An immensely eye-opening post got lost in the shuffle in another thread, in the midst of a bunch of other ongoing arguments.
The question of why there are so few direct followers of Mises even at the LvMI had always been somewhat puzzling to me, especially after I started reading Human Action and realized how brilliant and unrelentingly rigorous Mises was. Adam Knott speaks here of a debate over methodology within the Austrian school, which in any case goes a long way toward explaining its current, somewhat splintered state.
Adam Knott: J. Grayson Lilburne: liberty student:still not being explored outside the Rothbardian paradigm, and the few who do seem to pursue this (GMU crowd?) Right, and the GMU non-Rothbardians tend to be more Hayekian than Misesian. As revered as Mises is, there seems to actually be very few Misesians, in the sense of Mises being their chief influence. Great post, LS. In relation to this, I found it interesting that in Horowitz's Rothbard piece the other day (answered by Block), Horowitz implies that as opposed to a Rothbardian connection to Mises, one might choose a Kirznerian connection to Mises. What seems to come out of Horowitz's piece---and this is reinforced by Block's reply---is the idea of choosing between students of Mises, with no explicit reason given why one couldn't simply consider oneself a direct student of Mises. LvMi advocates being Rothbardian, while GMU apparently advocates being Hayekian or Kirznerian, both sides with Mises as common denominator. Why the interposition of an "intermediary" scholar between themselves and Mises? My answer: because the scientific method Mises represents is theoretically restrictive. To subscribe explicitly to the paradigm Mises advances is to accept that one can be scientific but value-free on the one hand, or, express one's values but with no scientific basis on the other hand. This explains why libertarian scholars want to maintain an intellectual distance between themselves and Mises. They do this by interposing another scholar between themselves and Mises--a scholar who does not subscribe to as clear a distinction between value-free science and value advocacy as does Mises. Mises writes in Socialism: "It must be emphasized again: there is no such thing as a scientific ought." After a lifetime of study under Mises, Rothbard, chafing under the constraints of Wertfreiheit, complains in The Ethics of Liberty that Mises is an "opponent of any sort of objective ethics." People want to express their concrete desires in scientific form. They don't want to explicitly say "my desire for concrete thing X has no scientific basis." They don't want to explicitly confine themselves within a scientific paradigm which includes as one of its fundamental insights, as AJ has referred to: "We orginally want or desire an object not because it is agreeable or good, but we call it agreeable or good because we want or desire it; and we do this because our sensuous or supesensuous nature so requires. There is, thus, no basis for recognizing what is good and worth wishing for outside the faculty of desiring--i.e., the original desire and wish themselves." (Epistemological Problems, p.151) Mises's system is inconveniently inhospitable to one who would attempt to express one's personal desires as scientifically "justified." And thus the need for an intellectual buffer between the scholar attempting to scientifically ground his/her concrete values, and Mises who argues that one's concrete values can have no scientific grounding. From an arm's length distance, we gain the credibility of Mises's scientific conclusions regarding inescapable market processes. By staying at arm's length distance, we may ignore the methodological grounding by which Mises reaches his scientific conclusions, and substitute our own methodology more suitable for reaching the moral and ethical conclusions we want to reach. In Mises's system, desire is "formalized" in the scientific conceptual framework. Desire is stripped of content and considered in its purely formal nature....desire "as such." Concrete desires then are the accidental, environmental, particular, individual, etc... They have no scientific basis. They are the particular or concrete desires or values that people happen to have, but which they do not necessarily have to have. This binary system of thought is theoretically confining. It is self-disciplining. Scholars who want to provide a scientific basis for their preferences know intuitively if not consciously that they have no friend in Mises or Hume (e.g., the fact-value or is-ought gap). And thus, as I have argued (and I suppose it is no secret), libertarian normative ethics begins with a critique of utilitarianism (in its egoistic, formalistic, "if-then" sense), and this means a critique of Mises and Hume. This will also mean a critique of Misesian praxeology (as the search for exact laws of human action)---though not necessarily a critique of the Rothbardian conception of praxeology (conceived merely as a form of supposition/counter-supposition reasoninig). As Lilburne's original post implies, the divide in libertarian ethics theory seems to be between those who consider Hume and Mises as foundational thinkers whose systems of thought can be built upon, and those who consider Hume and Mises as adversarial obstacles whose propositions must be overcome and proven wrong for the discipline of libertarian ethics to succeed. And thus, there is a Methodenstreit occurring in libertarian ethics theory: http://mises.org/journals/scholar/knott.pdf I believe it is important to add that this debate is not, as many probably believe, between those who believe that there is a rational basis for ethics, and those who deny that any rational basis for ethics exists. The debate in my opinion will inevitably reduce to the question of whether a rational framework or theory of ethical phenomena (ethical actions) can be constructed on the basis of an objectively conceived reality, independent of the subjective desires (desires of the subject) of individual actors, or, whether a science of ethical actions must be constructed, as Mises asserts, based on the formal conception of human action as striving for ends. The debate is not about the assertion of ethics versus the denial of ethics. The debate is about the objective versus the subjective conceptual foundations of a theory of human ethical actions. I would like to add one last insight in closing. In the debate over objective ethics versus value-free science, certain patterns repeat. One of them is the tendency among some to quickly resort to terms of opprobrium when their views are challenged. I think I can shed some light on this so that there is a better understanding of why this pattern repeats. In his 2003/2004 article which appeared in "The Free Radical," and was entitled "Reconciling Austrian and Objectivist Value Theories," Dr. Edward Younkins provides the following insights into Ayn Rand's objective ethics theory: "For Rand, all human values are moral values that are essential to the ethical standard of human nature in general and the particular human life of who the agent is." and: "From Ayn Rand's perspective, every human value is a moral value (including economic value) that is important to the ethical standard of man's life qua man. Rand viewed every human choice as