Jackson LaRose:So how anyone claim an objective anything?
Depends on what they mean by "objective". Most people, when pressed, seem to come up with something like "objective = consensus." It really depends on the sphere of knowledge: morality, reality, logic? As far as morality, it's very easy to see the connection: languages evolved in much smaller geographical units and more close-knit and insular groupings of people than currently exist. In such settings, I suppose that morality gains virtual consensus status, or at least "in public" it does - and it's "in public" where language gets formed.
Hence the moral words on English are structured around "objective = consensus" morality. That's why one can say things like "you OUGHT to do that" without referring to any purpose behind it.
"Why ought I do that?" Answer: "Because!" or just ಠ_ಠ
Why anarchy fails
AJ:languages evolved in much smaller geographical units and more close-knit and insular groupings of people than currently exist.
See, that's why it's a shame that humans can't communicate like octopi.
Jackson LaRose:But in this case, it's our consensus that validates reality, not reality validating the consensus. What if there were three other people in the dream (we'd call them "crazies"). Who's perception of the reality was completely separate from ours. Would that make us the "crazies"?
No it isn't, its the framework of the dream is reality. Whomever perceives it most accurately would be correct. If three people are way off and two are closer, the two would be "crazies" but not incorrect. If its even and there is a big dispute we'll leave it up to Bayes to decide.
AJ: 3. Even if the reasoning were correct, denying or defying the ethical precept brings no necessary consequences to the person's happiness.
3. Even if the reasoning were correct, denying or defying the ethical precept brings no necessary consequences to the person's happiness.
Does Hoppe claim that performative contradiction impairs one's happiness?
Angurse:Whomever perceives it most accurately would be correct
How could that be determined?
Zavoi: AJ: 3. Even if the reasoning were correct, denying or defying the ethical precept brings no necessary consequences to the person's happiness. Does Hoppe claim that performative contradiction impairs one's happiness?
I don't think he does, but the implication seems to be, "You don't want to be wrong and contradicted, do you?" Of course most people have developed a heuristic that says something like, "Being wrong or contradicted leads to pain." As I mentioned, in many or most cases it does, but in the case Hoppe lays out it is entirely unclear how it would impair happiness at all. An uncritical reader may conclude, "I'd fall into a contradiction...and it's about ethics...and ethics are important...so I'd better get with the libertarian program (or some unknown pain will visit on me)."
Jackson LaRose:How could that be determined?
Bayes.
Angurse:Bayes.
As I understand it, it still relies on past observation, which is still subject to our perception.
So is counting. Are you rejecting math again?
Angurse:Is there another way to know about reality?
I don't reject math, but it is made up. I happen to agree with it. Either way, I'd have to call that a strawman.
Jackson LaRose:I don't reject math, but it is made up. I happen to agree with it. Either way, I'd have to call that a strawman.
You happen to agree with it, well that's odd, as it is nothing more than observations. What is there to agree with about math, particularly given that is made up?
Angurse:So is counting. Are you rejecting math again?
I don't remember thinking up math, I was taught math.
Math is a construct thought up to help people explain the world they observed. Hence, if observation is limited (I hope we agree on that), our concept of mathematics must also be limited.
Angurse:You happen to agree with it, well that's odd, as it is nothing more than observations. What is there to agree with about math, particularly given that is made up?
Math makes sense to me. Although I don't desperately cling to the notion that just because I observe something, or it makes sense, that it is true or real. You can have it both ways. Unless you are certain about everything at once, which I think we both concede is a fairly tall order.
Jackson LaRose: I don't remember thinking up math, I was taught math. Math is a construct thought up to help people explain the world they observed. Hence, if observation is limited (I hope we agree on that), our concept of mathematics must also be limited.
Sure, are you actually going to explain why you agree with it now? It is only an observation after all, subject to perception.
See above post.
Math makes sense to me.
