In his excellent books The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Realism with a Human Face, Hilary Putnam argues that the fact/value dichotomy is untenable. His argument takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum: if the fact/value dichotomy is true, then scientific objectivity is false; but giving up scientific objectivity is absurd, therefore the fact/value dichotomy must be false.
First, drawing on Quine, Putnam points out that scientific propositions are never empirically tested singly, in isolation, but always along with background assumptions, which are themselves open to revision. (For example, in testing the proposition that water boils at 100° Celsius, we assume that the liquid is actually water, that the thermometer is working, that the water is actually boiling, etc.) Hence no empirical test by itself can tell us whether what needs revision is the proposition being tested or one of the background assumptions. Making that decision requires judgments of simplicity, relative plausibility, and overall coherence.
Putnam argues that coherence, plausibility, and simplicity are values, i.e. epistemic values, and that these values are presupposed in scientific inquiry. But if the fact/value dichotomy is true, then along with ethical and aesthetic values, epistemic values too must be subjective and untestable. As Putnam writes, "every argument that has ever been offered for noncognitivism in ethics applies immediately and without the slightest change to these epistemological predicates" (Realism, p.138). Thus, the dichotomist is committed to regarding disagreements over epistemic values as merely personal and subjective. With the water boiling example, when people disagree on which revision is more plausible, the dichotomist must hold that each is just expressing their subjective preferences. In short, upholders of the fact/value dichotomy are committed to giving up scientific objectivity completely. Scientific objectivity and ethical objectivity stand or fall together.
But since abandoning scientific objectivity is absurd, we must conclude that the fact/value dichotomy is false. Values can be objective.
AnalyticalAnarchism.net - The Positive Political Economy of Anarchism
"Putnam argues that coherence, plausibility, and simplicity are values, i.e. epistemic values, and that these values are presupposed in scientific inquiry. But if the fact/value dichotomy is true, then along with ethical and aesthetic values, epistemic values too must be subjective and untestable. As Putnam writes, "every argument that has ever been offered for noncognitivism in ethics applies immediately and without the slightest change to these epistemological predicates" (Realism, p.138). Thus, the dichotomist is committed to regarding disagreements over epistemic values as merely personal and subjective. With the water boiling example, when people disagree on which revision is more plausible, the dichotomist must hold that each is just expressing their subjective preferences. In short, upholders of the fact/value dichotomy are committed to giving up scientific objectivity completely. Scientific objectivity and ethical objectivity stand or fall together."
This analysis is true. Epistemology is value laden but not necessarily normative. Epistemological positions IE Occam's Razor can be both descriptive and prescriptive. Putnam's analysis is true in that universal prescriptivism in epistemology is incoherent, as it is in ethics.
Unfortunately, his reductio ad absurdum is not actually absurd. He is simply deriving a conclusion from a set of premises, seeing that the conclusion makes him uncomfortable or is incompatible with his current beliefs and thinks he has made a persuasive argument. I guess an obvious question would be 'why is "abandoning" scientific objectivity absurd (and was it ever there in the first place)?'.
edit: Before I am misunderstood, I would not say that epistemic values are 'merely preferences'; It would be more accurate to say that Occam priors describe how humans form beliefs and make decisions under conditions of uncertainty. I think that all humans share similar priors. I also think that almost all humans share certain fundamental moral beliefs. In neither case does this make the beliefs true in the sense Putnam wishes them to be.
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
Putnam:if the fact/value dichotomy is true, then scientific objectivity is false
How does that follow? Sorry if it is a dumb question. Did either of you read Danny Frederick's recent Two Concepts of Rationality?
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
Sage:Scientific objectivity and ethical objectivity stand or fall together.
I dunno.
1. Epistemic values are needed to prop up scientific objectivity, ethical values are not. So just because you have proven episty values from scientific objectivity, you have not proven ethical values.
2. Just because "every argument that has ever been offered for noncognitivism in ethics applies immediately and without the slightest change to these epistemological predicates", that doesn't mean they are both true or both false.
Frinstance, The evidence of my eyes tells me the world is flat. It also tells me that things drop from my hands to my feet when I let go of them. So the argument "the evidence of my eyes" applies to both of them. The world is not flat. So the evidence of my eyes is wrong there. Does that prove things fall up when I drop them?
To aid the reader, substitute an item from Column A with the corresponding one from Column B, and vice versa, to see my point.
Column A: Column B:
"every argument that has ever been offered" etc "the evidence of my eyes"
There are no episty values the world is flat
There are no ethical values things fall down, not up
My humble blog
It's easy to refute an argument if you first misrepresent it. William Keizer
Sage:if the fact/value dichotomy is true, then scientific objectivity is false; but giving up scientific objectivity is absurd, therefore the fact/value dichotomy must be false.
The fact/value dichotomy does not make values, like scientific objectivity, "false." It is a recognition that with regard to such values, as Mises put it, "there cannot be any question of truth and falsity." (Mises, TH) Accepting the fact/value dichotomy does not mean "giving up" scientific objectivity, or any other value for that matter.
There is no such thing as a value-free action. Therefore, of course the very act of pursuing knowledge is value-laden. Therefore there is no such thing as a value-free scientist. That does not mean science itself cannot be value-free. Impelled by values, the scientist seeks out facts. That does not mean values are facts.
Grayson Lilburne:That does not mean values are facts.
I'm hung-up on this proposition. What I've never been able to wrap my mind around is this possibly also means 'that does not mean values are not facts'. I don't see how that above proposition is universal.
Any individual-A that values X (in which X may represent any potential content), individual-A may consider that X is a fact even though individual-B does or doesn't value X and does or does not consider X to be a fact.
Another way of putting this: values are factual as long as any one individual maintains that what they value is a fact of their existence or individual act of valuing. The individual is valuing X. It is a fact that the said individual values X. How so? By such an individual preferring X to Y.
wilderness: I'm hung-up on this proposition. What I've never been able to wrap my mind around is this possibly also means 'that does not mean values are not facts'. I don't see how that above proposition is universal. Any individual-A that values X (in which X may represent any potential content), individual-A may consider that X is a fact even though individual-B does or doesn't value X and does or does not consider X to be a fact. Another way of putting this: values are factual as long as any one individual maintains that what they value is a fact of their existence or individual act of valuing. The individual is valuing X. It is a fact that the said individual values X. How so? By such an individual preferring X to Y.
From "Theory and History", a relevant section:
Ludwig von Mises: 1.1. Judgments of Value and Propositions of ExistencePropositions asserting existence (affirmative existential propositions) or nonexistence (negative existential propositions) are descriptive. They assert something about the state of the whole universe or of parts of the universe. With regard to them questions of truth and falsity are significant. They must not be confounded with judgments of value.Judgments of value are voluntaristic. They express feelings, tastes, or preferences of the individual who utters them. With regard to them there cannot be any question of truth and falsity. They are ultimate and not subject to any proof or evidence.Judgments of value are mental acts of the individual concerned. As such they must be sharply distinguished from the sentences by means of which an individual tries to inform other people about the content of his judgments of value. A man may have some reason to lie about his valuations. We may describe this state of affairs in the following way: Every judgment of value is in itself also a fact of the actual state of the universe and as such may be the topic of existential propositions. The sentence “I prefer Beethoven to Lehar” refers to a judgment of value. If looked upon as an existential proposition, it is true if I really prefer Beethoven and act accordingly and false if I in fact prefer Lehar and for some reasons lie about my real feelings, taste, or preferences. In an analogous way the existential proposition “Paul prefers Beethoven to Lehar” may be true or false. In declaring that with regard to a judgment of value there cannot be any question of truth or falsity, we refer to the judgment as such and not to the sentences communicating the content of such a judgment of value to other people.
1.1. Judgments of Value and Propositions of ExistencePropositions asserting existence (affirmative existential propositions) or nonexistence (negative existential propositions) are descriptive. They assert something about the state of the whole universe or of parts of the universe. With regard to them questions of truth and falsity are significant. They must not be confounded with judgments of value.Judgments of value are voluntaristic. They express feelings, tastes, or preferences of the individual who utters them. With regard to them there cannot be any question of truth and falsity. They are ultimate and not subject to any proof or evidence.Judgments of value are mental acts of the individual concerned. As such they must be sharply distinguished from the sentences by means of which an individual tries to inform other people about the content of his judgments of value. A man may have some reason to lie about his valuations. We may describe this state of affairs in the following way: Every judgment of value is in itself also a fact of the actual state of the universe and as such may be the topic of existential propositions. The sentence “I prefer Beethoven to Lehar” refers to a judgment of value. If looked upon as an existential proposition, it is true if I really prefer Beethoven and act accordingly and false if I in fact prefer Lehar and for some reasons lie about my real feelings, taste, or preferences. In an analogous way the existential proposition “Paul prefers Beethoven to Lehar” may be true or false. In declaring that with regard to a judgment of value there cannot be any question of truth or falsity, we refer to the judgment as such and not to the sentences communicating the content of such a judgment of value to other people.
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
thanks I. Ryan,
I. Ryan: wilderness: I'm hung-up on this proposition. What I've never been able to wrap my mind around is this possibly also means 'that does not mean values are not facts'. I don't see how that above proposition is universal. Any individual-A that values X (in which X may represent any potential content), individual-A may consider that X is a fact even though individual-B does or doesn't value X and does or does not consider X to be a fact. Another way of putting this: values are factual as long as any one individual maintains that what they value is a fact of their existence or individual act of valuing. The individual is valuing X. It is a fact that the said individual values X. How so? By such an individual preferring X to Y. From "Theory and History", a relevant section:
Ludwig von Mises: 1.1. Judgments of Value and Propositions of ExistencePropositions asserting existence (affirmative existential propositions) or nonexistence (negative existential propositions) are descriptive. They assert something about the state of the whole universe or of parts of the universe. With regard to them questions of truth and falsity are significant. They must not be confounded with judgments of value.
1.1. Judgments of Value and Propositions of ExistencePropositions asserting existence (affirmative existential propositions) or nonexistence (negative existential propositions) are descriptive. They assert something about the state of the whole universe or of parts of the universe. With regard to them questions of truth and falsity are significant. They must not be confounded with judgments of value.
ok
Ludwig von Mises:Judgments of value are voluntaristic. They express feelings, tastes, or preferences of the individual who utters them. With regard to them there cannot be any question of truth and falsity. They are ultimate and not subject to any proof or evidence.
This is where it gets shaky. How does any individual "express feelings, tastes, or preferences" - yet - at the same time these expressions are not a matter of fact of said individual, meaning, these expressions are not the reality of said individual? And this doesn't necessarily default to the individual is lying because feelings are observable and if somebody is eating vanilla ice cream then they prefer vanilla to chocolate stated by their action.
Ludwig von Mises:Judgments of value are mental acts of the individual concerned. As such they must be sharply distinguished from the sentences by means of which an individual tries to inform other people about the content of his judgments of value. A man may have some reason to lie about his valuations. We may describe this state of affairs in the following way: Every judgment of value is in itself also a fact of the actual state of the universe and as such may be the topic of existential propositions. The sentence “I prefer Beethoven to Lehar” refers to a judgment of value. If looked upon as an existential proposition, it is true if I really prefer Beethoven and act accordingly and false if I in fact prefer Lehar and for some reasons lie about my real feelings, taste, or preferences. In an analogous way the existential proposition “Paul prefers Beethoven to Lehar” may be true or false. In declaring that with regard to a judgment of value there cannot be any question of truth or falsity, we refer to the judgment as such and not to the sentences communicating the content of such a judgment of value to other people.
This appears to be Mises agreeing with me. Yet in that first part quoted above, I stumble across a "gets shaky" aspect in which there is disagreement between Mises interpretation and mine. I'm not trying to argue against Mises though, more concerning what Lilburne had stated. Let's explore more:
I don't know why Mises is talking about "sentences communicating" being the delineation. He's only referring to grammar which without further context appears to be a side note to the total writing of his in this section. He made a good comment.
I underlined where Mises states value is a fact, no dichotomy? If so, then wouldn't that differ from Lilburne said in which I originally responded to? I underlined a small portion, but that only appears to be a decent summary of the rest of that paragraph so I'm in no way only pointing out those few words. I could have underlined nearly the whole paragraph here, except, for that seeming reference by Mises to grammar being delineated from the rest of his assertion here.
wilderness: This is where it gets shaky. How does any individual "express feelings, tastes, or preferences" - yet - at the same time these expressions are not a matter of fact of said individual, meaning, these expressions are not the reality of said individual? And this doesn't necessarily default to the individual is lying because feelings are observable and if somebody is eating vanilla ice cream then they prefer vanilla to chocolate stated by their action. This appears to be Mises agreeing with me. Yet in that first part quoted above, I stumble across a "gets shaky" aspect in which there is disagreement between Mises interpretation and mine. I'm not trying to argue against Mises though, more concerning what Lilburne had stated. Let's explore more: I don't know why Mises is talking about "sentences communicating" being the delineation. He's only referring to grammar which without further context appears to be a side note to the total writing of his in this section. He made a good comment. I underlined where Mises states value is a fact, no dichotomy? If so, then wouldn't that differ from Lilburne said in which I originally responded to? I underlined a small portion, but that only appears to be a decent summary of the rest of that paragraph so I'm in no way only pointing out those few words. I could have underlined nearly the whole paragraph here, except, for that seeming reference by Mises to grammar being delineated from the rest of his assertion here.
He is just referring to two different things. In one sense, it might be a fact that individual A prefers X to Y. But in the other sense, that fact, his preference, is not more "correct" than that of any other individual.
