liberty student:Right, but you're ignoring the unseen. The act of the person who forces the immoral act, the king who debases his currency etc. Those acts are all praxeological as well.
No, I understand that. My point was that the end result will mean his extermination (or getting voted out of office, or whatever). I'm not looking at individual motives, but rather the system as a whole, which consists of many individuals, all trying to better their position. The king who debases his currency is infringing on the property of his citizens, and diminishing their wealth arbitrarily. This act is immoral, and there will be consequences. Lilburne is saying that we can't really call the king immoral, and I reject this position.
"If we wish to preserve a free society, it is essential that we recognize that the desirability of a particular object is not sufficient justification for the use of coercion."
J. Grayson Lilburne:In seeking the Form of Justice, the Form of the Good, and the Form of Beauty, Plato was trying to discover universal, absolute, and objective values.
I don't think you actually fully understand the Rothbardian position.
J. Grayson Lilburne: Ricardo was doing much the same when he tried to infer objective value from the intrinsic qualities of goods. And Rothbardian ethicists do much the same when they try to infer universal, absolute, and objective values from the intrinsic qualities of man.
Ricardo was doing much the same when he tried to infer objective value from the intrinsic qualities of goods.
And Rothbardian ethicists do much the same when they try to infer universal, absolute, and objective values from the intrinsic qualities of man.
Got a better analogy? Anyway..
"Even in the finest works of economics, including Human Action, the concept of property had attracted little attention before Rothbard burst onto the intellectual scene with Man, Economy, and State. Yet, as Rothbard pointed out, such common economic terms as direct and indirect exchange, markets and market prices, as well as aggression, invasion, crime, and fraud, cannot be defined or understood without a prior theory of property. Nor is it possible to establish the familiar economic theorems relating to these phenomena without an implied notion of property and property rights. A definition and theory of property must precede the definition and establishment of all other economic terms and theorems.[4]" - Hoppe
And what is your definition and theory of property?
J. Grayson Lilburne:If you mean by "wrt rights", universal, absolute, objective rights, then I don't see what the difference would be...
The difference is the second pillar (first being economics) of the Rothbardian system deals with political philosophy, eg. Ethics of Liberty.
"For we are not, in constructing a theory of liberty and property, i.e., a “political” ethic, concerned with all personal moral principles. We are not herewith concerned whether it is moral or immoral for someone to lie, to be a good person, to develop his faculties, or be kind or mean to his neighbors. We are concerned, in this sort of discussion, solely with such “political ethical” questions as the proper role of violence, the sphere of rights, or the definitions of criminality and aggression."
I believe, you were charging that he was trying to do what Plato and others had tried? You don't see the difference here?
Have you ever made a policy suggestion?
Conza88:And what is your definition and theory of property?
But resolving conflicts over scarcity isn't about property or ethics...
Esuric:No, I understand that. My point was that the end result will mean his extermination (or getting voted out of office, or whatever). I'm not looking at individual motives, but rather the system as a whole, which consists of many individuals, all trying to better their position.
Is there any value in abandoning methodological individualism? Is it possible to utilize praxeology collectively?
Again, Praxeology says that all action is rational to the actor. Whether we can show apodictically that his means did not reach his ends, doesn't mean any praxeological laws have been broken.
Esuric:The king who debases his currency is infringing on the property of his citizens, and diminishing their wealth arbitrarily. This act is immoral, and there will be consequences.
Is and ought.
Esuric:Lilburne is saying that we can't really call the king immoral, and I reject this position.
I'm not sure that is what he is saying, but I agree with him on quite a bit, and I can tell you I believe it is immoral. But that cannot be objectively proven, it is my subjective value judgment.
wilderness:But resolving conflicts over scarcity isn't about property or ethics...
