Why are there so few Misesians?

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Esuric replied on Sat, Jan 30 2010 7:22 PM

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abskebabs:

So 2+2=4 for you, but 5 for me because my "perception of reality" differs?

Well some would argue that morality operates in the same way.

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Jackson LaRose replied on Sat, Jan 30 2010 7:32 PM

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abskebabs:

So 2+2=4 for you, but 5 for me because my "perception of reality" differs?

It could...  I don't know how the world looks through your eyes!

A good example of this is a story I heard on the radio regarding numbers:

So these mathematicians go to the deep Amazon rainforest, and are interviewing these natives that have had no sustained contact with the "civilized" world before.  They put a single block, and ten blocks on opposite sides of a table.  They'd then ask the tribes-people "what number is between these two?"  Time after time, the natives would say "three" insead of "five" the answer you and I would probably give them.  Confused by these seemingly mathematically illiterate natives, the mathematicians concluded that the natives were counting logarithmically, not linearly.  This is also how babies naturally count, until they are conditioned to count the way we always do. 

Now, would we consider the natives illogical?  Is it just that they are so divergent culturally, that our concepts of "common sense" diverged enough to fundamentally alter our respective concepts of "logic"?

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Andrew Cain replied on Sat, Jan 30 2010 7:52 PM

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Adam Knott:

On #1.  You can read a summary of that in my essay "The Logic of Happiness," (March 2009) and a lengthier treatment in "Striving and Attainment" (August 2008)

Will do.

Adam Knott:

As Mises devoted some time to conceiving a branch of social science he termed thymology, then he would intend this branch of social science to be a complimentary branch to praxeology.  He in no way would have intended thymology to be a branch of knowledge at logical odds with praxeology.  All thymological (concrete) knowledge would be understood to take the logical form provided by praxeology.  I think I can illustrate this point.

My point with thymology is that it is an intregal part in the field of knowledge. You cannot have praxeology itself without thymology being beside it so I think it incorrect to say that thymology works within praxeology or under its framework. It is on the same level as praxeology itself.  You seem to be saying something similar to having a tree diagram with praxeology at the top and a line going down to thymology then the lines dispersing. I don't think that correct. I think thymology is on the same level as praxeology so they are both at the top and a line connects them both then move down.

Adam Knott:

"Praxeology is a theoretical and systematic, not a historical, science. Its scope is human action as such, irrespective of all environmental, accidental, and individual circumstances of the concrete acts.  Its cognition is purely formal and general without reference to the material content and the particular features of the actual case."  (HA, 3rd rev. p.32)

Yes praxeology is the action itself. However, thymology is on the other side. The history, the value statements, the speculation on human behavior. If we think of ethics as the discovering of the "good" for humanity then it is clearly a thymological process because what is good, how humans behave and understanding that behavior is what thymology encompasses. Now you can have praxeology ascepts of that by saying person X acted because they prefer such and such but the why is what thymology seems to want to answer. Praxeology doesn't seem so concerned with the 'why', merely the what.

Adam Knott:

  Thymology and history refer, in Mises's system, to the concrete content.  As I understand this, thymology is historical in the Misesian system, since specific content can only be established as a matter of what actually did happen.  (In Mises's system, I believe he conceives the immediate present as the just passed instant, so that technically, in his system, the content of action experienced presently is considered historical experience...)

Not necessarily. With thymology you can speculate on future human behavior and interactions.

'More concretely, all our anticipations about how family members, friends, acquaintances, and strangers will react in particular situations are based on our accumulated thymological experience.' - Salerno

Adam Knott:

My main point is that I think we can safely assume that in the Misesian conception of thymology, thymology would not be considered an "escape hatch" from formal praxeological concepts.

No, I agree. Thymology is a very important field which is why I put it at par with praxeology. Like I stated previous, you cannot understand the concept of money in a society without thymology. Praxeology can tell you this information about money but you first need to establish what is and isn't money.

Adam Knott:

To the extent that thymology could develop into a concept that then contradicts Misesian praxeology, we would, in my opinion, be referring to a conception of it propounded by another scholar such as Roderick Long

How do you see Roderick Long's concept of thymology as being in conflict with praxeology?

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Esuric replied on Sat, Jan 30 2010 7:57 PM

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Jackson LaRose:

So these mathematicians go to the deep Amazon rainforest, and are interviewing these natives that have had no sustained contact with the "civilized" world before.  They put a single block, and ten blocks on opposite sides of a table.  They'd then ask the tribes-people "what number is between these two?"  Time after time, the natives would say "three" insead of "five" the answer you and I would probably give them.  Confused by these seemingly mathematically illiterate natives, the mathematicians concluded that the natives were counting logarithmically, not linearly.  This is also how babies naturally count, until they are conditioned to count the way we always do. 