a moral choice involving moral values." I don't think we all realize how profound this aspect of objective ethics theory is. In moral theorizing, the two primary categories are good and evil (moral/immoral, etc....). In Randian ethics, as a comprehensive theory of human action and human behavior, all values are moral values. And this means that every object of human action, every object of discussion and analysis, every object of debate, including all participants in the debate, must eventually be categorized as either good or evil or some sub-class belonging to one of these primary moral classes. E.g., honest/dishonest, etc... Some of us may be arguing or debating under an implicit belief that in a debate over objective ethics, some of the "values" of discussion (some parts of the discussion) are in some sense "neutral," carrying no particular moral connotation or aspect. But I believe it is important to realize that in the Randian system, all values are ultimately moral values. And this means that in the Randian system, and in systems of the same general character, the moral theorizer ultimately makes a moral judgment about every value---every object of action. If this is the case, if every object of action is ultimately moral or immoral, honest or dishonest, good or evil, then what moral judgment must be applied to any theory or any theorist who contradicts the objective ethics theory or any of its primary assertions? I trust that we are all intelligent enough to grasp the full implications of this situation. If this kind of objective ethics theoretical system is a type of closed system of concepts that characterizes all values as moral values---each value (object) under consideration is either moral or immoral, good or evil---then what moral category do we expect this theoretical system to assign to any object, value, person, or action that contradicts that system? I believe this explains the constant and repetitive use of opprobrious terms and constant and repetitive resort to character assault, mainly by individuals on the objective ethics side of the debate. To some extent, this is the unavoidable consequence of adopting a theory of human action wherein the two fundamental categories of action are those of good and evil. Whereas in Misesian praxeology, actors are conceived as each striving after their ends with more or less appropriate means, in Randian and related moral theories, actors are conceived each as either good or evil, pursuing good or evil ends, with good or evil means. Under these theoretical conditions, it is at least understandable, if not praiseworthy, that those discussants and any of their notions that contradict objective ethics tend to be characterized by an adjective chosen from the less flattering category of the objective ethics theoretical construct. It may even be the case that this is considered virtuous by the moral ethicist concerned ! A wonderful passage by Mises helps illuminate the current situation: "The discovery of the inescapable interdependence of market phenomena overthrew this opinion. Bewildered, people had to face a new view of society. They learned with stupefaction that there is another aspect from which human action might be viewed than that of good and bad, of fair and unfair, of just and unjust. In the course of social events there prevails a regularity of phenomena to which man must adjust his actions if he wished to succeed. It is futile to approach social facts with the attitude of a censor who approves or disapproves from the point of view of quite arbitrary standards and judgments of value. One must study the laws of human action and social cooperation as the physicist studies the laws of nature. Human action and social cooperation seen as the object of a science of given relations, no longer a normative discipline of things that ought to be---this was a revolution of tremendous consequences for knowledge and philosophy as well as for social action." (Human Action, 3rd. rev. p.2) Indeed ! The revolution continues...
J. Grayson Lilburne: liberty student:still not being explored outside the Rothbardian paradigm, and the few who do seem to pursue this (GMU crowd?) Right, and the GMU non-Rothbardians tend to be more Hayekian than Misesian. As revered as Mises is, there seems to actually be very few Misesians, in the sense of Mises being their chief influence. Great post, LS.
liberty student:still not being explored outside the Rothbardian paradigm, and the few who do seem to pursue this (GMU crowd?)
Right, and the GMU non-Rothbardians tend to be more Hayekian than Misesian. As revered as Mises is, there seems to actually be very few Misesians, in the sense of Mises being their chief influence.
Great post, LS.
In relation to this, I found it interesting that in Horowitz's Rothbard piece the other day (answered by Block), Horowitz implies that as opposed to a Rothbardian connection to Mises, one might choose a Kirznerian connection to Mises.
What seems to come out of Horowitz's piece---and this is reinforced by Block's reply---is the idea of choosing between students of Mises, with no explicit reason given why one couldn't simply consider oneself a direct student of Mises. LvMi advocates being Rothbardian, while GMU apparently advocates being Hayekian or Kirznerian, both sides with Mises as common denominator. Why the interposition of an "intermediary" scholar between themselves and Mises?
My answer: because the scientific method Mises represents is theoretically restrictive. To subscribe explicitly to the paradigm Mises advances is to accept that one can be scientific but value-free on the one hand, or, express one's values but with no scientific basis on the other hand. This explains why libertarian scholars want to maintain an intellectual distance between themselves and Mises. They do this by interposing another scholar between themselves and Mises--a scholar who does not subscribe to as clear a distinction between value-free science and value advocacy as does Mises.
Mises writes in Socialism: "It must be emphasized again: there is no such thing as a scientific ought."
After a lifetime of study under Mises, Rothbard, chafing under the constraints of Wertfreiheit, complains in The Ethics of Liberty that Mises is an "opponent of any sort of objective ethics."
People want to express their concrete desires in scientific form. They don't want to explicitly say "my desire for concrete thing X has no scientific basis."
They don't want to explicitly confine themselves within a scientific paradigm which includes as one of its fundamental insights, as AJ has referred to:
"We orginally want or desire an object not because it is agreeable or good, but we call it agreeable or good because we want or desire it; and we do this because our sensuous or supesensuous nature so requires. There is, thus, no basis for recognizing what is good and worth wishing for outside the faculty of desiring--i.e., the original desire and wish themselves." (Epistemological Problems, p.151)
Mises's system is inconveniently inhospitable to one who would attempt to express one's personal desires as scientifically "justified." And thus the need for an intellectual buffer between the scholar attempting to scientifically ground his/her concrete values, and Mises who argues that one's concrete values can have no scientific grounding.
