No natural rights.

I'd like to hear some thoughts regarding how people manage to advocate libertarianism without recourse to natural rights ?

It seems to me the majority of libertarians did/do believe in natural rights. The ones that did not were perhaps forerunners of socialism. Authors like JS Mill and Bentham could perhaps be examples.

People I know who claim to advocate libertarianism and who don't believe in natural rights are people rather involved in every day political life. It seems to me that their lack of belief in natural rights makes it easier for them to compromise and accept political expedience, but perhaps I'm being overly cynic ?

 

To me it depends on which strand of libertarianism one subscribes to.

A deontological libertarian might use a natural rights basis, but natural rights have not been empirically or logically proven.  So using this concept as a base makes libertarianism look hollow.  As a market anarchist (which is ultimately derived from a deontological basis) I believe that self-ownership is a more cogent foundation for a deontological root.  Self-ownership exists because humans naturally hold control over our bodies.  No higher or external force controls your fingers if you type on a keyboard, or your hands and feet if you drive a car, or in practically any other activity.  Also, self-ownership does not have to be justified by reference to the divine or God, like natural rights advocates often do.

A consequentialist libertarian would simply say that a limited government is necessary in order to spread the greatest liberty to the greatest number.  This is the branch of libertarianism which the late Milton Friedman advocated.  Such libertarians reject a "natural rights" base.

If they don't make recourse to natural-rights, then they're usually deontologists (e.g. Nozick), proponents of argumentation ethics (which has deontological elements, e.g. Hoppe), contractarians (e.g. Narveson), utilitarians (e.g. Friedman, Mises etc.) Of course, there is the possibility that they're moral nihilists or subjectivists, but that is rare.

Those interested in natural rights should focus on Den Uyl's, Rasmussen's, Rand's and Veatch's works. I think Geoffrey Plauche has tried synthesizing their approaches in his dissertation paper.

Deontology and natural rights are close, if I'm not mistaking. Deontological arguments say "don't do it becaust it's wrong" as opposed to utilitarian arguments wich judge the 'goodness' of actions by their outcomes.

Also, I would consider a theory based on self-ownership as another variety of natural rights theory.

So let me put it this way : What's the justification for utilitarianism ? Actions are good if they result in "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" ? Why should we care ? And what if the majority derives happines by say torturing dissenters ?

Deontology basically relies on the claim that actions are right or wrong in themselves, which sets it in direct opposition with consequentialism.  While classical utilitarianism is generally considered to be a consequentialist view, not all forms of utilitarianism take this form; rule utilitarianism, for example, is clearly a deontological view, though it has consequentialist underpinnings.

But more importantly, natural rights views do not have a monopoly over deontological conceptions of morality.  Rule utilitarianism, as just mentioned, does not find its basis in any view of natural rights.  Interest-based views of justice are similarly not grounded in natural rights, and it's not completely clear that any of the Kantian views are either (his duties don't seem to be necessarily correlative with naturally held rights held by others).

Almost no one is a classical utilitarian anymore, so simplistic objections like the ones you just offered aren't likely to concern very many people.  Better questions might be these:

If I were starving, and despite being extremely wealthy you weren't willing to help me, would your natural rights oblige me to sit and die instead of steal from you?  What if you would barely notice my having done so?

If a meteor were headed straight for New York City, and we could deflect it, but doing so would send it crashing down upon a farmer's house, killing the farmer, would we be justified in deflecting it?

No natural rights view is completely uncontroversial, and I haven't seen one which doesn't entail things that are downright counterintuitive. Is that simply a reflection of our irrationality?  Can't we lean on modus tollens in cases like these?

If I recall correctly, Benjamin Tucker himself rejected natural rights later in life and opted for a Max Stirner type of philosophy. That was one of the major clashes between him and Lysander Spooner, aside from the intellectual property question.

check out David Friedman, (milton friedmans son) and anarcho-capitalist / libertarian. he focuses more on utilitarian style arguments, as he feels they might better convince those of utilitarian bent, as utilitarians might dismiss natural rights folks out of hand.

Machinery of Freedom <-book

Donny with an A:

If a meteor were headed straight for New York City, and we could deflect it, but doing so would send it crashing down upon a farmer's house, killing the farmer, would we be justified in deflecting it?

If we assume that we have no time to warn the farmer to get out of the way I would argue it is a very regrettable accident resulting from an act of self preservation. It is something akin to the driver of a bus filled with passengers slamming on his brakes to stop from going over a cliff and the bus skidding and killing a pedestrian as a result. Even if the driver knew that pedestrian would die he is justified. He saved the lives of his passengers.

 Sorry if it was unclear, but in the example, the agent does not reside in New York City.

If we view ethics as means to certain ends, why would we have separate rules-based and outcome-based systems?

In my opinion, rules-based approaches are used because following certain rules tends to lead to desirable outcomes. When an actor cannot predict the outcome of his actions, he cannot know what actions will lead to the desired ends. He can, however, follow certain rules (trusting in the 'system', so to speak). I accept Hayek's view that our traditions are sometimes 'smarter' than we are, so it makes sense to fall back on them when our reason cannot light the way.

An outcome-based approach must sometimes be necessary because no human-made ruleset could possibly be complete enough to base all ethical decisions on. When an actor can see that following a certain rule will lead to an undesirable outcome, it doesn't make any sense to follow that rule. This is difficult because so many of us arrogantly believe ourselves as being far wiser than we are. In my view, this approach is unsuitable for political action, because of the incredible complexity of society and the unintended consequences that often result from stupid politicians meddling in things they don't understand.

I think we lack the ability to produce a complete system of dentological ethics as well as the ability to predict the ethical consequences of our actions. So we just try to use what we can, to achieve our desired ends.

Grant,

Your position has some of the elements wich I find puzzling. For instance :

I accept Hayek's view that our traditions are sometimes 'smarter' than we are,

How can we know that our traditions are smarter than us ? By Hayek's definition we are not smart. So how do we know if certain tradition helps ? Perhaps the tradition exists because it's been imposed by a gang of criminals known as the state ? Imagine you know nothing about cars and want to buy one. How do you know if you've got a good deal ? Ah, you look at the majority/tradition ? What if most of them know nothing about cars as well ? Two wrongs make a right ? Many wrongs make a right ? How many ?

In my opinion, rules-based approaches are used because following certain rules tends to lead to desirable outcomes.

Desirable for whom ? Taxation for instance is desirable for tax spenders and undesirable for tax payers...

When an actor cannot predict the outcome of his actions, he cannot know what actions will lead to the desired ends.

If that was completly true, action wouldn't be possible...but people act anyhow.

He can, however, follow certain rules (trusting in the 'system', so to speak).

Like sheep ? :) Okay. A market economy is indeed based on incomplete information 'procesed' in a decentralized way, but I'm not talking about that, but about the moral justification for coercion.

I see all around coercitive traditions. Well, I know people who invoke Hayek to 'prove' that coercion is good because it's traditional. Is that what Hayek says ? I doubt it because it's nonsense, let alone morally repugnant.

Grant:

If we view ethics as means to certain ends, why would we have separate rules-based and outcome-based systems?

 

 That's a major flaw of deontological theories. They aren't praxeological. Something is either right or wrong regardless of what ends one seeks. For this reason, I don't think Hoppe's argumentation ethics is a truly praxeological theory.

 This doesn't mean that one has to be a consequentialist in order to have a praxeological ethics. The better alternative is a theory of virtue ethics and natural rights based on the virtue of justice.

 Also, see Roderick Long's "Why Does Justice Have Good Consequences?" for an argument that rule utilitarianism is praxeologically unstable.