Now, would we consider the natives illogical?  Is it just that they are so divergent culturally, that our concepts of "common sense" diverged enough to fundamentally alter our respective concepts of "logic"?

No, they are counting logarithmically, and not linearly. They would be illogical if they said that "a" is and isn't "a" at the same time, and in the same respect.

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abskebabs replied on Sat, Jan 30 2010 8:05 PM

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Jackson LaRose:

IA good example of this is a story I heard on the radio regarding numbers:

So these mathematicians go to the deep Amazon rainforest, and are interviewing these natives that have had no sustained contact with the "civilized" world before.  They put a single block, and ten blocks on opposite sides of a table.  They'd then ask the tribes-people "what number is between these two?"  Time after time, the natives would say "three" insead of "five" the answer you and I would probably give them.  Confused by these seemingly mathematically illiterate natives, the mathematicians concluded that the natives were counting logarithmically, not linearly.

Reading that only makes me wonder how flawed, narrow minded and value judging those researchers' methodology is. The natives' answer is correct, 3 (or any between 2 and 9) does lie between 1 and 10, they didn't by your statement specify halfway between, which then would require them to explain a foreign concept to a people that never rationally acquired a need to develop.

I highly recommend you read through the first part of Human Action, especially since Mises covers similiar erroneous conclusions in support of polylogism drawn from the anthroplogical work of Lucien Levy Bruhl based upon his encounters with savages.

Even if what you say is true:

1. That infants somehow posess a different numerary logic to ours "counting" logarithmically.

2. That isolated communities possess this characteristic too.

3. How in the world did we in the civilised world arrive at the concept of numbers that we cannot even reason fully contrary to without contradicting ourselves? Divine inspiration?

Forgive me if I seem overly harsh in my skepticism, I think resistance to polylogism is one of the few things I share with Richard Dawkins.

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Jackson LaRose replied on Sat, Jan 30 2010 8:11 PM

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abskebabs:

The natives' answer is correct, 3 (or any between 2 and 9) does lie between 1 and 10, they didn't by your statement specify halfway between,

This is due to my flaws as a good story relater, it was halfway between.

abskebabs:

I highly recommend you read through the first part of Human Action, especially since Mises covers similiar erroneous conclusions in support of drawn from the anthroplogical work of Lucien Levy Bruhl based upon his encounters with savages.

Got it on order.

abskebabs:

How in the world did we in the civilised world arrive at the concept of numbers that we cannot even reason fully contrary to without contradicting ourselves? Divine inspiration?

You don't give your species enough credit, my man.  Linear counting is an innovation, much like numbers, or language.

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Andrew Cain replied on Sat, Jan 30 2010 8:13 PM

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Adam Knott:

I believe the answer is, because there are at least two senses of the concept of natural law.   This complicates things.  We have to distinguish whether we are talking about natural law in the sense of the law of gravity, or in the sense of a so-called moral law.  As Patrick M. O'Neil writes:

Ignoring the difficulties involved, let us assume thatthe ultimate value of a particular ethical system could he proven,
what could be made of conscious, deliberate defiance of it?

We come upon a man committing some act grossly violative of his nature: let
us say that he was engaged in a theft. We apprehend him, and while we have him
in custody we question him about the nature of the act we caught him performing.
We fmd he is an extremely knowledgeable fellow, familiar with all the arguments
of the natural law school. In fact, he has read Rasmussen's article and was con-
vinced that the proposition that a man ought to act in accord with his nature is
correct, logically. "Well," we ask him, "if you know that to steal is to act against
your nature, and you know that you ought to act according to your nature, how
could you bring yourself to commit your felonious act?" "I chose not to act in
accord with correct ethical principles," our philosophical burglar might answer.

My story, I trust, illustrates the problem. To deny an ultimate value and to
defy an ultimate value are not at all the same activity, and it is the latter which
provides the stronger suppolt of the is-ought dichotomy. One can deny a fact, but
one cannot defy one. You can deny the law of gravity is operative in the world,
but your denial will have no effect on what will happen when you step off a
precipice. The law of gravity operates no matter which course of action you
pursue-if you accept the existence of the operation of the law and hold yourself
back from the edge of the cliff, or if you reject the truth of the law of gravity
and step over the ledge, or if you accept the truth of the law, but wish to fall (let
us say as a means of suicide), in all three cases the operation of the law of gravity
is unaffected.