From an arm's length distance, we gain the credibility of Mises's scientific conclusions regarding inescapable market processes. By staying at arm's length distance, we may ignore the methodological grounding by which Mises reaches his scientific conclusions, and substitute our own methodology more suitable for reaching the moral and ethical conclusions we want to reach.
In Mises's system, desire is "formalized" in the scientific conceptual framework. Desire is stripped of content and considered in its purely formal nature....desire "as such."
Concrete desires then are the accidental, environmental, particular, individual, etc... They have no scientific basis. They are the particular or concrete desires or values that people happen to have, but which they do not necessarily have to have.
This binary system of thought is theoretically confining. It is self-disciplining. Scholars who want to provide a scientific basis for their preferences know intuitively if not consciously that they have no friend in Mises or Hume (e.g., the fact-value or is-ought gap). And thus, as I have argued (and I suppose it is no secret), libertarian normative ethics begins with a critique of utilitarianism (in its egoistic, formalistic, "if-then" sense), and this means a critique of Mises and Hume.
This will also mean a critique of Misesian praxeology (as the search for exact laws of human action)---though not necessarily a critique of the Rothbardian conception of praxeology (conceived merely as a form of supposition/counter-supposition reasoninig).
As Lilburne's original post implies, the divide in libertarian ethics theory seems to be between those who consider Hume and Mises as foundational thinkers whose systems of thought can be built upon, and those who consider Hume and Mises as adversarial obstacles whose propositions must be overcome and proven wrong for the discipline of libertarian ethics to succeed.
And thus, there is a Methodenstreit occurring in libertarian ethics theory:
http://mises.org/journals/scholar/knott.pdf
I believe it is important to add that this debate is not, as many probably believe, between those who believe that there is a rational basis for ethics, and those who deny that any rational basis for ethics exists. The debate in my opinion will inevitably reduce to the question of whether a rational framework or theory of ethical phenomena (ethical actions) can be constructed on the basis of an objectively conceived reality, independent of the subjective desires (desires of the subject) of individual actors, or, whether a science of ethical actions must be constructed, as Mises asserts, based on the formal conception of human action as striving for ends.
The debate is not about the assertion of ethics versus the denial of ethics. The debate is about the objective versus the subjective conceptual foundations of a theory of human ethical actions.
I would like to add one last insight in closing.
In the debate over objective ethics versus value-free science, certain patterns repeat. One of them is the tendency among some to quickly resort to terms of opprobrium when their views are challenged. I think I can shed some light on this so that there is a better understanding of why this pattern repeats.
In his 2003/2004 article which appeared in "The Free Radical," and was entitled "Reconciling Austrian and Objectivist Value Theories," Dr. Edward Younkins provides the following insights into Ayn Rand's objective ethics theory:
"For Rand, all human values are moral values that are essential to the ethical standard of human nature in general and the particular human life of who the agent is."
and:
"From Ayn Rand's perspective, every human value is a moral value (including economic value) that is important to the ethical standard of man's life qua man. Rand viewed every human choice as a moral choice involving moral values."
I don't think we all realize how profound this aspect of objective ethics theory is. In moral theorizing, the two primary categories are good and evil (moral/immoral, etc....). In Randian ethics, as a comprehensive theory of human action and human behavior, all values are moral values. And this means that every object of human action, every object of discussion and analysis, every object of debate, including all participants in the debate, must eventually be categorized as either good or evil or some sub-class belonging to one of these primary moral classes. E.g., honest/dishonest, etc...
Some of us may be arguing or debating under an implicit belief that in a debate over objective ethics, some of the "values" of discussion (some parts of the discussion) are in some sense "neutral," carrying no particular moral connotation or aspect.
But I believe it is important to realize that in the Randian system, all values are ultimately moral values. And this means that in the Randian system, and in systems of the same general character, the moral theorizer ultimately makes a moral judgment about every value---every object of action.
If this is the case, if every object of action is ultimately moral or immoral, honest or dishonest, good or evil, then what moral judgment must be applied to any theory or any theorist who contradicts the objective ethics theory or any of its primary assertions?
I trust that we are all intelligent enough to grasp the full implications of this situation. If this kind of objective ethics theoretical system is a type of closed system of concepts that characterizes all values as moral values---each value (object) under consideration is either moral or immoral, good or evil---then what moral category do we expect this theoretical system to assign to any object, value, person, or action that contradicts that system?
I believe this explains the constant and repetitive use of opprobrious terms and constant and repetitive resort to character assault, mainly by individuals on the objective ethics side of the debate.
To some extent, this is the unavoidable consequence of adopting a theory of human action wherein the two fundamental categories of action are those of good and evil.
Whereas in Misesian praxeology, actors are conceived as each striving after their ends with more or less appropriate means, in Randian and related moral theories, actors are conceived each as either good or evil, pursuing good or evil ends, with good or evil means.
Under these theoretical conditions, it is at least understandable, if not praiseworthy, that those discussants and any of their notions that contradict objective ethics tend to be characterized by an adjective chosen from the less flattering category of the objective ethics theoretical construct.
It may even be the case that this is considered virtuous by the moral ethicist concerned !
A wonderful passage by Mises helps illuminate the current situation:
"The discovery of the inescapable interdependence of market phenomena overthrew this opinion. Bewildered, people had to face a new view of society. They learned with stupefaction that there is another aspect from which human action might be viewed than that of good and bad, of fair and unfair, of just and unjust. In the course of social events there prevails a regularity of phenomena to which man must adjust his actions if he wished to succeed. It is futile to approach social facts with the attitude of a censor who approves or disapproves from the point of view of quite arbitrary standards and judgments of value. One must study the laws of human action and social cooperation as the physicist studies the laws of nature. Human action and social cooperation seen as the object of a science of given relations, no longer a normative discipline of things that ought to be---this was a revolution of tremendous consequences for knowledge and philosophy as well as for social action." (Human Action, 3rd. rev. p.2)
Indeed ! The revolution continues...
