wilderness: Ok. Now this I understand, if... What you are saying is the ultimate desire is a first principle, which I think you are. In other words, some things are self-evident and are not logically deducted because the deductions would depend on these first principles in order to deduct from them. The act of deduction would be a negative demonstration. Which is great.
Ok. Now this I understand, if... What you are saying is the ultimate desire is a first principle, which I think you are. In other words, some things are self-evident and are not logically deducted because the deductions would depend on these first principles in order to deduct from them. The act of deduction would be a negative demonstration. Which is great.
Probably.
wilderness: But what does this have to do with the fact/value dichotomy?
But what does this have to do with the fact/value dichotomy?
Based on what you call "the fact/value dichotomy", was Mises a proponent of it?
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
I. Ryan: wilderness: Ok. Now this I understand, if... What you are saying is the ultimate desire is a first principle, which I think you are. In other words, some things are self-evident and are not logically deducted because the deductions would depend on these first principles in order to deduct from them. The act of deduction would be a negative demonstration. Which is great. Probably. wilderness:But what does this have to do with the fact/value dichotomy? Based on what you call "the fact/value dichotomy", was Mises a proponent of it?
wilderness:But what does this have to do with the fact/value dichotomy?
I don't know if he was or not. I know Lilburne brings it up due to an influence of Hume.
I know I wasn't talking about the fact/value dichotomy above in this post, so, I guess I don't readily see what it is, that's why I point out it is false because when it is applied to something it turns out not to be present. What I said above in our discussion is a case in point.
wilderness: I don't know if he was or not. I know Lilburne brings it up due to an influence of Hume. I know I wasn't talking about the fact/value dichotomy above in this post, so, I guess I don't readily see what it is, that's why I point out it is false because when it is applied to something it turns out not to be present. What I said above in our discussion is a case in point.
Well, I posted a section in which Mises explained what he thought, that "[w]ith regard to [judgements of value], there can be no question of truth and falsity". But you thought that his view was "shaky". So in my long post, I provided you my stance regarding it, which, I think, substantiates what he believed.
I. Ryan:Well, I posted a section in which Mises explained what he thought, that "[w]ith regard to [judgements of value], there can be no question of truth and falsity". But you thought that his view was "shaky". So in my long post, I provided you my stance regarding it, which, I think, substantiates what he believed.
I really appreciate your patience. Thank you.
I think we've crossed a bridge of understanding. At first I had hardly an idea of what you meant, and you've expressed the same of me.
I read "judgments of value" differently than I do now. If it is a formal proposition like X of Y, without any content, then I think I know what you mean now. It is self-evident and isn't arguable.
If on the other hand by "judgments of value" what is meant are the contents within the judgments of value I would say those contents are arguable as either possibly true or false.
But I'm still not understanding what this has to do with the fact/value dichotomy.
First, I will respond to this:
wilderness: If on the other hand by "judgments of value" what is meant are the contents within the judgments of value I would say those contents are arguable as either possibly true or false.
If I were to claim that you were incorrect when you desired to do A, to make any sense at all, I would need to tell you that what you desired to do, A, conflicts with what you, I, or an other person desires B:
I. Ryan: From where does truth[, correctness and incorrectness,] originate? Well, if you were to walk into a room where a person were drawing a bunch of stuff on a chalkboard that looked like he were trying to solve a problem in physics and you were to notice that he made a "mistake"[, were incorrect], you decide to try to explain that to him, but then he says that he is just drawing aimlessly to pass the time, he would, at once, silence your "criticism". For your point that his work is "incorrect" depended entirely on the assumption that he was desiring to conform his markings to a certain system. Also, in the same way, it makes no sense to say that the orbit of a planet is "incorrect". For the planet has no desires at all. What it does is just what it does, nothing more. Therefore, the foundation of truth is desire, intention, or whatever you want to call it.
From where does truth[, correctness and incorrectness,] originate? Well, if you were to walk into a room where a person were drawing a bunch of stuff on a chalkboard that looked like he were trying to solve a problem in physics and you were to notice that he made a "mistake"[, were incorrect], you decide to try to explain that to him, but then he says that he is just drawing aimlessly to pass the time, he would, at once, silence your "criticism". For your point that his work is "incorrect" depended entirely on the assumption that he was desiring to conform his markings to a certain system. Also, in the same way, it makes no sense to say that the orbit of a planet is "incorrect". For the planet has no desires at all. What it does is just what it does, nothing more. Therefore, the foundation of truth is desire, intention, or whatever you want to call it.
