Adam Knott:My argument would be that ethical acts (lying, coercing, assisting someone, obstructing someone, etc.) are acts. They utilize means and they aim at ends.
Well everything is an action. I don't dispute that.
Adam Knott:Thus, the general science of praxeology applies to these acts just as much as it applies to acts oriented toward the market economy.
But praxeology is not concerned with the ought. Merely concerned with what is.
Adam Knott: "Bewildered, people had to face a new side of society. They learned with stupefaction that there is another aspect from which human action might be viewed than that of good and bad, of fair and unfair, of just and unjust." (HA, p.2) There is another way besides normative ethics to approach the subject realm of ethics. That is my argument.
"Bewildered, people had to face a new side of society. They learned with stupefaction that there is another aspect from which human action might be viewed than that of good and bad, of fair and unfair, of just and unjust." (HA, p.2)
There is another way besides normative ethics to approach the subject realm of ethics. That is my argument.
Well what else is there? Without value statements, praxeology is merely the explaining of actions which is sufficient in explain things but that is all it is good for. I think that perhaps you are coming down too heavy on the side of praxeology and not recognizing the thymological aspect of human action.
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
"Bewildered, people had to face a new side of society. They learned with stupefaction that there is another aspect from which human action might be viewed than that of good and bad, of fair and unfair, of just and unjust."
Given that ethics is the determination of right and wrong it seems that Mises himself understood that praxeology cannot be used in the subject anymore than it can be used in economics. It can explain why people act the way they do, not why they hold certain values (whether that be utility or moral). Mises was utilitarian after all.
Laughing Man: 1) Well everything is an action. I don't dispute that. 2) But praxeology is not concerned with the ought. Merely concerned with what is. 3) Well what else is there? Without value statements, praxeology is merely the explaining of actions which is sufficient in explain things but that is all it is good for. I think that perhaps you are coming down too heavy on the side of praxeology and not recognizing the thymological aspect of human action.
1) Well everything is an action. I don't dispute that.
2) But praxeology is not concerned with the ought. Merely concerned with what is.
3) Well what else is there? Without value statements, praxeology is merely the explaining of actions which is sufficient in explain things but that is all it is good for. I think that perhaps you are coming down too heavy on the side of praxeology and not recognizing the thymological aspect of human action.
Laughing Man:
#1 is not accurate. Do you really want to maintain that everything is an action, and that in social science, there is no distinction made between a human act and a rock?
"One must not confuse knowledge with mysticism. The mystic may say that "shadow and sunlight are the same."[1] Knowledge starts from the clear distinction between A and non-A." (UF p.2)
If you are familiar with Rothbard's writings, then you are familiar with those of his writings that assert there is an incontestable logic that results from the fact that man acts to attain his chosen ends utilizing means. Then, if there are "ethical acts," and if we accept what Rothbard claims, then there is an incontestable logic to these ethical acts just as there is a logic to acts that are oriented toward the market economy.
In other words, if there is a science that can be built around the fact that man acts (utilizes means to attain ends), and this science ultimately arrives at "economic" (market, catallactic...) laws of human action, then this same science can arrive at "ethical" laws of human action. This is because the laws ultimately derive from the underlying means/ends relationship of human action.
#2 In your distinction between is and ought, you seem to be implying that is statements only refer to singular concrete perceptions: a rock is, a tree is, etc...
I don't agree with this notion. As I understand it, both physical and praxeological laws are included in is statements. The law of gravity and the law of marginal utility are both intended as is statements---as laws of the way things are.
So when you say praxeology is merely concerned with what is, I agree with this when this includes exact laws of phenomena as is propositions.
Such exact laws are the core of Austrian Economics. For example, Book 1, chapters 1 through 5 of Menger's Investigations Into the Method of the Social Sciences.
Also, see Mises:
"Praxeological knowledge makes it possible to predict, with apodictic certrainty the outcome of various modes of action." (HA, 3rd rev. p.117)
So what we're talking about here is a science of ethical actions: If you do ethical act X, then Y must necessarily happen.
We're not talking about a science of what is as you seem to be implying: If you do ethical act X, then you will have done ethical act X.
#3 I'm not sure you understand the importance of praxeological laws in social science. When Rothbard says that natural law provides man with a science of the paths that will lead to to his real happiness, and when virtue ethicists say that in living a certain type of life one will experience or attain eudaimonia, these are all expressions of laws of human action. They are expressions of a relationship between entities saying that if you do X, then you will experience or achieve state Y.
You seem to be conceiving praxeology as a science that goes around simply identifying objects: This is X, this is Y, this is Z, etc....
That's really not what's going on. The idea is to conceive how one thing Y is entailed in another thing X, such that if an actor attains X, he will necessarily also attain Y. (incidentally, Long is attempting something like this by way of his concept of constitutive means....)
In what you write above, it seems you aren't acknowledging the concept of exact laws. This concept is central to both Misesian and Mengerian social science. But it is also a concept that implicitly underlies all ethical theories that say if you do X, then you will attain, achieve, or experience Y.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
Why are there so few Miseseans (on the epistemology of ethics) ?