Why anarchy fails
Here's Liberty Student's post that I quoted (which is also eye-opening) in full:
liberty student: J. Grayson Lilburne:so should have Hume and Mises preempted the conceptual realism implicit in the Rothbardian insistence that justice has any kind of existence outside of the mind of the individual. I think this is a consequence of many of the libertarian philosophers having a personal experience with Rothbard that they did not have with Mises, and Mises' ideas, outside of their renaissance by Rothbard with MES, still not being explored outside the Rothbardian paradigm, and the few who do seem to pursue this (GMU crowd?) aren't radical libertarians. I suspect the next generation may be more likely to challenge Rothbard, just as it is only the last generation who were finally comfortable challenging Rand and Reagan. What is very interesting is how with technology, information is advancing faster than our own biases can adjust, even confirmation biases. I've accepted that what I know today could all be obsolete in a decade or two. The only way to avoid that is to unplug and become a hermit. It actually sounds tempting.
J. Grayson Lilburne:so should have Hume and Mises preempted the conceptual realism implicit in the Rothbardian insistence that justice has any kind of existence outside of the mind of the individual.
I think this is a consequence of many of the libertarian philosophers having a personal experience with Rothbard that they did not have with Mises, and Mises' ideas, outside of their renaissance by Rothbard with MES, still not being explored outside the Rothbardian paradigm, and the few who do seem to pursue this (GMU crowd?) aren't radical libertarians. I suspect the next generation may be more likely to challenge Rothbard, just as it is only the last generation who were finally comfortable challenging Rand and Reagan.
What is very interesting is how with technology, information is advancing faster than our own biases can adjust, even confirmation biases. I've accepted that what I know today could all be obsolete in a decade or two. The only way to avoid that is to unplug and become a hermit. It actually sounds tempting.
Because he wasn't all that.
Marko: Because he wasn't all that.
Blasphemy!
A very intriguing post. I agree with alot of what is said in this post, people want to believe in objective ethics, this is why natural rights is so popular. In my opinion the marginal utility of value and 5 minutes of thinking should instantly rule out any kind of objective ethics.
I think I share some of the reservations Adam Knott has with the Rothbardian portrayal of praxeology, as well as the notion of the "action axiom", though I'm not sure it would be fair to say there are not some who arguably would consider Mises their primary influence. I would say Hulsmann may well be someone you could classify in this category, though no doubts he is a "Rothbardian" too, and also outside of the Mises Institute, Thorstein Polleit.
I also think there may well be far more scholars we do not know of thanks to mises.org, who are now becoming very directly influenced by Mises! I can't say my own work in AE is very vast yet, but I think it is punctuated by the influence of the fact I decided to read Human Action before Man, Economy and State. Indeed, has anybody ever read an "Austrian" paper where the author expressly identified himself and followed the "method of imaginary constructions" as a means of exposition?
"When the King is far the people are happy." Chinese proverb
For Alexander Zinoviev and the free market there is a shared delight:
"Where there are problems there is life."
But he was. Try again.
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
Jon Irenicus: Because he wasn't all that. But he was. Try again.
I could try again, but you told me the answer now. :( The game is ruined.
The Late Andrew Ryan: I agree with alot of what is said in this post, people want to believe in objective ethics, this is why natural rights is so popular. In my opinion the marginal utility of value and 5 minutes of thinking should instantly rule out any kind of objective ethics.
5 minutes of thinking can reveal the exact opposite. Such as:
1. That marginal utility does in no way prove what you claim it does
2. The fact that humans have always to some extent engaged in voluntary cooperation is because they realized due to superior cognitive instincts what no other living being has realized and is capable of realizing; that voluntary exchange is a non-zero sum game and that without property rights there can be no meaningful system of such cooperation. The mere fact that humans have always engaged in such cooperations proves the above assertion. It matters not that they could never infer from these instincts a correct social theory of social cooperation. What is this cognitive ability if not part of an objective reality of human nature? Yes, and I do mean that the motive behind trade is in someway a result of the human wiring of the brain. This doesn't mean that objective theory of ethics is trivial, but it means that you cannot just reject it.
I don't think anyone's rejecting that humans have a hardwired propensity toward cooperation to at least some extent, because that isn't what is meant by objective ethics. For a more complete overview of the issue, check out O'Neil's essay.
DD5: The Late Andrew Ryan: I agree with alot of what is said in this post, people want to believe in objective ethics, this is why natural rights is so popular. In my opinion the marginal utility of value and 5 minutes of thinking should instantly rule out any kind of objective ethics. 5 minutes of thinking can reveal the exact opposite. Such as: 1. That marginal utility does in no way prove what you claim it does
Perhaps Ryan means Menger's subjective theory of value (which also happens to be marginal)?
J. Grayson Lilburne: DD5: The Late Andrew Ryan: I agree with alot of what is said in this post, people want to believe in objective ethics, this is why natural rights is so popular. In my opinion the marginal utility of value and 5 minutes of thinking should instantly rule out any kind of objective ethics. 5 minutes of thinking can reveal the exact opposite. Such as: 1. That marginal utility does in no way prove what you claim it does Perhaps Ryan means Menger's subjective theory of value (which also happens to be marginal)?
Yes, I do I always want to make the word utility in the subjectivist marignal theory of value. DD5, if you wish to have a large discussion of this please pm me, I don't want to waste epic amounts of thread space with somthing which is somewhat besides the point.
On the topic of "hardwired", I seem to remember a passage from Dawkins' God Delusion where he seeks to refute the theist assertion that without god morality and ethics would not exist by demonstrating that in various experiments people, regardless of socio-cultural background, tend to arrive at the same conclusions with respect to certain ethical dilemmas dealing with the value of human life. I can't remember the specifics (I really must figure out to which one of my friends I lent that book) but the thought experiments revolve around dilemmas such as sacrificing one life to save many.