In the first example of that passage, what determines whether his desire to draw those things is correct or incorrect is just his other desires. For if he desires (a) to define the symbols that he is using as people do in modern physics and (b) to employ them in such a way so they reflect the real world, he is incorrect; but if he desires just to draw random symbols, he is clearly correct.
In the second example of that passage, I show that, from the perspective of things which do not have desires, "there is no question of" correctness or incorrectness, they is just given. It makes no sense to say, for example, that the fact that the universe exists is "incorrect".
On these points, in "Theory and History", Mises writes:
Ludwig von Mises: We may, for instance, try to show a Buddhist that to act in conformity with the teachings of his creed results in effects which we consider disastrous. But we are silenced if he replies that these effects are in his opinion lesser evils or no evils at all compared to what would result from nonobservance of his rules of conduct. His ideas about the supreme good, happiness, and eternal bliss are different from ours. He does not care for those values his critics are concerned with[...]
We may, for instance, try to show a Buddhist that to act in conformity with the teachings of his creed results in effects which we consider disastrous. But we are silenced if he replies that these effects are in his opinion lesser evils or no evils at all compared to what would result from nonobservance of his rules of conduct. His ideas about the supreme good, happiness, and eternal bliss are different from ours. He does not care for those values his critics are concerned with[...]
But if we were to attempt to explain every desire in such a way, we would encounter a regression to infinity:
I. Ryan: When we try to explain the desires of a person, we[...] invoke their other desires. For example, we might say that a person wants X because he believes that X produces Y and he wants Y. But if that were the only thing that we were to do, we would encounter an infinite regression. For if we were to want to explain every desire in that way, we would need an infinitely long chain.[...]
When we try to explain the desires of a person, we[...] invoke their other desires. For example, we might say that a person wants X because he believes that X produces Y and he wants Y. But if that were the only thing that we were to do, we would encounter an infinite regression. For if we were to want to explain every desire in that way, we would need an infinitely long chain.[...]
Ludwig von Mises: [...]As soon as we start to refute by arguments an ultimate judgment of value, we look upon it as a means to attain definite ends. But then we merely shift the discussion to another plane. We no longer view the principle concerned as an ultimate value but as a means to attain an ultimate value, and we are again faced with the same problem.[...]
[...]As soon as we start to refute by arguments an ultimate judgment of value, we look upon it as a means to attain definite ends. But then we merely shift the discussion to another plane. We no longer view the principle concerned as an ultimate value but as a means to attain an ultimate value, and we are again faced with the same problem.[...]
So what do we do? We just assume that certain desires are neither correct nor incorrect, they are just given:
I. Ryan: So how do we stifle this infinite regression? We assume that an "ultimate given" exists: that new information completely independent to the rest of the information enters our minds in the form of "primary" or "ultimate" desires, which, incidentally, Mises refers to as "judgements of value". By the way, this "new information" is basically what people are referring to when they talk of "free will", "free choice", or whatever.Now to call these ultimate desires either correct or incorrect from the perspective of the person having the desire, we have to point to a more fundamental desire. But because of the fact that we defined that desire as an ultimate desire, that more fundamental one does not exist. So it makes no sense to say that, from the perspective of the person having the ultimate desire, it is either "correct" or "incorrect".
So how do we stifle this infinite regression? We assume that an "ultimate given" exists: that new information completely independent to the rest of the information enters our minds in the form of "primary" or "ultimate" desires, which, incidentally, Mises refers to as "judgements of value". By the way, this "new information" is basically what people are referring to when they talk of "free will", "free choice", or whatever.Now to call these ultimate desires either correct or incorrect from the perspective of the person having the desire, we have to point to a more fundamental desire. But because of the fact that we defined that desire as an ultimate desire, that more fundamental one does not exist. So it makes no sense to say that, from the perspective of the person having the ultimate desire, it is either "correct" or "incorrect".
So in conclusion, certain desires exist to which, if we view the situation from the perspective of the person having the ultimate desire, the terms "correct" and "incorrect" simply are not applicable.
wilderness: But I'm still not understanding what this has to do with the fact/value dichotomy.
What I posted of Mises, I think, substantiated what Lilburne said. But then you thought that what I posted was "shaky". So then, in my long post, I tried to substantiate it.