Sage: J. Grayson Lilburne: Yes, that is the Misesian project, in contrast to the Rothbardian project, which also tries to assert "universal" ends. Sage:If so, what about people whose ends are not served by libertarianism, e.g. Nazis? (+1 for Godwin counter) "The liberals do not assert that men ought to strive after the goals mentioned above. What they maintain is that the immense majority prefer a life of health and abundance to misery, starvation, and death. The correctness of this statement cannot be challenged. It is proved by the fact that all antiliberal doctrines--the theocratic tenets of the various religious, statist, nationalist, and socialist parties--adopt the same attitude with regard to these issues. They all promise their followers a life of plenty. They have never ventured to tell people that the realization of their program will impair their material well-being. They insist--on the contrary--that while the realization of the plans of their rival parties will result in indigence for the majority, they themselves want to provide their supporters with abundance." (HA chapter 8, emphasis added) While I think the Misesian project avoids the problems with utilitarianism, I don't think it by itself can provide a sufficient groundwork for libertarianism (i.e. a justification of the NAP). Hence I'm inclined to see the role of the Misesian project as a complement to the Rothbardian project. Mises' project is a value-free approach where the economist merely gives technical advice about which means are most suitable to achieving the ends people already have. In Mises' words: But for the Misesian project to justify libertarianism depends crucially on the universal acceptance of the ends of peace and prosperity. Mises can advocate libertarianism to people who share these ends. But he cannot do so for people who don't, e.g. nihilists, sociopaths, people with very high time preference. As Mises himself recognized: We may, for instance, try to show a Buddhist that to act in conformity with the teachings of his creed results in effects which we consider disastrous. But we are silenced if he replies that these effects are in his opinion lesser evils or no evils at all compared to what would result from nonobservance of his rules of conduct.
J. Grayson Lilburne: Yes, that is the Misesian project, in contrast to the Rothbardian project, which also tries to assert "universal" ends. Sage:If so, what about people whose ends are not served by libertarianism, e.g. Nazis? (+1 for Godwin counter) "The liberals do not assert that men ought to strive after the goals mentioned above. What they maintain is that the immense majority prefer a life of health and abundance to misery, starvation, and death. The correctness of this statement cannot be challenged. It is proved by the fact that all antiliberal doctrines--the theocratic tenets of the various religious, statist, nationalist, and socialist parties--adopt the same attitude with regard to these issues. They all promise their followers a life of plenty. They have never ventured to tell people that the realization of their program will impair their material well-being. They insist--on the contrary--that while the realization of the plans of their rival parties will result in indigence for the majority, they themselves want to provide their supporters with abundance." (HA chapter 8, emphasis added)
Yes, that is the Misesian project, in contrast to the Rothbardian project, which also tries to assert "universal" ends.
Sage:If so, what about people whose ends are not served by libertarianism, e.g. Nazis? (+1 for Godwin counter)
"The liberals do not assert that men ought to strive after the goals mentioned above. What they maintain is that the immense majority prefer a life of health and abundance to misery, starvation, and death. The correctness of this statement cannot be challenged. It is proved by the fact that all antiliberal doctrines--the theocratic tenets of the various religious, statist, nationalist, and socialist parties--adopt the same attitude with regard to these issues. They all promise their followers a life of plenty. They have never ventured to tell people that the realization of their program will impair their material well-being. They insist--on the contrary--that while the realization of the plans of their rival parties will result in indigence for the majority, they themselves want to provide their supporters with abundance." (HA chapter 8, emphasis added)
While I think the Misesian project avoids the problems with utilitarianism, I don't think it by itself can provide a sufficient groundwork for libertarianism (i.e. a justification of the NAP). Hence I'm inclined to see the role of the Misesian project as a complement to the Rothbardian project.
Mises' project is a value-free approach where the economist merely gives technical advice about which means are most suitable to achieving the ends people already have. In Mises' words:
But for the Misesian project to justify libertarianism depends crucially on the universal acceptance of the ends of peace and prosperity. Mises can advocate libertarianism to people who share these ends. But he cannot do so for people who don't, e.g. nihilists, sociopaths, people with very high time preference. As Mises himself recognized:
We may, for instance, try to show a Buddhist that to act in conformity with the teachings of his creed results in effects which we consider disastrous. But we are silenced if he replies that these effects are in his opinion lesser evils or no evils at all compared to what would result from nonobservance of his rules of conduct.
