Solid_Choke: Marko: Also Hayekianism is popular because it is a cop out. Hayek was clearly merely an economist, and not the most principled one at that. So it is a perfect designation for anyone who doesn't want his designation to oblige him to much of anything. Much harder to pull that off with Mises - because Mises had principles. This is bullshit, plain and simple. I'm not even an Austrian, but this claim is just ridiculous on its face. Not only was Hayek the most important economist of the 20th century (and the only Austrian to be taken seriously by the mainstream), he was decades ahead of his time in neuroscience, made important contributions to the philosophy of science and the history of economic thought, and is the only libertarian political philosopher (besides Nozick) that you are likely to encounter in graduate political philosophy course.
Marko: Also Hayekianism is popular because it is a cop out. Hayek was clearly merely an economist, and not the most principled one at that. So it is a perfect designation for anyone who doesn't want his designation to oblige him to much of anything. Much harder to pull that off with Mises - because Mises had principles.
Also Hayekianism is popular because it is a cop out. Hayek was clearly merely an economist, and not the most principled one at that. So it is a perfect designation for anyone who doesn't want his designation to oblige him to much of anything. Much harder to pull that off with Mises - because Mises had principles.
This is bullshit, plain and simple. I'm not even an Austrian, but this claim is just ridiculous on its face. Not only was Hayek the most important economist of the 20th century (and the only Austrian to be taken seriously by the mainstream), he was decades ahead of his time in neuroscience, made important contributions to the philosophy of science and the history of economic thought, and is the only libertarian political philosopher (besides Nozick) that you are likely to encounter in graduate political philosophy course.
Right, Hayek delved into epistemology and sociology as much as he did Economics. To say that Hayek was 'merely an economist' betrays a complete lack of familiarity with his work.
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
Esuric:Rothbard was a philosopher as much as he was an economist. Mises ventured into philosophy as well, but he is known for his business cycle, interest, and monetary theories.
Lets not forget the framework for Human Action, Praxeology, as well. That in it's absence most all economic theorems would be arbitrary, Austrian theories included.
I have mostly read Hayek and Mises, and I am salivating at the chance to indulge myself in Rothbard. I have read many essay's by him and I absolutely adore his sarcastic, yet entirely justified, tone directed toward the state. But before I dive into MES I am going to tackle a few small things first, like some Bastiat work and a few essays from modern economists like Robert Murphy, Market Anarchy, ect.....
filc:I have mostly read Hayek and Mises, and I am salivating at the chance to indulge myself in Rothbard. I have read many essay's by him and I absolutely adore his sarcastic, yet entirely justified, tone directed toward the state. But before I dive into MES I am going to tackle a few small things first, like some Bastiat work and a few essays from modern economists like Robert Murphy, Market Anarchy, ect.....
That seems like a sensible approach.
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
Laughing Man:The Dwight Schrute Healthcare System
HA! I subscribe to this HC system!
I approve that message.
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filc:My superior brainpower! I don't even have to work out. I just use my amazing brain power to make my muscles get stronger and weaker at will!
..Why would you want to make your muscles weaker?
Laughing Man:..Why would you want to make your muscles weaker?
So that I could then make them stronger of coarse!
Solid_Choke: This is bullshit, plain and simple. I'm not even an Austrian, but this claim is just ridiculous on its face. Not only was Hayek the most important economist of the 20th century (and the only Austrian to be taken seriously by the mainstream),
This is bullshit, plain and simple. I'm not even an Austrian, but this claim is just ridiculous on its face. Not only was Hayek the most important economist of the 20th century (and the only Austrian to be taken seriously by the mainstream),
Whatever. Hayek compared to Mises is a regression. Which is precisely why he could be taken seriously by the mainstream.
Solid_Choke: he was decades ahead of his time in neuroscience, made important contributions to the philosophy of science and the history of economic thought, and is the only libertarian political philosopher (besides Nozick) that you are likely to encounter in graduate political philosophy course.
he was decades ahead of his time in neuroscience, made important contributions to the philosophy of science and the history of economic thought, and is the only libertarian political philosopher (besides Nozick) that you are likely to encounter in graduate political philosophy course.
