EDIT: This thread is not about debating the relative merits of Praxeology vs. mainstream approaches to theory.
I do not understand what is meant by verbal propositions being "meaningful", compared to "if the logistic array of symbols were used, each proposition would not be meaningful." What does "meaningful" and "not meaningful" mean in this context? My google search results were way beyond my ability to comprehend. A simple explanation (if possible) is requested. The "bold" passages are the ones I don't understand. From Man, Economy and State, Scholar's ed., Appen. A, page 75: "The suggestion has been made that, since praxeology and economics are logical chains of reasoning based on a few universally known premises, to be really scientific it should be elaborated according to the symbolic notations of mathematical logic. This represents a curious misconception of the role of mathematical logic, or “logistics.” In the first place, it is the great quality of verbal propositions that each one is meaningful. On the other hand, algebraic and logical symbols, as used in logistics, are not in themselves meaningful. Praxeology asserts the action axiom as true, and from this (together with a few empirical axioms—such as the existence of a variety of resources and individuals) are deduced, by the rules of logical inference, all the propositions of economics, each one of which is verbal and meaningful. If the logistic array of symbols were used, each proposition would not be meaningful. Logistics, therefore, is far more suited to the physical sciences, where, in contrast to the science of human action, the conclusions rather than the axioms are known. In the physical sciences, the premises are only hypothetical, and logical deductions are made from them. In these cases, there is no purpose in having meaningful propositions at each step of the way, and therefore symbolic and mathematical language is more useful."
I do not understand what is meant by verbal propositions being "meaningful", compared to "if the logistic array of symbols were used, each proposition would not be meaningful." What does "meaningful" and "not meaningful" mean in this context? My google search results were way beyond my ability to comprehend. A simple explanation (if possible) is requested. The "bold" passages are the ones I don't understand.
From Man, Economy and State, Scholar's ed., Appen. A, page 75: "The suggestion has been made that, since praxeology and economics are logical chains of reasoning based on a few universally known premises, to be really scientific it should be elaborated according to the symbolic notations of mathematical logic. This represents a curious misconception of the role of mathematical logic, or “logistics.” In the first place, it is the great quality of verbal propositions that each one is meaningful. On the other hand, algebraic and logical symbols, as used in logistics, are not in themselves meaningful. Praxeology asserts the action axiom as true, and from this (together with a few empirical axioms—such as the existence of a variety of resources and individuals) are deduced, by the rules of logical inference, all the propositions of economics, each one of which is verbal and meaningful. If the logistic array of symbols were used, each proposition would not be meaningful. Logistics, therefore, is far more suited to the physical sciences, where, in contrast to the science of human action, the conclusions rather than the axioms are known. In the physical sciences, the premises are only hypothetical, and logical deductions are made from them. In these cases, there is no purpose in having meaningful propositions at each step of the way, and therefore symbolic and mathematical language is more useful."
"The market is a process." - Ludwig von Mises, as related by Israel Kirzner. "Capital formation is a beautiful thing" - Chloe732.
OK chloe, I was having some reading comprehension problems there with "logistics" simply meaning 'mathematical logic'. 3-4 hours of sleep will do that to me heh =)
I don't know how simple we can make an explanation of the whole thing, but maybe just the bolded isn't that bad. Note that I am not all that familiar with where Rothbard is getting these ideas from himself, but I will try to explain best I can from what I have read.
Let's start with the 2nd part:
Rothbard:On the other hand, algebraic and logical symbols, as used in logistics, are not in themselves meaningful.
This is from Donald Peterson's Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy: Three Sides of the Mirror p. 48:
Peterson:Wittgenstein's Grundgedanke or 'fundamental thought' is presented as an emphatic statement which appears in the midst of his discussion of the picture theory of meaning: (he cites the Tractatus at §4.0312) The possibility of sentences is based on the principle that objects have signs as their representatives. My fundamental thought is that the 'logical constants' are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts. That is: the logical constants—the connectives '∨', '&', ' ⊃ ' etc., the identity sign ' ＝ ', and the quantifiers '( )' and ' ∃ '—are not names of substantive objects in the world.
The possibility of sentences is based on the principle that objects have signs as their representatives. My fundamental thought is that the 'logical constants' are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts.
That is: the logical constants—the connectives '∨', '&', ' ⊃ ' etc., the identity sign ' ＝ ', and the quantifiers '( )' and ' ∃ '—are not names of substantive objects in the world.