(To give a better answer, I think that I need to acquire a definition of the "fact/value dichotomy". I am now starting to doubt whether I even know what the people who use it suppose it to mean.)
I. Ryan:First, I will respond to this: wilderness: If on the other hand by "judgments of value" what is meant are the contents within the judgments of value I would say those contents are arguable as either possibly true or false. If I were to claim that you were incorrect when you desired to do A, to make any sense at all, I would need to tell you that what you desired to do, A, conflicts with what you, I, or an other person desires B:
that's true.
Yet there is the conflict of scarcity. It happens. It might even be considered self-evident, unless somehow human beings somehow were able to always recognize the property of another. Negotiation or argumentation resolve potential conflict's of scarcity but these potential and actual conflicts always involve content laden judgments of value. There are sides to the argument or conflict. Disagreements or disputes that are to be resolved one way or another. They are unavoidable. If person-X desires A and person-Y argues that X ought to do B not A, then a decision will be made either with conflict or negotiation over scarcity. And due to scarcity it would make sense that either conflict or negotiation would be ways to deal with these types of resolutions.
I. Ryan:From where does truth(, correctness and incorrectness,) originate? Well, if you were to walk into a room where a person were drawing a bunch of stuff on a chalkboard that looked like he were trying to solve a problem in physics and you were to notice that he made a "mistake"[, were incorrect], you decide to try to explain that to him, but then he says that he is just drawing aimlessly to pass the time, he would, at once, silence your "criticism". For your point that his work is "incorrect" depended entirely on the assumption that he was desiring to conform his markings to a certain system. Also, in the same way, it makes no sense to say that the orbit of a planet is "incorrect". For the planet has no desires at all. What it does is just what it does, nothing more. Therefore, the foundation of truth is desire, intention, or whatever you want to call it. In the first example of that passage, what determines whether his desire to draw those things is correct or incorrect is just his other desires. For if he desires (a) to define the symbols that he is using as people do in modern physics and (b) to employ them in such a way so they reflect the real world, he is incorrect; but if he desires just to draw random symbols, he is clearly correct.
yes, either way the facts of situations make apparent what is correct or not of said person's desire.
I. Ryan:In the second example of that passage, I show that, from the perspective of things which do not have desires, "there is no question of" correctness or incorrectness, they is just given. It makes no sense to say, for example, that the fact that the universe exists is "incorrect".
That's the difference between first principles (which is the second example) and logical deductions (first example) as to what is a correct assumption of the person at the chalk board. The act, in the first example, is self-evident, but if the person acts on passing it off as physics when it's not, then it's not self-evident and deducted to be incorrect reasoning, ie. incorrect physics work.
I. Ryan:On these points, in "Theory and History", Mises writes:
Why wouldn't a social scientist be concerned with outlining the critics arguments? They are people too. They are social phenomena. Why study the Buddhist but not the Buddhist critic?
I. Ryan:But if we were to attempt to explain every desire in such a way, we would encounter a regression to infinity:
I. Ryan:When we try to explain the desires of a person, we[...] invoke their other desires. For example, we might say that a person wants X because he believes that X produces Y and he wants Y. But if that were the only thing that we were to do, we would encounter an infinite regression. For if we were to want to explain every desire in that way, we would need an infinitely long chain.[...]
This is what Aristotle pointed out as: 'it has to stop somewhere' and he pointed out the argument if not stopped somewhere would become circular, which I read as what you stated: "infinite regression".
I. Ryan: Ludwig von Mises:[...]As soon as we start to refute by arguments an ultimate judgment of value, we look upon it as a means to attain definite ends. But then we merely shift the discussion to another plane. We no longer view the principle concerned as an ultimate value but as a means to attain an ultimate value, and we are again faced with the same problem.[...]
Ludwig von Mises:[...]As soon as we start to refute by arguments an ultimate judgment of value, we look upon it as a means to attain definite ends. But then we merely shift the discussion to another plane. We no longer view the principle concerned as an ultimate value but as a means to attain an ultimate value, and we are again faced with the same problem.[...]
That "ultimate value" is self-evident and still is a logical conclusion though not by deduction. It is logically inferred by implication, ie. implications are real connections or essences in the world, that are inferred logically. In other words, the individual is active in discovering what is self-evident. It takes thought to realize what is self-evident and what is realized as self-evident does still require an explanation and that explanation or ontologically speaking that X might not really exist. X would still require it being true or not.