Moral law does not work in this way, however. One can admit the intellectual
correctness of a proposition of moral law (even of its ultimate value), and yet
deliberately defy it. This being the case, we must question what moral law means:

If one could not, by any means whatsoever, defy moral law, great difficulty would
arise over the appropriateness of the use of "ought"-for we do not normally use
that word to command actions which in any event cannot be avoided. If, on the
other hand, one can and does defy the imperative of a moral law, how is one still
seen as bound by it? Punishment or other ill consequences do not suffice to make
moral law objective, for if the person committing the violation of the maxim(s)
prefers the object of his illicit action, even when coupled with punitive or other
unfortunate consequences, that seems to mean that there is no apparent reason why
he should not act contrary to that moral law.

Any reason offered for why one should not act contrary to moral law must
either be a fact or a value. If a fact, it will need to he made relevant by the accep-
tance (envaluation; not epistemological acceptance) of that fact by the individual's
will, which condition, in turn, renders it subjective. If a value, it, in its turn, will
require an answer why it may not be defied, and so ad injnitum.

I'm a bit confused by this article, you can defy, not deny, gravity and you can defy, not deny, moral law and yet gravity is objective and moral law isn't? Why is this hypothetical man in jail if he stole a piece of property? Natural rights are not denied simply because someone steals from me or else how/why could I regain my stolen possessions? If I was denied natural rights then am I lost to wander the world without them until I die? And if I am not then how would I somehow regain them? I also don't understand how you say a fact is rendered subjective. Is it because one must accept facts based on one's condition? If so then everything in the world could be subjective for I can defy any bit of knowledge in the world based on my condition and thereby making anything subjective. I could postulate that Austrians don't actually exist. I could also say Marxists are for free markets or Charles Fourier was a genius.

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Adam Knott replied on Sat, Jan 30 2010 9:07 PM

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Laughing Man:

My point with thymology is that it is an intregal part in the field of knowledge. You cannot have praxeology itself without thymology being beside it so I think it incorrect to say that thymology works within praxeology or under its framework. It is on the same level as praxeology itself.  You seem to be saying something similar to having a tree diagram with praxeology at the top and a line going down to thymology then the lines dispersing. I don't think that correct. I think thymology is on the same level as praxeology so they are both at the top and a line connects them both then move down.

Yes praxeology is the action itself. However, thymology is on the other side. The history, the value statements, the speculation on human behavior.

1)  If we think of ethics as the discovering of the "good" for humanity then it is clearly a thymological process because what is good, how humans behave and understanding that behavior is what thymology encompasses.

Now you can have praxeology ascepts of that by saying person X acted because they prefer such and such but the why is what thymology seems to want to answer. Praxeology doesn't seem so concerned with the 'why', merely the what.

 

2)  Not necessarily. With thymology you can speculate on future human behavior and interactions.

3)  'More concretely, all our anticipations about how family members, friends, acquaintances, and strangers will react in particular situations are based on our accumulated thymological experience.' - Salerno

4)  No, I agree. Thymology is a very important field which is why I put it at par with praxeology. Like I stated previous, you cannot understand the concept of money in a society without thymology. Praxeology can tell you this information about money but you first need to establish what is and isn't money.

5)  How do you see Roderick Long's concept of thymology as being in conflict with praxeology?

Laughing Man:

I don't know where you are getting your concept of thymology, but I just assume it is from professor Long.   As I wrote, anyone is free to develop their own concepts of praxeology, thymology, natural law, etc...

My only contention here is that the concept of thymology you are propounding is not consistent with Mises's conception of it.  Your concept of thymology might have its own merits, and professor Long's concept of thymology might have its own merits.  Whatever their merits may be, the conception is not the conception Mises had in mind.  That is my argument.  I will attempt to illustrate by referring to the examples you provide above:

Regarding #1:

"If we think of ethics as the discovering of the "good" for humanity.."

Then praxeology conceives this as an attempt at something.  An attempt to discover the good.  Discovering the good is the end, and there are means utilized toward this end.  Thymology---I am arguing, based on my interpretation of Mises's system---then asks things like:  Who attempted to discover the good? (concrete actor specified)   Why did he/she attempt to discover the good?  (in order to = means/ends explanation specified)   How did he/she attempt to discover the good?  (concrete means specified).

In other words, in the Misesian system, the formal construct of action is provided by praxeology:  Actor, means and ends.   Thymology is the attempt to ascertain what the actual content is/was.   The concrete person, the concrete end sought, the concrete means utilized, i.e., the information that formal praxeology does not provide.

Regarding #2:

"With thymology you can speculate on future human behavior and interactions"

In the Misesian conception, "speculation" is an action.  It is an "attempt to" or a "trying to."  