Because he was simply wrong on that issue.
Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4
"Given that ethics is the determination of right and wrong it seems that Mises himself understood that praxeology cannot be used in the subject anymore than it can be used in economics. It can explain why people act the way they do, not why they hold certain values (whether that be utility or moral). Mises was utilitarian after all."
Angurse:
I would argue that ethics is a subject realm within the wider subject realm of human choice and human purposive activity. In ethics, one can choose from among various courses of ethical action and from among various ethical codes. In ethics, one can have as one’s purpose to adhere to a given ethical code. So ethics is an area within the wider realm of things open to an individual’s choosing and purpose.
Ethics can be pursued as a discipline concerned with right and wrong, and with good and bad. And that is how Rothbard and Rand pursued the subject realm of ethics. They approached ethics as a discipline of the ought.
But the question is whether there is another way to approach the subject realm of ethics. Can the ethical acts of an individual be studied as actions? Do ethical actions utilize means and aim at ends?
If the answer is yes, then these actions can be studied not only with respect to their goodness and badness, as Mises writes, but also with respect to their regular patterns in action, i.e., with respect to the laws of such actions. This is the Mengerian and Misesian approach to the subject realm of ethics as opposed to the Rothbardian and Randian approach to the same subject realm.
Mises understood that praxeology does not and cannot establish objective ethical values as Rand and Rothbard attempted to do. This corresponds to his understanding that in economics, praxeology does not and cannot establish objective economic values. Austrian economics substituted a new subjective theory of value for the older, objective and labor theories of value. In the same way, if praxeology is applied to ethical phenomena and ethical actions, ethical phenomena will be considered in relation to the ethical subject, as opposed to the attempt to conceive ethical standards that are objective (not relative to the ethical subject).
Adam Knott:"One must not confuse knowledge with mysticism. The mystic may say that "shadow and sunlight are the same."[1] Knowledge starts from the clear distinction between A and non-A." (UF p.2)
Wow. Perfect.
Adam Knott:In other words, if there is a science that can be built around the fact that man acts (utilizes means to attain ends), and this science ultimately arrives at "economic" (market, catallactic...) laws of human action, then this same science can arrive at "ethical" laws of human action. This is because the laws ultimately derive from the underlying means/ends relationship of human action.
But essentially, you're replacing one form of natural law, granted by God, nature, or whoever, with another form of natural law, originating from logic.
We may be arguing semantics, but Consequentialism doesn't appear to rule out natural law--it just explains the origin of such laws, which are grounded in reality. If action A leads to result B, which is undesirable, and which is overturned by men who seek to better their own position, then we can say that action A was immoral. This is an objective statement, insofar as action A leads to result B.
"If we wish to preserve a free society, it is essential that we recognize that the desirability of a particular object is not sufficient justification for the use of coercion."
Adam Knott:I would argue that ethics is a subject realm within the wider subject realm of human choice and human purposive activity. In ethics, one can choose from among various courses of ethical action and from among various ethical codes. In ethics, one can have as one’s purpose to adhere to a given ethical code. So ethics is an area within the wider realm of things open to an individual’s choosing and purpose.
Sure, all human action can be observed within the framework of praxeology.
Adam Knott: Ethics can be pursued as a discipline concerned with right and wrong, and with good and bad. And that is how Rothbard and Rand pursued the subject realm of ethics. They approached ethics as a discipline of the ought. But the question is whether there is another way to approach the subject realm of ethics. Can the ethical acts of an individual be studied as actions? Do ethical actions utilize means and aim at ends?
Of course. Its called descriptive ethics, but it doesn't actually answer the question of what is "right" or "wrong." So I wouldn't put it within the philosophy of ethics at all. You could compare it to beauty, praxeologically one can show how people desire beautiful things but it doesn't help to answer the question as to why or what beauty is.
Adam Knott:If the answer is yes, then these actions can be studied not only with respect to their goodness and badness, as Mises writes, but also with respect to their regular patterns in action, i.e., with respect to the laws of such actions. This is the Mengerian and Misesian approach to the subject realm of ethics as opposed to the Rothbardian and Randian approach to the same subject realm.
The laws will follow the action axiom like everything else, ethics will play a part in what means they seek to do so. (A crying baby annoys a mother - she wants quiet - she could hit it with a hammer or she could feed it.) Her ethics are a factor that guides her decision.
Adam Knott: Mises understood that praxeology does not and cannot establish objective ethical values as Rand and Rothbard attempted to do. This corresponds to his understanding that in economics, praxeology does not and cannot establish objective economic values. Austrian economics substituted a new subjective theory of value for the older, objective and labor theories of value. In the same way, if praxeology is applied to ethical phenomena and ethical actions, ethical phenomena will be considered in relation to the ethical subject, as opposed to the attempt to conceive ethical standards that are objective (not relative to the ethical subject).