＝
The rest of the chapter has a section contrasting Wittgenstein's view with Bertrand Russell's uncertainty at this point in time that these symbols (what Rothbard calls the "logistic array of symbols") are representational "logical objects". Then there are sections about the argument from equivalence, argument from brackets, argument from alternative notation, then 3 further (Ramsey's, from assimilation, and from logical priviledge).
I am not going to type much of that out now, but a couple examples should show what is meant.
Tractatus §5.254:An operation can vanish (for example, negation in '~~p' : ~~p = p).
ibid §5.44:And if there were an object called '~', it would follow that '~p' said something different from what 'p' said, just because the one sentence would then be about—and the other would not.
ibid §5.473:Logic must look after itself. If a sign is possible, then it is also capable of signifying. Whatever is possible in logic is also permitted. (The reason why 'Socrates is identical' means nothing is that there is no property called 'identical'. The proposition is nonsensical because we have failed to make an arbitrary determination, and not because the symbol, in itself, would be illegitimate.) In a certain sense, we cannot make mistakes in logic.
Rothbard:In the first place, it is the great quality of verbal propositions that each one is meaningful.
Rothbard's word choice here (great/verbal) seems a bit superfluous. What exactly is the problem with just accepting for now that a proposition has meaning? I wish that his Individualism and the Philosophy of the Social Sciences wasn't tied up in Cato's IP. It is short and some of the essays are available elsewhere.
(from p. 36)
The nature of the evidence on which the praxeological axiom rests is, moreover, fundamentally similar to that accepted by the self-proclaimed empiricists. To them, the laboratory experiment is evidence because the sensory experience involved in it is available to each observer; the experience becomes "evident" to all. Logical proof is in this sense similar; for the knowledge that B follows from A becomes evident to all who care to follow the demonstration. In teh same way, the fact of human action and of purposive choice also becomes evident to each person who bothers to contemplate it; it is just as evident as the direct sense experience of the laboratory.
From this philosophical perspective, then, all disciplines dealing with human beings — from philosophy to history, psychology, and the social sciences — must take as their starting point the fact that humans engage in motivated, purposive action and are thus different from the unmotivated atoms and stones that are the objects of the physical sciences. But where, then, does praxeology or economics differ from the other disciplines that treat human beings? The difference is that, to the praxeologist, economic theory (as distinct from applied economics, which will be treated below) deals, not with the content of human valuations, motivations, and choices, but with the formal fact that people engage in such motivated action. Other disciplines focus on the content of these values and actions. Thus psychology asks how and why people adopt values and actions; ethics deals with the problem of what values and choices they should adopt; technology explains how they should act in order to arrive at chosen ends; and history tries to explain the content of human motives and choices through recorded time. Of these disciplines, history is perhaps the most purely verstehende, for the historian is constantly attempting to describe, understand, and explain the motivations and choices of individual actors. Economic theory, on the other hand, is the least verstehende, for while it too begins with the axiom of purposive and intentional human action, the remainder of its elaborated structure consists of the deduced logical—and therefore true—implications of that primordial fact.
An example of the formal structure of economic theory is the well-known economic law, built up from the axiom of the existence of motivated human action, that if the demand for any product increases, given the existing supply, the price of that product will rise. This law holds regardless of the ethical or aesthetic status of the product, just as the law of gravity applies to objects regardless of their particular identity. The economic theorist is not interested in the content of what is being demanded, or in its ethical meaning—it may be guns or butter or even textbooks on philosophy. It is this universal, formal nature of economic law that has earned it among laymen the reputation of being cold, heartless, and excessively logical.
Having discussed the nature of the axiom on which the praxeological view of economics is grounded, we may now turn to examine the deductive process itself, the way in which the structure of economic laws is developed, the nature of those laws, and, finally, the ways in which the praxeological economist applies these economic laws to the social world.