Sage:
A few points:
1. When we speak of "justifying libertarianism," we are referring to a particular theoretical approach, namely, the objective ethics approach. The term "justification" is one used within the framework of objective ethics theories and related theories. You can see this, for example, if someone were to write: "the Misesian project is unable to bless libertarianism." At once, you would realize that the term "bless" refers to an entire corpus of Christian ethical teachings, and only makes sense within that system.
In the same way, the idea of "justification" only makes sense in the context of theories that utilize this interlocking web of concepts. Generally, this is the objective ethics system or theory you are advocating.
Misesian praxeology cannot justify libertarianism, and, Misesian praxeology cannot bless libertarianism, because justification and blessing are concepts foreign to its system.
2. I have been reading in the area of ethics theory for several years, and I have yet to come across an ethical theory that did not explicitly state, or imply without explicit statement, a constant relationship between specific conduct, and some state of affairs that an actor may want to attain or avoid.
All ethical theory that I am aware of----and this definitely includes the theories you are advocating----expresses a constant relationship between conduct and some state of affairs an actor may want to attain or avoid.
Consider these statements of constant relationships:
1. Doing X is wrong.
2. Doing X is immoral.
3. Doing X is evil.
4. Doing X diminishes your flourishing.
5. Doing X diminishes your eudaimonia
All of these are expressions of a constant relationship (a regularity in the phenomena of action, i.e, in the phenomena of "doing"), that give the actor information on how to avoid something he/she may consider harmful to his/her self-interest or well-being.
To avoid being wrong, abstain from X
To avoid being immoral, abstain from X
etc., etc.,......
3. Sage, I don't know whether you realize that the quote you provided from Mises regarding the Buddhist applies to the constant relationship between entities that any ethical theory may assert. (see #2 just above) What Mises is saying is that no matter what you tell the Buddhist will be the consequences of his actions (that he will be "wrong," "immoral," "evil," that he may "diminish his flourishing," "diminish his eudaimonia," etc..), there is nothing you can do, theoretically, if he is willing to suffer those consequences.
No theory, praxeological or natural law, can overcome this. That is Mises's point. Thus, all we can do by means of theory is assert what the consequences of his (the Buddhists) actions will be. If he is willing to suffer those, then we cannot stop him by theory.
Rothbard's natural law does not solve the problem by telling the Buddhist: "If you do X, you will be evil, wrong, etc..."
Nor does Rothbard's natural law solve this by telling the Buddhist: "If you do X, we are "justified" in doing Y to you..."
4.
I know of no ethical or moral theory that does not rely on statements of constant relationships (between conduct and some result) that enables the actor to "utilize" (utilitarianism) this information for his/her own well-being.
See #2 above. An actor can avoid being wrong by abstaining from X. An actor can avoid being immoral by abstaining from X. These are all ways an actor can improve his welfare and well-being by taking advantage of (by utilizing) the knowledge of a constant relationship asserted by the theory in question.
Praxeology is also of this form. Praxeology says that if you do X, then Y will be the result. To obtain Y, do X. To avoid Y, abstain from X.
In this sense, praxeology is not different from the theories you advocate.
What Rothbard failed to notice or consider, was that praxeology could do for ethical actions, what praxeology does for catallactic actions: establish a necessary consequence between an act X, and an apodictically certain consequence Y.
I think that more and more, people are coming to the recognition that Rothbard failed to consider that praxeology could be applied to actions of an ethical nature. Praxeology can do for ethical actions, what it does for catallactic actions. But since praxeology is purely formal, this enables praxeology to make formal and necessary propositions, propositions that, according to Menger and Mises cannot be made in the context of "empirically full" or "empirically real" (i.e., "objective") theories of phenomena.
As an indication to the skeptical that the idea of ethical actions has merit, here is a passage from de Soto, whom I consider to be a Rothbard supporter:
In discussing the School of Public Choice, de Soto writes that it....
"...fits in perfectly with the broad praxeological conception of economics developed by Mises, who considered that the goal of our science was to build a general theory of human action in all its varieties and contexts (including, therefore, political actions)." (emphasis added)
(Essay: "Ludwig von Mises's Human Action as a Textbook of Economics" p.55)
Thus, in this 2004 essay, de Soto is already talking about a class of actions called "political actions," and this is obviously intended to differentiate such political actions from other kinds of actions, especially those having to do with the market economy (roughly, catallactic actions).