I could not care less about his contribution to neuroscience, that is about off field as it gets. He was merely an economist, a scientist. He did not pick out a political orientation and then get behind it with all his being. To call yourself a Hayekian betrays ones chief influence in the field of economics. It says just about nothing about ones politics or approach to politics.
Marko: He was merely an economist
He was merely an economist
I thought that you already accepted my rebuttal of that statement.
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
I. Ryan: Marko: He was merely an economist I thought that you already accepted my rebuttal of that statement.
I did not see you rebuke anything. I asked you if that work is a part of what Hayekianism is. You were unable to answer. If you show that Hayek's contribution to neuroscience is subsumed under Hayekianism then you will have rebuked me.
What I wrote stands in the context I wrote it. Of course he was more than merely an economist. Aside from that he was also a war veteran, an immigrant, a husband, a father... Do you see how easily it is to 'rebuke' what I said if we ignore the context?
Hayek is merely an economist in the sense that Hayekianism merely denotes his contribution in economics. Just like Keynesianism merely denotes Keynes' take on economy. Rothbardianism on the other hand is a term more similar to Marxism, Marxism being much more than just economic theory of Marx.
It would be absurd for a non-economist to deem himself a Hayekian, but it is not absurd for a non-economist to deem himself a Rothbardian.
Marko: I did not see you rebuke anything. I asked you if that work is a part of what Hayekianism is. You were unable to answer. If you show that Hayek's contribution to neuroscience is subsumed under Hayekianism then you will have rebuked me. What I wrote stands in the context I wrote it. Of course he was more than merely an economist. Aside from that he was also a war veteran, an immigrant, a husband, a father... Do you see how easily it is to 'rebuke' what I said if we ignore the context? Hayek is merely an economist in the sense that Hayekianism merely denotes his contribution in economics. Just like Keynesianism merely denotes Keynes' take on economy. Rothbardianism on the other hand is a term more similar to Marxism, Marxism being much more than just economic theory of Marx.
Well, if every person reading your statement misinterprets it, that is probably your fault.
I am not looking to blame anyone.
Marko: I am not looking to blame anyone.
I am.
I can accept the blame if it will make you feel better.
Adam Knott, I thought that write up was awesome! I'd really like to read more about praxeology, what should I read first? I've ordered Human Action from Amazon, just waiting for it to arrive. Any other suggestions?
The issue of natural rights has always been the sticking point for me, as it seems utterly unnecessary in creating a rational, all-encompassing framework of interpreting society. I find Stirnerite egoism a much better fit, at least until praxeology can be applied to ethical choices (if it can at all, don't know enough about it to judge either way).
Of course, economics seems much more specific and easier to apply praxeology to, since the end seems fairly straight-forward and objective; to "avoid discomfort", which in economical terms would imply maximizing acquisition of limited resources (even this end relies on quite a few assumed answers which spring from ethical questions an individual must pose to themselves). In this regard, the means could be mapped out with much more certainty.
In ethics, the appropriate end allowing the individual to "avoid discomfort" are subjective to the individual, as far as I've experienced. This means there is no way that a universal "road map to the end of suffering" could be proven. The only answer is each individual discovering their personal means through an act of individual will, either by applying praxeology, going to church, meditating, submitting to Allah, dropping acid, etc.
This situation seems ideal to me; tolerant, free, competitive, etc.
Thoughts?
Jackson LaRose:going to church, meditating, submitting to Allah, dropping acid, etc.
All of which are within the framework of praxeology.
Also, a good place to start with praxeology is Michael Oakeshott's On Human Action which covers it remarkably well in my opinion.
but can praxeology determine which is the optimal means or ends?
Jackson LaRose:but can praxeology determine which is the optimal means or ends?