So then my question is this: Is it a waste of time to try and deduct a set of objective ethics from "man in the state of nature" when we've been endowed with a universal (or nearly universal) consensus as to the value of human life based entirely on our own, entirely subjective, cognitive discourse?
Professor Salerno wrote a paper called Mises and Hayek Dehomogenized. I would love to see a "Mises and Rothbard Dehomogenized", particularly if it were written by Mr. Knott.
Rothbard was a philosopher as much as he was an economist. Mises ventured into philosophy as well, but he is known for his business cycle, interest, and monetary theories. This probably explains why most conversations on this website deal with ethics and epistemology as opposed to actual economics. The most serious attacks against the monetary equilibrium tradition, which Mises was apart of, are not economic in nature. Rothbard, Mises, Hayek, Wicksell, Kirzner, and Bohm-Bawerk are all different, but the economic framework they employed is fundamentally identical (methodological individualism, abstraction, deductive method). Their philosophical views, however, are quite different (people tend to find this stuff more interesting).
The Anglo classicists looked at social classes and distribution, the Walrasians focus on cardinal utility and a mathematical approach, while the monetarists and various branches of Keynesians focus on aggregates and borrow from other schools of thought.
"If we wish to preserve a free society, it is essential that we recognize that the desirability of a particular object is not sufficient justification for the use of coercion."
DD5: 1. That marginal utility does in no way prove what you claim it does 2. The fact that humans have always to some extent engaged in voluntary cooperation is because they realized due to superior cognitive instincts what no other living being has realized and is capable of realizing; that voluntary exchange is a non-zero sum game and that without property rights there can be no meaningful system of such cooperation. The mere fact that humans have always engaged in such cooperations proves the above assertion. It matters not that they could never infer from these instincts a correct social theory of social cooperation. What is this cognitive ability if not part of an objective reality of human nature? Yes, and I do mean that the motive behind trade is in someway a result of the human wiring of the brain. This doesn't mean that objective theory of ethics is trivial, but it means that you cannot just reject it.
DD5:
I think an important question is whether there are such things as, or whether we can conceive there are such things as, "ethical actions." (actions of an ethical nature)
Are things such as lying to someone, coercing someone, assisting someone, obstructing someone, etc.., things we may refer to as "ethical acts"?
Are these things human purposive activities that aim at ends and utilize means?
If so, then they fall within the purview of Misesian praxeology, which includes the Austrian School formal system; methodological individualism, subjective value, means/ends, marginal utility, etc...
If so, this means that the objective ethics approach is not the only approach that can be taken with regard to the subject realm of ethics.
Even if someone holds fast to standard objective ethics theory, the situation is significantly changed if/once we realize that the ethical acts of individuals are acts, and thus can be comprehended by Austrian School social science, perhaps diminishing the need for an alternative approach.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
Adam Knott: DD5: I think an important question is whether there are such things as, or whether we can conceive there are such things as, "ethical actions." (actions of an ethical nature) Are things such as lying to someone, coercing someone, assisting someone, obstructing someone, etc.., things we may refer to as "ethical acts"? Are these things human purposive activities that aim at ends and utilize means? If so, then they fall within the purview of Misesian praxeology, which includes the Austrian School formal system; methodological individualism, subjective value, means/ends, marginal utility, etc... If so, this means that the objective ethics approach is not the only approach that can be taken with regard to the subject realm of ethics. Even if someone holds fast to standard objective ethics theory, the situation is significantly changed if/once we realize that the ethical acts of individuals are acts, and thus can be comprehended by Austrian School social science, perhaps diminishing the need for an alternative approach.
This is a very interesting quote: "It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)"
It should be fairly clear to anyone why there are more Rothbardians than Misesians. It is no big mystery. Rothbard was a system builder, economics was just one of his fields. Mises on the other hand was first and foremost an economist. "Rothbardianism" simply means a lot more than "Misesianism" means. In fact pretty much all of Misesianism is already subsumed under Rothbardianism since Rothbard was a Misesian economist.
Most anybody who would call himself a "Rothbardian" would mean a lot more than just Rothbard's views on economy. I imagine for many it is a sort of synonym of ancap. So it is simply a lot more useful designation. It says more about the person using it.
Now why there are more Hayekians than Misesians should be clear too. It is obviously the consequence of most Misesians calling themselves Rothbardians.
Also Hayekianism is popular because it is a cop out. Hayek was clearly merely an economist, and not the most principled one at that. So it is a perfect designation for anyone who doesn't want his designation to oblige him to much of anything. Much harder to pull that off with Mises - because Mises had principles.
Marko: It should be fairly clear to anyone why there are more Rothbardians than Misesians. It is no big mystery. Rothbard was a system builder, economics was just one of his fields. Mises on the other hand was first and foremost an economist. "Rothbardianism" simply means a lot more than "Misesianism" means. In fact pretty much all of Misesianism is already subsumed under Rothbardianism since Rothbard was a Misesian economist. Most anybody who would call himself a "Rothbardian" would mean a lot more than just Rothbard's views on economy. I imagine for many it is a sort of a synonym of ancap. So it is simply a lot more useful designation. It says more about the person using it. Now why there are more Hayekians than Misesians should be clear too. It is obviously the consequence of most Misesians calling themselves Rothbardians. Also Hayekianism is popular because it is a cop out. Hayek was clearly merely an economist, and not the most principled one at that. So it is a perfect designation for anyone who doesn't want his designation to oblige him to much of anything. Much harder to pull that off with Mises - because Mises was so principled.
Most anybody who would call himself a "Rothbardian" would mean a lot more than just Rothbard's views on economy. I imagine for many it is a sort of a synonym of ancap. So it is simply a lot more useful designation. It says more about the person using it.