"In our view the major task of “political science” or better, “political philosophy” is to construct the edifice of natural law pertinent to the political scene. That this task has been almost completely neglected in this century by political scientists is all too clear. Political science has either pursued a positivistic and scientistic “model building,” in vain imitation of the methodology and content of the physical sciences, or it has engaged in purely empirical fact-grubbing. The contemporary political scientist believes that he can avoid the necessity of moral judgments, and that he can help frame public policy without committing himself to any ethical position. And yet as soon as anyone makes any policy suggestion, however narrow or limited, an ethical judgment—sound or unsound—has willy-nilly been made.[1] The difference between the political scientist and the political philosopher is that the “scientist’s” moral judgments are covert and implicit, and therefore not subject to detailed scrutiny, and hence more likely to be unsound. Moreover, the avoidance of explicit ethical judgments leads political scientists to one overriding implicit value judgment-that in favor of the political status quo as it happens to prevail in any given society. At the very least, his lack of a systematic political ethics precludes the political scientist from persuading anyone of the value of any change from the status quo.
In the meanwhile, furthermore, present-day political philosophers generally confine themselves, also in a Wertfrei manner, to antiquarian descriptions and exegeses of the views of other, long gone political philosophers. In so doing, they are evading the major task of political philosophy, in the words of Thomas Thorson, “the philosophic justification of value positions relevant to politic.”[2]
[2]Hence, as Thorson points out, political philosophy is a subdivision of the philosophy of ethics, in contrast to “political theory” as well as positivistic analytic philosophy. See Thomas Landon Thorson, “Political Values and Analytic Philosophy” Journal of Politics (November 1961): 712n. Perhaps Professor Holton is right that “the decline in political philosophy is one part of a general decline,” not only in philosophy itself, but also “in the status of rationality and ideas as such.” Holton goes on to add that the two major challenges to genuine political philosophy in recent decades have come from historicism—the view that all ideas and truths are relative to particular historical conditions—and scientism, the imitation of the physical sciences. James Holton, “Is Political Philosophy Dead?” Western Political Quarterly (September1961): 75ff.
I dunno, this kind of sounds familiar? No?
liberty student:Is there any value in abandoning methodological individualism? Is it possible to utilize praxeology collectively?
Methodological individualism starts with the individual and abstracts (this is what historicism rejects). I haven't abandoned it at all.
liberty student:Again, Praxeology says that all action is rational to the actor. Whether we can show apodictically that his means did not reach his ends, doesn't mean anything any praxeological laws have been broken.
I'm saying that individuals who seek to better their own situations will destroy systems which prevent them from doing so and which violate their property rights. Is this so controversial?
liberty student:Is and ought.
Just is.
liberty student:I'm not sure that is what he is saying, but I agree with him on quite a bit, and I can tell you I believe it is immoral. But that cannot be objectively proven, it is my subjective value judgment.
It is objectively proven when the citizens hang him upside down and stab him repeatedly.
Conza, great post. Mises saves the day.
Conza88:I dunno, this kind of sounds familiar? No?
indeed
very good post Esuric
J. Grayson Lilburne: So insofar as a moral statement is an expression of those facts (as if someone said "that killing, in fact, is counter to my values"), it is meaningful.
So insofar as a moral statement is an expression of those facts (as if someone said "that killing, in fact, is counter to my values"), it is meaningful.
I don't want to give ammunition to the Juan's of this forum, but to the extent that a 'moral statement' is an expression of facts of preference, is ceases to be a moral statement.
Do you believe that the preferences that people ascribe to morality, such as empathy, generosity and filial devotion are distinct from 'mere' aesthetic preferences? Do you think that the 'moral' urge that wells within your stomach at the sight of the poor and downtrodden varies from the reaction you would get from dropping a vase or breaking your laptop in kind as well as degree?
Obviously the term itself is functional in the same way that the term 'hand' is functional while still being entirely collapsible into fundamental quantum elements (which is not very practical in everyday matters which occur at a high level of abstraction).
If this is indeed the case, then you are indeed a moral nihilist (which I take to mean rejecting moral realism). Not that it's anything to be ashamed of :)
AJ and Liberty Student, this question is for you as well.
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
Again, Praxeology says that all action is rational to the actor.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Esuric:But there is constancy in the world, a natural order.