No. Praxeology doesn't determine that which is optimal. It is the general science of human action. The ends sought and the means used to reach them are still subjective.
Oh, well that settles it I guess. No objective morality! Woo Hoo! OK, let's go tell the pope, and then go home!
Jackson LaRose:Oh, well that settles it I guess. No objective morality! Woo Hoo! OK, let's go tell the pope, and then go home!
Indeed, now lets get back to why there are so few Misesians.
OK, because people are insecure and need the comfort and reassurance of knowing their actions are "true" and "good", and they will be rewarded for being faithful to those guidelines.
Jackson LaRose:OK, because people are insecure and need the comfort and reassurance of knowing their actions are "true" and "good", and they will be rewarded for being faithful to those guidelines.
Or his followers are just more appealing.
because they provide easier answers?
Laughing Man: Knott, How are defining what is and isn't a science in terms of saying Rothbardian ethics isn't a science? Mises 'utilitarianism' is perhaps the greatest flaw of Mises' work even though he assumes broad value statement concerning the positive well-being of individuals. Thing such a wealth, life, abundance. I think Long's work on ethics is actually more of a cross between extreme deontological concerns in Rothbard and extreme consequential concerns with Rand. It's a nice balance between the two in my mind.
Knott,
How are defining what is and isn't a science in terms of saying Rothbardian ethics isn't a science? Mises 'utilitarianism' is perhaps the greatest flaw of Mises' work even though he assumes broad value statement concerning the positive well-being of individuals. Thing such a wealth, life, abundance. I think Long's work on ethics is actually more of a cross between extreme deontological concerns in Rothbard and extreme consequential concerns with Rand. It's a nice balance between the two in my mind.
Hi Laughing Man
I'm not sure we're in that much disagreement here. In my post above I left open the possibility that someone may argue that Rothbard provided a scientific ethics. I would argue he didn't, by both his own standards set forth in the first 25 pages of The Ethics of Liberty, and I would probably argue that his most able followers and admirers implicitly agree, since they don't take his system and build on it.
Regarding Mises's utilitarianism, there are at least two senses of the term utilitarianism as Long notes on the first page of his Yeager critique. The kind of utilitarianism Mises was primarily concerned with, as I understand it, is the egoistic utilitarianism Long refers to. This is the idea that the individual actor "utilizes" means to attain his ends, and thus "utilitarianism." I think in ethics theory we have to be conscious of the tendency to equate the term 'utilitarianism' with the category of evil or immoral in the normative ethical system (here I'm referring to the notion that the two primary categories of normative moral theorizing are good and evil, moral and immoral, etc...). For example, in the virtue ethics theories I've seen, an individual actor is conceived to "utilize" changes in his conduct (moral or ethical), in order to, attain various states of happiness (eudaimonia, flourishing, etc...) Moral theory is "utilitarian" to the extent it tells a person that if he changes his conduct to X, then Y positive thing will happen to him. In this sense, Rothbard's ethics, as he conceived it in the abovementioned 25 pages, is utilitarian: "...natural law provides man with a "science of happiness," with the paths which will lead to his real happiness." Thus, if you do X, then you will be happy. By means of X, you can attain Y. Utilizing X gets you Y.....
When we use the term utilitarianism as a virtual synonym for immorality, as Rothbardian ethics theory tends to do, I think we overlook some important things.
I also don't think we're really in disagreement about Long's approach. Generally, those who follow Rothbard and Rand consider Aristotle to be their primary source, and they base their ethical theories on a critique of utilitarianism. I don't think stating this is too controversial. Objective ethicists do not take "Hume's Law" and Austrian School social science (theoretical subjectivism, methodological individualism, subjective value, means/ends), and try to construct an ethical theory with these constructs as a base. Rather, they begin with a critique of Humean and Misesian utilitarianism, and they believe that the key to overcoming the challenge that Hume and Mises pose to objective ethics theories lies in some type of Aristotelian formulation.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
Jackson LaRose:because they provide easier answers?