If an actor speculates, this is simply an action, the formal nature of which praxeology conceives.  Thymology asks:  Who is speculating?  (concrete person specified)   Why are they speculating?   (in order to  =  means/ends explanation specified)   How are they speculating?   (concrete means specified)

The speculating you are referring to, in the Misesian system, would be speculation as to the concrete content of a supposed action.

Who....will strive after what ends.....utilizing what means.....?

The behaviors and interactions you are referring to, in the Misesian system, would all be absolutely conceived in terms of the formal structure provided by praxeology. 

Are you meaning to imply that thymology is a discipline that would speculate about forms or modes of acting that would be non-praxeological forms???

In Misesian praxeology, the form of action is assumed or supposed.  Thymological speculation refers to the concrete content of the actions supposed.

Regarding #3:

Salerno writes "concretely."   This does not conflict with what I'm asserting about the Misesian conception of thymology.  The "how" refers to the concrete means and the concrete ends that friends, family members, etc... will employ.   If in the future, I initiate a political discussion at Thanksgiving dinner, will my family react by arguing heatedly against me?  Or by standing up and leaving the room?   Or by applauding wildly ?    What concrete means toward what concrete ends will specific person A do when I initiate said discussion ?

Regarding #4:

The concept of money ultimately derives from the concept of an actor who seeks to attain his ends utilizing means to do so.   Whether the actor in the individual case utilizes round discs of metal, pieces of paper, blocks of salt, cigarettes, etc... toward his ends, is a thymological question.   In the Misesian conception, ascertaining the concrete content of the individual action is a thymological-historical, not a theoretical pursuit.

An analogy might be geology.  A large swath of trees has been knocked down, and the trees are all pointing in the same direction. This is the historical evidence.  The evidence is consistent with a number of plausible explanations.  A large wind storm may have caused the trees to all be knocked over.  Or, a large piece of land may have fallen into a nearby body of water, resulting in a large wave that caused the trees to all be knocked over in one direction.

Whatever concrete explanation is given, it can't contradict the physical laws.   Providing the concrete explanation, in terms of the physical laws, is the task of the geologist (here,  I don't claim to know with precision that this is absolutely correct.  I assume what the geologist does for illustrative purposes).

Let's assume a geologist discovers a previously unknown physical law.  Then, in this sense, he is a physicist, since he discovered a previously unknown regularity in the sequence of physical phenomena.  

If we conceive that a "thymologist" uncovers a previously unknown mode of action, or conceives of action by means of a different scheme (constitutive means for example), then in the Misesian system, in this respect, that person is a praxeologist.  He uncovers a previously unknown constant relationship in the field of human action, or he discovers a new way to conceive of action.  Then, he does praxeology.  He conceives universal features of human action in a new way.

Regarding #5:

I don't know enough about Long's precise concept of thymology to answer this accurately at this time.   But I know that his concept of praxeology is not identical to Mises's, and in my opinion, Long's concept diverges from Mises's significantly. (Mises was concerned with regularity in the phenomena of action, not with "conceptual incoherence")

Long's conception of thymology, if it is connected to his conception of praxeology, is, in my opinion, unlikely to be consistent with Mises's unless it were by accident.

Does this mean that Long's conception of thymology is necessarily inconsistent or inaccurate?  No.

My point is that if there are several distinct and non-identical theoretical conceptions or constructs that are claiming the same name, it will only lead to confusion.  For example, does natural law mean the discovery of what is right?  Or does it refer to regularity in the sequence of events? 

When we are talking about thymology, we need to be clear about whose concept of thymology we are talking about.   Is it Misesian thymology, a branch of knowledge Mises conceived as complimentary to praxeology?   Or is thymology something different, a realm of theoretical inquiry running parallel to praxeology, with one of its sub-branches being normative ethics?

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Angurse replied on Sat, Jan 30 2010 10:51 PM

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Jackson LaRose:

You don't give your species enough credit, my man.  Linear counting is an innovation, much like numbers, or language.

Some innovation, even bees can do it.

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Jackson LaRose replied on Sun, Jan 31 2010 10:39 AM

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Via an innovation developed by the trial and error process know as natural selection.

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Angurse replied on Sun, Jan 31 2010 12:00 PM

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So lets not get hasty crediting our species, we aren't the first.

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Jackson LaRose replied on Sun, Jan 31 2010 6:12 PM

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Sure, but we don't leave that stuff up to fate, we create our own destiny as a species, and I personally think that's something unique.

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Andrew Cain replied on Sun, Jan 31 2010 6:44 PM

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Adam Knott:

Then praxeology conceives this as an attempt at something.  An attempt to discover the good.  Discovering the good is the end, and there are means utilized toward this end.  Thymology---I am arguing, based on my interpretation of Mises's system---then asks things like:  Who attempted to discover the good? (concrete actor specified)   Why did he/she attempt to discover the good?  (in order to = means/ends explanation specified)   How did he/she attempt to discover the good?  (concrete means specified).