I think you have left out a crucial point. Not only did Mises understand that praxeology does not and cannot establish objective economic and ethical values it also does not establish subjective economic and, therefore, ethical values. It merely explains how things are. But if you want to consider descriptions as a form of the philosophy itself well... sure, ok.
Esuric: 1) But essentially, you're replacing one form of natural law, granted by God, nature, or whoever, with another form of natural law, originating from logic. 2) We may be arguing semantics, but Consequentialism doesn't appear to rule out natural law--it just explains the origin of such laws, which are grounded in reality. If action A leads to result B, which is undesirable, and which is overturned by men who seek to better their own position, then we can say that action A was immoral. This is an objective statement, insofar as action A leads to result B.
1) But essentially, you're replacing one form of natural law, granted by God, nature, or whoever, with another form of natural law, originating from logic.
2) We may be arguing semantics, but Consequentialism doesn't appear to rule out natural law--it just explains the origin of such laws, which are grounded in reality. If action A leads to result B, which is undesirable, and which is overturned by men who seek to better their own position, then we can say that action A was immoral. This is an objective statement, insofar as action A leads to result B.
Esuric:
Regarding #1. Yes, if we are explicitly talking about 'law' in the sense of a constant relationship between non-identical entities.
Menger:
"The aim of this orientation, which in the future we will call the exact one, an aim which research pursues in the same way in all realms of the world of phenomena, is the determination of strict laws of phenomena, of regularities in the succession of phenomena which do not present themselves to us as absolute, but which in respect to the approaches to cognition by which we attain to them simply bear within themselves the guarantee of absoluteness. It is the determination of laws of phenomena which commonly are called "laws of nature," but more correctly should be designated by the expression "exact laws." (Investigations Into the Method of the Social Sciences, Book 1, Chapter 4)
I don't believe everyone who uses the term natural law necessarily is referring to the notion of 'law' in the sense of a constant relationship between entities. It depends on what one means by natural law.
Here is another passage linking the idea of natural law to the idea of laws in the sense of a constant relationship between entities:
"Long before the Classical economists discovered that a regularity in the sequence of phenomena prevails in the field of human action, the champions of natural law were dimly aware of this inescapable fact." (Theory and History, p.45)
So in discussing natural law, we will want to clarify whether we are talking about regularity in the sequence of phenomena, or about something else.
***
In #2, I'm not clear on which definition of natural law you are using. Also, I can't tell who is doing which act in this example.
Angurse: 1) Sure, all human action can be observed within the framework of praxeology. 2) Of course. Its called descriptive ethics, but it doesn't actually answer the question of what is "right" or "wrong." So I wouldn't put it within the philosophy of ethics at all. You could compare it to beauty, praxeologically one can show how people desire beautiful things but it doesn't help to answer the question as to why or what beauty is. 3) The laws will follow the action axiom like everything else, ethics will play a part in what means they seek to do so. (A crying baby annoys a mother - she wants quiet - she could hit it with a hammer or she could feed it.) Her ethics are a factor that guides her decision. 4) I think you have left out a crucial point. Not only did Mises understand that praxeology does not and cannot establish objective economic and ethical values it also does not establish subjective economic and, therefore, ethical values. It merely explains how things are. But if you want to consider descriptions as a form of the philosophy itself well... sure, ok.
1) Sure, all human action can be observed within the framework of praxeology.
2) Of course. Its called descriptive ethics, but it doesn't actually answer the question of what is "right" or "wrong." So I wouldn't put it within the philosophy of ethics at all. You could compare it to beauty, praxeologically one can show how people desire beautiful things but it doesn't help to answer the question as to why or what beauty is.
3) The laws will follow the action axiom like everything else, ethics will play a part in what means they seek to do so. (A crying baby annoys a mother - she wants quiet - she could hit it with a hammer or she could feed it.) Her ethics are a factor that guides her decision.
4) I think you have left out a crucial point. Not only did Mises understand that praxeology does not and cannot establish objective economic and ethical values it also does not establish subjective economic and, therefore, ethical values. It merely explains how things are. But if you want to consider descriptions as a form of the philosophy itself well... sure, ok.
I think your main point is that no matter what praxeology does or is, it isn't normative ethics, and can't provide the information that normative ethics attempts to provide. If this is your point, I agree.
On #4, I don't understand this part:
"it also does not establish subjective economic and, therefore, ethical values"
In Misesian praxeology as I understand it, the idea isn't that subjective values are somehow established. The theory is constructed on the supposition that all values (all desires) are relative to a valuing/desiring subject. The idea is that where there is a value or desire, there is a valuing or desiring subject who "holds" that value or desire. This assumption or supposition is part of the theoretical construct (theoretical value subjectivism). Someone could attempt to construct a theory on the assumption that value or a desirable quality is intrinsic to various objects, or they could attempt to construct their theory based on some other assumption. But the problem becomes one of consistency of explanation. That is why the subjective theory of value supplanted the older objective and/or labor theories of value.
