EDIT: This thread is not about debating the relative merits of Praxeology vs. mainstream approaches to theory.
I do not understand what is meant by verbal propositions being "meaningful", compared to "if the logistic array of symbols were used, each proposition would not be meaningful." What does "meaningful" and "not meaningful" mean in this context? My google search results were way beyond my ability to comprehend. A simple explanation (if possible) is requested. The "bold" passages are the ones I don't understand. From Man, Economy and State, Scholar's ed., Appen. A, page 75: "The suggestion has been made that, since praxeology and economics are logical chains of reasoning based on a few universally known premises, to be really scientific it should be elaborated according to the symbolic notations of mathematical logic. This represents a curious misconception of the role of mathematical logic, or “logistics.” In the first place, it is the great quality of verbal propositions that each one is meaningful. On the other hand, algebraic and logical symbols, as used in logistics, are not in themselves meaningful. Praxeology asserts the action axiom as true, and from this (together with a few empirical axioms—such as the existence of a variety of resources and individuals) are deduced, by the rules of logical inference, all the propositions of economics, each one of which is verbal and meaningful. If the logistic array of symbols were used, each proposition would not be meaningful. Logistics, therefore, is far more suited to the physical sciences, where, in contrast to the science of human action, the conclusions rather than the axioms are known. In the physical sciences, the premises are only hypothetical, and logical deductions are made from them. In these cases, there is no purpose in having meaningful propositions at each step of the way, and therefore symbolic and mathematical language is more useful."
I do not understand what is meant by verbal propositions being "meaningful", compared to "if the logistic array of symbols were used, each proposition would not be meaningful." What does "meaningful" and "not meaningful" mean in this context? My google search results were way beyond my ability to comprehend. A simple explanation (if possible) is requested. The "bold" passages are the ones I don't understand.
From Man, Economy and State, Scholar's ed., Appen. A, page 75: "The suggestion has been made that, since praxeology and economics are logical chains of reasoning based on a few universally known premises, to be really scientific it should be elaborated according to the symbolic notations of mathematical logic. This represents a curious misconception of the role of mathematical logic, or “logistics.” In the first place, it is the great quality of verbal propositions that each one is meaningful. On the other hand, algebraic and logical symbols, as used in logistics, are not in themselves meaningful. Praxeology asserts the action axiom as true, and from this (together with a few empirical axioms—such as the existence of a variety of resources and individuals) are deduced, by the rules of logical inference, all the propositions of economics, each one of which is verbal and meaningful. If the logistic array of symbols were used, each proposition would not be meaningful. Logistics, therefore, is far more suited to the physical sciences, where, in contrast to the science of human action, the conclusions rather than the axioms are known. In the physical sciences, the premises are only hypothetical, and logical deductions are made from them. In these cases, there is no purpose in having meaningful propositions at each step of the way, and therefore symbolic and mathematical language is more useful."
"The market is a process." - Ludwig von Mises, as related by Israel Kirzner. "Capital formation is a beautiful thing" - Chloe732.
OK chloe, I was having some reading comprehension problems there with "logistics" simply meaning 'mathematical logic'. 3-4 hours of sleep will do that to me heh =)
I don't know how simple we can make an explanation of the whole thing, but maybe just the bolded isn't that bad. Note that I am not all that familiar with where Rothbard is getting these ideas from himself, but I will try to explain best I can from what I have read.
Let's start with the 2nd part:
Rothbard:On the other hand, algebraic and logical symbols, as used in logistics, are not in themselves meaningful.
This is from Donald Peterson's Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy: Three Sides of the Mirror p. 48:
Peterson:Wittgenstein's Grundgedanke or 'fundamental thought' is presented as an emphatic statement which appears in the midst of his discussion of the picture theory of meaning: (he cites the Tractatus at §4.0312) The possibility of sentences is based on the principle that objects have signs as their representatives. My fundamental thought is that the 'logical constants' are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts. That is: the logical constants—the connectives '∨', '&', ' ⊃ ' etc., the identity sign ' ＝ ', and the quantifiers '( )' and ' ∃ '—are not names of substantive objects in the world.
The possibility of sentences is based on the principle that objects have signs as their representatives. My fundamental thought is that the 'logical constants' are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts.
That is: the logical constants—the connectives '∨', '&', ' ⊃ ' etc., the identity sign ' ＝ ', and the quantifiers '( )' and ' ∃ '—are not names of substantive objects in the world.