That is what I was saying. Praxeology tells us the what while thymology tells us the why. However, through the quote I provided by Mises. Thymology is value statements. It is experience, broad empirical data. Not empirical in the sense that it is laboratory data but basic human experience. Thymology is also not apodictically certain.

Adam Knott:

The behaviors and interactions you are referring to, in the Misesian system, would all be absolutely conceived in terms of the formal structure provided by praxeology. 

I'm not denying the merits of praxeology. Through the discussion I have repeated that thymology and praxeology are necessary for one another. Remember my written tree diagram with praxeology and thymology both at the top. You seem to be saying that praxeology comes first and then comes the thymology but praxeology wouldn't even be able to applied to reality if it were not for human understanding. Both are required and are dependent upon the other.

Also Ethical systems are concerned with human interactions are they not? What is and isn't acceptable behavior?

Adam Knott:

The concept of money ultimately derives from the concept of an actor who seeks to attain his ends utilizing means to do so.   Whether the actor in the individual case utilizes round discs of metal, pieces of paper, blocks of salt, cigarettes, etc... toward his ends, is a thymological question.

The concept of money is a general medium of exchange meaning that one individual cannot simply decide what is and isn't money. Human experiences is necessary to tell what actual is money in a given society. You have to go there and experience it. You cannot apodictically state what is or isn't money in a society nor can you even know there is money since they could be bartering.

Adam Knott:

I don't know enough about Long's precise concept of thymology to answer this accurately at this time.   But I know that his concept of praxeology is not identical to Mises's, and in my opinion, Long's concept diverges from Mises's significantly. (Mises was concerned with regularity in the phenomena of action, not with "conceptual incoherence")

Adam Knott:

Long's conception of thymology, if it is connected to his conception of praxeology, is, in my opinion, unlikely to be consistent with Mises's unless it were by accident.

Well I was listening to some of Long's lectures last night and I found these too which he addressed thymology.

Aprioism and Positivism in the Social Science  ( 26  mins in  )

Praxeology: The Austrian Method ( 39 mins in )

He also has a long paper on action, I haven't gone through it but if I see anything in it I will pass it on.

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Angurse replied on Sun, Jan 31 2010 6:49 PM

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Jackson LaRose:

Sure, but we don't leave that stuff up to fate, we create our own destiny as a species, and I personally think that's something unique.

Yet, it clearly isn't unique as it isn't specific to the species. We didn't innovate, we just discovered, as other species have done.

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Jackson LaRose replied on Sun, Jan 31 2010 7:20 PM

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But the other species don't consciously innovate, they rely on the "market of genes" to determine the winners and losers, not action.

Ooh, creepy, praxeologically, would genes be conscious?

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Angurse replied on Sun, Jan 31 2010 8:17 PM

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Jackson LaRose:

But the other species don't consciously innovate, they rely on the "market of genes" to determine the winners and losers, not action.

And you know man consciously learned to count and other species didn't how? Men do have genes do they not? They must play some role.

Jackson LaRose:

Ooh, creepy, praxeologically, would genes be conscious?

No.

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Jackson LaRose replied on Sun, Jan 31 2010 8:22 PM

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Because or natural inclination is to see number logarithmically, not linearly, we must've overcome that somehow.

Why not?

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Angurse replied on Sun, Jan 31 2010 8:35 PM

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Jackson LaRose:

Because or natural inclination is to see number logarithmically, not linearly, we must've overcome that somehow.

How do you know that is our natural inclination?

Jackson LaRose:

Why not?

Genes don't act purposefully.

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Jackson LaRose replied on Sun, Jan 31 2010 8:37 PM

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Angurse:

How do you know that is our natural inclination?

I blindly believe what scientists tell me

Angurse:

Genes don't act purposefully.

how do you know?

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Angurse replied on Sun, Jan 31 2010 8:45 PM

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Jackson LaRose:

how do you know?

I'll let Gene Callahan explain.

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Adam Knott replied on Mon, Feb 1 2010 12:51 PM

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Laughing Man:

 

Through the discussion I have repeated that thymology and praxeology are necessary for one another.

You seem to be saying that praxeology comes first and then comes the thymology but praxeology wouldn't even be able to applied to reality if it were not for human understanding.  Both are required and are dependent upon the other.

Laughing Man:

You are making the case for what thymology IS, by using Long's definition of what thymology is.