I. Ryan:So what do we do? We just assume that certain desires are neither correct nor incorrect, they are just given:
I never saw one "certain desire" that was "just given" - a content expressed desire - in those quotes of Mises, except where he may have been saying ignore the critics of Buddhism. But why would any social scientist ignore a social phenomena? It's not that Mises has to conclude in the science who is right or wrong, except to point out the logical fallacies which therefore would point out the truth and falsities of the Buddhist and/or critics. Logic possibly reaches conclusions on the content on where the two part ways. The theories of the time may judge in any disagreements or disputes that may arise if the two sides somehow contact each other. No doubt the two sides are already making judgments about each other, and there would be a way to scientifically hash out who is more correct or not. But as in all sciences, the science is carried out by human beings that are fallible. Epistemologically speaking, humans are not omniscient but judgments are always made between or upon people. And they are carried out through agreements, barter/negotiations, and/or conflicts. As I've said, such haggling isn't necessarily decided by armchair scientists. The people involved in the haggling are either going to reason out the situation more or less, but they still are throwing oughts at each other. Maybe they compromise and only 3 of their oughts are used and 3 of theirs but the situation is ordinal and not necessarily cardinal.
I. Ryan:So how do we stifle this infinite regression? We assume that an "ultimate given" exists: that new information completely independent to the rest of the information enters our minds in the form of "primary" or "ultimate" desires, which, incidentally, Mises refers to as "judgements of value". By the way, this "new information" is basically what people are referring to when they talk of "free will", "free choice", or whatever. Now to call these ultimate desires either correct or incorrect from the perspective of the person having the desire, we have to point to a more fundamental desire. But because of the fact that we defined that desire as an ultimate desire, that more fundamental one does not exist. So it makes no sense to say that, from the perspective of the person having the ultimate desire, it is either "correct" or "incorrect".
Now to call these ultimate desires either correct or incorrect from the perspective of the person having the desire, we have to point to a more fundamental desire. But because of the fact that we defined that desire as an ultimate desire, that more fundamental one does not exist. So it makes no sense to say that, from the perspective of the person having the ultimate desire, it is either "correct" or "incorrect".
This "ultimate desire" stated in this quote doesn't provide any content. It is formal. It is self-evident that any act of a human involves desire. Yet it never states what that desire is, because if such was said, then that desire would no longer be a self-evident first principle in which all desires are deducted from. Once the content of the desire is included, then logical deductions are made in relation to the world.
I. Ryan:So in conclusion, certain desires exist to which the terms "correct" and "incorrect" simply are not applicable.
The quotes never point out "certain desires" specifically. Mises was talking about primary desire that which is self-evident and even that has to be logically inferred as either existing or not, meaning it ontologically is correctly being or not being. But there are no logical deductions that involve premise-conclusion.
I. Ryan: wilderness: But I'm still not understanding what this has to do with the fact/value dichotomy. What I posted of Mises, I think, substantiated what Lilburne said. But then you thought that what I posted was "shaky". So then, in my long post, I tried to substantiate it.
It may have been shaky and without me bothering to go back and see if that has been cleared up and we have moved onto other areas to gain further clarity might be what's happening now. If it is necessary to know if the exact 'shakiness' is still present I can go back and look or we can encounter the issues when they arise in each post without necessarily having to connect it back to that exact 'shakiness' still being wondered by me. If you need to know to help clarify the discussion, I could do that. It's up to you.
I. Ryan:(To give a better answer, I think that I need to acquire a definition of the "fact/value dichotomy". I am now starting to doubt whether I even know what the people who use it suppose it to mean.)
I can't help you there.