Also Hayekianism is popular because it is a cop out. Hayek was clearly merely an economist, and not the most principled one at that. So it is a perfect designation for anyone who doesn't want his designation to oblige him to much of anything. Much harder to pull that off with Mises - because Mises was so principled.
If you are being serious, what a ridiculous mass of complete non-sense your post is!
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
Marko:Also Hayekianism is popular because it is a cop out. Hayek was clearly merely an economist, and not the most principled one at that. So it is a perfect designation for anyone who doesn't want his designation to oblige him to much of anything. Much harder to pull that off with Mises - because Mises had principles.
It is also easier to take Hayek out of context in my opinion, and his views have been more open to different interpretations due to his particular style of writing.
I. Ryan: If you are being serious, what a ridiculous mass of complete non-sense your post is!
No, I'm actually joking.
What, did I hurt your feelings, precious?
Marko: No, I'm actually joking. What, did I hurt your feelings, precious?
I am not sure why you believe that my feelings are relevant.
Everyone, keep it clean.
To paraphrase Marc Faber: We're all doomed, but that doesn't mean that we can't make money in the process. Rabbi Lapin: "Let's make bricks!" Stephan Kinsella: "Say you and I both want to make a German chocolate cake."
DD5:It is also easier to take Hayek out of context in my opinion, and his views have been more open to different interpretations due to his particular style of writing.
I get it, all "Hayekians" purposely take him out of context in order to legitimize their statist proposals (like a free banking system for example), right? Unbelievable. Also, TMC is more ambiguous than anything Hayek has ever written, part three at least.
I. Ryan: I am not sure why you believe that my feelings are relevant.
So you are not a distraught Hayekian?
It's not easy being Misesian.
The fallacies of intellectual communism, a compilation - On the nature of power
Marko: So you are not a distraught Hayekian?
No, I am not. Mises has influenced me most. But, to respond to the most egregious error of that post, your comment that Hayek was "clearly merely an economist", I will say that you should definitely read, among other works, "The Sensory Order".
Marko: It should be fairly clear to anyone why there are more Rothbardians than Misesians. It is no big mystery. Rothbard was a system builder, economics was just one of his fields. Mises on the other hand was first and foremost an economist. "Rothbardianism" simply means a lot more than "Misesianism" means. In fact pretty much all of Misesianism is already subsumed under Rothbardianism since Rothbard was a Misesian economist.
Marko:
I don't see it that way. I think Mises was the system builder (praxeology), and Rothbard was a man who held several different theories (systems), some of which were incompatible with one another.
Rothbard held a natural-law/natural-rights theory, a welfare economics theory, and a theory of praxeology. He was one man who subscribed to several systems. To me, this is not systematic, but something different. If Rothbard also supports and subscribes to the argumentation ethics, would that then make his 'system' even more comprehensive ? Or would it mean that he subscribes to various social theories depending on the social phenomena at hand: Lockean theory in one case, Austrian theory in another, Hoppean in another....
Your assertion that Mises is subsumed by Rothbard is not accurate according to Rothbard himself. Rothbard explicitly claimed that praxeology was not appropriate for ethics (The Ethics of Liberty, p.12). Mises held that praxeology was a general science applicable to all human acts. Mises believed that science might one day "develop a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization that would place a theoretical science by the side of the purely historical discipline of political science." (Ulitmate Foundation, p.98)
Thus, Mises believed that praxeology was a science that would be extended to comprehend social-political phenomena above and beyond purely market phenomena, whereas Rothbard held that this was wrong, and that for the social-political sphere of human action, a positive ethics based on natural-law/natural-rights was needed.
Thus, Rothbard did not subsume Mises as Rothbardians believe. It would be much more accurate to hold that, especially during the time Rothbard wrote MES, there was overlap between himself and Mises on the question of the validity (but not the exact form) of praxeology. As Rothbard's career progressed, he became less enthusiastic about praxeology as a general science (a concept he refers to in MES), until finally, he disavowed this idea altogether, claiming essentially that praxeology did not apply beyond the realm of market phenomena.
One of the primary conclusions of Rothbard's long career in libertarian social thought is that praxeology is confined to a method of economc (market phenomena) analysis, and that once we pass beyond market phenomena, we change our theoretical system to natural-law/natural rights.
But if praxeology can study ethical actions (coercion) and "psychological actions" (trying to figure something out, trying to overcome one's fears), then I consider that Mises was a system builder (praxeology), while Rothbard subscribed to numerous systems on a pragmatic basis.
Marko: Rothbard was a system builder, economics was just one of his fields. Mises on the other hand was first and foremost an economist.
This is not meant to sound petty, as I have a great deal of respect and admiration for Rothbard, but I would argue that Mises was more of a system builder than Rothbard was. First and foremost, economics, moreover, praxeology, of which economics is only a part, is a HUGE system. And Mises actually did himself personally build HUGELY important keystones of that edifice: reconciling monetary theory with subjective value theory, proving the non-neutrality of money, developing purchasing power theory, establishing price theory and economic calculation theory on a sound non-Wieserian-imputation basis, proving the impossibility of socialism, formulating the business cycle theory, establishing the praxeological basis of economics, and more. Rothbard did a masterful job describing the edifice in MES, but afaik, he himself provided few, if any, keystones. And if Mr. Knott is right, Rothbard may have also made some unsound departures in praxeological theory. (But I don't know enough about this in particular to form an opinion yet.)
In terms of philosophy, I would note that...
All this being said, Rothbard may very well have been the greatest economic historian who ever lived, and a masterful cultural historian as well. And his ardent advocacy for liberty makes him, in my estimation as a moral agent, one of the greatest human beings who ever lived too, even if I don't agree with the meta-ethics he tried to formulate in order to justify that advocacy.