My point is not that Long's definition is necessarily wrong, incorrect, or inconsistent.  I believe that would have to be established separately, on the merits of Long's definition and conception of thymology.

You, as a Long supporter and follower, are simply taking Long's definition and conception of thymology, and making the existential or ontological argument that thymology IS....(insert Long's definition here).

I'm saying that Long's definition and conception is not identical to Mises's definition and conception.  So while you are perfectly at liberty to assert unconditionally that thymology is what Long says it is, I'm simply going to point out that Mises said it was something else.  Also, Mises was the one who coined the term thymology, so reference to his conception, as distinct from Long's conception, would seem reasonable.

Here is Long's own account of Mises's conception of thymology:

"Ludwig von Mises introduced into Austrian theory a distinction between praxeology, the method of economic theory, and thymology, the method of economic history.  Praxeology comprises a set of a priori insights into the nature and implications of human action; thymology involves identifying, via the hermeneutical method of verstehen, the particular means and ends chosen in particular cases.  Thus praxeology, for example, states the laws governing monetary exchange, while thymology determines whether a particular interaction is in fact a case of monetary exchange.  For Mises, thymology presupposes praxeology, since one must possess such concepts as means and ends before one can apply them.  Praxeology, by contrast, does not presuppose thymology: Mises maintains, in Kantian terms, that we derive our praxeological categories not from experience but from the innate structure of the human mind."  (Long, "Rule Following, Praxeology, and Anarchy" New Perspectives on Political Economy, p.41)

With respect to the underlined passage, then Long goes on to propose his own revised conception of the relationship between praxeology and thymology:

"It further follows that the relation of dependence between praxeology and thymology must be two-way rather than one-way......In that sense, Rothbard and Lavoie are correct in holding, against Mises, that praxeological insight requires some sort of experience..."

Thus, as I read Long, he is saying that Mises's conception is wrong, and he is proposing a revision to Mises's conception of thymology.  The Longian conception of thymology and the Misesian conception of praxeology are distinctly different.   When we speak of thymology, I suggest we clarify whether we are referring to the Long conception or the Mises conception.

******

One note I would like to make about Long's concept(s) that I think may be helpful.

In describing his own conception of the relationship of praxeology and thymology, Long concludes:

"Praxeological and thymological understanding arise together; they are simply aspects---not separable components---of the single indissoluble whole which is intelligent human experience."  (Ibid., p. 43)

I believe this conception of Long's is intimately connected to his concept of "constitutive means," which is also a concept in which the means are aspects---not separable components---of a single indissoluble whole.

Besides the fact that Long's concept of constitutive means fails his own test of what is a constitutive means (in his own description of what a constitutive means is, he provides a test for it, then neglects to apply that test to the entity he asserts is a constitutive means.  see:  http://mises.org/Community/forums/t/10229.aspx ), the concept of an indissoluble whole is problematic in the context of a theory of human action for the following general reason:

When we conceive that an object is already constituted (the object and its aspects already constitute the whole in question), then a problem arises as to how any action can take place with respect to constituting the whole that the actor desires to constitute.

In other words, the problem of human action is how an actor can constitute a desired whole, or, given one whole, how an actor can attain or obtain a different one.

The statement that [wholes] are constituted by [their aspects] does not solve that problem. 

In this formulation reference to human action is absent.

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Andrew Cain replied on Mon, Feb 1 2010 6:58 PM

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Adam Knott:

"Ludwig von Mises introduced into Austrian theory a distinction between praxeology, the method of economic theory, and thymology, the method of economic history.  Praxeology comprises a set of a priori insights into the nature and implications of human action; thymology involves identifying, via the hermeneutical method of verstehen, the particular means and ends chosen in particular cases.  Thus praxeology, for example, states the laws governing monetary exchange, while thymology determines whether a particular interaction is in fact a case of monetary exchange.  For Mises, thymology presupposes praxeology, since one must possess such concepts as means and ends before one can apply them.  Praxeology, by contrast, does not presuppose thymology: Mises maintains, in Kantian terms, that we derive our praxeological categories not from experience but from the innate structure of the human mind."  (Long, "Rule Following, Praxeology, and Anarchy" New Perspectives on Political Economy, p.41)

With respect to the underlined passage, then Long goes on to propose his own revised conception of the relationship between praxeology and thymology:

"It further follows that the relation of dependence between praxeology and thymology must be two-way rather than one-way......In that sense, Rothbard and Lavoie are correct in holding, against Mises, that praxeological insight requires some sort of experience..."