"It [praxeology] merely explains how things are."
Yes, but is explanations include laws of nature and praxeological laws such as the law of gravity and the law of marginal utility. Praxeological laws are essentially universal laws of human nature; laws derived from the phenomenon of action---aiming at ends. Thus, praxeology merely explains universal laws of human nature...
Adam Knott:So in discussing natural law, we will want to clarify whether we are talking about regularity in the sequence of phenomena
Yes, but that there's a real causal connection--not Hume's theory.
Adam Knott:In #2, I'm not clear on which definition of natural law you are using.
The belief that the existence of a law is set by nature and therefore has validity everywhere. Laws which are set in reality, and not determined by policy makers and jurists (they are to be uncovered). Your argument is basically the argument I put forth in Garyson's thread about natural law. It is true that every individual forms his own subjective moral judgments, but the consequences of such actions, which are guided by his/her judgments, are grounded in reality. Thus, it doesn't matter whether the king believes that inflation is immoral; the reaction will tell him that debasing the coinage is wrong; or, should not to be done by a king who wishes to remain in power. The subjective beliefs either match up with reality or they don't.
This is how I've always understood natural law, though I've never really ventured into it. My philosophy professors have always been insane nihilists who deny even the principle of minimal contradiction.
Thats basically my main point Adam,
In that praxeology simply cannot prove ethics, explain how they should be (normative), or reveal their foundations (meta) I wouldn't consider it a fitting alternative.
Adam Knott: Yes, but is explanations include laws of nature and praxeological laws such as the law of gravity and the law of marginal utility. Praxeological laws are essentially universal laws of human nature; laws derived from the phenomenon of action---aiming at ends. Thus, praxeology merely explains universal laws of human nature...
No, now perhaps I've misread you, but praxeology doesn't explain natural laws such as gravity it is "a third class." Back to my point, discovered praxeological laws would only describe how people behave due to the phenomena of ethics, it won't resolve the question of ethics itself. So I don't think the approach could be considered an alternative or substitute to the approaches of Rand or Ross.
Angurse: No, now perhaps I've misread you, but praxeology doesn't explain natural laws such as gravity it is "a third class." Back to my point, discovered praxeological laws would only describe how people behave due to the phenomena of ethics, it won't resolve the question of ethics itself. So I don't think the approach could be considered an alternative or substitute to the approaches of Rand or Ross.
Yes, you partially misunderstood what I wrote. You wrote that praxeology merely explains how things are, meaning, can only make "is" statements.
My point was that in science, in general, including both physical science, and social science, "is" statements include "if -then" statements; statements of logical entailment. These if-then statements are essentially laws, since they assert a constant relationship between non-identical entities. So when we say that praxeology merely explains how things are, this includes an explanation of the praxeological laws we are subject to.
I think above you've restated your position:
The type of social science Menger and Mises were interested in arrives at exact laws which allow us to know the necessary outcome of various modes of acting. These laws say that if an actor does X, then Y will be the result.
If I understand you correctly, you are saying that this does not answer the question whether an actor should or ought want Y, or whether Y is good, fair, just, moral, etc... I.e., praxeology is not normative ethics.
Adam Knott:If I understand you correctly, you are saying that this does not answer the question whether an actor should or ought want Y, or whether Y is good, fair, just, moral, etc... I.e., praxeology is not normative ethics.
Exactly, plus "what is right?" i.e. meta-ethics. Understanding the "if-then" implications of "is" does nothing to change that.
By that conception Austrian economics would be "meta-economics" from the perspective of prior economics schools.
Why anarchy fails
Adam Knott:Do you really want to maintain that everything is an action, and that in social science, there is no distinction made between a human act and a rock?
Sorry, I should of been more clear. Everything purposeful is action.
Adam Knott:Then, if there are "ethical acts," and if we accept what Rothbard claims, then there is an incontestable logic to these ethical acts just as there is a logic to acts that are oriented toward the market economy.
Well nothing in this reality is truly illogical. Whether you believe in impositionism or reflectionism, there is a logic to the world so it is only natural that everything in this world can be logically deduced or observed.
But it seems like you are trying to blend in 'why people exchange goods and services?' with 'why do people interact the way they do?' Yes praxeology is concerned with human action but human action that is value free. You cannot actually have a 'value-free' ethical system.
Adam Knott:As I understand it, both physical and praxeological laws are included in is statements. The law of gravity and the law of marginal utility are both intended as is statements---as laws of the way things are.
Yes but you cannot derive value statements without implying them through 'is' statements in terms of ethical systems. You cannot ascertain whether private property is a beneficial institution simply by stating this or that is private property.
Adam Knott: I'm not sure you understand the importance of praxeological laws in social science. When Rothbard says that natural law provides man with a science of the paths that will lead to to his real happiness, and when virtue ethicists say that in living a certain type of life one will experience or attain eudaimonia, these are all expressions of laws of human action. They are expressions of a relationship between entities saying that if you do X, then you will experience or achieve state Y.