I think it's important to distinguish between order and purpose. Telos is greek for both "purpose" and "end". Often, when one finds order, it is evidence of telos on the same level: a watch is evidence for a watchmaker and a watch-user. But that can mislead one to think that such is always the case; although it's not. In both evolutionary phenomena via natural selection and market phenomena via consumer selection, we have order, but no purpose on the same level. The order of a market is emergent; it results from a profusion of tiny purposes, not one over-arching purpose. There is a natural order in human society, but there is no natural over-arching purpose/end. Many minds find that incongruous, and so try to fill that gap with an imagined over-arching telos. That is what I think lies behind religion, deism, and natural rights philosophy: all of which try to construct a universal telos where it doesn't exist.
I also discuss this tendency in my post on Pythagoras.
Esuric:Methodological individualism starts with the individual and abstracts (this is what historicism rejects). I haven't abandoned it at all.
Sure you have. You're making collective value statements that don't reflect the values of all of the individual actors in the collective.
Esuric:I'm saying that individuals who seek to better their own situations will destroy systems which prevent them from doing so and which violate their property rights. Is this so controversial?
No, it isn't controversial, but it is not axiomatic. You're assuming that people will pay any cost to stop a rights violation, and we can clearly see in a democracy, people will gladly pay some cost rather than deal with the costs of enforcing their own rights. Basically, you're asserting.
Remember, praxeology tells us WHY people act, not HOW people act. It's a very significant difference.
Esuric: liberty student:Is and ought. Just is.
Well that's what I meant. You're saying that ought is is. When that can't be proven. That's the entire basis of the discussion, and you post "just is" to assert discussion over. It would be like me posting, "Just Subjective".
You wouldn't accept my asserting, so why would you do it?
Esuric:It is objectively proven when the citizens hang him upside down and stab him repeatedly.
You've conflated inductive reasoning with deductive reasoning. You claim that praxeological laws have been broken, and yet you won't indicate how. When asked, you make an appeal to empiricism. Which is it?
Esuric:Conza, great post. Mises saves the day.
Conza quoted Mises?
Knight_of_BAAWA:And yet you've never been able to deal with those like me, who know that god is pure nonsense, and who do not deny causality, aren't nihilists, etc.
Esuric:So take up the challenge and defeat Lilburne. Defend natural rights
'It is objectively proven when the citizens hang him upside down and stab him repeatedly.'
That only proves that those particular citizens believe that his actions were wrong. (or that they thought such action could further their other, unrelated goals. Maybe they are running for office?)
zefreak:Morality assumes objective value exists
zefreak:(Even moralists who argue via epistemology IE Argumentation Ethics (assuming their reasoning is valid, which I don't think it is) assume that self-contradiction is morally wrong.)
Next time: try learning about that which you're discussing.
liberty student:Sure you have. You're making collective value statements that don't reflect the values of all of the individual actors in the collective.
I don't think you understand the term methodological individualism. It doesn't mean that we only talk about a single individual at a time. I'm merely abstracting. Do you believe abstraction is somehow incompatible with methodological individualism?
liberty student:No, it isn't controversial, but it is not axiomatic. You're assuming that people will pay any cost to stop a rights violation, and we can clearly see in a democracy, people will gladly pay some cost rather than deal with the costs of enforcing their own rights. Basically, you're asserting.
No, just because it hasn't happened yet doesn't mean anything. As soon as the welfare states collapse economically and the illusory wealth vanishes, individuals will overthrow the system. It's not an assertion at all, it is a statement backed by praxeology and torrential historical evidence. Now what they replace this system with is up to them--one can only speculate.
liberty student:You've conflated inductive reasoning with deductive reasoning.
Incorrect.
liberty student:You claim that praxeological laws have been broken, and yet you won't indicate how. When asked, you make an appeal to empiricism. Which is it?
He's separating subjective judgments from real world consequences, which manifest through individual action, guided by praxeological laws.
liberty student:Conza quoted Mises?
I believe the first part was Mises, am I wrong?
Knight_of_BAAWA:So please stop being butthurt because you violate Okham's Razor.
Your razor is too sharp I'm afraid.
zefreak:AJ and Liberty Student, this question is for you as well.
I read it a dozen times, and maybe I am a moron, but I didn't understand it. I think your questions weren't clear enough for me. Urge, wells, mere, etc.
zefreak:I don't want to give ammunition to the Juan's of this forum, but to the extent that a 'moral statement' is an expression of facts of preference, is ceases to be a moral statement.