I. Ryan: No, I am not. Mises has influenced me most. But, to respond to the most egregious error of that post, your comment that Hayek was "clearly merely an economist", I will say that you should definitely read, among other works, "The Sensory Order".
That is nice. I did not know about this work. But is the information contained within it a part of Hayekianism?
Esuric:I get it, all "Hayekians" purposely take him out of context in order to legitimize their statist proposals
Did I say all "Hayekians" or did I say "purposely"?
Esuric:like a free banking system for example
And that should be "free banking" as oppose to free banking.
Adam & Grayson, you could well be right. I will allow for that possibility as I do not feel competent to argue that you are not.
But at the same time I must point out that what I wrote is the prevailing perception. So it is immaterial if it is not true if the question we are trying to answer is why are there relatively few Misesians. If this perception is indeed the prevailing one as I think it is, then it is reason enough why.
PS, Just to elaborate on what I meant earlier with Misesianism as subsumed under Rothbardianism. This in the sense that Rothbardianism = Misesian economics + a bunch of other stuff. On the assumption (here challenged) that outside economics the contribution of Mises was not that great.
Marko: That is nice. I did not know about this work. But is the information contained within it a part of Hayekianism?
No idea. The labels "Hayekian" and "Misesian" are quite ambiguous. But, as you already alluded to, the label "Rothbardian" is less ambiguous. For it usually denotes a subscription to the policies that he advocates, "anarcho-capitalism". To claim to be (a) a "Misesian" and (b) an "anarchist" would seem, to all besides Poptech, to be entirely non-contradictory and even almost expected, atleast 'round here. But to claim to be (a) a "Rothbardian" and (b) a "minarchist" or a "statist" would be quite confusing.
So the reason, I think, why many more people label themselves "Rothbardian" than "Hayekian" or "Misesian" is merely that the former one, "Rothbardian", is less ambiguous and therefore more useful than the latter two, "Hayekian" and "Misesian".
I will, because it is related and probably of interest, also say that Hoppe, at one point, in a lecture, referred to Mises as "our intellectual master".
I. Ryan: But, as you already alluded to, .
But, as you already alluded to, .
Aha! As I already alluded to. So you are now saying my post was not a complete mass of non-sense.
Marko (I. Ryan added the bracketed text.):So you are now saying [implying] my post was not a complete mass of non-sense.
Yeah, basically.
Marko: It should be fairly clear to anyone why there are more Rothbardians than Misesians. It is no big mystery. Rothbard was a system builder, economics was just one of his fields. Mises on the other hand was first and foremost an economist. "Rothbardianism" simply means a lot more than "Misesianism" means. In fact pretty much all of Misesianism is already subsumed under Rothbardianism since Rothbard was a Misesian economist. Most anybody who would call himself a "Rothbardian" would mean a lot more than just Rothbard's views on economy. I imagine for many it is a sort of synonym of ancap. So it is simply a lot more useful designation. It says more about the person using it. Now why there are more Hayekians than Misesians should be clear too. It is obviously the consequence of most Misesians calling themselves Rothbardians. Also Hayekianism is popular because it is a cop out. Hayek was clearly merely an economist, and not the most principled one at that. So it is a perfect designation for anyone who doesn't want his designation to oblige him to much of anything. Much harder to pull that off with Mises - because Mises had principles.
That makes complete sense.
I've never read Hayek but Block,Kinsella,Rothbard and Hoppe Etc put me off ever wanting too.
Hayek never even had the guts to call himself a libertarian.
I don't really want to comment or read anything here.I have near zero in common with many of you.I may return periodically when there's something you need to know.
Near Mutualist/Libertarian Socialist.
Scott F:I've never read Hayek but Block,Kinsella,Rothbard and Hoppe Etc put me off ever wanting too.
I'm pretty sure that attitude is antithetical to the spirit of those four scholars, and that they would would be most disappointed to hear that they've inadvertently inspired anyone to put on ideological blinders.
Scott F:Hayek never even had the guts to call himself a libertarian.
The analogous word current in his time was "liberal". And he wrote extensively in promotion of liberalism.
Marko: Adam & Grayson, you could well be right. I will allow for that possibility as I do not feel competent to argue that you are not. But at the same time I must point out that what I wrote is the prevailing perception. So it is immaterial if it is not true if the question we are trying to answer is why are there relatively few Misesians. If this perception is indeed the prevailing one as I think it is, then it is reason enough why. PS, Just to elaborate on what I meant earlier with Misesianism as subsumed under Rothbardianism. This in the sense that Rothbardianism = Misesian economics + a bunch of other stuff. On the assumption (here challenged) that outside economics the contribution of Mises was not that great.
I agree with your overall sentiment here.
I would phrase it this way:
Mises was a trained economist who realized that economics was only the best elaborated part of a more general or universal science, but who was not able in his lifetime to revise or extend this more universal science beyond market or catallactic phenomena. He laid the foundation for doing so, but he himself did not do so.
The realm of human action that lies outside of market or catallactic human actions, and that from a libertarian point of view is/was most in need of scientific or rational comprehension, is the ethical realm of human action---the realm of interpersonal actions which are the basis of politics and political organization. Mises undoubtedly did not know how to extend praxeology to treat this subject realm. He could only suggest that this realm of human action be approached in similar fashion to the economic (market) realm of human action:
"There is an important sense in which the subject-matter of political science can be conceived to come within the scope of our definition of the economic. Systems of government, property relationships, and the like, can be conceived as the result of choice. It is desirable that this conception should be further explored on lines analogous to better known analysis."
(Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature & Significance of Economic Science, p.134)
"Economic theory has traditionally dealt with the phenomena of the market, prices, production, and monetary calculation. In these spheres of human activity, theorists have developed constructions that help to explain the regularities these phenomena evince and to bring into clear focus the tendencies for change in these phenomena consequent upon given autonomous changes in the data.....