Interactions, future behavior, value statements, these all have to do with thymology, not praxeology.
'Understanding does not deal with the praxeological side of human action. It refers to value judgments and the choice of ends and of means on the part of our fellow men. It refers not to the field of praxeology and economics, but to the field of history. It is a thymological category. The concept of a human character is a thymological concept. Its concrete content in each instance is derived from historical experience.'
-Mises
Adam Knott: Regarding the underlined part of your passage, as I understand it, in the approach Mises advocates, the desired outcome is specified by the individual actor. It is the singular outcome the actor desires. In this system, the desired outcome (the "end") is taken as a given end, and that given end is supposed (assumed) as the given end (desired outcome) of the actor concerned. In this system then, the idea that the 'variability of the desired outcome' could be too great would simply mean that we are talking about something other than an individual aiming for a specific, singular state of affairs.
Regarding the underlined part of your passage, as I understand it, in the approach Mises advocates, the desired outcome is specified by the individual actor. It is the singular outcome the actor desires. In this system, the desired outcome (the "end") is taken as a given end, and that given end is supposed (assumed) as the given end (desired outcome) of the actor concerned.
In this system then, the idea that the 'variability of the desired outcome' could be too great would simply mean that we are talking about something other than an individual aiming for a specific, singular state of affairs.
This is a very useful insight, and really clarifies what I was trying to articulate in the last post.
Adam Knott:In this system, the desired outcome (the "end") is taken as a given end, and that given end is supposed (assumed) as the given end (desired outcome) of the actor concerned.
This why I don't suspect praxeology can be usefully applied to ethics in a universal, objective sense. In economics, if one doesn't want to participate in the system towards the (presumably) common end, one abstains. Ethics, on the other hand, must be considered for every interaction between individuals. If you presuppose a common end of which every interaction between individuals strive towards, I would argue the presupposition is too great to be useful, because the individual that does not strive toward the presupposed goal is ignored.
Angurse: Adam Knott:If I understand you correctly, you are saying that this does not answer the question whether an actor should or ought want Y, or whether Y is good, fair, just, moral, etc... I.e., praxeology is not normative ethics. Exactly, plus "what is right?" i.e. meta-ethics. Understanding the "if-then" implications of "is" does nothing to change that.
Yes, "right/wrong" is included.
However, I would mention that to the extent a theory asserts that in doing X, a person will be right, and in doing Y, a person will be wrong, the theory asserts a constant relationship between entities.
I.e., "If you don't want to be wrong, then avoid doing Y." "If you want to be right, then do X."
The theory provides an actor information he can then "utilize" (utilitarianism) for his own benefit and welfare.....
Jackson LaRose: This why I don't suspect praxeology can be usefully applied to ethics in a universal, objective sense. In economics, if one doesn't want to participate in the system towards the (presumably) common end, one abstains. Ethics, on the other hand, must be considered for every interaction between individuals. If you presuppose a common end of which every interaction between individuals strive towards, I would argue the presupposition is too great to be useful, because the individual that does not strive toward the presupposed goal is ignored.
Jackson:
I think you provide the answer to your own question:
As your passage implies, the subject realm of ethics pre-supposes an interaction between individuals.
Interaction between individuals is the commonality of which every ethical action consists.
The individual that does not interact with another individual is not ignored.
The individual that does not interact with another individual does not undertake an ethical action.
That is, such an individual is not the subject of a science that studies ethical actions....
AJ:By that conception Austrian economics would be "meta-economics" from the perspective of prior economics schools.
Well, meta-economics does incorporate ethics, perhaps you meant this for Adam. However, Austrian economics doesn't say or speculate as to what value is... it accepts that its subjective and doesn't dig any deeper.
I just realised, in terms of disciples of Mises, Hayek or Rothbard, would I be right to say there are virtually no "disciples" of Sennholz or Reisman? Why do you think this might be?
"When the King is far the people are happy." Chinese proverb
For Alexander Zinoviev and the free market there is a shared delight:
"Where there are problems there is life."
Actually Reisman does have one. He comments on the Mises blog a lot and I think has written blogposts and perhaps articles; Wladimir Kraus. The reason might be in Reisman's case is that both a) his work is not too widely known/digested yet and b) he deviates (nominally) from praxeology which might set off alarm bells for some.
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
Perhaps this is why for Sennholz. Hes too good!
Laughing Man: 1) Well nothing in this reality is truly illogical. Whether you believe in impositionism or reflectionism, there is a logic to the world so it is only natural that everything in this world can be logically deduced or observed. 2) Interactions, future behavior, value statements, these all have to do with thymology, not praxeology. 'Understanding does not deal with the praxeological side of human action. It refers to value judgments and the choice of ends and of means on the part of our fellow men. It refers not to the field of praxeology and economics, but to the field of history. It is a thymological category. The concept of a human character is a thymological concept. Its concrete content in each instance is derived from historical experience.' -Mises
1) Well nothing in this reality is truly illogical. Whether you believe in impositionism or reflectionism, there is a logic to the world so it is only natural that everything in this world can be logically deduced or observed.