5.
As we all know, praxeology deals with apodictically necessary consequences resulting from definite kinds of actions:
"Praxeological knowledge makes it possible to predict with apodictic certainty the outcome of various modes of action." (HA, 3rd. rev. p.117)
Thus, praxeology can do the same thing that the ethical theories you advocate can do:
Formulate a constant relationship (invariant regularity) between ethical conduct (ethical action) and a necessary consequence.
This is essentially the same thing that prof. Long and his followers are trying to demonstrate, at least as I understand it. They are trying to show that conduct which they will define as moral, results in, or is constitutive of, an actor's eudaimonia. By contrast, they are trying to show that conduct which they will define as immoral, results in, or is constitutive of, a diminishment or negation of an actor's eudaimonia.
The essential idea is that a specific mode of conduct X has a necessary effect Y, such that if you want Y, you can obtain it by doing X, or if you want to avoid Y, you can do that by abstaining from X.
Praxeology can do the same essential thing, except as praxeology is avowedly formal, this allows praxeology to formulate propositions of apodictic certainty. Materially full concepts such as those recommended by Rothbard on p.12 of EOL, are incapable, in principle, of yielding apodictically necessary statements:
"Strict (exact) laws of phenomena can never be the result of the realistic school of thought in theoretical research even if this were the most perfect conceivable and its fundamental observation the most comprehensive and most critical."
(Menger, Investigations Into the Method of the Social Sciences, Book 1, Chapter 4)
Something like this is/was recognized by Hoppe, and given by him as the reason why Rothbardian natural law ultimately must fail:
"It has been a common quarrel with this position, even on the part of sympathetic readers, that the concept of human nature is far "too diffuse and varied to provide a determinate set of contents of natural law." (A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, p.235) (emphasis added)
What this means, is that if the natural law social theorist is going to formulate his theory in concrete, objective, contentual, non-formal terms, (see EOL, p.12), then the theory will not be able to provide, as Hoppe writes, a determinate set of contents.
If we formulate our theory in terms of concretes, then we cannot arrive at a statement connecting a concrete activity to a universal ethical or moral principle. The advisability of eating poisonous mushrooms (EOL p.32) depends on Crusoe's purpose (which is the point Mises was making).
Eating poisonous mushrooms is not universally to be avoided. It depends on the actor's purpose. This is means/ends analysis, i.e., praxeology.
In summary, praxeology can do for ethical actions what it does for catallactic actions: formulate apodictically necessary relationships between various modes of acting and a necessary consequence.
All any ethical theory can do, it seems, is to assert a relationship between an actor's conduct, and some result the actor may want to attain or avoid.
However, praxeology, due to its approach, can assert apodictically what the result of various modes of action will be:
"The aim of this orientation, which in the future we will call the exact one, an aim which research pursues in the same way in all realms of the world of phenomena, is the determination of strict laws of phenomena, of regularities in the succession of phenomena which do not present themselves to us as absolute, but which in respect to the approaches to cognition by which we attain to them simply bear within themselves the guarantee of absoluteness. It is the determination of laws of phenomena which commonly are called "laws of nature," but more correctly should be designated by the expression "exact laws."
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
No. His argument is purely that as a theory, one containing or premised on contradictions is invalid and false, and thus useless. It's a litmus test.
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
AJ:I don't think he does, but the implication seems to be, "You don't want to be wrong and contradicted, do you?"
This implication only comes, and the lack of happiness-correlation is only a "problem", if one begins with a preconceived idea that ethics has to be about increasing one's own happiness. But whether or not an action increases the actor's happiness is not the only useful thing that can be said about the action, and restricting the domain of ethics to this aspect renders it incapable of resolving conflicts of terminal values (which do in fact occur, or else everyone's goals would align, and one could resolve any dispute by reasoning it through scientifically/praxeologically until the disputants agree; in any case, this would make any non-happiness-oriented conceptions of ethics practically irrelevant but not theoretically invalid).