Knight_of_BAAWA: zefreak:Morality assumes objective value existsNo it doesn't. . zefreak:(Even moralists who argue via epistemology IE Argumentation Ethics (assuming their reasoning is valid, which I don't think it is) assume that self-contradiction is morally wrong.) No they don't. Next time: try learning about that which you're discussing.
Please formulate a system of ethics that doesn't arbitrarily attribute value to objects, ends or means and doesn't rely on the shared disgust of performative contradiction.
(I am really giving too much away, as Argumentation Ethics and other epistemic arguments such as Anthony de Jasay's aren't valid and suffer from fallacies of equivocation)
Esuric:I don't think you understand the term methodological individualism. It doesn't mean that we only talk about a single individual at a time. I'm merely abstracting.
Abstracting to what? You are taking a single actor and abstracting him to a group of theoretical actors (note you're the guy who appeals to "the real world") who all express the same value preferences as the single actor. Anyone can do that. It is meaningless.
Esuric: liberty student:You've conflated inductive reasoning with deductive reasoning. Incorrect.
No really, you have. See...
Esuric:It's not an assertion at all, it is a statement backed by praxeology and torrential historical evidence.
You're claiming that human action can be predicted by praxeology. That is untrue. Praxeology informs us why people act, not how.
Esuric:He's separating subjective judgments from real world consequences, most of which are done by individuals, guided by praxeological laws.
What praxeological laws? Can you name them please?
Esuric:Your razor is too sharp I'm afraid.
That's debatable.
Conza was quoting Rothbard, not Mises.
Mises, rather, favorably repeated the following in Human Action:
"Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense."
liberty student: Esuric:Your razor is too sharp I'm afraid. That's debatable.
I was responding to Baawa here.
liberty student:Abstracting to what? You are taking a single actor and abstracting him to a group of theoretical actors (note you're the guy who appeals to "the real world") who all express the same value preferences as the single actor. Anyone can do that. It is meaningless.
Here, this may help you: http://mises.org/media/4112
J. Grayson Lilburne: Esuric:Conza, great post. Mises saves the day. Conza was quoting Rothbard, not Mises. Mises, rather, favorably repeated the following in Human Action: "Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense."
The first part was Rothbard? Oops
liberty student: zefreak:AJ and Liberty Student, this question is for you as well. I read it a dozen times, and maybe I am a moron, but I didn't understand it. I think your questions weren't clear enough for me. Urge, wells, mere, etc.
Just being poetic :)
Short version, are moral urges (the feeling of disapprobation and, conversely, approval that arises from a given state of affairs) different in kind from feelings that arise from circumstances that would hardly be considered moral or immoral, such as breaking a computer or valued item? Is the difference merely one of degree (an admittedly large degree, to be sure)?
Is there a necessary distinction between moral sentiment and sentiment?
zefreak:Please formulate a system of ethics that doesn't arbitrarily attribute value to objects, ends or means and doesn't rely on the shared disgust of performative contradiction.
Do you understand the issue with the performative contradiction aspect? Of course you don't. That's why you stupidly think it's about disgust, when it's actually about consistency.
And do show the fallacy of equivocation--if you can. Which you can't. So don't bother. Just slink away.
I can't help but make a hypothesis but I don't know much about this so I'm just asking,
Aren't the people in favor of the non-existence of morality using the humean theory that something is meaningful if and only if that thing can be sensed or are relations of ideas?
And secondly I think zefreak is using the word "axiom" in a mathematical sense as "that which is assumed" instead of the "self-evident statement" usage. Is that right zefreak?
Esuric:I was responding to Baawa here.
I know.
Esuric, are you going to answer which praxeological laws are being broken, as well as my comment to you that you're using praxeology to predict how when it is only capable of explaining why?
And lastly, in light of the Mises quote from Lilburne, how do you feel about natural rights by appealing to Praxeology now?