2) Interactions, future behavior, value statements, these all have to do with thymology, not praxeology.
On #1. OK I interpret you as acknowledging that the logic of action applies to ethical actions as well. I agree with this. But Rothbard said this was wrong. (EOL p.12)
My main point is to establish that there are ethical actions, and that therefore a science of those actions is possible. If you agree with this, then we are in agreement.
On #2 Previously, I thought we were contrasting praxeology to objective or normative ethics.
In what you write above, you are contrasting praxeology to thymology. In the Misesian system as I understand it, thymology deals with the concrete content of human actions as opposed to the categorial form of human actions. But thymology is not objective or normative ethics.
I believe that by the term thymology, Mises means the concrete content of human actions, in this sense:
History:
Jeff says: "The reason Bob went to New York rather than California is because he prefered the cultural atmosphere of New York."
Larry says: "No, the reason Bob went to New York rather than California is because his friend owned a rent controlled apartment in New York."
Psychology:
Jeff says: "The reason Bob likes New York is because he had an intense father who was a New Yorker."
Larry says: "No, the reason Bob likes New York is because he wants to live an alternative life-style and in a small town he feels judged."
The point I'm trying to make is that I believe in the Misesian system, thymology is a discipline that deals in explaining events with respect to their concrete content, whereas praxeology (of which economics is the best elaborated part) deals in only the formal aspects of action without respect to content.
(my point in the above is not to provide a definition of history versus psychology. my example may be defective in that respect)
But thymology is not objective ethics or normative ethics. Thymology does not attempt to arrive at a judgment as to what is right and wrong or what one ought or ought not have done.......except......as this would be understood by praxeology with respect to means and ends:
Thymology: Bob wanted to get to New York as quickly as possible. He thus took the corridor train. What he ought to have done is taken the 5:30 Jet Blue which would have gotten him there an hour sooner.
I.e., If Bob wanted to get to New York as soon as possible, then he ought to have taken the Jet Blue 5:30.
In the Misesian system, thymology is the natural compliment to praxeology, and it deals with the concrete content----the concrete content of the formal form that praxeology provides.
The entire system basically has nothing to do with the program of objective or normative ethics.
(what I mean is, the goal of thymology is not identical to the goal of objective or normative ethics)
That's why Rothbard noted that Mises was an "opponent of any sort of objective ethics." and "a value-free scientist and opponent of any concept of objective ethics." (EOL, p.206, 209)
Obviously Mises was not an opponent of thymology. Thymology and objective ethics are distinct and separate disciplines.
Adam Knott: OK I interpret you as acknowledging that the logic of action applies to ethical actions as well. I agree with this. But Rothbard said this was wrong. (EOL p.12)
What do you think are praxeological laws of ethics?
Adam Knott: That's why Rothbard noted that Mises was an "opponent of any sort of objective ethics." and "a value-free scientist and opponent of any concept of objective ethics." (EOL, p.206, 209) Obviously Mises was not an opponent of thymology. Thymology and objective ethics are distinct and separate disciplines.
Well not necessarily. As my quote of Mises pointed out in Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, thymology includes but is not exclusive to value statements. The understanding of human behavior. Thymology does not work within praxeology but with praxeology. Praxeology can tell you all these wonderful things about money but it can't actually tell you what money is in a given society. That is what thymology does. It looks at human interactions/experiences and give you information concerning their behavior. Theorize you are an alien and you come to this planet. You see people handing over green pieces of paper to each other. You wouldn't know if this is some kind of game, or religious event or a way of communicating but if you have experienced the concept of money then you can witness the event with clarity.
Thymology does not necessarily have to be objective in terms of ethics. Mises still made value statements concerning the welfare and behavior of humanity that he felt were not objectively found in the world. Things like people valuing prosperity and abundance. And perhaps is something we can discover through discussion, we both know praxeology is value free, but is thymology?
Laughing Man:Yes praxeology is concerned with human action but human action that is value free.
Praxeology itself is value-free, but its objects of study, actions, are never value-free. Action always involves choice; and choice always involves a ranking of alternatives (valuation).
if praxeology is a value-free study of human action, how did it get adapted to the study of ethics?
Laughing Man:we both know praxeology is value free, but is thymology?
Yes, according to Mises. Thymology is a historical science. And as Rothbard said, Mises was a value-free scientist. Mises could not have a value-free scientist, consider thymology a science, and consider thymology a non-value-free science all at the same time. Moreoveer, the notion of objective/normative ethics, according to Mises, is not a science, because as he said, there is no such thing as a scientific "ought". Therefore, Mises could not have considered objective/normative ethics a part of thymology, since the latter is value-free and the former is not.