＝
The rest of the chapter has a section contrasting Wittgenstein's view with Bertrand Russell's uncertainty at this point in time that these symbols (what Rothbard calls the "logistic array of symbols") are representational "logical objects". Then there are sections about the argument from equivalence, argument from brackets, argument from alternative notation, then 3 further (Ramsey's, from assimilation, and from logical priviledge).
I am not going to type much of that out now, but a couple examples should show what is meant.
Tractatus §5.254:An operation can vanish (for example, negation in '~~p' : ~~p = p).
ibid §5.44:And if there were an object called '~', it would follow that '~p' said something different from what 'p' said, just because the one sentence would then be about—and the other would not.
ibid §5.473:Logic must look after itself. If a sign is possible, then it is also capable of signifying. Whatever is possible in logic is also permitted. (The reason why 'Socrates is identical' means nothing is that there is no property called 'identical'. The proposition is nonsensical because we have failed to make an arbitrary determination, and not because the symbol, in itself, would be illegitimate.) In a certain sense, we cannot make mistakes in logic.
Rothbard:In the first place, it is the great quality of verbal propositions that each one is meaningful.
Rothbard's word choice here (great/verbal) seems a bit superfluous. What exactly is the problem with just accepting for now that a proposition has meaning? I wish that his Individualism and the Philosophy of the Social Sciences wasn't tied up in Cato's IP. It is short and some of the essays are available elsewhere.
(from p. 36)
The nature of the evidence on which the praxeological axiom rests is, moreover, fundamentally similar to that accepted by the self-proclaimed empiricists. To them, the laboratory experiment is evidence because the sensory experience involved in it is available to each observer; the experience becomes "evident" to all. Logical proof is in this sense similar; for the knowledge that B follows from A becomes evident to all who care to follow the demonstration. In teh same way, the fact of human action and of purposive choice also becomes evident to each person who bothers to contemplate it; it is just as evident as the direct sense experience of the laboratory.
From this philosophical perspective, then, all disciplines dealing with human beings — from philosophy to history, psychology, and the social sciences — must take as their starting point the fact that humans engage in motivated, purposive action and are thus different from the unmotivated atoms and stones that are the objects of the physical sciences. But where, then, does praxeology or economics differ from the other disciplines that treat human beings? The difference is that, to the praxeologist, economic theory (as distinct from applied economics, which will be treated below) deals, not with the content of human valuations, motivations, and choices, but with the formal fact that people engage in such motivated action. Other disciplines focus on the content of these values and actions. Thus psychology asks how and why people adopt values and actions; ethics deals with the problem of what values and choices they should adopt; technology explains how they should act in order to arrive at chosen ends; and history tries to explain the content of human motives and choices through recorded time. Of these disciplines, history is perhaps the most purely verstehende, for the historian is constantly attempting to describe, understand, and explain the motivations and choices of individual actors. Economic theory, on the other hand, is the least verstehende, for while it too begins with the axiom of purposive and intentional human action, the remainder of its elaborated structure consists of the deduced logical—and therefore true—implications of that primordial fact.
An example of the formal structure of economic theory is the well-known economic law, built up from the axiom of the existence of motivated human action, that if the demand for any product increases, given the existing supply, the price of that product will rise. This law holds regardless of the ethical or aesthetic status of the product, just as the law of gravity applies to objects regardless of their particular identity. The economic theorist is not interested in the content of what is being demanded, or in its ethical meaning—it may be guns or butter or even textbooks on philosophy. It is this universal, formal nature of economic law that has earned it among laymen the reputation of being cold, heartless, and excessively logical.
Having discussed the nature of the axiom on which the praxeological view of economics is grounded, we may now turn to examine the deductive process itself, the way in which the structure of economic laws is developed, the nature of those laws, and, finally, the ways in which the praxeological economist applies these economic laws to the social world.
One of the basic tools for the deduction of the logical implications of the axiom of human action is the use of the Gedankenexperiment, or "mental experiment". The Gedankenexperiment is the economic theorist's controlled laboratory experiment. Since the relevant variables of the social world cannot actually be held constant, the economist holds them constant in his imagination. Using the tool of verbal logic, he mentally investigates the causal influence of one variable on another. The economist finds, for example, that the price of a product is determined by two variables, the demand for it and the supply at any given time. He then mentally holds the supply constant, and finds that and increase in demand—brought about by higher rankings of the product on the value scales of the public—will bring about an increase in price. Similarly, he finds, again using verbal deductive logic, that if these value scales, and therefore public demand, are mentally held constant, and the supply of the product increases, its price will fall. In short, economics arrives at ceteris paribus laws: Given the supply, the price will change in the same direction as demand; given the demand, price will change in the opposite direction from supply.