Or more advance upon, better answers.
if you accept their conclusions
Jackson LaRose:if you accept their conclusions
Which seems to be the case, hence the question.
Jackson LaRose: OK, because people are insecure and need the comfort and reassurance of knowing their actions are "true" and "good", and they will be rewarded for being faithful to those guidelines.
I can do this all day
Hi Jackson
Here is a short reading list for praxeology:
Human Action - MisesEpistemological Problems of Economics - MisesThe Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science - MisesInvestigations Into the Method of the Social Sciences - MengerIndividualism and Economic Order - HayekAn Essay on the Nature & Significance of Economic Science - RobbinsMinds, Brains, & Science - SearlePhysics and Philosophy - HeisenbergThe Phenomenology of the Social World - Schutz
Those are the most important books I know of.
"...economics seems much more specific and easier to apply praxeology to, since the end seems fairly straight-forward and objective; to "avoid discomfort", which in economical terms would imply maximizing acquisition of limited resources (even this end relies on quite a few assumed answers which spring from ethical questions an individual must pose to themselves). In this regard, the means could be mapped out with much more certainty. In ethics, the appropriate end allowing the individual to "avoid discomfort" are subjective to the individual, as far as I've experienced. This means there is no way that a universal "road map to the end of suffering" could be proven. The only answer is each individual discovering their personal means through an act of individual will..."
You are touching on something important here. The reason praxeology wasn't extended to other realms of human action outside of the market.
Here is what Kirzner wrote:
"Economic theory has traditionally dealt with the phenomena of the market, prices, production, and monetary calculation. In these spheres of human activity, theorists have developed constructions that help to explain the regularities these phenomena evince and to bring into clear focus the tendencies for change in these phenomena consequent upon given autonomous changes in the data..."
"From the point of view of praxeology, the earlier attempts suffered from their tendency to seek for the defining criteria in the nature of the specific affairs with which market phenomena are concerned."
"The subject matter of economics came to be connected with the material things that are the objects of traffic in the market; it came to be linked peculiarly with the use of money in market transactions or with the specific social relationships that characterize the market system. Where writers came closest to the recognition that these criteria were only accidental characteristics of the affairs upon which economic analysis could be brought to bear, where they were able to glimpse the congenerousness of the specifically economic type analysis with the underlying actions of men, they were unable to follow this clue to the conclusion to which it pointed."
"Precisely because those features in action that made it susceptible of economic analysis seemed common to all human activities, these writers were driven back to look for some other defining characteristic. And this meant again the search for some arbitrary quality to justify selecting the particular slice of pie that made up economic theory; but it meant in addition the relegation yet further into the background of the true recipe of that larger pie from which their conception of economics was being arbitrarily hacked."
(The Economic Point of View, p.182-183)
In these passages Kirzner is addressing the very same issue you have in your post. Common to both the economic and the ethical realm, you write, is the 'attempt to avoid discomfort.' Then, you go on to recognize that though both realms of human action have this feature in common, still yet, market phenomena are in some sense objective, while ethical phenomena are in some sense subjective, and this seems to indicate a defining characteristic between the two such that different methods of inquiry may be appropriate for each realm.
This is exactly what Kirzner (and Mises) are touching on.
But even in your own post, you begin to see the problem with this view of things. Because in the first underlined passage, you essentially realize that what is best suited to alleviate uneasiness vis-a-vis the market sphere of human action, is subjective to each individual.
In the second underlined passage, I believe there is an important distinction to be made. You seem to be referring to something we might refer to as an "ontological proof." This would be a proof or a statement that seeks to convey a kind of information implied by a statement such as "X is what is in your mind." This is a statement or proof of the existential or ontological existence of something. But in my understanding, that is not what praxeology does.
Praxeology says something more like: "If X is in your mind, then Y is in your mind, because Y is part of X."