One of the basic tools for the deduction of the logical implications of the axiom of human action is the use of the Gedankenexperiment, or "mental experiment". The Gedankenexperiment is the economic theorist's controlled laboratory experiment. Since the relevant variables of the social world cannot actually be held constant, the economist holds them constant in his imagination. Using the tool of verbal logic, he mentally investigates the causal influence of one variable on another. The economist finds, for example, that the price of a product is determined by two variables, the demand for it and the supply at any given time. He then mentally holds the supply constant, and finds that and increase in demand—brought about by higher rankings of the product on the value scales of the public—will bring about an increase in price. Similarly, he finds, again using verbal deductive logic, that if these value scales, and therefore public demand, are mentally held constant, and the supply of the product increases, its price will fall. In short, economics arrives at ceteris paribus laws: Given the supply, the price will change in the same direction as demand; given the demand, price will change in the opposite direction from supply.
One important aspect of these economic laws must be pointed out: They are necessarily qualitative. The fact that human beings have goals and preferences, that they make choices to attain their goals, that all action must take place over time, all these are qualitative axioms. And since only the qualitative enters into the logical process from the real world, only the qualitative can emerge. One can say, for example, than an increase in demand, given the supply, will raise the price; one cannot say that a 20 percent increase in demand will bring about a 25 percent increase in price. The praxeologist must reject all attempts, no matter how fashionable, to erect a theory consisting of alleged qualitative laws. In an age that tries desperately to imitate prestigious physics, with its emphasis on mathematics and its quantitative laws, many social scientists, including many economists, have ignored this methodology because of this very insistence on the bounds of the discipline.
I hope this clears up a couple parts for you. Does he mean 'qualitative' by "verbal and meaningful"? Tell me what is still confusing you and I will try to help.
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
scineram:I wonder why does that make formal logic unsuitable for praxeology. Why would the statements be meaningless? It only uses the language you want it to. I think he maybe misunderstood formalization.
Adam Knott:Good point !
Scineram, Adam: Can you explain what you mean by "formal logic"? Do you mean what is described here? Rothbard refers to "mathematical logic", "logistics" and "logical symbols"; is this different from what you are refering to above by "formal logic"?
I don't think it's different. But logistics is a completely unrelated something.
I've been thinking about this. I know explanations have already been given in the thread and I agree with them, but I don't believe this has been explained in the following manner:
Meaningful implies value. Mathematical or symbolic logic doesn't explain value, anybody correct me if I'm wrong. Therefore the difference is as explained by ordinal and cardinal. Human action is ordinal not cardinal and cardinal is mathematical/symbolic logic. Thus symbolic logic doesn't explain value or in other words, doesn't explain human action. To leave out meaning(ful) or value and still try to explain human action is nonsensical. Human action is implicitly predicated by value. That's why symbolic logic isn't meaningful. It doesn't explain the basic underlying deductions of human action, which is value.
well formal logic notation can be applied to ordinal schemes, but I just think, wahts the point. truly the onus is on those who feel that there are benefits to translating the informal logical arguments into formal logical arguments to do it and to start reaping the benefits. I won't object to efforts to translate economic understanding into a 'formal' form, so long as those that would formalize won't object to be held to account if their 'translations' fall short
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Good points Wilderness.
"Mathematical or symbolic logic doesn't explain value,..."
Or even: To the extent that such schemes do not incorporate the concept of value, then to this extent do they not incorporate the (or a) fundamental concept of human action (purpose, intentionality, etc.).
Maybe not necessarily that they cannot, but simply if they do not, then they don't conceive human action, human purpose, human intentionality, but instead, something else....
I agree with Nir too.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
There are several books on methodology that I should read to get to the bottom of this. However, after reading everyone's replies, I would like to attempt to boil it down this way (a certain theme is repeated for clarity): Rothbard points out the difference between human action, of which we do know the underlying cause (motivated man), and the rest of nature, of which we cannot know the underlying cause, because nature (the universe) is unmotivated. In nature, we only see "facts", perhaps Rothbard means "effects" (?). For example, given we can only see the "effect" of gravity, then Fg = Gm1m2/r^2 is the appropriate use of symbology to explain the effect we are seeing. Regarding Rothbard's use of the term "meaningless", what meaning does the above equation have without reference to gravity itself? It has "operational meaning", but not meaning within itself. And, as Rothbard explains, a mathematical expression will be modified upon receipt of additional empirical information, such as the discovery of general relativity for example, which requires a new set of symbols to explain more generally the effects we are seeing. We can never know the underlying causes in nature, only the effects. We can only refine our explanation of these effects, with increasing precision, but we can never get to the cause, because, nature is unmotivated. Think about the mainstream approach, and their attempt to treat human action like "natural" phenomenon; they are constantly using empirical data to compare to their equations, and their equations will be revised if needed to determine a more "general" equation. The cause (human action) is right in front of them but they choose to ignore the implications of this. It is inappropriate to use mathematical logic in praxeology to describe human action because, for example, the statement "humans act" contains Rothbard's "meaning" within itself. Reducing this to a mathematical form could be done, but I believe Rothbard is saying it would be pointless to do so since the statement has already been reduced to its most elemental form (Occam's Razor comes into play) and the statement of "verbal logic" describes the cause itself with absolute certainty. In other words, when we say "humans act", we are done. In the study of human action, there is no more precision to be gained that can get us closer to the “cause” or "root" of the matter, as general relativity did with Newton’s Fg=Gm1m2/r^2. And today, quantum physics tries to unify the “very large” (general relativity) with the “very small” (the quantum), i.e., they are trying to come up with a more “general” theory to explain the “effects” observed in the universe. Mathematical methodology is superior for this type of analysis, but they will never get to the cause, for the reasons explained above. My "boiled down" explanation was longer than I intended, but it did help me get these ideas out of my mind and into written form. Thanks for your patience.