wilderness: Yet there is the conflict of scarcity. It happens. It might even be considered self-evident, unless somehow human beings somehow were able to always recognize the property of another. Negotiation or argumentation resolve potential conflict's of scarcity but these potential and actual conflicts always involve content laden judgments of value. There are sides to the argument or conflict. Disagreements or disputes that are to be resolved one way or another. They are unavoidable. If person-X desires A and person-Y argues that X ought to do B not A, then a decision will be made either with conflict or negotiation over scarcity. And due to scarcity it would make sense that either conflict or negotiation would be ways to deal with these types of resolutions. [...] Why wouldn't a social scientist be concerned with outlining the critics arguments? They are people too. They are social phenomena. Why study the Buddhist but not the Buddhist critic? [...] except where he may have been saying ignore the critics of Buddhism. But why would any social scientist ignore a social phenomena? It's not that Mises has to conclude in the science who is right or wrong, except to point out the logical fallacies which therefore would point out the truth and falsities of the Buddhist and/or critics. Logic possibly reaches conclusions on the content on where the two part ways. The theories of the time may judge in any disagreements or disputes that may arise if the two sides somehow contact each other. No doubt the two sides are already making judgments about each other, and there would be a way to scientifically hash out who is more correct or not. But as in all sciences, the science is carried out by human beings that are fallible. Epistemologically speaking, humans are not omniscient but judgments are always made between or upon people. And they are carried out through agreements, barter/negotiations, and/or conflicts. As I've said, such haggling isn't necessarily decided by armchair scientists. The people involved in the haggling are either going to reason out the situation more or less, but they still are throwing oughts at each other. Maybe they compromise and only 3 of their oughts are used and 3 of theirs but the situation is ordinal and not necessarily cardinal.
[...]
except where he may have been saying ignore the critics of Buddhism. But why would any social scientist ignore a social phenomena? It's not that Mises has to conclude in the science who is right or wrong, except to point out the logical fallacies which therefore would point out the truth and falsities of the Buddhist and/or critics. Logic possibly reaches conclusions on the content on where the two part ways. The theories of the time may judge in any disagreements or disputes that may arise if the two sides somehow contact each other. No doubt the two sides are already making judgments about each other, and there would be a way to scientifically hash out who is more correct or not. But as in all sciences, the science is carried out by human beings that are fallible. Epistemologically speaking, humans are not omniscient but judgments are always made between or upon people. And they are carried out through agreements, barter/negotiations, and/or conflicts. As I've said, such haggling isn't necessarily decided by armchair scientists. The people involved in the haggling are either going to reason out the situation more or less, but they still are throwing oughts at each other. Maybe they compromise and only 3 of their oughts are used and 3 of theirs but the situation is ordinal and not necessarily cardinal.
I am not sure why those are relevant.
wilderness: That "ultimate value" is self-evident and still is a logical conclusion though not by deduction. It is logically inferred by implication, ie. implications are real connections or essences in the world, that are inferred logically. In other words, the individual is active in discovering what is self-evident. It takes thought to realize what is self-evident and what is realized as self-evident does still require an explanation and that explanation or ontologically speaking that X might not really exist. X would still require it being true or not.
How is it possible to have a "logical conclusion" not reached "by deduction"?
wilderness: I never saw one "certain desire" that was "just given" - a content expressed desire - in those quotes of Mises [...] This "ultimate desire" stated in this quote doesn't provide any content. It is formal. It is self-evident that any act of a human involves desire. Yet it never states what that desire is, because if such was said, then that desire would no longer be a self-evident first principle in which all desires are deducted from. Once the content of the desire is included, then logical deductions are made in relation to the world. [...] The quotes never point out "certain desires" specifically. Mises was talking about primary desire that which is self-evident and even that has to be logically inferred as either existing or not (meaning it correctly is or isn't).
I never saw one "certain desire" that was "just given" - a content expressed desire - in those quotes of Mises
The quotes never point out "certain desires" specifically. Mises was talking about primary desire that which is self-evident and even that has to be logically inferred as either existing or not (meaning it correctly is or isn't).
Remember this:
I. Ryan: So how do we stifle this infinite regression? We assume that an "ultimate given" exists: that new information completely independent to the rest of the information enters our minds in the form of "primary" or "ultimate" desires, which, incidentally, Mises refers to as "judgements of value". By the way, this "new information" is basically what people are referring to when they talk of "free will", "free choice", or whatever.
So how do we stifle this infinite regression? We assume that an "ultimate given" exists: that new information completely independent to the rest of the information enters our minds in the form of "primary" or "ultimate" desires, which, incidentally, Mises refers to as "judgements of value". By the way, this "new information" is basically what people are referring to when they talk of "free will", "free choice", or whatever.
If "ultimate desires" have no "content", that implies that "free will" does not exist. For the differing "content" of the "ultimate desires" is from where the "free will" originates.