I. Ryan:He is just referring to two different things. In one sense, it might be a fact that individual A prefers X to Y. But in the other sense, that fact, his preference, is not more "correct" than that of any other individual.
For example, economically this makes sense in reference to economic goods in the market, but again, this doesn't hold exclusively.
What is logically impossible is not going to happen. Hypothetically what has falsified a given proposition today, doesn't mean such a 'if..., then" proposition will be false tomorrow. For example, preferences in the market on what an individual buys or sells are not concerns of logical truths or falsities that generalize beyond said individual. If individual-A prefers X to Y, that doesn't imply individual-B prefers X to Y. What an individual prefers isn't a general proposition of a all individuals. Yet, of course if the subject is whether or not individual did in fact, meaning of truth, buy or sell X, then it would be correct to denote the exchange of X has in fact taken place due to individual-A preferring X. I only restated what you appear to be agreeing with.
I had stated already that Lilburne's proposition, re-quoted below, isn't universal. It is possible that values are facts, thus, the dichotomy only stands in the way of realizing this other possibility that you have noted too, "two different things". The fact-value is thereby a false dichotomy.
wilderness: Grayson Lilburne:That does not mean values are facts. I'm hung-up on this proposition. What I've never been able to wrap my mind around is this possibly also means 'that does not mean values are not facts'. I don't see how that above proposition is universal.
wilderness: I had stated already that Lilburne's proposition, re-quoted below, isn't universal. It is possible that values are facts, thus, the dichotomy only stands in the way of realizing this other possibility that you have noted too, "two different things". The fact-value is thereby a false dichotomy.
The problem is that, between those two possibilities, we are using two different definitions of the word "fact". When Lilburne said "[t]hat does not mean values are facts", I am pretty sure that he is using a different definition than when you said "[i]t is possible that values are facts".
To try to make this argument clear, I will provide a brief, poorly articulated overview of my (very tentative) position regarding it.
From where does truth originate? Well, if you were to walk into a room where a person were drawing a bunch of stuff on a chalkboard that looked like he were trying to solve a problem in physics and you were to notice that he made a "mistake", you decide to try to explain that to him, but then he says that he is just drawing aimlessly to pass the time, he would, at once, silence your "criticism". For your point that his work is "incorrect" depended entirely on the assumption that he was desiring to conform his markings to a certain system. Also, in the same way, it makes no sense to say that the orbit of a planet is "incorrect". For the planet has no desires at all. What it does is just what it does, nothing more. Therefore, the foundation of truth is desire, intention, or whatever you want to call it.(So in that sense, of course, truth is subjective. But that does not have any sorts of radical implications for science. For what unites the members of a certain science as scientists in that science is that they define certain terms in certain ways and desire to make their use of those terms conform to the real world. If one of them did not desire that, they would be a "counterfeit" or a liar in that science, nothing more.)
Now to build a system of praxeology, we need to assume that people have desires. But from where do these desires originate? When we try to explain the desires of a person, we generally invoke their other desires. For example, we might say that a person wants X because he believes that X produces Y and he wants Y. But if that were the only thing that we were to do, we would encounter an infinite regression. For if we were to want to explain every desire in that way, we would need an infinitely long chain. So how do we stifle this infinite regression? We assume that an "ultimate given" exists: that new information completely independent to the rest of the information enters our minds in the form of "primary" or "ultimate" desires, which, incidentally, Mises refers to as "judgements of value". By the way, this "new information" is basically what people are referring to when they talk of "free will", "free choice", or whatever.
Now to call these ultimate desires either correct or incorrect from the perspective of the person having the desire, we have to point to a more fundamental desire. But because of the fact that we defined that desire as an ultimate desire, that more fundamental one does not exist. So it makes no sense to say that, from the perspective of the person having the ultimate desire, it is either "correct" or "incorrect".
So in conclusion, ultimate desires, "judgements of value" are neither "correct" nor "incorrect", they are just given. Our only other option is to drop the notion of desire and see "actors" as a compilation of interrelated parts entirely dependent on each other. But I am sure that no person here who understands what I mean when I say that will want to do that. For that would go against the Austrian School by trying to reduce people to simultaneous equations like those found in physics. (See Robert Murphy in his talk "Austrian vs. Neoclassical Analytics" for some talk about how Milton Friedman conceived economics in that way.)
So I think that I already addressed what we are trying to answer. But just to make it more clear, I will trace out some of the implications of it.
Now considering that "correctness" depends on the perspectives of individuals, not a natural, external, "objective" thing, if we encounter two perspectives which each have ultimate desires conflicting with the other, ultimate desires that, if one were satisfied, would preclude that the other were satisfied, is it possible to say whose perspective is more "correct"? Of course not. For I already established that ultimate desires are neither true nor false, they are just given. So this implies that people whose ultimate desires respect life, like most of us here, are not any more "correct" than people whose ultimate desires do not do so, like some psychopaths; they are just different. We are able to justify jailing them or killing them only by reference to our own self-interest. Incidentally, the only reason that society is able to exist is that most people are like us and therefore have the power to selfishly vanquish the people with conflicting desires.
(By the way, Ayn Rand, I think, recognized all of this. For I think that her attempt to make certain values "objective" was probably just one of trying to show that all people, simple in virtue of being people, had a certain part of their perspective be in a certain way. So if that is true, she tried to establish that certain things were true for all people simply because all people had certain desires, like the desire to live or to act. For even the act of committing suicide relies on living and acting. It is impossible to end your life without acting. So in that sense, you demonstrate that you value your ability to live, to use means (for example, poison, your mind, your body, et cetera) to achieve ends (for example, your death). I might not be making much sense here. Correct me if I am wrong. I do not know much about her work.)
So although it does not make sense to say that your ultimate desires are either "true" or "false", it does make sense to say that it is true or false that you have certain ultimate desires, which is what I think that Mises was trying to say in the passages that I posted earlier, in this thread.
I. Ryan: wilderness:I had stated already that Lilburne's proposition, re-quoted below, isn't universal. It is possible that values are facts, thus, the dichotomy only stands in the way of realizing this other possibility that you have noted too, "two different things". The fact-value is thereby a false dichotomy. The problem is that, between those two possibilities, we are using two different definitions of the word "fact". When Lilburne said "[t]hat does not mean values are facts", I am pretty sure that he is using a different definition than when you said "[i]t is possible that values are facts".
wilderness:I had stated already that Lilburne's proposition, re-quoted below, isn't universal. It is possible that values are facts, thus, the dichotomy only stands in the way of realizing this other possibility that you have noted too, "two different things". The fact-value is thereby a false dichotomy.
I. Ryan:To try to make this argument clear, I will provide a brief, poorly articulated overview of my (very tentative) position regarding it. From where does truth originate? Well, if you were to walk into a room where a person were drawing a bunch of stuff on a chalkboard that looked like he were trying to solve a problem in physics and you were to notice that he made a "mistake", you decide to try to explain that to him, but then he says that he is just drawing aimlessly to pass the time, he would, at once, silence your "criticism". For your point that his work is "incorrect" depended entirely on the assumption that he was desiring to conform his markings to a certain system. Also, in the same way, it makes no sense to say that the orbit of a planet is "incorrect". For the planet has no desires at all. What it does is just what it does, nothing more. Therefore, the foundation of truth is desire, intention, or whatever you want to call it.(So in that sense, of course, truth is subjective. But that does not have any sorts of radical implications for science. For what unites the members of a certain science as scientists in that science is that they define certain terms in certain ways and desire to make those terms conform to the real world. If one of them did not desire that, they would be a "counterfeit" or a liar in that science, nothing more.)
From where does truth originate? Well, if you were to walk into a room where a person were drawing a bunch of stuff on a chalkboard that looked like he were trying to solve a problem in physics and you were to notice that he made a "mistake", you decide to try to explain that to him, but then he says that he is just drawing aimlessly to pass the time, he would, at once, silence your "criticism". For your point that his work is "incorrect" depended entirely on the assumption that he was desiring to conform his markings to a certain system. Also, in the same way, it makes no sense to say that the orbit of a planet is "incorrect". For the planet has no desires at all. What it does is just what it does, nothing more. Therefore, the foundation of truth is desire, intention, or whatever you want to call it.(So in that sense, of course, truth is subjective. But that does not have any sorts of radical implications for science. For what unites the members of a certain science as scientists in that science is that they define certain terms in certain ways and desire to make those terms conform to the real world. If one of them did not desire that, they would be a "counterfeit" or a liar in that science, nothing more.)
yes
I. Ryan:Now to build a system of praxeology, we need to assume that people have desires. But from where do these desires originate? When we try to explain the desires of a person, we generally invoke their other desires. For example, we might say that a person wants X because he believes that X produces Y and he wants Y. But if that were the only thing that we were to do, we we encounter an infinite regression. For if we were to want to explain every desire in that way, we would need an infinitely long chain. So how do we stifle this infinite regression? We assume that an "ultimate given" exists: that new information completely independent to the rest of the information enters our minds in the form of "primary" or "ultimate" desires, which, incidentally, Mises refers to as "judgements of value". By the way, this "new information" is basically what people are referring to when they talk of "free will", "free choice", or whatever. Now to call these ultimate desires either correct or incorrect from the perspective of the person having the desire, we have to point to a more fundamental desire. But because of the fact that we defined that desire as an ultimate desire, that more fundamental one does not exist. So it makes no sense to say that, from the perspective of the person having the ultimate desire, it is either "correct" or "incorrect". But that does not mean that it makes no sense to make that judgement from the point of view of you or a different person. For if I were to want to kill you but you were to not want to be killed, in a sense, not trying to prevent me from killing you would be "incorrect". In other words, you should, based on your desire to live, try to fend off any attacks like that. But even if your desire to live is not an "ultimate" one, it ultimately depends on one.
Now to call these ultimate desires either correct or incorrect from the perspective of the person having the desire, we have to point to a more fundamental desire. But because of the fact that we defined that desire as an ultimate desire, that more fundamental one does not exist. So it makes no sense to say that, from the perspective of the person having the ultimate desire, it is either "correct" or "incorrect". But that does not mean that it makes no sense to make that judgement from the point of view of you or a different person. For if I were to want to kill you but you were to not want to be killed, in a sense, not trying to prevent me from killing you would be "incorrect". In other words, you should, based on your desire to live, try to fend off any attacks like that. But even if your desire to live is not an "ultimate" one, it ultimately depends on one.
I. Ryan:So in conclusion, ultimate desires, "judgements of value" are neither "correct" nor "incorrect", they are just given. Our only other option is to drop the notion of desire and see "actors" as a compilation of interrelated parts entirely dependent on each other. But I am sure that no person here who understands what I mean when I say that will want to do that. For that would go against the Austrian School by trying to reduce people to simultaneous equations like those found in physics. (See Robert Murphy in his talk "Austrian vs. Neoclassical Analytics" for some talk about how Milton Friedman conceived economics in that way.)
yes, I know what you're saying so far.
I. Ryan:(By the way, Ayn Rand, I think, recognized all of this. For I think that her attempt to make certain values "objective" was probably just one of trying to show that all people, simple in virtue of being people, had a certain part of their perspective be in a certain way. So if that is true, she tried to establish that certain things were true for all people simply because all people had certain desires, like the desire to live or to act. For even the act of committing suicide relies on living and acting. It is impossible to end your life without acting. So in that sense, you demonstrate that you value your ability to live, to use means (for example, poison, your mind, your body, et cetera) to achieve ends (for example, your death). I might not be making much sense here. Correct me if I am wrong. I do not know much about her work.)
I've never read any of Ayn Rand's work. So I don't know.
I know what you are saying, but the axiom is human action not human desire. The ultimate given is the human action taken when object-A is preferred to object-B. What encompass action, ie. desires, judgments, and object-A, are attributes of the class: human action.
I will need to disagree on the point raised. What points you raised were more helpful, but I'm inclined, as of the moment, to disagree on the axiom (the "ultimate given") that you introduced, ie. desire.
wilderness: I know what you are saying, but the axiom is human action not human desire. The ultimate given is the human action taken when object-A is preferred to object-B. What encompass action, ie. desires, judgments, and object-A, are attributes of the class: human action. I will need to disagree on the point raised. What points you raised were more helpful, but I'm inclined, as of the moment, to disagree on the axiom (the "ultimate given") that you introduced, ie. desire.
First, I am not sure that my argument rests on the assumption that our ultimate desires are the ultimate given of praxeology. For it is possible that more than one ultimate given exists. (In other words, I tried to prove that what I called our "ultimate desires" is the ultimate given of our desires, not of all of our action.)
Second, I am pretty sure that "the [...] action taken when object-A is preferred to object-B" is the question that praxeology is trying to solve, not its ultimate foundation.
You might want to elaborate on your position here, though. I might be missing something.
I. Ryan:First, I am not sure that my argument rests on the assumption that our ultimate desires are the ultimate given of praxeology. For it is possible that more than one ultimate given exists. (In other words, I tried to prove that what I called our "ultimate desires" is the ultimate given of our desires, not of all of our action.)
I don't know what that has to do with the false dichotomy: fact/value. Since you raised "ultimate desire" as a point of note it would entail that it is your point for whatever reason such a 'raising' would be deciphered by you.
I. Ryan:Second, I am pretty sure that "the [...] action taken when object-A is preferred to object-B" is the question that praxeology is trying to solve, not its ultimate foundation.
It is categorically what human action is.
wilderness: It is categorically what human action is.
You said that it is the ultimate given of praxeology, that "[t]he ultimate given is the human action taken when object-A is preferred to object-B". But it is not; it is what it is trying to explain.
wilderness: I don't know what that has to do with the false dichotomy: fact/value. Since you raised "ultimate desire" as a point of note it would entail that it is your point for whatever reason such a 'raising' would be deciphered by you.
I really do not understand what you are saying at this point. I tried to prove that praxeology is not able to explain certain desires, that it just has to regard them as given in this sense:
Ludwig von Mises: Science always is and must be rational. It is the endeavor to attain a mental grasp of the phenomena of the universe by a systematic arrangement of the whole body of available knowledge. However, as has been pointed out above, the analysis of objects into their constituent elements must sooner or later necessarily reach a point beyond which it cannot go. The human mind is not even capable of conceiving a kind of knowledge not limited by an ultimate given inaccessible to further analysis and reduction. The scientific method that carries the mind up to this point is entirely rational. The ultimate given may be called an irrational fact.
Science always is and must be rational. It is the endeavor to attain a mental grasp of the phenomena of the universe by a systematic arrangement of the whole body of available knowledge. However, as has been pointed out above, the analysis of objects into their constituent elements must sooner or later necessarily reach a point beyond which it cannot go. The human mind is not even capable of conceiving a kind of knowledge not limited by an ultimate given inaccessible to further analysis and reduction. The scientific method that carries the mind up to this point is entirely rational. The ultimate given may be called an irrational fact.
Ludwig von Mises: The panmechanistic world view is committed to a methodological monism; it acknowledges only mechanistic causality because it attributes to it alone any cognitive value or at least a higher cognitive value than to teleology. This is a metaphysical superstition. Both principles of cognition—causality and teleology—are, owing to the limitations of human reason, imperfect and do not convey ultimate knowledge. Causality leads to a regressus in infinitum which reason can never exhaust. Teleology is found wanting as soon as the question is raised of what moves the prime mover. Either method stops short at an ultimate given which cannot be analyzed and interpreted. Reasoning and scientific inquiry can never bring full ease of mind, apodictic certainty, and perfect cognition of all things. He who seeks this must apply to faith and try to quiet his conscience by embracing a creed or a metaphysical doctrine.
The panmechanistic world view is committed to a methodological monism; it acknowledges only mechanistic causality because it attributes to it alone any cognitive value or at least a higher cognitive value than to teleology. This is a metaphysical superstition. Both principles of cognition—causality and teleology—are, owing to the limitations of human reason, imperfect and do not convey ultimate knowledge. Causality leads to a regressus in infinitum which reason can never exhaust. Teleology is found wanting as soon as the question is raised of what moves the prime mover. Either method stops short at an ultimate given which cannot be analyzed and interpreted. Reasoning and scientific inquiry can never bring full ease of mind, apodictic certainty, and perfect cognition of all things. He who seeks this must apply to faith and try to quiet his conscience by embracing a creed or a metaphysical doctrine.
Ludwig von Mises: The observation of the instinctive behavior of animals fills man with astonishment and raises questions which nobody can answer satisfactorily. Yet the fact that animals and even plants react in a quasi-purposeful way is neither more nor less miraculous than that man thinks and acts, that in the inorganic universe those functional correspondences prevail which physics describes, and that in the organic universe biological processes occur. All this is miraculous in the sense that it is an ultimate given for our searching mind. Such an ultimate given is also what we call animal instinct. Like the concepts of motion, force, life, and consciousness, the concept of instinct too is merely a term to signify an ultimate given. To be sure, it neither “explains” anything nor indicates a cause or an ultimate cause.
The observation of the instinctive behavior of animals fills man with astonishment and raises questions which nobody can answer satisfactorily. Yet the fact that animals and even plants react in a quasi-purposeful way is neither more nor less miraculous than that man thinks and acts, that in the inorganic universe those functional correspondences prevail which physics describes, and that in the organic universe biological processes occur. All this is miraculous in the sense that it is an ultimate given for our searching mind.
Such an ultimate given is also what we call animal instinct. Like the concepts of motion, force, life, and consciousness, the concept of instinct too is merely a term to signify an ultimate given. To be sure, it neither “explains” anything nor indicates a cause or an ultimate cause.
Ludwig von Mises: It is impossible to demonstrate the validity of the a priori foundations of logic and praxeology without referring to these foundations themselves. Reason is an ultimate given and cannot be analyzed or questioned by itself. The very existence of human reason is a nonrational fact. The only statement that can be predicated with regard to reason is that it is the mark that distinguishes man from animals and has brought about everything that is specifically human.
It is impossible to demonstrate the validity of the a priori foundations of logic and praxeology without referring to these foundations themselves. Reason is an ultimate given and cannot be analyzed or questioned by itself. The very existence of human reason is a nonrational fact. The only statement that can be predicated with regard to reason is that it is the mark that distinguishes man from animals and has brought about everything that is specifically human.
Ludwig von Mises: We may call irrational the ultimate given, viz., those things that our thinking can neither analyze nor reduce to other ultimately given things. Then every ultimate end chosen by any man is irrational. It is neither more nor less rational to aim at riches like Croesus than to aim at poverty like a Buddhist monk.
We may call irrational the ultimate given, viz., those things that our thinking can neither analyze nor reduce to other ultimately given things. Then every ultimate end chosen by any man is irrational. It is neither more nor less rational to aim at riches like Croesus than to aim at poverty like a Buddhist monk.
Ludwig von Mises: Whatever the true nature of the universe and of reality may be, man can learn about it only what the logical structure of his mind makes comprehensible to him. Reason, the sole instrument of human science and philosophy, does not convey absolute knowledge and final wisdom. It is vain to speculate about ultimate things. What appears to man’s inquiry as an ultimate given, defying further analysis and reduction to something more fundamental, may or may not appear such to a more perfect intellect. We do not know. Man cannot grasp either the concept of absolute nothingness or that of the genesis of something out of nothing. The very idea of creation transcends his comprehension. The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, whom Pascal in his Mémorial opposed to that of the “philosophes et savants,” is a living image and has a clear and definite meaning for the faithful believer. But the philosophers in their endeavors to construct a concept of God, his attributes, and his conduct of world affairs, became involved in insoluble contradictions and paradoxes. A God whose essence and ways of acting mortal man could neatly circumscribe and define would not resemble the God of the prophets, the saints, and the mystics. The logical structure of his mind enjoins upon man determinism and the category of causality. As man sees it, whatever happens in the universe is the necessary evolution of forces, powers, and qualities which were already present in the initial stage of the X out of which all things stem. All things in the universe are interconnected, and all changes are the effects of powers inherent in things. No change occurs that would not be the necessary consequence of the preceding state. All facts are dependent upon and conditioned by their causes. No deviation from the necessary course of affairs is possible. Eternal law regulates everything. In this sense determinism is the epistemological basis of the human search for knowledge.[1] Man cannot even conceive the image of an undetermined universe. In such a world there could not be any awareness of material things and their changes. It would appear a senseless chaos. Nothing could be identified and distinguished from anything else. Nothing could be expected and predicted. In the midst of such an environment man would be as helpless as if spoken to in an unknown language. No action could be designed, still less put into execution. Man is what he is because he lives in a world of regularity and has the mental power to conceive the relation of cause and effect. Any epistemological speculation must lead toward determinism. But the acceptance of determinism raises some theoretical difficulties that have seemed to be insoluble. While no philosophy has disproved determinism, there are some ideas that people have not been able to bring into agreement with it. Passionate attacks have been directed against it because people believed that it must ultimately result in absurdity.