Adam Knott: 2. I have been reading in the area of ethics theory for several years, and I have yet to come across an ethical theory that did not explicitly state, or imply without explicit statement, a constant relationship between specific conduct, and some state of affairs that an actor may want to attain or avoid. All ethical theory that I am aware of----and this definitely includes the theories you are advocating----expresses a constant relationship between conduct and some state of affairs an actor may want to attain or avoid.
Given a very broad definition of ethics as "a way of assigning attributes to actions," the body of any ethical theory will consist of statements such as [1] "Action X has attribute B." Such statements can always be reformulated (to incorporate what you call a "constant relationship") as [2] "If you want to avoid doing actions with attribute B, then you'll want to avoid doing action X". However, [2] is a direct implication of [1] and adds no new information. So you're right that an ethical theory cannot avoid making statements of constant relationship (thereby providing information that can be used to maximize utility), but that doesn't mean that such statements must be the fundamental elements of an ethical theory. (Indeed, strictly speaking, [2] does not imply [1], and [2] is therefore a weaker claim than [1].)
That isn't an explanation, its just falling on intuition. Its only an observation, user-perception. You could have avoided page after page of questioning Bayes, reality, and whatnot.
Angurse:That isn't an explanation, its just falling on intuition.
That's all anyone can do. That's what I've been trying to say this whole time. It's impossible to prove that one individuals perception of reality is any more or less valid than another's, because there is no way of determining what the "true" reality is.
This "absolute truth" nonsense has been well know for some time, a better question is who's really going to waste their time thinking about it.
^^ Ahem, that would be me
Jackson LaRose: Angurse:You happen to agree with it, well that's odd, as it is nothing more than observations. What is there to agree with about math, particularly given that is made up? Math makes sense to me. Although I don't desperately cling to the notion that just because I observe something, or it makes sense, that it is true or real. You can have it both ways. Unless you are certain about everything at once, which I think we both concede is a fairly tall order.
I have done a tremendous amount of thinking on the nature of "reality" and here's how I look at it:
Puzzle Piece 1: The only thing I can really claim to know is that I am experiencing sensations. I see stuff, hear stuff, feel stuff, smell stuff, and taste stuff. Whether "real" or "imagined," these things I do indeed sense. It's not, "I sense, therefore I exist." It's rather, "When I say I exist, I just mean that I sense" - that is what I mean when I think to myself that I exist: "I am experiencing sensations." Hence all the input I have from any "outside world" is patterns of sensation.
Puzzle Piece 2: Thoughts and emotions are not different from sensory experience. Along with Einstein I can say that thoughts are visual, auditory, olfactory, and "muscular" as he put it. Taste surely plays a role as well. Emotions are physical sensations as well, as I suggest some introspection will reveal. This puzzle piece will not sit well with those who believe that "words are the stuff of thought," but I hold that this is the first illusion one must put aside if clear thinking is the goal. For those that have come to this revelation, combined with Puzzle Piece 1 it should not be surprising when I say that all experience is patterns of sensation.
Now the philosopher comes along and asks, "What is truth?" Well that is already getting caught up in words. A better question would be, "What am I trying to get at when I say X is true? - if there is in fact a coherent notion I'm trying to get at." The answer I have come up with is, "If there is any coherent notion like that, it can only be that I mean:
X is true = X follows from my premises/beliefs." (More precisely, "X seems to follow from my premises.")
By the way, this neatly disposes of Moore's Paradox. But anyway, for example, "There [seem to] have been black dogs" follows from my premises: 1) I [seem to] have seen dogs that looked black in daylight. 2) [It seems that] things that look black in daylight are black. 3) Anything I [seem to] have seen has been. QED
Now any or all of those premises may be "wrong," but from my own point of view - knowing this could all be a dream and I'm the only sentient being in the universe - I can have no knowledge of such things being wrong apart from my senses and memories (which in turn I am only consciously aware of via the sensations). Someone else may say the premises are wrong, but my acceptance of that as actual "wrongness" is dependent on whether I have chosen to believe what others say, hence it still either follows from my premises (beliefs) or it doesn't.
Next the philosopher asks, "What is reality?" From above, what I name reality is merely a set of sensual patterns that have certain unique or semi-unique characteristics, primarily these two: 1) the sensations cannot be controlled directly merely by intention (except some parts of my own body), and 2) the patterns of sensation seem to have a remarkable stability and permanence, down to very fine details - much finer and more permanent than my short-term memory faculty seems to be able to accurately store.
