to say that there are absolutely no possible cooked-up cases where utility is best promoted by violating the rule (and without setting a precedent for future violations, etc.). As Long writes:
there are possible cases, however infrequent, in which one could best promote utility by committing (not just any rule-violation but) a morally horrific rule-violation. In such a case, if a moral theory recommends the rule-violation, it is a bad theory; and if it does not recommend the rule-violation, it is no longer utilitarian.
And if such cases exist, then indirect utilitarianism is incoherent.
Sage: AJ:Either it benefits you or it doesn't. Killing the donor, you net gain four lives, which may bring psychic benefit to you. This is my point. Utilitarianism recommends killing the patient if it best promotes utility, but this directly violates the NAP. Hence a libertarian cannot be a direct utilitarian.
But killing the patient would not promote utility for a direct utilitarian who is also a strict libertarian.* Such a person would have reasoned that violating the NAP will always reduce his own net happiness.
*As you implicitly define libertarian: total non-violation of the NAP (however we define aggression; I don't think I will agree with your definition, but I take it for granted above).
Everyone is a direct individualist utilitarian in the broad sense, in that everyone strives for more happiness and less unhappiness. That's just the action axiom. Whether we have heuristics to help achieve this is beside the point.
In speaking about individuals, it's silly for there to be a position called "utilitarianism" - it should just be called reality. The reason such a term exists is undoubtedly that it arose in the statist and collectivist context, where it involved recommendation to others and justification for statist atrocities; individual consequentialism (Mises's direct "utilitarianism") does not entail any such thing.