An example of this kind of statement would be (and excuse my constantly using this example, but it seems to be a good one for illustrating the principle involved): "If you walk towards one location, you must necessarily walk away from another location."
Praxeology does not say "You walked away from X location." (ontological proof)
Praxeology says something like: "If you walked away from location X, then you walked toward location Y."
If someone replies: "Yes, I see, but there are xyz problems with this conception." Then addressing these challenges is part of the epistemology of praxeology. That's why Mises wrote: "The importance of phenomenology for the solution of the epistemological problems of praxeology has not been noticed at all." (Money, Method, and the Market Process, p.19)
If you apply this notion to your second underlined passage, I will argue that praxeology is and can be what Schutz referred to as an objective science about subjective experiences:
"In our view, pure economics (#1) is a perfect example of an objective meaning-complex about subjective meaning-complexes, in other words, of an objective meaning-configuration stipulating the typical and invariant subjective experiences of anyone who acts within an economic framework(#2)." (The Phenomenology of the Social World, p.245) (numbering added)
To understand Misesian praxeology, substitute "praxeology" for "economics" at #1, and substitute "means/ends framework" for "economic framework" at #2.
Angurse:No. Praxeology doesn't determine that which is optimal. It is the general science of human action. The ends sought and the means used to reach them are still subjective.
This is an important point Angurse is making Jackson. Praxeology states that we are not in a position to judge the desired ends of other people. It would be in error for us to decide on behalf of someone else whether they should be a plumber or a carpenter. The most economic output will result if the man decides for himself.
Praxeology reveals that all methods of controlled economics, coercive economics, and anything otherwise will ultimately fail as it requests a man or gorup of men being omniscient. A body which can preemptively acknowledge the desires of every man women and child on earth, at all moments of time. No such men exist to date, likely never will.
OK, that was heavy (had to read it a few times). But, I think I see what you (and Mises) are saying. Essentially, praxeology is a helpful tool, when dealing with a means ends system, but even at Mises' own admission, begins to unravel when the scope of consideration becomes so wide that the variability of the desired outcome is too great to fit neatly into the framework of the methodology.
This is a great insight, and really helps me out, because after listening to a lot of Roddy Long (sounds like a porno star when you call him that) and much less triple H (Hoppe), the amount of "givens" they kept adding to their philosophical ideas was bothering me. Y'know, people do behave irrationally at times (I imagine we all have), and they didn't really seem to have considered that. But the intellectual concessions they had to make was merely a result of them shoehorning such a wild a subject as ethics into Praxeology's narrow framework. Of course I don't really know anything about how Rothbard tweaked praxeology a generation before, either, so maybe it makes sense to them.
filc:Praxeology states that we are not in a position to judge the desired ends of other people. It would be in error for us to decide on behalf of someone else whether they should be a plumber or a carpenter. The most economic output will result if the man decides for himself.
So how did the Natty Rights get involved?
Jackson LaRose:I can do this all day
Non-answers are pretty easy.
Jackson LaRose:OK, that was heavy (had to read it a few times). But, I think I see what you (and Mises) are saying. Essentially, praxeology is a helpful tool, when dealing with a means ends system, but even at Mises' own admission, begins to unravel when the scope of consideration becomes so wide that the variability of the desired outcome is too great to fit neatly into the framework of the methodology.
Praxeology is not really a tool. It's the foundation from which economics is built apon. Economics is above that. Economics would really be the tool if anything. Praxeology is the foundation which allows us to comprehend and understand economics in a meaningful way. It's framework is built from a single axiom, Human Action. It's built up from there.
Jackson LaRose:Y'know, people do behave irrationally at times (I imagine we all have), and they didn't really seem to have considered that.
This would be incorrect from a praxeological stance. The only way we could judge someone's rationality is by being omniscient. We have not the tools to judge others actions as being rational or irrational. Some people argue that folks who live on welfare are irrational, but strictly speaking from an economic and praxeological standpoint, depending on what their tolerances and preferences are, they may be acting entirely rationally.