A little reflection on this should allow one to dismantle the paradoxical aspect of Curry's Paradox.
As for mathematics, it is just sets of assumed premises (called axioms) and definitions, so anything is true (false) in mathematics if it follows from premises (doesn't follow from premises). Of course, truth is a norm of assertion - i.e., "2+2=4" states nothing less than "This whole sentence follows from the premises, and 2+2=4". In other words, an assertion by definition asserts its own truth automatically. Hence the age-old Liar Paradox isn't a paradox; it's simply false.
AJ:^^ Ahem, that would be me
Whoops!
I meant "who is willing to take the time out of their busy schedule to figure out such important concepts is the better question."
Thanks AJ, that was a lot more concise than I'm capable of being.
"Absolutes are garbage"
Hmm, that might be a catchy sig.
Zavoi, emphasis by AJ: AJ:I don't think he does, but the implication seems to be, "You don't want to be wrong and contradicted, do you?" This implication only comes, and the lack of happiness-correlation is only a "problem", if one begins with a preconceived idea that ethics has to be about increasing one's own happiness. But whether or not an action increases the actor's happiness is not the only useful thing that can be said about the action
This implication only comes, and the lack of happiness-correlation is only a "problem", if one begins with a preconceived idea that ethics has to be about increasing one's own happiness. But whether or not an action increases the actor's happiness is not the only useful thing that can be said about the action
I don't see how the word "useful" can be interpreted so that it means anything other than "increases one's happiness" (although the mental process connecting utility to happiness may have several steps).
Zavoi:and restricting the domain of ethics to this aspect renders it incapable of resolving conflicts of terminal values (which do in fact occur, or else everyone's goals would align, and one could resolve any dispute by reasoning it through scientifically/praxeologically until the disputants agree; in any case, this would make any non-happiness-oriented conceptions of ethics practically irrelevant but not theoretically invalid).
I agree that subjective ethics and praxeology don't provide a dispute resolution system on their own. Objective ethics does provide that. However, that could only be a deficiency on the part of subjective ethics and praxeology if objective ethics (and the dispute resolution systems therein provided) were valid in the first place.
Angurse: AJ:^^ Ahem, that would be me Whoops! I meant "who is willing to take the time out of their busy schedule to figure out such important concepts is the better question."
No problem, I've spent large parts of my life "lost in thought."
Jon Irenicus: Does Hoppe claim that performative contradiction impairs one's happiness? No. His argument is purely that as a theory, one containing or premised on contradictions is invalid and false, and thus useless. It's a litmus test.
Jon:
According to what you are writing above, Hoppe is claiming that a theory that is contradictory is unutilizable (usesless).
That is, if someone tries to use (utilize) such a theory, they won't be able to. Their intention, to use the theory in question to guide their actions, cannot be realized. (their end cannot be attained by the supposed means)
If someone has designed a very large butterfly net that contains only a large metal ring, but with no netting, then we can tell that person that by and large, for the purpose of catching butterflies, such a "net" is useless. The concept of "use" implies human purpose.
Is it your contention that Hoppe's theory intends to show an actor how a theory they hold is useless, but at the same time, Hoppe's theory conceives that the attempt to utilize that useless theory has absolutely no impact on that actor's well-being ?
*******
In Hoppe's original presentation of his theory, he provides what appear to be the various ways an actor's well-being would be negatively impacted were that actor to try to implement a nonlibertarian ethic:
...then literally no one would be allowed to do anything with anything...
...one would have to have all the late-comers' consent prior to ever doing what one wanted to do....
....Neither we, our forefathers, nor our progeny could, do or will survive....
....it would be impossible for anyone to first say anything at a definite point in time and for someone else to be able to reply...
....acting and proposition making would also be impossible....
....One would have to interrogate and come to agreement with the entire world population....
....surely, everyone would be long dead before this was accomplished....
If according to Hoppe, adopting a libertarian ethic is not conducive to a person's well-being, while adopting a nonlibertarian ethic is not detrimental to a person's well-being, then what is the purpose of listing all of these consequences of adopting a nonlibertarian ethic?