One important aspect of these economic laws must be pointed out: They are necessarily qualitative. The fact that human beings have goals and preferences, that they make choices to attain their goals, that all action must take place over time, all these are qualitative axioms. And since only the qualitative enters into the logical process from the real world, only the qualitative can emerge. One can say, for example, than an increase in demand, given the supply, will raise the price; one cannot say that a 20 percent increase in demand will bring about a 25 percent increase in price. The praxeologist must reject all attempts, no matter how fashionable, to erect a theory consisting of alleged qualitative laws. In an age that tries desperately to imitate prestigious physics, with its emphasis on mathematics and its quantitative laws, many social scientists, including many economists, have ignored this methodology because of this very insistence on the bounds of the discipline.
I hope this clears up a couple parts for you. Does he mean 'qualitative' by "verbal and meaningful"? Tell me what is still confusing you and I will try to help.
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
chloe732:This represents a curious misconception of the role of mathematical logic, or “logistics.” In the first place, it is the great quality of verbal propositions that each one is meaningful. On the other hand, algebraic and logical symbols, as used in logistics, are not in themselves meaningful. Praxeology asserts the action axiom as true, and from this (together with a few empirical axioms—such as the existence of a variety of resources and individuals) are deduced, by the rules of logical inference, all the propositions of economics, each one of which is verbal and meaningful. If the logistic array of symbols were used, each proposition would not be meaningful.
It's a cop-out . It shows how Austrians have been dodging this issue for decades now.
scineram:It's a cop-out .
That may be the case, but I'm looking for a better answer than that. EDIT: I'm not interested in a thread about methodological approaches. I simply would like to know what Rothbard means by this. Whether is it correct or not is a separate question for another day. Thanks.
Because symbolic logic can be applied to various subjects so doesn't necessarily say anything meaningful/specific about economics, ie. human action. It doesn't mean it can't be applied to economics, I don't know enough about symbolic logics application and any technical rebuttals or affirmations to this approach. Yet, praxeology is saying something about human action, ie. economics, specifically. In other words, praxeologic goes directly to the point as economics is a study of humans acting.
scineram: chloe732:This represents a curious misconception of the role of mathematical logic, or “logistics.” In the first place, it is the great quality of verbal propositions that each one is meaningful. On the other hand, algebraic and logical symbols, as used in logistics, are not in themselves meaningful. Praxeology asserts the action axiom as true, and from this (together with a few empirical axioms—such as the existence of a variety of resources and individuals) are deduced, by the rules of logical inference, all the propositions of economics, each one of which is verbal and meaningful. If the logistic array of symbols were used, each proposition would not be meaningful. It's a cop-out . It shows how Austrians have been dodging this issue for decades now.
Why are you such a dedicated anti-freedom and anti-praxeology poster, scineram? Why log on here religiously with these one-liners if our ideas are such nonsense? Seriously, you must have something better to do right?
What issue specifically are you even talking about? The same approach of the natural sciences doesn't work for social sciences.
Anyhow... I think I understand everything pretty well chloe up until the last sentence. That one should be simple but I don't understand what "logistic array of symbols" means exactly. I think this is a more general topic of discussion in philosophy, not only an "Austrian thing we are dodging". This might shed some light on it: Read from #2 Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism
edit: I read the full original quote now and think I basically get it. I wand to re-read this part of ME&S, then I will write up an explanation later.
E. R. Olovetto:I want to re-read this part of ME&S, then I will write up an explanation later.
ERO - I am stuck on this point, and I think it is important to understand it. It just occurred to me that Rothbard and others wrote papers / books on Praxeology (I see these in Literature), but I'm specifically interested in what Rothbard means in the passage I quoted. If this can be explained simply, that's what I'm looking for. Thanks.
E. R. Olovetto: scineram: chloe732:This represents a curious misconception of the role of mathematical logic, or “logistics.” In the first place, it is the great quality of verbal propositions that each one is meaningful. On the other hand, algebraic and logical symbols, as used in logistics, are not in themselves meaningful. Praxeology asserts the action axiom as true, and from this (together with a few empirical axioms—such as the existence of a variety of resources and individuals) are deduced, by the rules of logical inference, all the propositions of economics, each one of which is verbal and meaningful. If the logistic array of symbols were used, each proposition would not be meaningful. It's a cop-out . It shows how Austrians have been dodging this issue for decades now. Why are you such a dedicated anti-freedom and anti-praxeology poster, scineram? Why log on here religiously with these one-liners if our ideas are such nonsense? Seriously, you must have something better to do right?