J. Grayson Lilburne: wilderness:Ethics is a science. Ethics inasmuch as it is a quest for universal, absolute, and objective "ought"s, is only a science insofar as Plato's Theory of the Forms and Ricardo's Labor Theory of Value is part of science; if it is a science, it is a vain one. It is a hunt for a Chimera. In seeking the Form of Justice, the Form of the Good, and the Form of Beauty, Plato was trying to discover universal, absolute, and objective values. Ricardo was doing much the same when he tried to infer objective value from the intrinsic qualities of goods. And Rothbardian ethicists do much the same when they try to infer universal, absolute, and objective values from the intrinsic qualities of man. This whole strain of thought is known as conceptual realism. Just as Aristotle overthrew Platonic conceptual realism and Menger overthrew Ricardian conceptual realism, so should have Hume and Mises preempted the conceptual realism implicit in the Rothbardian insistence that justice has any kind of existence outside of the mind of the individual.
wilderness:Ethics is a science.
Ethics inasmuch as it is a quest for universal, absolute, and objective "ought"s, is only a science insofar as Plato's Theory of the Forms and Ricardo's Labor Theory of Value is part of science; if it is a science, it is a vain one. It is a hunt for a Chimera.
In seeking the Form of Justice, the Form of the Good, and the Form of Beauty, Plato was trying to discover universal, absolute, and objective values.
This whole strain of thought is known as conceptual realism. Just as Aristotle overthrew Platonic conceptual realism and Menger overthrew Ricardian conceptual realism, so should have Hume and Mises preempted the conceptual realism implicit in the Rothbardian insistence that justice has any kind of existence outside of the mind of the individual.
This was a great post I read on this very topic.
zefreak: liberty student: zefreak:AJ and Liberty Student, this question is for you as well. I read it a dozen times, and maybe I am a moron, but I didn't understand it. I think your questions weren't clear enough for me. Urge, wells, mere, etc. Just being poetic :) Short version, are moral urges (the feeling of disapprobation and, conversely, approval that arises from a given state of affairs) different in kind from feelings that arise from circumstances that would hardly be considered moral or immoral, such as breaking a computer or valued item? Is the difference merely one of degree (an admittedly large degree, to be sure)? Is there a necessary distinction between moral sentiment and sentiment?
Feelings that are typically called moral have to do with disapprobation and approval of one's own action or those of others regarding interpersonal affairs: matters of conscience. I think that's the key distinction. Another key distinction within matters of conscience are sentiments regarding interpersonal violence and whether it is felt to be justified or unjustified: matters of justice.
Lilburne,
remove my quote from your OP. You are being intellectually dishonest by associating me with your OP.
zefreak:Is there a necessary distinction between moral sentiment and sentiment?
I believe so.
liberty student:Esuric, are you going to answer which praxeological laws are being broken, as well as my comment to you that you're using praxeology to predict how when it is only capable of explaining why?
First, you need to understand methodological individualism, see my post above. I don't want to repeat myself.
liberty student:You are taking a single actor and abstracting him to a group of theoretical actors (note you're the guy who appeals to "the real world") who all express the same value preferences as the single actor.
The only assumption I make is that they want to better their own condition. This is the only preference they share. Or do you also deny this?
liberty student:And lastly, in light of the Mises quote from Lilburne, how do you feel about natural rights by appealing to Praxeology now?
I haven't appealed to anyone, so why do you? I'm saying that separating subjective judgments (which influence action) from real world phenomena is nihilistic and ultimately meaningless. Some of those actions are evil, and will face a reaction.
Knight_of_BAAWA: zefreak:Please formulate a system of ethics that doesn't arbitrarily attribute value to objects, ends or means and doesn't rely on the shared disgust of performative contradiction. *sigh* Do you understand the issue with the performative contradiction aspect? Of course you don't. That's why you stupidly think it's about disgust, when it's actually about consistency. And do show the fallacy of equivocation--if you can. Which you can't. So don't bother. Just slink away.
Firstly, do you not understand that epistemology is largely normative, especially when used in arguments on these forums? We assume that we are all good rationalists who seek consistency and in our positions. When it comes to casual discussions this is a normal assumption to make, but in attempting to provide a rigorous proof to someone that they should act in a certain manner, the fact that an individual can validly reject your normative epistemic assertions (such as Occam's Razor, try proving that one? It is a normative heuristic, and nothing more!), although hardly anyone will take it that far. I am simply making the point that even if the assertion 'one cannot reject the NAP (or whatever) without engaging in performative contradiction' is true, it does not adequately establish the NAP as an objective ethic.