....The subject matter of economics came to be connected with the material things that are the objects of traffic in the market; it can to be linked peculiarly with the use of money in market transactions or with the specific social relationships that characterize the market system. Where writers came closest to recognizing that these criteria were only accidental characteristics of the affairs upon which economic analysis could be brought to bear, where they were able to glimpse the congenerousness of the specifically economic type of analysis with the underlying actions of men, they were unable to follow this clue to the conclusions to which it pointed....
... Precisely because those features in action that made it susceptible of economic analysis seemed common to all human activities, these writers were driven back to look for some other defining characteristic. And this meant again the search for some arbitrary quality to justify selecting the particular slice of pie that made up economic theory...
....but it meant in addition the relegation yet further into the background of the true recipe of that larger pie from which their conception of economics was being arbitrarily hacked....
....In finding the economic aspect of activities in general to consist in concern with the ends-means relationship, this conception...includes within its scope kinds of actions with which economics has had traditionally little to do..."
(Kirzner, The Economic Point of View, p. 182-183)
Both of these passages were written by authors in consultation with Mises.
Thus, Mises had in mind a general science of human action (praxeology) based on an analysis of the means/ends relationship. The most pressing realm of human action in need of praxeological analysis aside from the market-related realm of human action, is/was the social-political realm of human action; that realm having to do with "Systems of government, property relationships, and the like..." This realm of human action ultimately concerns the ethical side of man, the ways and means of treating and interacting with one's fellow citizens. But Mises did not know how to apply praxeology to the social-political realm of human action, and he admitted it.
And thus there existed/exists a huge void in the science of human action. Libertarians demanded and demand to know the rational basis for their intuition that libertarian ethics somehow is inherent in or is consistent with, man's nature.... Mises did not and could not provide this information.
Enter Rothbard, and enter Rand.
This is the void Rothbard and Rand filled. And this is why what you write is correct. Because libertarians want and wanted more than the laws of economics, understood as the laws of market phenomena. Libertarians wanted to know the rational basis for their social-political program and views. This is something Mises could not provide in the scientific sense (as part of praxeology). He could only argue for liberalism as a value choice, not as part of value-free science. He did not know how to describe the social-political acts of individuals as actions, conceivable by a praxeological science in terms of the ends sought and the means utilized.
Thus, as you write, in the strictly scientific, value-free sense, Mises is/was only economics, since he only elaborated the branch of praxeology that is economics.
What Rothbard and Rand claimed, in essence, was to have provided a scientific basis for libertarian ethics as well. And so when you write that Rothbard is perceived as providing more than Mises, or perceived as subsuming Mises, and providing information that is Misesian economics + a bunch of other stuff, this is accurate. Rothbard provided, roughly speaking, both Misesian economics + Natural-law/Natural-rights ethics, and he furthermore conceived that his natural-law ethics was scientific (i.e., not merely based on, and not merely reducible to, the desires of the particular natural-law theorist).
But there is a huge problem here if it turns out that Rothbard's natural-law ethics isn't really scientific. If that is the case, then this means not only that the scientific basis of libertarian ethics has not been provided as promised by Rothbard and Rand, but it also means that roughly fifty years of libertarian scholarship has been diverted down a dead-end path in seeking to find the basis of libertarian ethics in natural-law and objective ethics, rather than in praxeology.
And this is the debate and controversy I believe the libertarian scholarly community is going through to some extent. Hoppe disavowed Rothbard's natural-law and proposed his own argumentation ethics in its place. Long apparently wants to construct an Aristotelian virtue ethics (the Aristotelian source being common to Randian and Rothbardian ethics) that begins with a critique of Mises and utilitarianism, and generally bypasses Austrian School social theory.
I personally believe that it is implicitly if not explicitly admitted by most libertarian scholars that the Randian and Rothbardian ethical theories ultimately fail. Rand and Rothbard were instrumental in inaugurating the modern American libertarian movement, but their theories do not overcome the notion that the source of moral and ethical values is subjective (the individual moral/ethical subject). O'Neil won the debate:
http://mises.org/journals/jls/7_1/7_1_4.pdf
But it's taking twenty five years or more to come to terms with this, and to come to terms with the implications of this.
Mises argued that praxeology was a general science of human action that ultimately studies all acts of the individual, and this includes man's "ethical acts." . Rand and Rothbard essentially argued that this approach was not appropriate for the subject realm of ethics, and that only an objective ethics can inform our ethical actions.
Fifty years later we are now re-examining whether the path that was chosen---Randian and Rothbardian objective ethics---was, in retrospect, the correct path.
Marko: Also Hayekianism is popular because it is a cop out. Hayek was clearly merely an economist, and not the most principled one at that. So it is a perfect designation for anyone who doesn't want his designation to oblige him to much of anything. Much harder to pull that off with Mises - because Mises had principles.
This is bullshit, plain and simple. I'm not even an Austrian, but this claim is just ridiculous on its face. Not only was Hayek the most important economist of the 20th century (and the only Austrian to be taken seriously by the mainstream), he was decades ahead of his time in neuroscience, made important contributions to the philosophy of science and the history of economic thought, and is the only libertarian political philosopher (besides Nozick) that you are likely to encounter in graduate political philosophy course.
"I cannot prove, but am prepared to affirm, that if you take care of clarity in reasoning, most good causes will take care of themselves, while some bad ones are taken care of as a matter of course." -Anthony de Jasay
Knott,
How are defining what is and isn't a science in terms of saying Rothbardian ethics isn't a science? Mises 'utilitarianism' is perhaps the greatest flaw of Mises' work even though he assumes broad value statement concerning the positive well-being of individuals. Thing such a wealth, life, abundance. I think Long's work on ethics is actually more of a cross between extreme deontological concerns in Rothbard and extreme consequential concerns with Rand. It's a nice balance between the two in my mind.
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael