Long Post: law of thought and law of reality

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wilderness Posted: Wed, Mar 24 2010 6:26 PM

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Might be considered an extremely long post, but it is a debate by scholars, seemingly, over a very curious idea that has to do with Aristotle, Kant, Menger, Mises, Rothbard, and Hoppe to name some.

I've been coming across a point of contention between not only Kant and Aristotle but then those influenced by either one.  Kant being labeled as more mental in practice whereas Aristotle was moderate in application in his works.  For one, it's why Mises would consider himself, and I believe Hoppe as well, Neo-Kantian.  These two use Kantian terminology (eg. synthetic aprior) but don't apply the concepts the same way that Kant did.  It makes Mises and Hoppe more moderate in this sense.  When I say moderate I mean more reflective instead of impositional.  Their thoughts are reflecting reality instead of imposing their thoughts on reality.  It's a big deal for any scientist to not impose their thoughts on reality, in other words, to be a realist and know what reality is, instead of imposing on reality from a personal bias and prejudice.  Yet this is were the contention exists.  Was Mises being impositional and not reflectionist at times?  This of course wouldn't do anything to the general writings and thoughts of Mises.  In general this might be considered nit-picking.  But there are also some very practical implications especially for the readers of Mises or any other person the reader - reads.  In economics, as in any science, there is usually a background noise called philosophy that is undeniably influencing the outcome of the science.  It is necessary to consider this when dealing with interpretations, knowledge, and thus theories.  For instance, consider this as well, Aristotle being the influence he was on coming up with defining what science is to begin with, Aristotle still imposed his thoughts on reality.  There's definitely objectional stances that Aristotle held that we would not as a whole dare to hold anymore.  It's usually time and scientists over time, that weed out bias from reality.

Here's where it all began for me:

I read this and it seems to be another point of contention that develops out what I said above and the whole picture should develop by the end of this post.  At least that's my goal.  It began with this quote by Rothbard that made me curious (from 1956):

Rothbard:

"Whether we consider the Action Axiom “a priori” or “empirical” depends on our ultimate philosophical position. Professor Mises, in the neo-Kantian tradition, considers this axiom a law of thought and therefore a categorical truth a priori to all experience. My own epistemological position rests on Aristotle and St. Thomas rather than Kant, and hence I would interpret the proposition differently. I would consider the axiom a law of reality rather than a law of thought, and hence “empirical” rather than “a priori.” But it should be obvious that this type of “empiricism” is so out of step with modern empiricism that I may just as well continue to call it a priori for present purposes. For (1) it is a law of reality that is not conceivably falsifiable, and yet is empirically meaningful and true; (2) it rests on universal inner experience, and not simply on external experience, that is, its evidence is reflective rather than physical; and (3) it is clearly a priori to complex historical events."

Now it says here that Mises considered his interpretation of human action a law of thought.  I haven't found anything, and I'll say this upfront, to corroborate that Mises actually considered this.  Rothbard delineates his interpretation of human action as a law of reality.  The question is, is this truth, even if Mises didn't consider it or even if he did.  I go to the next article that discusses this very subject by Gennady Stolyarov II in which he is discussing another article by Younkin's that takes up this debate.  This article by Stolyarov is from 2007:

Stolyarov II:

"Academicians like Professor Younkins and other examiners of Austrian economics like Mr. Drum did not form their ideas on the apparent dichotomy between the Misesian-Hoppeian position and the Rothbardian one arbitrarily. Both have read the writers in question extensively and have tried to represent their views as accurately as possible. Yet both have also succumbed to the “law of reality”/“law of thought” dichotomy posited by Rothbard. This is a dichotomy Rothbard himself wrote about to counter orthodox Kantian idealism—which indeed considers there to exist “laws of thought” independent of reality and imposed by the mind thereon....

Professor Younkins’s intentions here are noble, and I agree with him that praxeology is fundamentally consistent with Aristotelian metaphysics and epistemology.  By implication, I also accept as valid and valuable Younkins’s characterization of Rothbard’s view of the action axiom as a “law of reality.” Yet Younkins errs in positing a dichotomy between a “law of reality” and a “law of thought” or a “law of the mind”—an unfortunate dichotomy that presumes that “laws of thought” are outside reality itself and hence do not really exist.  Unfortunately, Rothbard’s own writings may have been responsible for instilling the view that his own ideas on the action axiom fundamentally clashed with those of Mises and Hoppe."

Stolyarov went on in that journal article to show from Mises writings and Hoppe's writings that there interpretation of human action is not detached from any law of reality and that there is no dichotomy (law of thought/law of reality) that Rothbard had put forth.

Yet it doesn't end with this.  Other philosopher-economists of the Austrian tradition have also picked up on this debate.  I'll say now, I don't know if the debate is over, meaning, I don't know if one side or the other have discovered anything that makes this go away.  And here's some others that have contributed and I'll start with a quote from Professor Younkin's (unfortunately no date given with the article and it states it is a work in progress):

Younkin:

"Unlike Menger, the father of Austrian economics, Mises did not believe the essential defining qualities or essences existed in individual phenomena that made possible their recognition as representatives of that type. If he had held to the notion that there are certain ontological, a priori, and intelligible structures in the world, then he may have considered the law of human action to be a law of reality rather than a law of thought. An a priori in reality would not be the result of any forming or shaping of reality on the part of the experiencing subject. Rather, essences or universals would then be said to be discerned through a person’s theoretical efforts.

"In a larger sense, values as depicted by Menger are not subjective (i.e., arbitrary) nor inherent but are objective. Unfortunately, because the label, objective value theory, had already been attached to the labor theory of value, Menger’s new value theory was eventually accorded the mistaken label of subjective value theory. Menger’s theory explains the inextricable ontological connection between the realm of cognition and the sphere of objective causal processes that results from valuation and economizing. Value is a judgment made by economizing individuals regarding the importance of things for maintaining their lives andadvancing their well-being. A person’s judgment of value can be said to have been objectively made when it derives from knowledge based on the facts of the reality and on reasoning in accordance with the laws of logic."

Younkins' throughout the article discusses Menger and spends extensive time on how some of Menger's ideas were not picked up by Mises.  Philosopher's and Austrian economists currently are trying to pick up those pieces that for some reason, I have my hunches, Mises didn't incorporate.  To put it simply it is due to the lack of Aristotle in Mises life.  I already contend that Mises doesn't correctly define natural law according to the traditional use and Mises when he argues against it, he only argues against the form Hobbes drew up.  Hobbes is no natural theorist in the traditional use of the terms.  And there's good reason supported by history given by Barry Smith and Heinrich Rommen that makes this very likely.  First, and then I'll get to Rommen, here's Barry Smith talking about it directly (article form 1990):

Smith:

"Now as anyone who has worked through the writings of Menger's Austrian philosophical contemporaries very soon becomes aware, the tacit intellectual background of educated Austrians in Menger's day and beyond was Aristotelian through and through to such an extent that Menger himself might have felt the need to draw attention to this background only when attempting to explain his ideas to those, such as Walras, or his own son Karl Jr., who did not share it. Menger is otherwise relatively silent as far as methodological self-interpretation is concerned, at least in the sense that he does not ally himself explicitly for example with the Aristotelian camp.   Problems arise, however, when we consider the writings of those of Menger's Austrian contemporaries and successors including Mises, Hayek, as well as Karl Jr. who have sought self-interpretations of Menger at one remove. Such Austrian Austrians are, I want to suggest, least likely to enjoy a conscious awareness of the essence of Austrian economic thinking. Their interpretations of Menger will tend to pick out what is quirky, or especially modern, in Menger at the expense of the shared and therefore for practical purposes invisible background that holds his work together. And this background is, as cannot be too often stress, Aristotelian..."

And here's Heinrich Rommen coming at the contention of natural law and how the Third Reich falsely used it (much like today's healthcare reform being called a right).  But the Third Reich would have only been going along with what Thomas Hobbes and Spinoza had done some time before when each of these three entities redefined the term to suit their needs.  In 1936 here's Rommen coming at a slightly oblique angle on this:

Rommen:

"Thus Hobbes altered the meaning of the words “nature” and “natural,” a process that characterizes the entire period of modern philosophy from the time of Descartes.  “Nature” and “natural” become the opposite of civitas, “reason,” and “order.” In the philosophy of Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza (1632–77) human nature is at bottom governed by the passions and not by reason. The status naturalis is a condition without any obligation or duty. It is a state in which, as Spinoza repeatedly asserts, might is right....

[take note that Hobbes altering such terms to the opposite of, means, that nature and natural mean "reason" and "order" and as the book and other sources, including Aristotle, Aquinas, etc... explain, nature simply means reality and the scientist discovers reality or the nature of things.]

Rommen:

“Nature” no longer refers to the rational nature of each individual man or to man’s endowments of intellect and free will, on which rest the dignity, liberty, and initiative of the individual person;  nor does it refer to the universal order of being and oughtness, to the transcendent reality of reason. On the contrary, nature is transformed into an altogether materialistic concept. It is viewed as the blood, the hereditary biological mass of animal nature, deprived of its personalist and spiritual values. Thus metamorphosed, the law of nature has but one principle: Right is what profits the German folkcommunity— just as a deformed proletarian natural law would yield the single principle: Right is what profits the proletariat. This vicious alteration of the meaning of the terms “nature” and “natural” makes it possible for Huber on one page to abuse the venerable terms in the interest of the blood-and-race ideology and on another to maintain that “there are no personal liberties of the individual which fall outside the realm of the state and which must be respected by the state. … The constitution of the Reich is not based upon a system of inborn and inalienable rights of the individual."

In light of Germany, and perhaps Austria when Mises was there as socialism was abundant throughout that region, the ideas of Hobbes were as Mises defines natural law in Hobbesian terms, and don't forget socialism was so prevalent that Mises was a socialist before a free marketer.  The state was the last justifier for everything which is completely Hobbes.  This above quote is an inference of the natural law meaning to the people of that region "might makes right" as Spinoza put it, anyways it's in that quote.  But this is not natural law in the traditional sense.  It simply means reality.  It is delineated by supernatural for a reason as natural law doesn't necessarily have to do with divine works but is rather discovered, reflectively, by reason.

Here's Mises on natural law in Human Action:

Mises:

"There is, however, no such thing as a perennial standard of what is just and what is unjust. Nature is alien to the idea of right and wrong. "Thou shalt not kill" is certainly not part of natural law. The characteristic feature of natural conditions is that one animal is intent upon killing other animals and that many species cannot preserve their own life except by killing others....

From the notion of natural law some people deduce the justice of the institution of private property in the means of production. Other people resort to natural law for the justification of the abolition of private property in the means of production. As the idea of natural law is quite arbitrary, such discussions are not open to settlement."

That's clearly natural law that he hijacks, Hobbes does, as the tradition of natural law was in play thousands of years before Hobbes but being the absolute statist Hobbes was of course the notoriety by gov'ts during Hobbes time and since attached natural law under their arbitrary functions.  Of course not in all circles as the Late Scholastics are one example of being able to sustain the true meaning of natural law.  It's an old strawman and unfortunately Mises, without knowing, fell for it and then strawman's natural law all over again.  I say without knowing because what I've been finding and I've quoted some here, is that Mises was not in contact with Aristotle as much as Mises was with Kant.  Carl Menger was very much in contact with Aristotle and his economics shows it.  Not that Mises doesn't use Aristotelian thinking.  He does because he was influenced by Menger.  Now the issue of natural law isn't strictly of economics.  The Aristotelian thinking though correlates in this type of outcome.  Note this that Mises also writes in his book Liberalism:

Mises:

The program of liberalism, therefore, if condensed into a single word, would have to read: property, that is, private ownership of the means of production (for in regard to commodities ready for consumption, private ownership is a matter of course and is not disputed even by the socialists and communists). All the other demands of liberalism result from this fundamental demand.  Side by side with the word "property" in the program of liberalism one may quite appropriately place the words "freedom" and "peace....

As the liberal sees it, the task of the state consists solely and exclusively in guaranteeing the protection of life, health, liberty, and private property against violent attacks. Everything that goes beyond this is an evil. A government that, instead of fulfilling its task, sought to go so far as actually to infringe on personal security of life and health, freedom, and property would, of course, be altogether bad."

Mises isn't logically contradicting himself with these quotes from Human Action and Liberalism.  In the first, as I've pointed out, that isn't the Aristotle, Thomist-natural law.  It was Hobbes which by default isn't traditional natural law.  Mises saying the protection of life, health, liberty, and private property is straight out of John Locke's works on natural law.  These are natural rights.  It is best to know the meaning behind the use of concepts to get a better intellectual grasp of what any person, such as the economist and political writer Mises, in order to make light what he really said.  In other words, what he advocated a liberal should practice, which is to protect natural rights, ie. which is a specie of the natural law of human nature.

Here are more articles that point out Menger's Aristotelian approach.  Maki does a fine job in explaining Menger's Aristotelian thinking which is also called realism:

Universal and the Methodenstreit:  A Re-examination of Carl Menger's Concepts of Economics as an Exact Science by Uskali Maki

The Philosophical Origins of Austrian Economics by David Gordon

And since I brought up realism here's a link to a good explanation but this aspect was only accidental to the general post:  Scientific realism and ontology by Uskali Maki

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From what I've read so far there is general agreement, actually not one of the sources I've come across, differ on the point that Mises was not directly influenced by Aristotle.  He was accidentally influenced as Carl Menger is the foundation of the Austrian School and he was directly influenced by Aristotle.  Of course there could be more to this, this post is in no way to be taken as any kind of final authority on the subject.  The other discontention is how much was Mises able to differ from Kant's more mental inclination, in other words, taking an imposition approach rather than a reflective approach on how knowledge is apprehended out of reality.

As Barry Smith points out from his article I linked above:

Smith:

"The impositionist view finds its classical expression in the work of Kant (whose ideas may be safe against the argument just presented), and special versions of impositionism are to be found also in Hume (in his treatment of causality), in Mach (in his theory of thought economy), and in the work of the logical positivists. The reflectionist view, on the other hand, finds its classical expression in Aristotle; it was developed further by successive waves of scholastics extending far into the modern era, and brought to perfection by Brentano and his successors, above all by Adolf Reinach and other realist phenomenologists in the early years of this century, the latter building on ideas set out by Husserl in his Logical Investigations.

Still greater confusion has arisen, however, as a result of the no less pervasive assumption that all talk of the a priori must of necessity imply an impositionist or Kantian framework. For the apriorism lying in the background of Menger's thinking is quite clearly reflectionist. Menger believes that there are a priori categories (`essences' or `natures') in reality and that a priori propositions reflect structures or connections among such essences existing autonomously in the sense that they are not the result of any shaping or forming of reality on the part of the experiencing subject. The impositionist apriorist, in contrast, insists that a priori categories must be creatures of the mind. He, therefore, may hold that the issue as to which sorts of economic structures exist is a matter for more or less arbitrary legislation by the economic theorist, or a matter of the `conceptual spectacles' of the economic agent. No grain of such ideas is to be found in Menger.

That the author of Human Action sees his methodology primarily in terms recalling Kantian doctrines is seen, for example, in passages such as: `The a priori sciences logic, mathematics, and praxeology aim at a knowledge unconditionally valid for all beings endowed with the logical structure of the human mind' (Mises 1966, p. 57).

We know now that there is an Aristotelian alternative to the Kantian form of apriorism. This alternative seems not to have been explicitly recognized as such by Mises; but this is hardly surprising, given that, for reasons pointed out above, the special nature of Austrian Aristotelian apriorism was appreciated by very few at the time when Mises was working out the philosophical foundations of his praxeology.

Thus while impositionism is not explicitly defended by Mises qua methodologist, he does insist on the analytic character of all a priori propositions. The methodology which results is thereby rendered inconsistent with a reflectionist apriorism, since it implies that a priori propositions are empty of content, and clearly propositions that are empty of content are unable to picture anything (intelligible) on the side of the objects of the corresponding theory.

[But then here's Smith on pointing out that Mises, unknowing to him, still applied Aristotelian thinking]

Smith:

"When once we examine Mises' practice, however, then a quite different picture emerges, and we discover that Mises, too, was not at his best in his methodological self-interpretations. For we are forced to recognize that there is a veritable plenitude of non-logical primitive concepts at the root of praxeology. Indeed, Mises' descriptions of this plenitude in his actual practice in economics, and also in occasional passages in his methodological writings, can be seen to represent what is almost certainly the most sustained realization of the Aristotelian idea in the literature of economic theory.

Action, we are told by Mises, involves apprehension of causal relations and of regularities in the phenomena. It presupposes being in a position to influence causal relations. It presupposes felt uneasiness. It involves the exercise of reason. It is a striving to substitute a more satisfactory for a less satisfactory state of affairs."

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In conclusion, this post can't be a final authority on the subject.  I don't think the debate is actual over.  And from appearance it depends on what philosophy the reader of Mises may be inclined to read Mises as.  To simply go with Mises and reject natural law would strawman the whole tradition of natural law in accord with Arisototle, Aquinas, and by subsequent philosopher-economists such as Rothbard and Hoppe, etc....  It will only replace effective communication with ineffective communication.  Secondly, Mises use of Kantian terms doesn't mean Mises was exclusively Kantian.  Mises called himself, I believe, a Neo-Kantian and so does Hoppe.  But at times, Barry Smith and Younkins point out, Mises in his language of his writings, such as what I quoted above, Mises states human action is:  logical structure of the human mind'.  This teeters the intellectual to wonder how much of Kant was getting into Mises' writings.  Not the Neo-Kantian, but true Kantian.

Yet, Stolyarov and Smith point out that Mises at other times observed the fact that how else could human action exist if not in reality.  What seems more important to consider through all of this is Mises, though indirectly influenced by Aristotle via Carl Menger, was Aristotelian at times and at other times he wasn't.  Menger is undeniably Aristotelian.  Mises, from what I gather, is quasi-Aristotelian.  And with the Kant influence it makes it appear that Mises is being more impositional rather than Aristotelian reflectivist.  I say appear, to use Barry Smith's terminology, for where Mises isn't explicitly Aristotlelian due to the use of Kantian language, the underlying meaning, at times, is Aristotelian.  Though, at other times, as I also quoted above, Mises perplexes even the intellectuals in their determinate if some Kantian did manage to smuggle itself in.

What is this post overall?  Food for thought to not jump the gun on what Menger, Mises, Rothbard, Hoppe, or any of these economist put forth in their writings.  There is definitely a lot of thought being put into their writings to provide clarity.  It's necessary because theory is what provides perspective to what any individual gathers from these economist writings.  For example, if a reader were to think in Kantian terms they may read Hoppe and Mises in terms of Kant.  Yet both of these economist broke from Kant in part, and thought-think of themselves of Neo-Kantian.  Rothbard being Aristotelian and Thomist in tradition didn't even like the word aprior as he thought even the term was too Kant.  Rothbard thought this might subject his writings/philosophy to be interpreted as more of a mental activity rather than what Rothbard considered himself which was extreme-empiricist.  But obvously, as he writes, even the term empiricist is thought of in terms of logical positivism which is obviously not what Rothbard meant either.  So he said he settled on aprior, but then came up with that statement that I quoted at the beginning of this post in which he called Mises interpretation a law of thought and his a law of reality.  Was Rothbard right?  I don't know.

What I do know is Mises wasn't always Aristotelian, which may make some of his writings become interpreted in ways that are a law of thought at times (Kant-impositional) rather than a law of reality (Aristotelian-reflectionist).  As I said in the beginning of this post, this does NOT mean that Mises writings are all laws of thought.  Mises interpreted reality, and it's still up for debate I believe. This might be about the language as Smith who has studied Husserl and others made a point that in language Mises was Kantian at times, but in actual practice he was Aristotelian.  So it's about getting to the meaning, and not getting hung up on the names (terms) that people are using.  Mises used Kant terms, but not always in the way Kant would have used them.  Did Mises use the terms in impositional ways, thus, was he at times (not all of the time) interpreting human action as a law of thought instead of an Aristotelian law of reality?  I don't think I'm qualified to say. 

And I don't even know if it is significant seeing that there is a good show on both sides presenting their findings.  What is clear is that Mises didn't always go about in Aristotelian ways.  So I leave this post open-ended.  It was a post of consideration as it would be inappropriate at this time for me to decide either way.  I don't even know if the scholars that study this more in-depth than I have, have been able to shift through it all yet.  It seems that they haven't.

There's definitely a lot to consider in light of everything that I've laid out in this post.  This is a cautious reminder of any students of Mises, Menger, Rothbard, and Hoppe, etc... that what they wrote will still need to pass the scrutiny of other philosophers and economists to see if it was in practice something that can be considered real.

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E. R. Olovetto replied on Wed, Mar 24 2010 8:45 PM

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Thanks for posting this, just thought I'd give you a bump for now.

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wilderness replied on Thu, Mar 25 2010 1:52 PM

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E. R. Olovetto:

Thanks for posting this, just thought I'd give you a bump for now.

You're welcome, and thank you.

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filc replied on Fri, Mar 26 2010 5:45 PM

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, there is alot of information here that I had not even really thought about. Thanks Wilderness, excellent post.Sheesh

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z1235 replied on Fri, Mar 26 2010 9:34 PM

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The only reality I can ever know is the one residing in my thoughts. The only thoughts I can ever have are the ones residing in reality. Thoughts are real, and reality (or whatever we perceive of it) is thoughts. 

Z.

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wilderness replied on Sat, Mar 27 2010 9:02 AM

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filc:

, there is alot of information here that I had not even really thought about. Thanks Wilderness, excellent post.Sheesh

It is very interesting.  I'm glad I read Maki's article (also linked in OP) that re-examines Carl Menger's economic terms before I read any of Menger's works.  Terms such as real types and exact science now understood in its Aristotelian approach will probably make the readings that much more easy, have the depth of knowledge that Menger intended, and I'll be able to understand those terms aren't necessarily identifiers of a reality that Carl simply made up in a vacuum.  I think he may have come up with the terms but what they represent and how they are used is Aristotelian.  So it's not a whole new philosophy starting from complete scratch.  If I didn't read that article first, it may have made his writings seem a bit philosophically foreign, 'old fashion terminologically', and/or disconnected without any context to the larger sphere of economics and philosophy that Menger was apart of.

What I also found interesting is that those philosophers, historians, and economists that I linked in the OP are each in an effort to maintain the original intent of the subjects writings.  To make sure culture doesn't swallow up and make disappear the truth-value in any of those writings.  If nobody did, then they would get lost and the depth of truth-value in the writings would only become the ever the more vague in time to the point that only a re-discovery could salvage the depth of their thought.

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wilderness replied on Sat, Mar 27 2010 8:19 PM

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z1235:

The only reality I can ever know is the one residing in my thoughts. The only thoughts I can ever have are the ones residing in reality. Thoughts are real, and reality (or whatever we perceive of it) is thoughts.

I think there is empirical data.  And human action isn't strictly a thought.  It is a "lived experience".

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Jeremiah Dyke replied on Sat, Mar 27 2010 8:20 PM

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This is great!

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Justin Spahr-Summers replied on Sat, Mar 27 2010 9:46 PM

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This is a lot to process, but it's very interesting. Of note is also that one of Rand's criticisms of Mises (whom she respected a great deal) was his use of a priori knowledge, Rand being rather empiricist herself—although not in the sense that pseudo-economists use the word. Rothbard's brief entanglement with Objectivism highlights their similar philosophical basis as well.

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z1235 replied on Sun, Mar 28 2010 10:05 AM

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wilderness:

z1235:

The only reality I can ever know is the one residing in my thoughts. The only thoughts I can ever have are the ones residing in reality. Thoughts are real, and reality (or whatever we perceive of it) is thoughts.

I think there is empirical data.  And human action isn't strictly a thought.  It is a "lived experience".

Or, so you think. Any a priori (law of thought) starts with self-evident axioms. Where is this evidence collected if not from maps of reality residing in our thoughts?

Z.

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wilderness replied on Sun, Mar 28 2010 1:12 PM

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z1235:

wilderness:

z1235:

The only reality I can ever know is the one residing in my thoughts. The only thoughts I can ever have are the ones residing in reality. Thoughts are real, and reality (or whatever we perceive of it) is thoughts.

I think there is empirical data.  And human action isn't strictly a thought.  It is a "lived experience".

Or, so you think.

sure, but not strictly think.  I walk.  The walking is not the act of thinking.

z1235:

Any a priori (law of thought) starts with self-evident axioms. Where is this evidence collected if not from maps of reality residing in our thoughts?

another piece of evidence is breathing.  Breathing is not a thought.  It may involve thought, but breathing is the biological process that involves lungs and a mouth. 

The reason the axiom is self-evident and not a verbal or worded proposition and neither is it a logical deduction, is due to the act (human action) not being able to be formulated into a subject, predicate, or class without act happening prior to propositional formulation and subsequent logical deductions. 

Propositions, which differ from axioms by class, are prior to words.  Axioms are also prior to words.  Logical deductions are prior to words.  The names, ie. words, simply label the axioms, propositions, and logical deductions.  Writing, thinking, and/or verbalizing axioms, propositions, and logical deductions, at times, make it easier to analogize. 

The human acting is the founding act of being able to self-reflect and formulate words upon there being such thing as an act to begin with.

I don't know if you are saying there is a difference between word and thought.  I am.

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wilderness replied on Sun, Mar 28 2010 7:38 PM

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Jeremiah Dyke:

This is great!

thanks

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wilderness replied on Mon, Mar 29 2010 9:01 AM

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I thought this blog provided an interesting thought that has to do with the OP in this thread.  The blog was pasted in this thread earlier today.

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wilderness replied on Mon, Mar 29 2010 9:04 AM

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Justin Spahr-Summers:

This is a lot to process, but it's very interesting.

Yes.  There is a lot to process.  There's more to this, I think, than I've yet to find out.

Justin Spahr-Summers:

Of note is also that one of Rand's criticisms of Mises (whom she respected a great deal) was his use of a priori knowledge, Rand being rather empiricist herself—although not in the sense that pseudo-economists use the word. Rothbard's brief entanglement with Objectivism highlights their similar philosophical basis as well.

Do you have more on this?  A link perhaps?

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CrazyCoot replied on Mon, Mar 29 2010 10:49 AM

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Hobbes' ideas should be addressed more by libertarians; especially of the ancap, voluntaryist etc kind.  People, whether they've read him or not, still tend to bring up at least a bastardized version of his ideas when arguing against a stateless society.

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Justin Spahr-Summers replied on Mon, Mar 29 2010 9:14 PM

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wilderness:

Justin Spahr-Summers:

Of note is also that one of Rand's criticisms of Mises (whom she respected a great deal) was his use of a priori knowledge, Rand being rather empiricist herself—although not in the sense that pseudo-economists use the word. Rothbard's brief entanglement with Objectivism highlights their similar philosophical basis as well.

Do you have more on this?  A link perhaps?

I unfortunately don't... it's just kind of aggregated knowledge from Ayn Rand's Marginalia and Goddess of the Market (which is an excellent read, by the way). Excerpts might be available around the 'net somewhere.

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wilderness replied on Tue, Mar 30 2010 7:10 AM

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CrazyCoot:

Hobbes' ideas should be addressed more by libertarians; especially of the ancap, voluntaryist etc kind.  People, whether they've read him or not, still tend to bring up at least a bastardized version of his ideas when arguing against a stateless society.

I admit I haven't read Hobbes' ideas.  I always figured if I get qualitatively solid enough in my theorizing, then I would pick up some of the works that, at least for now, disagree with.  This way I can critique them better.  I have read some excerpts and paraphrasing of his works in other writings.

Could you provide one example of a usual "bastardized version"?  I'm curious.

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wilderness replied on Tue, Mar 30 2010 7:23 AM

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Justin Spahr-Summers:

I unfortunately don't... it's just kind of aggregated knowledge from Ayn Rand's Marginalia and Goddess of the Market (which is an excellent read, by the way). Excerpts might be available around the 'net somewhere.

I don't know if you saw this post.  The OP linked here brought up something similar to what this thread is about.  The OP linked to a forum were Rand and Mises view were being vetted concerning, I believe, something near exact to what you brought up here.  I read through some of the responses.  I saw one of the posters brought up the idea about Menger being Aristotelian.  Overall similar thought patterns in at least two posts in the forum I linked that I had presented here.  Some of the other posts get bogged down in the subjectivist-objectivist semantics, which personally, I find these terms to be philosophically primitive when the subject is more elaborate than what those two terms solely make it out to be.  The numerous posts that can develop in simply trying to explain what each person means by those two terms is evidence of what I mean.

I haven't read any Rand.  I can't make an accurate comparison.  The 6th poster down in that forum (a partial quote of this post below but not the Rand comparison which you can find through that link I provided) mentions Menger and Rand and compares them.  The 13th poster (also quoted below) brought up Menger and a recent professor who I may check up on who had also held similar views.  The 13th poster compared Menger and Mises and even brought up Kant being used by Mises.  That same poster then went on to give a technical economic example, at least for me, on how they may be understood as to not having differences once a person gets to the meaning of their presented science.  Meaning, not caught up in the jargon that each of them had excess to in order to present their science. 

That posters case might be more in line with what might be developing as presented in my OP here in this thread though I strongly remind everybody that what I had presented in the OP can't be taken as any final authority.  I didn't even readily come up with any conclusions but rather presented what appears to be a philosophical discussion and argument over the law of thought and law of reality case that Rothbard had introduced. 

The terminology was different by Menger and Mises, etc... due to the access that each had to the various philosophers, Aristotle and Kant, and then changed the terminologies definitions to suit the meaningful insights each had, maybe?  It's interesting and that definitely would effect the reading of either of their works.

Quote of post 13 in that other forum.  This poster had actually responded to post 6 so both are quoted below:

partialquoteofpost6:

I actually think the original Austrian theory of value propounded by Carl Menger is very close to Rand's model of objective value. Consider Menger's definition of a good, from his Principles of Economics:

post13:

You're not the only one. Dr Beuchner noted this a while back, too, (1995 - Objective Value). He said he was very big on Menger as a result of that. He also noted that it was a tradgedy that other Austrians were translated to English long before Menger was, and that a large part of the idea that Austrian school is inherently subjectivist stems from that lack of translations of Menger.

Moreover, von Mises' subjectivism at the level of consumer goods is real subjectivism, not merely labelled as such by the intrinsicists. His view on subjective and objective value matches the view of subjective and objective concepts espoused by Kant: there are core concepts/values that are subjective, and all other values are objectively derived from those at the core. In von Mises, the latter then translates into objectivity in business practice but placed in the service of soverieng consumers whose desires are not to be questioned, and in whose service the entrepreneurs are but servants who make profits by better responding to consumer demands. The result of Misesan subjectivism in values is the conclusion that the entrepreneur is but a jumped up "chiselling arbitrageur" (in Salsman's words) - and after reading Israel Kirzner's book on entrepreneurialism, which expressly equates the entrepreneur with the arbitrageur, it is not just an aberration on von Mises' part or an unfounded slur on Salsman's part.

Edit: there is nothing inherently wrong with arbitrage, only that it is of secondary importance and that the entrepreneur is and does much more than that.

Anybody that knows economics better than I, if there is a critique of this to point out anything that is wrong, it would be nice if you could point that out.

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wilderness replied on Mon, Apr 5 2010 12:21 PM

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Here's a more recent paper by Geoffrey A. Plauche (2006) that covers this same material with further explanation.  Example from Introduction:

Plauche:

Within the tradition of Austrian philosophy, this Aristotelian apriorism can be traced at least from Franz Brentano and his students to the realist phenomenology of the early Edmund Husserl, Husserl's student Adolf Reinach, and Johannes Daubert. Among the Austrian economists, Carl Menger can be seen as developing economics as an Aristotelian a priori discipline. Ludwig von Mises developed this apriorism into the formal method of praxeology, and though he appears to be a sort of Kantian realist in his theoretical self-interpretation, it has been argued that Mises was thoroughly Aristotelian in practice (Smith 1990:282). More recently, Murray Rothbard attempted to return Austrian economics and praxeology to an explicitly Aristotelian-Thomist foundation but he did not do so in any great detail. It will be with praxeology as an a priori discipline that this essay will primarily be concerned. I will argue that Rothbard did not go far enough in giving praxeology an Aristotelian foundation, an oversight that I will attempt to (at least begin to) remedy in this essay.

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Justin Spahr-Summers,

Plauche mentions Rand and makes explicit what you did as well in this thread, but unfortunately this paper doesn't appear to have been updated to include a more thorough investigation as far as I have been able to find:

Plauche:

[IV. Ayn Rand, Objectivism, and Praxeology
It is fairly well-known among Objectivists and Austrians that Ayn Rand rejected Mises's method of praxeology. In this section, to be added later, I will seek to show that praxeology is not incompatible with the philosophy of Ayn Rand. I've already promised Chris Sciabarra that I would submit this paper to JARS when it's finished.]

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Here's a similar thread that E.R. Olovetto posted for the sake of reference material convenience.

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E. R. Olovetto replied on Mon, Apr 5 2010 1:05 PM

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I'm going to check out Plauche's paper. I think that Plauche and Long reach some faulty conclusions at times regarding punishment. I just want to note too that when Reinach and others are talking about "state of affairs", this is Sachverhalt in German. In early Wittgenstein, "state of affairs" is used, but in later works the term "forms of life" is used. This is his (later) Philosophical Investigations, if anyone is interested in reading it.

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wilderness replied on Mon, Apr 5 2010 1:24 PM

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E. R. Olovetto:

I'm going to check out Plauche's paper. I think that Plauche and Long reach some faulty conclusions at times regarding punishment. I just want to note too that when Reinach and others are talking about "state of affairs", this is Sachverhalt in German. In early Wittgenstein, "state of affairs" is used, but in later works the term "forms of life" is used.

Do you know why Wittgenstein changed the name?  What accuracy may he have been striving for in such a change, for Wittgenstein, to necessarily have to take place?

Also is there a difference between Wittgenstein's early works compared to his later, generally speaking, and any pitfalls of his works that I may want to take heed of before reading his writings?

E. R. Olovetto:

This is his (later) Philosophical Investigations, if anyone is interested in reading it.

I'll see if I can download it.  I noticed different mechanism to download and I don't know which one works for my computer.  I'll trial and error it.

thanks.

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E. R. Olovetto replied on Mon, Apr 5 2010 2:29 PM

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That is just various file hosts and the PDF is in a ZIP file. I agree with whoever left this review on Amazon, that if you have to get one book on the Tractatus (I have this and a bunch of other things in PDF too), this is the one, Donald Peterson's Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy: Three Sides of the Mirror. I don't know why it lists only 1 new over $100. I bought it (seeming brand new) from the 3rd listed used seller's shop for like $15.

I don't know what to recommend for analysis of his later work though, besides things that are online. Toulmin and Janik's Wittgenstein's Vienna is a good historical background that I read first. Reading Long's paper on Wittgenstein again is toward the top of my list, so maybe I can make sense of the importance of his philosophy related to ours then.

I think that his major shift (sometime while writing what is known as The Brown Book IIRC) is to abandon the Picture Theory of Meaning. I'll quote a short passage from Peterson on this after one I just noticed on another translation of Sachverhalte:

Facts are, thankfully, referred to as 'facts' (Tatsachen), and the totality of these in the 'world' (die Welt). In the ontology facts are analyzed into constituent 'elementary facts' (Sachverhalte). Facts can be 'said'.

Wittgenstein later abandoned this view [The Picture Theory], arguing, essentially, that language describes the world through language-games, rather than through the metaphysical matching of the picture theory.And this lends something to the already easy task of finding fault with and dismissing the picture theory. But the picture theory has great value not because it is correct—which it is not—but because Wittgenstein articulated and developed the details and consequences of such theories of meaning. His work, and subsequent criticism, have made it plain what is the appeal and what are the faults of such a theory, and in particular, they have emphasized that a theory of this sort relies on an internal, and presumably structural, relation between elementary sentence and elementary fact. And in examining, for example, the conceptual basis of cognitive science, we find that, in theories of 'mental representation' inspired by the computer model of the mind, the picture theory and its internal relation are not dead.

I don't know if that is going to clear things up at all. Maybe "forms of life" came about because he goes from talking about how things are in our world to imaginary one's where things don't happen the same way, like with the "wood-sellers" cited in Long's paper. This is related to why you will see me harp on people for saying things like "non-enforceable obligations", because what does it mean "to be obliged/obligated"? These are the types of things Wittgenstein talks about in PI.

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Conza88 replied on Wed, Apr 14 2010 10:56 AM

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Excellent.