Fortunately, one does not have to reject rationalism in order to reject natural rights ethics. The fallacy of equivocation that I mentioned previously is between the usage of the word ownership with both the ontological fact of physical possession and the normative concept of right to exclusive use. Property is similarly used to reference both meanings, switching between the two as needed. I know you won't be satisfied with that, but I will edit this post once I find the link to AJ's exposition of this point.
Ohhhh, that's where Giles went. Too bad.
zefreak:Firstly, do you not understand that epistemology is largely normative
And there is no equivocation between physical possession and right to exclusive use. Try again.
Esuric: Ohhhh, that's where Giles went. Too bad.
Actually, Giles is not banned. He chose to leave the forum and for Jon to rename his account, Lilburne and I to clean up old posts he wasn't proud of.
And the discussion about my problem with Baawa's post, are now here. I will delete all attempts to spam the same posts all over the forum. You're welcome to participate in that thread, and I will be happy to defend myself there.
http://mises.org/Community/forums/t/13596.aspx
Conza88: "Even in the finest works of economics, including Human Action, the concept of property had attracted little attention before Rothbard burst onto the intellectual scene with Man, Economy, and State. Yet, as Rothbard pointed out, such common economic terms as direct and indirect exchange, markets and market prices, as well as aggression, invasion, crime, and fraud, cannot be defined or understood without a prior theory of property. Nor is it possible to establish the familiar economic theorems relating to these phenomena without an implied notion of property and property rights. A definition and theory of property must precede the definition and establishment of all other economic terms and theorems." - Hoppe And what is your definition and theory of property?
"Even in the finest works of economics, including Human Action, the concept of property had attracted little attention before Rothbard burst onto the intellectual scene with Man, Economy, and State. Yet, as Rothbard pointed out, such common economic terms as direct and indirect exchange, markets and market prices, as well as aggression, invasion, crime, and fraud, cannot be defined or understood without a prior theory of property. Nor is it possible to establish the familiar economic theorems relating to these phenomena without an implied notion of property and property rights. A definition and theory of property must precede the definition and establishment of all other economic terms and theorems." - Hoppe
Exclusive control. It is true that economics shows us the prosperity that comes from exclusive control being associated with homesteading and exchange, and continued exclusive control after homesteading and exchange. But that says nothing about whether such a state of affairs is moral or immoral.
Conza88:I believe, you were charging that he was trying to do what Plato and others had tried? You don't see the difference here?
Of course it's not completely analogous. But there is a key commonality: a chimeric quest for universal, absolute, objective values. That the class of values Rothbard was seeking was more limited than those Plato was seeking doesn't change that.
J. Grayson Lilburne: zefreak: liberty student: zefreak:AJ and Liberty Student, this question is for you as well. I read it a dozen times, and maybe I am a moron, but I didn't understand it. I think your questions weren't clear enough for me. Urge, wells, mere, etc. Just being poetic :) Short version, are moral urges (the feeling of disapprobation and, conversely, approval that arises from a given state of affairs) different in kind from feelings that arise from circumstances that would hardly be considered moral or immoral, such as breaking a computer or valued item? Is the difference merely one of degree (an admittedly large degree, to be sure)? Is there a necessary distinction between moral sentiment and sentiment? Feelings that are typically called moral have to do with disapprobation and approval of one's own action or those of others regarding interpersonal affairs: matters of conscience. I think that's the key distinction. Another key distinction within matters of conscience are sentiments regarding interpersonal violence and whether it is felt to be justified or unjustified: matters of justice.
So the distinction regards not the sentiment itself but the object with which the sentiment is related? The same phenomenon (identically experienced, or similar 'qualia' to borrow the term) of disapprobation can be both a moral and a non-moral sentiment, depending on the object of its relation?
If this is the case (and I think you would agree) then it seems an arbitrary distinction. Useful in common discourse, but there is nothing 'special' about moral sentiment vs 'other' sentiment.