Indeed scineram. 1,691 posts is a bit much when almost all of them are snide one-liners. If you don't have anything constructive to contribute, why don't you just move on?
My opinion is that he's a troll who usually offers no explanation for his reasoning. So honestly, who cares what he has to say? Scineram probably doesn't know what Rothbard means there either, but he's referring to the fact that the actual content of propositions in logical manipulations is irrelevant in establishing their validity and you will learn this in any logic course you do, albeit with different terms. What matters is the manipulation of the symbols. Rothbard's comments on it being more suited to the natural sciences relates to the hypothetico-deductive methodology.
It does not mean Austrian econ is not amenable to formalisation to eliminate logical errors - some Austrians are trying to do or interested in doing this, it's just difficult to translate complex arguments in normal English to formal logic.
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
E. R. Olovetto:I hope this clears up a couple parts for you.
Holy cow...I wasn't expecting you to put in an effort like this! It will take some time to read through and study your post. Thanks.
A Note On Mathematical Economics - MNR
....
As Professor Mises has pointed out, there is a crucial distinction between the natural world studied by physics and the world of human action.
In physics, the facts of nature are given to us. They may be broken down into their simple elements in the laboratory and their movements observed. On the other hand, we do not know the laws explaining the movements of physical particles; they are unmotivated.
We must therefore seek causes by hypothecating general theories, and from these axioms be able to deduce not only the original facts, but other theories which can be directly tested by fact (the famous concept of "operational meaning"). As much as we may progress in the knowledge of the laws of physics, our knowledge is never absolute, since the laws may always be revised by more general laws and through further empirical testing
In economics, however, the conditions are almost reversed. Here we know the cause, for human action, unlike the movement of stones, is motivated. Therefore, we may build economics on the basis of axioms — such as the existence of human action and the logical implications of action — which are originally known as true.
From these axioms we can deduce step by step, therefore, laws which are also known as true. And this knowledge is absolute rather than relative precisely because the original axioms are already known. On the other hand, there are no simple elements of "facts" in human action; the events of history are complex phenomena, which cannot "test" anything. They themselves can only be explained by applying many relevant theories to different aspects of the complex "fact."
Why is mathematics so useful in physics? Precisely because the axioms themselves, and the laws deduced from them, are unknown and in fact meaningless. Their meaning is only "operational," since they are meaningful only insofar as they can explain given facts.
Thus, the equation of the law of gravitation is in itself meaningless; it is only meaningful to us in relation to the facts that we humans observe and that the law can explain. Consequently, mathematics, which performs deductive operations on meaningless symbols, is perfectly suited for the methods of physics.
Economics, on the other hand, starts from an axiom that is known and meaningful to us — human action. Since the action is itself meaningful, all the laws which are deduced step by step from it are also meaningful. This is the answer to those critics (such as Mr. Schuller, American Economics Review [March, 1951], p. 188) who called on Professor Mises to use the methods of mathematical logic instead of verbal logic. For mathematical logic must deal with meaningless symbols; hence its use would strip economics of all its meaning.
On the other hand, verbal logic permits each law to be meaningful as it is deduced. The laws of economics are already known to be meaningfully true; they do not have to borrow their meaning from "operational" testing. The most that mathematics could possibly do, therefore, is to laboriously translate verbal symbols into meaningless formal symbols and then, at each step, retranslate them into words.
Because of the barrenness of the mathematical symbols, such a course would be likely to lead to grave errors. However, if anyone is hardy enough to embark on the venture, we may only wish him well. And yet, such translation and retranslation would have to fall with one slash of Occam's Razor — the famous scientific principle that there be no unnecessary multiplication of entities, i.e., that science be as simple as possible.[1]
...
[1] The popularity in philosophy of mathematical logic as compared to verbal logic may be ascribed to the influence of positivism in philosophy. For a realization that mathematical logic is essentially subordinate to the verbal, cof. the remarks of Andreé Laelandes and Renée Poirier, on "logic" and "logistitque" in (A. Laelande, ed.) Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philosophie, 6th eEd. (Paris, 1951). Pp. 574, 579.