There are several books on methodology that I should read to get to the bottom of this. However, after reading everyone's replies, I would like to attempt to boil it down this way (a certain theme is repeated for clarity):
Rothbard points out the difference between human action, of which we do know the underlying cause (motivated man), and the rest of nature, of which we cannot know the underlying cause, because nature (the universe) is unmotivated.
In nature, we only see "facts", perhaps Rothbard means "effects" (?). For example, given we can only see the "effect" of gravity, then Fg = Gm1m2/r^2 is the appropriate use of symbology to explain the effect we are seeing. Regarding Rothbard's use of the term "meaningless", what meaning does the above equation have without reference to gravity itself? It has "operational meaning", but not meaning within itself.
And, as Rothbard explains, a mathematical expression will be modified upon receipt of additional empirical information, such as the discovery of general relativity for example, which requires a new set of symbols to explain more generally the effects we are seeing. We can never know the underlying causes in nature, only the effects. We can only refine our explanation of these effects, with increasing precision, but we can never get to the cause, because, nature is unmotivated. Think about the mainstream approach, and their attempt to treat human action like "natural" phenomenon; they are constantly using empirical data to compare to their equations, and their equations will be revised if needed to determine a more "general" equation. The cause (human action) is right in front of them but they choose to ignore the implications of this.
It is inappropriate to use mathematical logic in praxeology to describe human action because, for example, the statement "humans act" contains Rothbard's "meaning" within itself. Reducing this to a mathematical form could be done, but I believe Rothbard is saying it would be pointless to do so since the statement has already been reduced to its most elemental form (Occam's Razor comes into play) and the statement of "verbal logic" describes the cause itself with absolute certainty. In other words, when we say "humans act", we are done. In the study of human action, there is no more precision to be gained that can get us closer to the “cause” or "root" of the matter, as general relativity did with Newton’s Fg=Gm1m2/r^2.
And today, quantum physics tries to unify the “very large” (general relativity) with the “very small” (the quantum), i.e., they are trying to come up with a more “general” theory to explain the “effects” observed in the universe. Mathematical methodology is superior for this type of analysis, but they will never get to the cause, for the reasons explained above.
My "boiled down" explanation was longer than I intended, but it did help me get these ideas out of my mind and into written form. Thanks for your patience.
Adam Knott:Maybe not necessarily that they cannot, but simply if they do not, then they don't conceive human action, human purpose, human intentionality, but instead, something else....
Yes, I believe you are correct. Not necessarily that they cannot (the confusion of a double-negative), as I said in my first post in this thread it possibly can happen; but I don't know about the technicals of symbolic logic to do it myself. But Jon pointed out earlier in the thread that he has taken a class on logic in which I assume he has practiced the technicals and he states it is possible but would be very complicated.
wilderness:Meaningful implies value.
Why? What do you mean?
wilderness:Human action is ordinal not cardinal
No. The world is cardinal, and you act in it.
wilderness:cardinal is mathematical/symbolic logic.
No.
Then please give me the cardinal units by which action is motivated, that'd allow you to say in terms of what I prefer chocolate to vanilla 3.9030878x more.
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
Have you never compared prices between stores? Mileage between cars?
scineram:Have you never compared prices between stores? Mileage between cars?