Zavoi: AJ:I don't think he does, but the implication seems to be, "You don't want to be wrong and contradicted, do you?" This implication only comes, and the lack of happiness-correlation is only a "problem", if one begins with a preconceived idea that ethics has to be about increasing one's own happiness. But whether or not an action increases the actor's happiness is not the only useful thing that can be said about the action, and restricting the domain of ethics to this aspect renders it incapable of resolving conflicts of terminal values (which do in fact occur, or else everyone's goals would align, and one could resolve any dispute by reasoning it through scientifically/praxeologically until the disputants agree; in any case, this would make any non-happiness-oriented conceptions of ethics practically irrelevant but not theoretically invalid). Adam Knott: 2. I have been reading in the area of ethics theory for several years, and I have yet to come across an ethical theory that did not explicitly state, or imply without explicit statement, a constant relationship between specific conduct, and some state of affairs that an actor may want to attain or avoid. All ethical theory that I am aware of----and this definitely includes the theories you are advocating----expresses a constant relationship between conduct and some state of affairs an actor may want to attain or avoid. Given a very broad definition of ethics as "a way of assigning attributes to actions," the body of any ethical theory will consist of statements such as [1] "Action X has attribute B." Such statements can always be reformulated (to incorporate what you call a "constant relationship") as [2] "If you want to avoid doing actions with attribute B, then you'll want to avoid doing action X". However, [2] is a direct implication of [1] and adds no new information. So you're right that an ethical theory cannot avoid making statements of constant relationship (thereby providing information that can be used to maximize utility), but that doesn't mean that such statements must be the fundamental elements of an ethical theory. (Indeed, strictly speaking, [2] does not imply [1], and [2] is therefore a weaker claim than [1].)
Zavoi:
"...an ethical theory cannot avoid making statements of constant relationship (thereby providing information that can be used to maximize utility/happiness), but that doesn't mean that such statements must be the fundamental elements of an ethical theory. (Indeed, strictly speaking, [2] does not imply [1], and [2] is therefore a weaker claim than [1].)"
"....in any case, this [removing the non-utility/happiness elements] would make any non-utility/happiness-oriented conceptions of ethics practically irrelevant but not theoretically invalid)."
I interpret you as saying that removing utility/happiness elements from ethical theory would render such a theory practically irrelevant, but that this doesn't mean such elements are fundamental to ethics theory.
Removing such elements from the theory makes the theory of no practical use, but the theory itself may be internally consistent?
Is that correct ?
"We need not go further into the fact that every ethic, no matter how strict an opponent of eudaemonism it may at first appear to be, must somehow clandestinely smuggle the idea of happiness into its system."
(Epistemological Problems of Economics, p.151/152)
AJ:I don't see how the word "useful" can be interpreted so that it means anything other than "increases one's happiness" (although the mental process connecting utility to happiness may have several steps).
I mean "useful" in a certain specific sense of "intellectually interesting." I could try to hash through it again, if you think it would be at all helpful...
Adam Knott: I interpret you as saying that removing utility/happiness elements from ethical theory would render such a theory practically irrelevant, but that this doesn't mean such elements are fundamental to ethics theory. Removing such elements from the theory makes the theory of no practical use, but the theory itself may be internally consistent? Is that correct ?
I think you misunderstood. When I say "in any case, this would make [it] practically irrelevant...", by "this" I'm referring to the hypothetical situation where everyone shares the same set of terminal values, and any seeming "conflicts" that arise between people are due only to confusion/misinformedness over the objective issue of how best to achieve those values. As a matter of empirical observation, it seems unlikely that this is the case, but even if it were the case, this fact by itself would not refute non-happiness-oriented ethics -- it would just make it so that questions about non-happiness-oriented ethics would never be asked (in the context of a real-life scenario) in the first place.
Adam Knott:"We need not go further into the fact that every ethic, no matter how strict an opponent of eudaemonism it may at first appear to be, must somehow clandestinely smuggle the idea of happiness into its system."
Why must it do this? Again it seems that "ethics" has already been defined as having to do with the actor's happiness. But of course there's no point in arguing semantics -- just say what you have to say about human actions, and call it what you will.