I. Ryan: wilderness: Yet there is the conflict of scarcity. It happens. It might even be considered self-evident, unless somehow human beings somehow were able to always recognize the property of another. Negotiation or argumentation resolve potential conflict's of scarcity but these potential and actual conflicts always involve content laden judgments of value. There are sides to the argument or conflict. Disagreements or disputes that are to be resolved one way or another. They are unavoidable. If person-X desires A and person-Y argues that X ought to do B not A, then a decision will be made either with conflict or negotiation over scarcity. And due to scarcity it would make sense that either conflict or negotiation would be ways to deal with these types of resolutions. [...] Why wouldn't a social scientist be concerned with outlining the critics arguments? They are people too. They are social phenomena. Why study the Buddhist but not the Buddhist critic? [...] except where he may have been saying ignore the critics of Buddhism. But why would any social scientist ignore a social phenomena? It's not that Mises has to conclude in the science who is right or wrong, except to point out the logical fallacies which therefore would point out the truth and falsities of the Buddhist and/or critics. Logic possibly reaches conclusions on the content on where the two part ways. The theories of the time may judge in any disagreements or disputes that may arise if the two sides somehow contact each other. No doubt the two sides are already making judgments about each other, and there would be a way to scientifically hash out who is more correct or not. But as in all sciences, the science is carried out by human beings that are fallible. Epistemologically speaking, humans are not omniscient but judgments are always made between or upon people. And they are carried out through agreements, barter/negotiations, and/or conflicts. As I've said, such haggling isn't necessarily decided by armchair scientists. The people involved in the haggling are either going to reason out the situation more or less, but they still are throwing oughts at each other. Maybe they compromise and only 3 of their oughts are used and 3 of theirs but the situation is ordinal and not necessarily cardinal. I am not sure why those are relevant.
I was providing exceptions to what Mises said, 'critics are not to be concerned with'. I know I lost the context and he couldn't have meant 'critics' as a social phenomena can not be understood. That would be counter-intuitive to what Mises says concerning the Buddhist. Ethics was drawn up in the OP and I've seen the fact/value dichotomy used in an effort to validate that ethics and morals don't exist. We really don't need to get into that because the fact/value dichotomy appears false as it is, except our discussion does appear to making strides. But I don't know if our discussion is about the fact/value dichotomy anymore when it comes to how others interpret it, but as you yourself have noted, you do think you are interpreting it in the way you understand it. I also brought up "oughts" since Lilburne interprets the fact/value dichotomy as being about 'oughts'. I don't know which one is supposed to be the ought or not.
I. Ryan: wilderness: That "ultimate value" is self-evident and still is a logical conclusion though not by deduction. It is logically inferred by implication, ie. implications are real connections or essences in the world, that are inferred logically. In other words, the individual is active in discovering what is self-evident. It takes thought to realize what is self-evident and what is realized as self-evident does still require an explanation and that explanation or ontologically speaking that X might not really exist. X would still require it being true or not. How is it possible to have a "logical conclusion" not reached "by deduction"?
Negative demonstration. Also, sometimes categories have to be assumed. All axioms are realized without deduction. That's why they are called first principles. In order to even demonstrate a logical deduction to any first principle those first principles would have to be premised within the deduction. How terms within any proposition are even realized they must first be assumed as well, but sometimes those terms will be deducted, sometimes categories are not deducted though. Here's a list of categories that Mises doesn't deduct but rather assumes as being what human action is (taken from here at last quote before the conclusion in that post with full article linked at that post too):
Smith:For we are forced to recognize that there is a veritable plenitude of non-logical primitive concepts at the root of praxeology. Indeed, Mises' descriptions of this plenitude in his actual practice in economics, and also in occasional passages in his methodological writings, can be seen to represent what is almost certainly the most sustained realization of the Aristotelian idea in the literature of economic theory. Action, we are told by Mises, involves apprehension of causal relations and of regularities in the phenomena. It presupposes being in a position to influence causal relations. It presupposes felt uneasiness. It involves the exercise of reason. It is a striving to substitute a more satisfactory for a less satisfactory state of affairs. The italicized are not logically deducted. They are assumptions. Aristotle discusses these assumptions (not these specific assumptions but assumptions in and of themselves). Science doesn't work without some assumptions and such assumptions have been used by science from its beginnings in human history. They are still to be weighed logically as to discover if they are being or not. They are sometimes called 'primitive concepts' or primitive terms, intuitions, experiences, non-logical categories. I can't think off-hand at the moment any other terms. Negative demonstration is the one main way that I know of. Also they are assumptions so are sometimes, by appearances, simply accepted because they are that self-evident. Yet that wouldn't mean that in time they wouldn't be scientifically rejected. It could happen, but what is self-evident are used as the first principles in which all logical deductions within any field of study rely upon. And as long as those first principles are providing fruitful logical deductions that are accurate there wouldn't readily be a reason to get rid of them. I. Ryan: wilderness:I never saw one "certain desire" that was "just given" - a content expressed desire - in those quotes of Mises Remember this: So how do we stifle this infinite regression? We assume that an "ultimate given" exists: that new information completely independent to the rest of the information enters our minds in the form of "primary" or "ultimate" desires, which, incidentally, Mises refers to as "judgements of value". By the way, this "new information" is basically what people are referring to when they talk of "free will", "free choice", or whatever. -- If "ultimate desires" have no "content", that implies that "free will" does not exist. For the differing "content" of the "ultimate desires" is from where the "free will" originates.