I believe that makes things crystal clear. Bolding of keywords is mine.
chloe732:
Here's my take:
Mathematics is the exact science of spatiotemporal nature. According to Heisenberg:
"It may be said that classical physics is just that idealization in which we can speak about parts of the world without any reference to ourselves." (Physics and Philosophy)
So the idea is that mathematical logic refers to a realm, an ideal realm, that is independent of human action. The idea is that whether a planet is over here or over there is really not important to human well-being. Such an event is thought to be neutral with respect to human happiness and unhappiness, human satisfaction and dissatisfaction, human intention, human well-being, etc.. Thus, the formal logic of nature, when nature is conceived as independent of human intention, is "not meaningful." This logic applies to a realm absent human intention, and thus absent the categories of human action.
By contrast, the concepts of praxeology are human meaning categories. They are definitely categories that refer to human action and human intention.
Human action is the phenomenon of "aiming at ends." In this formal system, there is a category or conception of "what the actor has" (the state of affairs that exists now for the actor), and, "what the actor is aiming for" (the state of affairs the actor is aiming for).
These categories (what I have now, versus what I want) are human meaning categories. They matter to me, or to the actor concerned. They are not, as Heisenberg writes, an idealization in which we can speak about the world without any reference to our selves. Quite the contrary, these concepts directly refer to ourselves: our wants and our attainments.
So I would interpret Rothbard (at this stage of his career where he is a student of Mises), as trying to make the point that the concepts of praxeology are human meaning concepts (striving, attainment, value, supply, means, ends, happiness, unhappiness, etc...), whereas the concepts of mathematics, dealing with the location of objects conceived to be independent of human intention (1, 2, 3, x, y, z, etc...), are not concepts of human meaning.
That is what I believe he is trying to convey.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
Adam Knott: chloe732: Here's my take: Mathematics is the exact science of spatiotemporal nature. According to Heisenberg: "It may be said that classical physics is just that idealization in which we can speak about parts of the world without any reference to ourselves." (Physics and Philosophy) So the idea is that mathematical logic refers to a realm, an ideal realm, that is independent of human action. The idea is that whether a planet is over here or over there is really not important to human well-being. Such an event is thought to be neutral with respect to human happiness and unhappiness, human satisfaction and dissatisfaction, human intention, human well-being, etc.. Thus, the formal logic of nature, when nature is conceived as independent of human intention, is "not meaningful." This logic applies to a realm absent human intention, and thus absent the categories of human action. By contrast, the concepts of praxeology are human meaning categories. They are definitely categories that refer to human action and human intention. Human action is the phenomenon of "aiming at ends." In this formal system, there is a category or conception of "what the actor has" (the state of affairs that exists now for the actor), and, "what the actor is aiming for" (the state of affairs the actor is aiming for). These categories (what I have now, versus what I want) are human meaning categories. They matter to me, or to the actor concerned. They are not, as Heisenberg writes, an idealization in which we can speak about the world without any reference to our selves. Quite the contrary, these concepts directly refer to ourselves: our wants and our attainments. So I would interpret Rothbard (at this stage of his career where he is a student of Mises), as trying to make the point that the concepts of praxeology are human meaning concepts (striving, attainment, value, supply, means, ends, happiness, unhappiness, etc...), whereas the concepts of mathematics, dealing with the location of objects conceived to be independent of human intention (1, 2, 3, x, y, z, etc...), are not concepts of human meaning. That is what I believe he is trying to convey.
Awesome. Well said. This makes perfect sense.
"If we wish to preserve a free society, it is essential that we recognize that the desirability of a particular object is not sufficient justification for the use of coercion."
Adam Knott:So I would interpret Rothbard (at this stage of his career where he is a student of Mises), as trying to make the point that the concepts of praxeology are human meaning concepts (striving, attainment, value, supply, means, ends, happiness, unhappiness, etc...), whereas the concepts of mathematics, dealing with the location of objects conceived to be independent of human intention (1, 2, 3, x, y, z, etc...), are not concepts of human meaning.
I wonder why does that make formal logic unsuitable for praxeology. Why would the statements be meaningless? It only uses the language you want it to. I think he maybe misunderstood formalization.
scineram: Adam Knott:So I would interpret Rothbard (at this stage of his career where he is a student of Mises), as trying to make the point that the concepts of praxeology are human meaning concepts (striving, attainment, value, supply, means, ends, happiness, unhappiness, etc...), whereas the concepts of mathematics, dealing with the location of objects conceived to be independent of human intention (1, 2, 3, x, y, z, etc...), are not concepts of human meaning. I wonder why does that make formal logic unsuitable for praxeology. Why would the statements be meaningless? It only uses the language you want it to. I think he maybe misunderstood formalization.
Good point !