Jackson LaRose:So how did the Natty Rights get involved?
Forgive my ignorance but I don't follow this line.
It's not a "non-answer", I just didn't feel like typing it twice. My answer is the same.
I'm pretty sure he means irrational in the 'driven by emotion or cognitive bias' sense, which is praxeologically compatible.
filc:Praxeology is not really a tool. It's the foundation from which economics is built apon. Economics is above that. Economics would really be the tool if anything. Praxeology is the foundation which allows us to comprehend and understand economics in a meaningful way. It's framework is built from a single axiom, Human Action. It's built up from there.
OK, that makes sense.
filc:This would be incorrect from a praxeological stance. The only way we could judge someone's rationality is by being omniscient. We have not the tools to judge others actions as being rational or irrational. Some people argue that folks who live on welfare are irrational, but strictly speaking from an economic and praxeological standpoint, depending on what their tolerances and preferences are, they may be acting entirely rationally.
OK, I can completely agree with that. This is sort of what I was driving at when I asked:
filc: Jackson LaRose:So how did the Natty Rights get involved?
"Natty Rights" is my new colloquialism for natural rights advocates. You like?
zefreak:
That's is what I meant. Maybe "illogical" would've been a better choice of words, but even then, that could be said to be praxelogically incorrect, so I guess it really boils down to semantics. Stupid limiting language, I wish I could change colors to communicate, like an octopus!
Adam Knott:I'm not sure we're in that much disagreement here. In my post above I left open the possibility that someone may argue that Rothbard provided a scientific ethics. I would argue he didn't, by both his own standards set forth in the first 25 pages of The Ethics of Liberty, and I would probably argue that his most able followers and admirers implicitly agree, since they don't take his system and build on it.
Fair enough. I was just seeing where you draw the line on what is and isn't science since that seems to be a prevalent problem in philosophy which could help illuminate why someone would or would not consider Rothbardian ethics scientific.
Adam Knott:The kind of utilitarianism Mises was primarily concerned with, as I understand it, is the egoistic utilitarianism Long refers to. This is the idea that the individual actor "utilizes" means to attain his ends, and thus "utilitarianism."
Well it seems that Mises' utilitarianism is somewhat different then run of the mill utilitarianism, hence why I put it quotation marks.
Adam Knott:In this sense, Rothbard's ethics, as he conceived it in the abovementioned 25 pages, is utilitarian: "...natural law provides man with a "science of happiness," with the paths which will lead to his real happiness." Thus, if you do X, then you will be happy. By means of X, you can attain Y. Utilizing X gets you Y.....
Well I don't think Rothbard thought purely in deonotoligcal terms. He recognized that rights bring about positive consequences but I theorized that if asked whether we should have rights even if they aren't positive then he would of said yes. Also with eudiamonia it has to be somewhat ambiguous because while everyone has an ultimate end not everyone has the exact same path/end itself. It is like saying 'Wow look at all these rights, are they not great? Oh and look at all the great things you can do with them too!'
Adam Knott:When we use the term utilitarianism as a virtual synonym for immorality, as Rothbardian ethics theory tends to do, I think we overlook some important things
Well I don't think utilitarianism is evil per say, I mean it can certainly justify a lot of evil things in the hope of maximizing the greatest happiness. I think Rothbard's disagreement was that it lacked a radical departure from the status quo. Rothbard wanted a stable system of unalienable rights that are not subject to the scruples of the state apparatus and wouldn't justify 'unlibertarian' values. Utilitarianism was just simply too unstable for Rothbard and I tend to agree with him on that.
Adam Knott:Generally, those who follow Rothbard and Rand consider Aristotle to be their primary source, and they base their ethical theories on a critique of utilitarianism.
Well I actually just finished reading Gordon's Philosophical Origins of Austrian Economics and Aristotle seems to be a great influence on many of the Austrian economics. Not so much on Mises though.