Action, we are told by Mises, involves apprehension of causal relations and of regularities in the phenomena. It presupposes being in a position to influence causal relations. It presupposes felt uneasiness. It involves the exercise of reason. It is a striving to substitute a more satisfactory for a less satisfactory state of affairs.
The italicized are not logically deducted. They are assumptions. Aristotle discusses these assumptions (not these specific assumptions but assumptions in and of themselves). Science doesn't work without some assumptions and such assumptions have been used by science from its beginnings in human history. They are still to be weighed logically as to discover if they are being or not. They are sometimes called 'primitive concepts' or primitive terms, intuitions, experiences, non-logical categories. I can't think off-hand at the moment any other terms. Negative demonstration is the one main way that I know of. Also they are assumptions so are sometimes, by appearances, simply accepted because they are that self-evident. Yet that wouldn't mean that in time they wouldn't be scientifically rejected. It could happen, but what is self-evident are used as the first principles in which all logical deductions within any field of study rely upon. And as long as those first principles are providing fruitful logical deductions that are accurate there wouldn't readily be a reason to get rid of them.
I. Ryan: wilderness:I never saw one "certain desire" that was "just given" - a content expressed desire - in those quotes of Mises Remember this: So how do we stifle this infinite regression? We assume that an "ultimate given" exists: that new information completely independent to the rest of the information enters our minds in the form of "primary" or "ultimate" desires, which, incidentally, Mises refers to as "judgements of value". By the way, this "new information" is basically what people are referring to when they talk of "free will", "free choice", or whatever. -- If "ultimate desires" have no "content", that implies that "free will" does not exist. For the differing "content" of the "ultimate desires" is from where the "free will" originates.
wilderness:I never saw one "certain desire" that was "just given" - a content expressed desire - in those quotes of Mises
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You're right. I meant if we say X is ultimate given, then X has no content. Yet why accept an X, something that isn't even expressed? Why accept what isn't even present? You're right. I fumbled on that one.
That would only mean there are no content-free "ultimate givens". Yet obviously first principles, like the ones you bolded above, are content laden. To make a logical deduction it first involves the very act of free will or free choice or a judgment of value prior to any logical deduction to even take place. So those can't be logically deducted because an individual would have to use their own free-will, etc... in order to make the logical deductions. That's a good instance of negative demonstration.
Interesting, so where should we go from here?
I. Ryan:Interesting, so where should we go from here?
In regards to?
wilderness: In regards to?
No idea.
I. Ryan: wilderness: In regards to? No idea.
I looked at my post you initially responded to today, and all that comes to mind is I try to convey the idea to people that axioms are not logically deducted. I get people asking me to write premise-conclusions or syllogisms to prove what is self-evident and that seems to be the tricky part for some people. They want a logical deduction but axioms being more certain than syllogisms can't be put into syllogistic form. So even some people who are familiar with logic up to that point fall into the trap that what is self-evident has to be put into a premise-conclusion form. I did at one point in time. And if some people are looking for syllogisms and thinking they are pretty smart by asking somebody to show them a premise-conclusion, but the other person doesn't have a syllogism to show them, well, thinking that they are pretty smart people for being able to ask for a syllogism, thinking they've thought of it all before everybody else, then say they've proven that what is self-evident/axioms are therefore bogus (whichever the axiom is). They feel they've somehow refuted something, but now that I know what an axiom is I think back at how absurd it would be to even ask for a syllogism in the first place for something that is self-evident. I remember trying to find logical deductions of axioms before, and now think how foolish I was.
To get people to realize that what is empirical and aprior, that these two are parts to a whole called science and correctly judged common sense.
Have you read the post in my signature?