Laughing Man: 1) What do you think are praxeological laws of ethics? 2) Well not necessarily. As my quote of Mises pointed out in Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, thymology includes but is not exclusive to value statements. The understanding of human behavior. Thymology does not work within praxeology but with praxeology. Praxeology can tell you all these wonderful things about money but it can't actually tell you what money is in a given society. That is what thymology does. It looks at human interactions/experiences and give you information concerning their behavior. Theorize you are an alien and you come to this planet. You see people handing over green pieces of paper to each other. You wouldn't know if this is some kind of game, or religious event or a way of communicating but if you have experienced the concept of money then you can witness the event with clarity. Thymology does not necessarily have to be objective in terms of ethics. Mises still made value statements concerning the welfare and behavior of humanity that he felt were not objectively found in the world. Things like people valuing prosperity and abundance. And perhaps is something we can discover through discussion, we both know praxeology is value free, but is thymology?
1) What do you think are praxeological laws of ethics?
2) Well not necessarily. As my quote of Mises pointed out in Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, thymology includes but is not exclusive to value statements. The understanding of human behavior. Thymology does not work within praxeology but with praxeology. Praxeology can tell you all these wonderful things about money but it can't actually tell you what money is in a given society. That is what thymology does. It looks at human interactions/experiences and give you information concerning their behavior. Theorize you are an alien and you come to this planet. You see people handing over green pieces of paper to each other. You wouldn't know if this is some kind of game, or religious event or a way of communicating but if you have experienced the concept of money then you can witness the event with clarity.
On #1. You can read a summary of that in my essay "The Logic of Happiness," (March 2009) and a lengthier treatment in "Striving and Attainment" (August 2008)
On #2.
I will begin by saying that the precise conception of thymology in the Misesian system is debatable, especially since he didn't devote that many pages to it. What makes his conception of praxeology much less debatable is the fact that this was his primary focus, and so most of his conceptions and illustrations are with praxeology in mind. In other words, in my understanding, he would have considered himself a praxeologist, and not a "thymologist."
That being said, I would advance the following argument:
As Mises devoted some time to conceiving a branch of social science he termed thymology, then he would intend this branch of social science to be a complimentary branch to praxeology. He in no way would have intended thymology to be a branch of knowledge at logical odds with praxeology. All thymological (concrete) knowledge would be understood to take the logical form provided by praxeology. I think I can illustrate this point.
A thymologist might ask a question such as: "Why did Rothbard seek to construct an objective ethics?"
And in Mises's conception of thymology, the thymologist would answer something like:
"Because Rothbard thought that doing so was the most efficacious means of attaining liberty."
So the thymologist asks why person A did X, or why person A does X (or why person A valued X, or values X), where A and X are concrete things. But the answer, in the Misesian conception, will always take the form of the praxeological means/end relationship.
"Praxeology is a theoretical and systematic, not a historical, science. Its scope is human action as such, irrespective of all environmental, accidental, and individual circumstances of the concrete acts. Its cognition is purely formal and general without reference to the material content and the particular features of the actual case." (HA, 3rd rev. p.32)
Here, Mises contrasts praxeology with history, as he does in the quote you provided about thymology. Thymology and history refer, in Mises's system, to the concrete content. As I understand this, thymology is historical in the Misesian system, since specific content can only be established as a matter of what actually did happen. (In Mises's system, I believe he conceives the immediate present as the just passed instant, so that technically, in his system, the content of action experienced presently is considered historical experience...)
My main point is that I think we can safely assume that in the Misesian conception of thymology, thymology would not be considered an "escape hatch" from formal praxeological concepts.
To the extent that thymology could develop into a concept that then contradicts Misesian praxeology, we would, in my opinion, be referring to a conception of it propounded by another scholar such as Roderick Long.
Any scholar is free to develop his/her own concept of thymology. But I will argue that to the extent such a concept implies a renunciation of Misesian praxeology, to this extent is a non-Misesian conception of thymology being employed.
Jackson LaRose: if praxeology is a value-free study of human action, how did it get adapted to the study of ethics?
It didn't. That is what the debate and discussion is partially about. : - )
So Rothbard independently added the parts about natural rights without regard to praxeology? I know I'm getting a lot of eye rolls here, but I'm easily confused.
This simply replaces natural law, granted by god, nature, or whatever, with natural law originating from logic. I still don't see a real difference.
Oh, OK. I think I agree, because concept of what is considered "logical" is subjective to the individual, so it is impossible to have a universal, external "logic" upon which to measure morality.
Jackson LaRose:Oh, OK. I think I agree, because concept of what is considered "logical" is subjective to the individual, so it is impossible to have a universal, external "logic" upon which to measure morality.
But Mises, and every sober thinking individual, rejects polylogism.
Why? Psychopaths are people too!
Jackson LaRose: Why? Psychopaths are people too!
Mises borrows from Freud and early 20th century psychoanalysts in stating that polylogism does not even apply here and those that we refer to as deranged or pschopathic are still acting in the sense they are engaging in purposeful behaviour.
It is just that from the perspective of ourselves who consider each other sane, we may deem their ends as nonsensical or "crazy" and the means that they apply to achieve those ends contrary to purpose.