Whatever the true nature of the universe and of reality may be, man can learn about it only what the logical structure of his mind makes comprehensible to him. Reason, the sole instrument of human science and philosophy, does not convey absolute knowledge and final wisdom. It is vain to speculate about ultimate things. What appears to man’s inquiry as an ultimate given, defying further analysis and reduction to something more fundamental, may or may not appear such to a more perfect intellect. We do not know.
Man cannot grasp either the concept of absolute nothingness or that of the genesis of something out of nothing. The very idea of creation transcends his comprehension. The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, whom Pascal in his Mémorial opposed to that of the “philosophes et savants,” is a living image and has a clear and definite meaning for the faithful believer. But the philosophers in their endeavors to construct a concept of God, his attributes, and his conduct of world affairs, became involved in insoluble contradictions and paradoxes. A God whose essence and ways of acting mortal man could neatly circumscribe and define would not resemble the God of the prophets, the saints, and the mystics.
The logical structure of his mind enjoins upon man determinism and the category of causality. As man sees it, whatever happens in the universe is the necessary evolution of forces, powers, and qualities which were already present in the initial stage of the X out of which all things stem. All things in the universe are interconnected, and all changes are the effects of powers inherent in things. No change occurs that would not be the necessary consequence of the preceding state. All facts are dependent upon and conditioned by their causes. No deviation from the necessary course of affairs is possible. Eternal law regulates everything.
In this sense determinism is the epistemological basis of the human search for knowledge.[1] Man cannot even conceive the image of an undetermined universe. In such a world there could not be any awareness of material things and their changes. It would appear a senseless chaos. Nothing could be identified and distinguished from anything else. Nothing could be expected and predicted. In the midst of such an environment man would be as helpless as if spoken to in an unknown language. No action could be designed, still less put into execution. Man is what he is because he lives in a world of regularity and has the mental power to conceive the relation of cause and effect.
Any epistemological speculation must lead toward determinism. But the acceptance of determinism raises some theoretical difficulties that have seemed to be insoluble. While no philosophy has disproved determinism, there are some ideas that people have not been able to bring into agreement with it. Passionate attacks have been directed against it because people believed that it must ultimately result in absurdity.
Ludwig von Mises: Ideas are the ultimate given of historical inquiry.
Ideas are the ultimate given of historical inquiry.
Ludwig von Mises: For the natural sciences the limit of knowledge is the establishment of an ultimate given, that is, of a fact that cannot be traced back to another fact of which it would appear as the necessary consequence. For the sciences of human action the ultimate given is the judgments of value of the actors and the ideas that engender these judgments of value.
For the natural sciences the limit of knowledge is the establishment of an ultimate given, that is, of a fact that cannot be traced back to another fact of which it would appear as the necessary consequence. For the sciences of human action the ultimate given is the judgments of value of the actors and the ideas that engender these judgments of value.
Ludwig von Mises: However, there is a momentous difference between the ultimate given in the natural sciences and that in the field of human action. An ultimate given of nature is—for the time being, that is, until someone succeeds in exposing it as the necessary consequence of some other ultimate given—a stopping point for human reflection. It is as it is, that is all that man can say about it. But it is different with the ultimate given of human action, with the value judgments of individuals and the actions induced by them. They are ultimately given as they cannot be traced back to something of which they would appear to be the necessary consequence. If this were not the case, it would not be permissible to call them an ultimate given. But they are not, like the ultimate given in the natural sciences, a stopping point for human reflection. They are the starting point of a specific mode of reflection, of the specific understanding of the historical sciences of human action.
However, there is a momentous difference between the ultimate given in the natural sciences and that in the field of human action. An ultimate given of nature is—for the time being, that is, until someone succeeds in exposing it as the necessary consequence of some other ultimate given—a stopping point for human reflection. It is as it is, that is all that man can say about it.
But it is different with the ultimate given of human action, with the value judgments of individuals and the actions induced by them. They are ultimately given as they cannot be traced back to something of which they would appear to be the necessary consequence. If this were not the case, it would not be permissible to call them an ultimate given. But they are not, like the ultimate given in the natural sciences, a stopping point for human reflection. They are the starting point of a specific mode of reflection, of the specific understanding of the historical sciences of human action.
Ludwig von Mises: It is vain to object that life and reality are not logical. Life and reality are neither logical nor illogical; they are simply given. But logic is the only tool available to man for the comprehension of both.
It is vain to object that life and reality are not logical. Life and reality are neither logical nor illogical; they are simply given. But logic is the only tool available to man for the comprehension of both.
I. Ryan: wilderness: I don't know what that has to do with the false dichotomy: fact/value. Since you raised "ultimate desire" as a point of note it would entail that it is your point for whatever reason such a 'raising' would be deciphered by you. I really do not understand what you are saying at this point. I tried to prove that praxeology is not able to explain certain desires, it just has to regard them as given.
I really do not understand what you are saying at this point. I tried to prove that praxeology is not able to explain certain desires, it just has to regard them as given.
but desiring is an act of a human, ie. human action. Unless you mean the desire wasn't deliberate or realizable but that wouldn't be determinable in any act that a human makes. One could only surmise that any given action is purposeful.
I. Ryan: wilderness: It is categorically what human action is. You said that it is the ultimate given of praxeology.
You said that it is the ultimate given of praxeology.
"ultimate given", first principle, self-evident: I interpreted the "ultimate given" that you introduced to mean the latter two here. These latter two are the definitions of axioms back to Aristotle and ever since. Being that 'human action' is an axiom I was simply re-wording 'axiom' in it's other names, ie. first principle, self-evident; that are common in the field of logic to describe that same word: axiom. And since I interpreted your concept "ultimate given" to be a first principle (axiom) I thereby used it as such.
I. Ryan:But it is not, it is what it is trying to explain.
I don't know what you mean here. What is explained by any axiom is what it is. Maybe you meant something else.
I. Ryan: Ludwig von Mises: It is vain to object that life and reality are not logical. Life and reality are neither logical nor illogical; they are simply given. But logic is the only tool available to man for the comprehension of both.
All those quotes are what "first principles" mean. Mises is simply using another term, ie. ultimate given. So we are not in disagreement. And right here, this quote, what you bolded, are not only first principles but are categories.
Categories, as I stated, 'preferring A to B' is of the category human action. When a human acts it is self-evident that such a human is preferring A to B. Meaning the action involves choice and valuation - that's human action.
What is implied by the category, ie. class, life and reality, in other words, what attributes are of life and reality involve logic. Life and reality are given, ie. self-evident, and are not logically deducted during a premise-conclusion event, but to name them in a class in which all that is implied by life - that inference involves logic. Notice the next sentence after the bolded one. "But logic is the only tool available to man for the comprehension of both". To comprehend life and reality involves logical implications of all that fall into those two categories, ie. life and reality.
Maybe we're getting on the same page now?
wilderness: I don't know what you mean here. What is explained by any axiom is what it is. Maybe you meant something else.
wilderness: "ultimate given", first principle, self-evident: I interpreted the "ultimate given" that you introduced to mean the latter two here. These latter two are the definitions of axioms back to Aristotle and ever since. Being that 'human action' is an axiom I was simply re-wording 'axiom' in it's other names, ie. first principle, self-evident; that are common in the field of logic to describe that same word: axiom. And since I interpreted your concept "ultimate given" to be a first principle (axiom) I thereby used it as such.
wilderness:but desiring is an act of a human, ie. human action. Unless you mean the desire wasn't deliberate or realizable but that wouldn't be determinable in any act that a human makes. One could only surmise that any given action is purposeful.
wilderness: All those quotes are what "first principles" mean. Mises is simply using another term, ie. ultimate given. So we are not in disagreement. And right here, this quote, what you bolded, are not only first principles but are categories. Categories, as I stated, 'preferring A to B' is of the category human action. When a human acts it is self-evident that such a human is preferring A to B. Meaning the action involves choice and valuation - that's human action. What is implied by the category, ie. class, life and reality, in other words, what attributes are of life and reality involve logic. Life and reality are given, ie. self-evident, and are not logically deducted during a premise-conclusion event, but to name them in a class in which all that is implied by life - that inference involves logic. Notice the next sentence after the bolded one. "But logic is the only tool available to man for the comprehension of both". To comprehend life and reality involves logical implications of all that fall into those two categories, ie. life and reality. Maybe we're getting on the same page now?
I am lost at this point. I will go back to your first response before I try to respond to what I just quoted.
wilderness: [...]the axiom is[...] not human desire. [...] [...]I'm inclined[...] to disagree on the axiom[...] that you introduced, ie. desire.
[...]the axiom is[...] not human desire.
[...]
[...]I'm inclined[...] to disagree on the axiom[...] that you introduced, ie. desire.
I never claimed that "desire" is "the axiom".
I. Ryan:I never claimed that "desire" is "the axiom".
lol, ok.
I really don't know what you're trying to say. I think the discussion has really gone off-course from my initial response to Lilburne. The only thing that I've picked up from you've said so far is that there is no fact/value dichotomy as you've made it clear that values can be facts.
Then there can be no such value which is either a result of a fact and/or a fact in itself. For example, I value that you exist (GL). Is that not both value and fact? Or at least a value attached to fact irreducibly?
"The power of liberty going forward is in decentralization. Not in leaders, but in decentralized activism. In a market process." -- liberty student
wilderness: I. Ryan: wilderness: I don't know what that has to do with the false dichotomy: fact/value. Since you raised "ultimate desire" as a point of note it would entail that it is your point for whatever reason such a 'raising' would be deciphered by you. I really do not understand what you are saying at this point. I tried to prove that praxeology is not able to explain certain desires, it just has to regard them as given. but desiring is an act of a human, ie. human action. Unless you mean the desire wasn't deliberate or realizable but that wouldn't be determinable in any act that a human makes. One could only surmise that any given action is purposeful.
Ryan said certain desires. Desire is a category of action, but not any particular desire.
ladyattis: Grayson Lilburne:That does not mean values are facts. Then there can be no such value which is either a result of a fact and/or a fact in itself. For example, I value that you exist (GL). Is that not both value and fact? Or at least a value attached to fact irreducibly?
That you value is a fact (ie X values Y's existence). The content of the value (any expression of it) is not (ie Y ought to exist).
Grayson Lilburne:Ryan said certain desires. Desire is a category of action, but not any particular desire.
Yes. And that's what I told Ryan. That's a non-issue.
The point is there fact/value is a false dichotomy. There are values that are facts. That has already been discussed.
Grayson Lilburne:The content of the value (any expression of it) is not (ie Y ought to exist).
It still depends and holds too many caveats. I could say Y ought to exist and act Y. A community could say Y ought to exist and act Y. The false dichotomy is to maintain that the fact/value is universal without exceptions.
wilderness: Grayson Lilburne:The content of the value (any expression of it) is not (ie Y ought to exist). It still depends and holds too many caveats. I could say Y ought to exist and act Y. A community could say Y ought to exist and act Y. The false dichotomy is to maintain that the fact/value is universal without exceptions.
Acting in accordance with your value "Y ought to exist" does not make the statement "Y ought to exist" a fact. It only makes the statement "wilderness, at the moment of action, valued the existence of Y" a fact.
Grayson Lilburne:That you value is a fact (ie X values Y's existence). The content of the value (any expression of it) is not (ie Y ought to exist).
I see no difference between what is and what ought to be as often one seeks what isn't, but should be, into what is.
wilderness: It still depends and holds too many caveats. I could say Y ought to exist and act Y. A community could say Y ought to exist and act Y. The false dichotomy is to maintain that the fact/value is universal without exceptions.
Remember this:
I. Ryan: The problem is that, between those two possibilities, we are using two different definitions of the word "fact". When Lilburne said "[t]hat does not mean values are facts", I am pretty sure that he is using a different definition than when you said "[i]t is possible that values are facts".
There are not any "caveats", "conditionals", or "depend[ents]". There are just two different things, one of which, it is sensical to call it either "true" or "false", the other of which, it does not:
Lilburne: That you value is a fact[...]. [But t]he content of the value[...] is not[...].
That you value is a fact[...]. [But t]he content of the value[...] is not[...].
Now:
wilderness: The point is there fact/value is a false dichotomy. There are values that are facts. That has already been discussed. [...] [T]here is no fact/value dichotomy as you've made it clear that values can be facts.
[T]here is no fact/value dichotomy as you've made it clear that values can be facts.
1) Really, I do not think that it is expedient to call what I am trying to explain a "fact/value dichotomy".
2) No, you are misunderstanding our points. For we are not saying that "[t]here are values that are facts", like that a certain portion of what we call "values" are able to be true or false and a certain portion are not. What we are saying is that, in one sense, no "values" are able to be true or false and in the other sense, all "values" are.
ladyattis: Grayson Lilburne:That you value is a fact (ie X values Y's existence). The content of the value (any expression of it) is not (ie Y ought to exist). I see no difference between what is and what ought to be as often one seeks what isn't, but should be, into what is.
I'm sorry, but I can't decipher that...
Grayson Lilburne:Acting in accordance with your value "Y ought to exist" does not make the statement "Y ought to exist" a fact.
If the statement is reflective of the act, then yes it is. The content of "Y" that can be acted is a fact when acted.
Grayson Lilburne:It only makes the statement "wilderness, at the moment of action, valued the existence of Y" a fact.
Therefore the value is a fact. False dichotomy.
I. Ryan: wilderness:It still depends and holds too many caveats. I could say Y ought to exist and act Y. A community could say Y ought to exist and act Y. The false dichotomy is to maintain that the fact/value is universal without exceptions. Remember this: I. Ryan:The problem is that, between those two possibilities, we are using two different definitions of the word "fact". When Lilburne said "[t]hat does not mean values are facts", I am pretty sure that he is using a different definition than when you said "[i]t is possible that values are facts". There are not any "caveats", "conditionals", or "depend[ents]". There are just two different things, one of which, it is sensical to call it either "true" or "false", the other of which, it does not:
wilderness:It still depends and holds too many caveats. I could say Y ought to exist and act Y. A community could say Y ought to exist and act Y. The false dichotomy is to maintain that the fact/value is universal without exceptions.
I. Ryan:The problem is that, between those two possibilities, we are using two different definitions of the word "fact". When Lilburne said "[t]hat does not mean values are facts", I am pretty sure that he is using a different definition than when you said "[i]t is possible that values are facts".
Which ones?
I. Ryan: Lilburne:That you value is a fact[...]. [But t]he content of the value[...] is not[...]. Now: wilderness:The point is there fact/value is a false dichotomy. There are values that are facts. That has already been discussed. [...] [T]here is no fact/value dichotomy as you've made it clear that values can be facts. 1) Really, I do not think that it is expedient to call what I am trying to explain a "fact/value dichotomy".
Lilburne:That you value is a fact[...]. [But t]he content of the value[...] is not[...].
wilderness:The point is there fact/value is a false dichotomy. There are values that are facts. That has already been discussed. [...] [T]here is no fact/value dichotomy as you've made it clear that values can be facts.
ok, why?
I. Ryan:2) No, you are misunderstanding our points. For we are not saying that "[t]here are values that are facts", like that a certain portion of what we call "values" are able to be true or false and a certain portion are not. What we are saying is that, in one sense, no "values" are able to be true or false and in the other sense, all "values" are.
Which only affirms my point. Why the dichotomy then?
wilderness: Grayson Lilburne:Acting in accordance with your value "Y ought to exist" does not make the statement "Y ought to exist" a fact. If the statement is reflective of the act, then yes it is. The content of "Y" that can be acted is a fact when acted.
But the statement is only truly reflective of the act if "wilderness believes..." is tacked onto the beginning of it.
Grayson Lilburne: wilderness: Grayson Lilburne:Acting in accordance with your value "Y ought to exist" does not make the statement "Y ought to exist" a fact. If the statement is reflective of the act, then yes it is. The content of "Y" that can be acted is a fact when acted. But the statement is only truly reflective of the act if "wilderness believes..." is tacked onto the beginning of it.
Let's not throw out science, don't simply take wilderness' word for it. It is possible to assert that individual-A values, as a matter of fact, a TV when they are involved in the exchange of a TV.
wilderness: Which ones?
My quoting of Lilburne was supposed to answer that.
wilderness: Therefore the value is a fact. False dichotomy. [...] Which only affirms my point. Why the dichotomy then?
The dichotomy is between facts, things which are able to be either true or false, and ultimate desires, things which, as I demonstrated, are not.
I. Ryan: wilderness:Which ones? My quoting of Lilburne was supposed to answer that.
wilderness:Which ones?
my fault.
I. Ryan: wilderness: Therefore the value is a fact. False dichotomy. [...] Which only affirms my point. Why the dichotomy then? The dichotomy is between facthood, a thing which is able to be either true or false, and ultimate desire, a thing which, as I demonstrated, is not.
The dichotomy is between facthood, a thing which is able to be either true or false, and ultimate desire, a thing which, as I demonstrated, is not.
If ultimate desire doesn't exist factually, ie. in reality, then it doesn't exist and I can't argue against something that isn't real.
wilderness: If ultimate desire doesn't exist factually, ie. in reality, then it doesn't exist and I can't argue against something that isn't real.
No, we already said that the fact that they exist is a fact. But the grain of truth in what you are saying in the above quotation is that, yes, it is impossible to "argue against" the ultimate desires of people.
I. Ryan: wilderness: If ultimate desire doesn't exist factually, ie. in reality, then it doesn't exist and I can't argue against something that isn't real. No, we already said that the fact that they exist is a fact.
No, we already said that the fact that they exist is a fact.
It's a fact. It's not a fact. Which is it?
And I know you're saying the content of the fact isn't a fact, but if it's not a fact then it isn't real. Even if the factual content of the value is only a fact to one individual in the whole world it is still a fact to that person. Though of course they could be wrong.
I. Ryan:But the grain of truth in what you are saying in the above quotation is that, yes, it is impossible to "argue against" the ultimate desires of people.
If they are facts, then it is possible to argue against the ultimate desires of people. People are not infallible.
wilderness: It's a fact. It's not a fact. Which is it? [...] If they are facts, then it is possible to argue against the ultimate desires of people. People are not infallible.
I hope that AJ sees this thread. It is a perfect example of how our language is able to really mess us up.
wilderness: And I know you're saying the content of the fact isn't a fact, but if it's not a fact then it isn't real. Even if the factual content of the value is only a fact to one individual in the whole world it is still a fact to that person. Though of course they could be wrong.
OK, let me try to revise the language a bit:
1) Whether an ultimate desire exists or not is either true or false.
2) But as I demonstrated, the ultimate desire itself is neither true nor false, it is just given.
That is all.
I. Ryan: wilderness: It's a fact. It's not a fact. Which is it? [...] If they are facts, then it is possible to argue against the ultimate desires of people. People are not infallible. I hope that AJ sees this thread. It is a perfect example of how our language is able to really mess us up.
Yes, but he only points that out and I can't recall a time when he was actually providing meanings to the words. He only probes with questions. And waits for others to define the words. I mean there is not necessarily anything wrong with pointing that out, but I'd rather partake in a discussion with contributions to what words mean and not only pointing out that 'people are talking past each other'. That part is obvious.
I. Ryan: wilderness: And I know you're saying the content of the fact isn't a fact, but if it's not a fact then it isn't real. Even if the factual content of the value is only a fact to one individual in the whole world it is still a fact to that person. Though of course they could be wrong. OK, let me try to revise the language a bit: 1) Whether an ultimate desire exists or not is either true or false. 2) But as I demonstrated, the ultimate desire itself is neither true nor false, it is just given. That is all.
Ok. Now this I understand, if... What you are saying is the ultimate desire is a first principle, which I think you are. In other words, some things are self-evident and are not logically deducted because the deductions would depend on these first principles in order to deduct from them. The act of deduction would be a negative demonstration. Which is great.
But what does this have to do with the fact/value dichotomy?