Well this makes me recall the quote I think by Mises in which a praxeologist can sit in an armchair with their eyes closed and deduce whole economies. Now you would need thymology to take that theory and apply it to the real world. Now whether praxeology or thymology is first needed wasn't the point I was addressing. The point was that you do need both to apply it to the reality of human behavior. Real world application. Praxeology would stay in the abstract if not for thymology. Now you have been saying that you have discovered an ethical system through praxeology. Yet everything in praxeology is apoditically certain. Therefore either you discovered objective ethics that are apoditically certain or something was faulty.

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Adam Knott replied on Mon, Feb 1 2010 9:05 PM

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"

Laughing Man:

Adam Knott:

"Ludwig von Mises introduced into Austrian theory a distinction between praxeology, the method of economic theory, and thymology, the method of economic history.  Praxeology comprises a set of a priori insights into the nature and implications of human action; thymology involves identifying, via the hermeneutical method of verstehen, the particular means and ends chosen in particular cases.  Thus praxeology, for example, states the laws governing monetary exchange, while thymology determines whether a particular interaction is in fact a case of monetary exchange.  For Mises, thymology presupposes praxeology, since one must possess such concepts as means and ends before one can apply them.  Praxeology, by contrast, does not presuppose thymology: Mises maintains, in Kantian terms, that we derive our praxeological categories not from experience but from the innate structure of the human mind."  (Long, "Rule Following, Praxeology, and Anarchy" New Perspectives on Political Economy, p.41)

With respect to the underlined passage, then Long goes on to propose his own revised conception of the relationship between praxeology and thymology:

"It further follows that the relation of dependence between praxeology and thymology must be two-way rather than one-way......In that sense, Rothbard and Lavoie are correct in holding, against Mises, that praxeological insight requires some sort of experience..."

Well this makes me recall the quote I think by Mises in which a praxeologist can sit in an armchair with their eyes closed and deduce whole economies. Now you would need thymology to take that theory and apply it to the real world. Now whether praxeology or thymology is first needed wasn't the point I was addressing. The point was that you do need both to apply it to the reality of human behavior. Real world application. Praxeology would stay in the abstract if not for thymology. Now you have been saying that you have discovered an ethical system through praxeology. Yet everything in praxeology is apoditically certain. Therefore either you discovered objective ethics that are apoditically certain or something was faulty.

Laughing Man:

Thank you for your willingness to discuss these issues.  Not everyone is willing to.

The main point I'm trying to stress is that Mises had a distinct conception of the relationship between praxeology and thymology which is approximately equivalent to the distinction between form and content.  Praxeology deals with the universal aspects of human action, and thymology with the concrete, individual, and accidental aspects of human action.  This is the Misesian conception, at least as I understand it.  

This doesn't mean that other scholars such as Long can't propose their own conceptions which are more amenable to the ends they wish to pursue.  Some scholars may want to achieve a synthesis of Randian objective ethics and Misesian praxeology, and to do so, they will have to change essential aspects of Misesian praxeology.     Some scholars may be primarily interested in establishing universal, concrete, ethical values, but with the backing of "praxeology," and again, if this is the goal, it is very likely that they will have to change essential aspects of Misesian praxeology.

If this is what professor Long is intending, then he is not alone.  Israel M. Kirzner argued for another category or aspect to be appended to that of purposeful behavior (human action); the role of entrepreneurial discovery.   Rothbard (in his post-Mises-student phase) conceived praxeology as only a reasoning method used for Austrian economics (market study), and not as a general science of all human purposeful behavior (which he did conceive in his Mises-student phase while writing MES).

Thus, we can probably identify and differentiate various scholar's conceptions of praxeology that depart from Mises's conception of it in significant ways.  As I believe my last post shows, Long's himself views his conception of thymology as an improvement over what he considers to be Mises's faulty conception of it.  I believe that is conclusive evidence that Long's conception is significantly different than Mises's.

Mises provides his conception of Thymology on the very first written page of Human Action (3rd rev.ed.) in the Forward:

"..... in the last decades the meaning of the term "psychology" has been more and more restricted to the field of experimental psychology, a discipline that resorts to the research methods of the natural sciences. On the other hand, it has become usual to dismiss those studies that previously had been called psychological as "literary psychology" and as an unscientific way of reasoning. Whenever reference is made to "psychology" in economic studies, one has in mind precisely this literary psychology, and therefore it seems advisable to introduce a special term for it. I suggested in my book Theory and History (New Haven, 1957, pp. 264-274) the term "thymology," and I used this term also in my recently published essay The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science (Princeton, 1962)."

So here, Mises provides an explicit definition or conception of what he means by thymology.  By the term thymology, he means literary psychology, the discipline that in academia has been replaced by experimental psychology.

I interpret literary psychology to be something like the verbally expressed reasons we give for the motivations of specific actions, or the reasons people hold the values they do.  Thymology answers questions such as:  "why did he do that?" or "what will he do?"   "why does he like that?"  "what will he like?"

These questions are asked and answered, I assume, with reference to the known or assumed character of the individual concerned.  As Mises writes, "The concept of a human character is a thymological concept.  Its concrete content in each instance is derived from historical experience."

Mises explains in The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science that: 

"Thymology is a branch of history.." (p.48)

"This specific understanding of the sciences of human action aims at establishing the facts that men attach a definite meaning to the state of their environment, that they value this state and, motivated by these judgments of value, resort to definite means in order to preserve or to attain a definite state of affairs different from that which would prevail if they abstained from any purposeful reaction. Understanding deals with judgments of value, with the choice of ends and of the means resorted to for the attainment of these ends, and with the valuation of the outcome of actions performed."(p.49)(underline added)

Here, when Mises writes about understanding (where underlined), I interpret this to mean: actor A's attempt to "understand" actor B's judgments of value, choice of ends, choice of means....and, actor A's valuation of the action performed by actor B. 

In other words, actor A's appraisement of, or ascertainment of, the various aspects of B's action: B's motivation, B's judgment of value, B's choice of ends, B's choice of means, etc...

Thus, actor A uses the method of understanding (verstehen) to try to answer such questions as:

What was (or is, or will be) B's judgment of value?   (Elvis Presley was the most important singer of the twentieth century)

Why did (does, or will) B value Elvis Presley?  (B's father was/is a minister in the south and exposed B to gospel music)

What was (is or will be)  B's goal?   (to catalogue every song ever performed by Elvis Presley)

How did (does, or will) B do that?   (embark on an ambitious discography)

"Understanding does not deal with the praxeological side of human action. It refers to value judgments and the choice of ends and of means on the part of our fellow men. It refers not to the field of praxeology and economics, but to the field of history. It is a thymological category. The concept of a human character is a thymological concept. Its concrete content in each instance is derived from historical experience." (p.51)

"The subject of the historical understanding is the mental grasp of phenomena which cannot be totally elucidated by logic, mathematics, praxeology, and the natural sciences and as far as they cannot be elucidated by science and reason.  It establishes the fact that scientific inquiry has reached a point beyond which it cannot go further, and tries to fill the gap by Verstehen.  One may, if one likes, qualify the Verstehen as irrational because it involves individual judgments not amenable to criticism by purely rational methods.  However, the method of understanding is not a free charter to deviate from the certified results obtained from the documentary evidence and from its interpretation through the teachings of the natural sciences and of praxeology.  The Verstehen oversteps its due limits if it ventures to contradict physics, physiology, logic, mathematics, or economics."  (Money, Method, and the Market Process. p.30)(underline added)

In the underlined, I interpret Mises as meaning that A's individual "Verstehen account" (A's individual judgment) about the various aspects of B's action, is "not amenable to criticism by purely rational methods."

This means that A, C, and D may give varying "Verstehen accounts" of aspects of B's action(s), and the discrepancies between these various accounts, providing these accounts do not contradict established scientific principles, cannot be conclusively resolved by logical reasoning.

"Praxeology deals with choice and actions and with their outcome.  Psychology (what Mises says he means by thymology) deals with the internal processes determining the various choices in their concreteness.  It may be left undecided whether psychology can succeed in explaining why a man in a concrete case preferred red to blue or bread to lyrics.  At any rate such an explanation has nothing to do with a branch of knowledge for which the concrete choices are the data not needing further explanation or analysis.  Not what a man choses, but that he chooses counts for praxeology." (Money, Method, and the Market Process. p. 21)(parenthasized comment added)

*****

"Now you have been saying that you have discovered an ethical system through praxeology. Yet everything in praxeology is apoditically certain. Therefore either you discovered objective ethics that are apoditically certain or something was faulty."

You are misunderstanding my points about praxeology and ethics.

My argument is:

1.  That there are human actions of an ethical nature:  lying to someone, coercing someone, assisting someone, obstructing someone.

2.  That praxeology is a general science studying all forms of human action.

3.  That, as there are ethical actions, then praxeology studies these ethical actions.

4.  That, as praxeology is an "exact science" of human action, that therefore, praxeology is an exact science of ethical actions as well.

5.  Praxeology is concerned with laws of human action, be they economic/catallactic, ethical, or psychological forms of action.

6.  Thus, praxeology is concerned with laws of ethical action.

"Praxeological knowledge makes it possible to predict with apodictic certainty the outcome of various modes of action." (HA, 3rd. rev. p.117)

My main point is that there are laws of ethical action which it is the task of praxeology to discover and conceive.