This is a very critical notion made in the early part of Human Action that I feel could be easily overlooked.
Yeah, I'll buy that, but wouldn't that imply logic is subject to the individual's perception of reality?
Esuric: This simply replaces natural law, granted by god, nature, or whatever, with natural law originating from logic. I still don't see a real difference.
I believe the answer is, because there are at least two senses of the concept of natural law. This complicates things. We have to distinguish whether we are talking about natural law in the sense of the law of gravity, or in the sense of a so-called moral law. As Patrick M. O'Neil writes:
Ignoring the difficulties involved, let us assume thatthe ultimate value of a particular ethical system could he proven,what could be made of conscious, deliberate defiance of it?
We come upon a man committing some act grossly violative of his nature: letus say that he was engaged in a theft. We apprehend him, and while we have himin custody we question him about the nature of the act we caught him performing.We fmd he is an extremely knowledgeable fellow, familiar with all the argumentsof the natural law school. In fact, he has read Rasmussen's article and was con-vinced that the proposition that a man ought to act in accord with his nature iscorrect, logically. "Well," we ask him, "if you know that to steal is to act againstyour nature, and you know that you ought to act according to your nature, howcould you bring yourself to commit your felonious act?" "I chose not to act inaccord with correct ethical principles," our philosophical burglar might answer.
My story, I trust, illustrates the problem. To deny an ultimate value and todefy an ultimate value are not at all the same activity, and it is the latter whichprovides the stronger suppolt of the is-ought dichotomy. One can deny a fact, butone cannot defy one. You can deny the law of gravity is operative in the world,but your denial will have no effect on what will happen when you step off aprecipice. The law of gravity operates no matter which course of action youpursue-if you accept the existence of the operation of the law and hold yourselfback from the edge of the cliff, or if you reject the truth of the law of gravityand step over the ledge, or if you accept the truth of the law, but wish to fall (letus say as a means of suicide), in all three cases the operation of the law of gravityis unaffected.
Moral law does not work in this way, however. One can admit the intellectualcorrectness of a proposition of moral law (even of its ultimate value), and yetdeliberately defy it. This being the case, we must question what moral law means:
If one could not, by any means whatsoever, defy moral law, great difficulty wouldarise over the appropriateness of the use of "ought"-for we do not normally usethat word to command actions which in any event cannot be avoided. If, on theother hand, one can and does defy the imperative of a moral law, how is one stillseen as bound by it? Punishment or other ill consequences do not suffice to makemoral law objective, for if the person committing the violation of the maxim(s)prefers the object of his illicit action, even when coupled with punitive or otherunfortunate consequences, that seems to mean that there is no apparent reason whyhe should not act contrary to that moral law.
Any reason offered for why one should not act contrary to moral law musteither be a fact or a value. If a fact, it will need to he made relevant by the accep-tance (envaluation; not epistemological acceptance) of that fact by the individual'swill, which condition, in turn, renders it subjective. If a value, it, in its turn, willrequire an answer why it may not be defied, and so ad injnitum.
( http://mises.org/journals/jls/7_1/7_1_4.pdf p. 94/95)
To answer your question, we have to agree on what we mean by the concept natural law.
abskebabs: Jackson LaRose: Why? Psychopaths are people too! Mises borrows from Freud and early 20th century psychoanalysts in stating that polylogism does not even apply here and those that we refer to as deranged or pschopathic are still acting in the sense they are engaging in purposeful behaviour. It is just that from the perspective of ourselves who consider each other sane, we may deem their ends as nonsensical or "crazy" and the means that they apply to achieve those ends contrary to purpose. This is a very critical notion made in the early part of Human Action that I feel could be easily overlooked.
"Yet, modern psychology has brought about some results which may arouse the interest of praxeology. It was once usual to consider the behavior of lunatics and neurotics as quite nonsensical and "irrational." It is the great merit of Breuer and Freud that they have disproved this opinion. Neurotics and lunatics differ from those whom we call sane and normal with regard to the means which they choose for the attainment of satisfaction and with regard to the means which they apply for the attainment of these means. Their "technology" is different from that of sane people, but they do not act in a categorically different way. They aim at ends and they apply means in order to attain their ends. A mentally troubled person with whom there is still left a trace of reason and who has not been literally reduced to the mental level of an animal, is still an acting being. Whoever has the remnants of a human mind cannot escape the necessity of acting."
Money, Method, and the Market Process, p.21/22.
Jackson LaRose: Yeah, I'll buy that, but wouldn't that imply logic is subject to the individual's perception of reality?
So 2+2=4 for you, but 5 for me because my "perception of reality" differs?
Holy crap Adam A+++++! Reading that post, I feel the same way when I read "The Ego and It's Own", something like:
"Yeah, I was thinking that, but the doody leaking from my brain and out of my mouth/ hands couldn't even come close to how concise and articulate this guy is making it!"
Now if only Marko and UKnigraham read this...