Adam Knott:Objective ethicists do not take "Hume's Law" and Austrian School social science (theoretical subjectivism, methodological individualism, subjective value, means/ends), and try to construct an ethical theory with these constructs as a base. Rather, they begin with a critique of Humean and Misesian utilitarianism, and they believe that the key to overcoming the challenge that Hume and Mises pose to objective ethics theories lies in some type of Aristotelian formulation.
Well economical subjective value theory is just that, economics. We both understand that economics should/is be a value-free system. However, I think Long points out an important distinction between this subjective value which can be explanatory (in appealing to the values of others to explain their actions) and normative (in which all ends are on a level playing field). I don't see how methodological individualism really conflicts with ethics formulation though. Would your class perhaps be that ethical systems search for the 'good' of humanity while methodological individualism tells us that only individuals can act?
Jackson LaRose: OK, that was heavy (had to read it a few times). But, I think I see what you (and Mises) are saying. Essentially, praxeology is a helpful tool, when dealing with a means ends system, but even at Mises' own admission, begins to unravel when the scope of consideration becomes so wide that the variability of the desired outcome is too great to fit neatly into the framework of the methodology.
Jackson:
If I may, a re-wording:
"...even at Mises' own admission, praxeology does not apply when the scope of consideration does not deal with an actor utilizing means to attain ends, which is the framework of praxeology."
: - )
Regarding the underlined part of your passage, as I understand it, in the approach Mises advocates, the desired outcome is specified by the individual actor. It is the singular outcome the actor desires. In this system, the desired outcome (the "end") is taken as a given end, and that given end is supposed (assumed) as the given end (desired outcome) of the actor concerned.
In this system then, the idea that the 'variability of the desired outcome' could be too great would simply mean that we are talking about something other than an individual aiming for a specific, singular state of affairs.
I'm not sure, but you may have meant to say something like:
"...praxeology begins to unravel when the scope of consideration becomes so wide that the variability of the..... outcome is too great to fit neatly into the framework of the methodology."
That is, omit "desired" from your description, so that we are not referring to the conscious desire of an individual subject ??
For example, a person tosses a rock into a pond. Here, the variability of the..... outcome (where exactly the rock will come to rest, where the water drops will land, etc...) is "too great to fit neatly into the framework of the methodology."
But here we are no longer talking about social science in the sense that we are no longer referring to an individual's desiring a specific state. We are describing an event from the point of view of naturalism, a theoretical construct from which we have attempted to remove reference to human consciousness categories (e.g., success versus failure, useful versus unuseful, etc.).
Jackson LaRose: It's not a "non-answer", I just didn't feel like typing it twice. My answer is the same.
Just saying people accept the theories that have advanced upon Mises' own because of those people's moral insecurities completely ignores the possible mistakes and shortcomings of Mises. Perhaps you should read more about praxeology, Mises and many of his followers (and their own followers) before throwing out non-answers.
Laughing Man: I don't see how methodological individualism really conflicts with ethics formulation though. Would your class perhaps be that ethical systems search for the 'good' of humanity while methodological individualism tells us that only individuals can act?
I don't see how methodological individualism really conflicts with ethics formulation though. Would your class perhaps be that ethical systems search for the 'good' of humanity while methodological individualism tells us that only individuals can act?
LM:
My argument would be that ethical acts (lying, coercing, assisting someone, obstructing someone, etc.) are acts. They utilize means and they aim at ends.
Thus, the general science of praxeology applies to these acts just as much as it applies to acts oriented toward the market economy.
Regularities inhere also in the ethical realm of human action, regular patterns of co-presence and succession. The general science envisioned by Menger and Mises applies to these human goal-directed activities, and with respect to the ethical actions of the individual, what Mises writes is appropriate:
"Bewildered, people had to face a new side of society. They learned with stupefaction that there is another aspect from which human action might be viewed than that of good and bad, of fair and unfair, of just and unjust." (HA, p.2)
There is another way besides normative ethics to approach the subject realm of ethics. That is my argument.