Praxeology: Economics and Evolution

The foundation of the study of "evolution" is intention, albeit metaphoric intention. The evolutionists assert that "replicators", or the "survival machines" carrying the replicators, "try", "attempt", or "intend" to survive, that they "desire" to not go extinct, but, ultimately, that these assertions are merely "metaphoric" or "convenient":

From "The Selfish Gene" by Richard Dawkins Chapter 4:

One of the most striking properties of survival-machine behaviour is its apparent purposiveness. By this I do not just mean that it seems to be well calculated to help the animal's genes to survive, although of course it is. I am talking about a closer analogy to human purposeful behaviour. When we watch an animal 'searching' for food, or for a mate, or for a lost child, we can hardly help imputing to it some of the subjective feelings we ourselves experience when we search. These may include 'desire' for some object, a 'mental picture' of the desired object, an 'aim' or 'end in view'. Each one of us knows, from the evidence of our own introspection, that, at least in one modern survival machine, this purposiveness has evolved the property we call 'consciousness'. I am not philosopher enough to discuss what this means, but fortunately it does not matter for our present purposes because it is easy to talk about machines that behave as if motivated by a purpose, and to leave open the question whether they actually are conscious.

Now, and, granted, this might appear as random, the 'reason' why states tend to take control of the provision of education, to establish a compulsory, territorial monopoly of such, is to establish an arm of systematic indoctrination of their subjects into believing that the existence of they, the state, are necessary, 'good', expedient, or whatever. But, contrary to what, at first glance, that proposition probably looks like, it is not a conspiracy theory. For whether or not it is true does not depend on whether or not the people of the state actually, 'consciously' have those intentions; indeed, even if we assume that none of them have those intentions, that every last one of them believe that they are great 'benefactors' of their subjects, intends to 'do good' and only that, the soundness of the proposition is not compromised.

The usual pretext, or ostensible reason, and, indeed, per the previous passage, we able even able to assume, the literal intention of the people of states, of establishing compulsory, territorial monopolies of the provision of education is to provide a sort of "equal opportunity" to "the people", to provide the rich, the poor, and all other classes the "equal opportunity" to "get ahead" in life. But, as we all know, because such systems of education are compulsory, territorial monopolies, institutions not subject to direct competition, the "education" that it will provide will be stream-lined, unvaried, and skewed in the direction of the ideologies, whims, and feelings of the the feelings of the people of which they are an arm, the state.

Now, whether we assume that these people are 'evil' or not, liars or not, we have to assume that the majority of them are 'friends of the state', that the majority of them are either (a) 'evil' people prepared to tell what what they believe are lies, to maintain their power, that is, that of the state, or (b) 'good' people prepared to tell what they believe is the truth, that is, that the state is a great 'benefactor'; either way, we have to assume that the 'revealed' ideologies and feelings of these people have to lean toward pro-statism, whether or not they are lying. For, if they did not, if the majority of them were, like, for example, Ron Paul is, anti-statism, it is plain that the state would get dismantled quickly.

Now these are the conclusions of the above two passages:

1. Compulsory, territorial monopolies, those of the provision of education, law, order, or any other thing, tend to be stream-lined, unvaried, and skewed toward the ideologies, whims, and feelings of those of which they are an arm, the state.
2. The majority of the people of states are, through their actions, pro-statism.

What follows from those two conclusions is the implication that, if a state establishes such a monopoly, it will tend, in general, to 'express' pro-statist ideologies and feelings.

Now the people of a state, as parasites, have to be the minority in their territory; and, because of that, to keep their power, they have to seek the peaceful consent of the majority, which consists of pro-statist ideologies and feelings in the heads of their subjects.[1]

Similarly, these are the conclusions of the above two passages:

1. Compulsory, territorial monopolies of the provision of education established by states tend, in general, to express pro-statist ideologies and feelings.
2. The people of states have to rely on the consent of their subjects in the form of pro-statist ideologies and feelings.

What follows from those two conclusions is the implication that the states which are the 'fittest to survive', those which will tend to exist for long periods of time and propagate their techniques, are those which take control of their system of education and establish such a monopoly. For such a monopoly spreads exactly what they need to spread to survive, pro-statist propaganda.

So, whatever the literal intentions of the people of states, one of the metaphoric intentions of states themselves are to take control of the system of education to increase their chances of survival. But, as Mises said, economics refers always to the individual; its foundation is the literal intentions of the involved individuals. So I guess that this, what I just explained, is not economics although it might use some parts of it; for it refers to 'metaphoric' intention, like what Dawkins was explaining; and, for that reason, we might want to call this a sort of study of the 'evolution' of 'institutions' or something.

One more thing: Now that I explained of all this, it might be easy to infer the significance of this quotation:[2]

David Friedman, "The Machinery of Freedom", Appendix 2:

Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). An explanation of evolutionary biology and sociobiology--the economics of genes. One of the most interesting books I have read in recent years.

[1] I did not really make much of an effort to prove that one; for Hume, Mises, Hoppe, Rothbard, and basically all other "Austrian" people maintain it. To hear a fuller argument, look especially at the ten lecture series of Hoppe, apparently based on a book that he is writing right now, called "Economics, Society, and History".

[2] From the back of "The Machinery of Freedom" by David Friedman, Appendix 2. In that, he provided a few short comments about a few books, one of which is that. The boldfaced print was not in the original.

I.Ryan

Thank you for this thought provoking post.

The totality of your post highlights possibly THE  problem of the social sciences, one that has not been adequately dealt with, and one that is preventing the social sciences from making further progress.

Consider the quote you have provided from Dawkins:

"One of the most striking properties of survival-machine behaviour is its apparent purposiveness. By this I do not just mean that it seems to be well calculated to help the animal's genes to survive, although of course it is. I am talking about a closer analogy to human purposeful behaviour. When we watch an animal 'searching' for food, or for a mate, or for a lost child, we can hardly help imputing to it some of the subjective feelings we ourselves experience when we search. These may include 'desire' for some object, a 'mental picture' of the desired object, an 'aim' or 'end in view'. Each one of us knows, from the evidence of our own introspection, that, at least in one modern survival machine, this purposiveness has evolved the property we call 'consciousness'. I am not philosopher enough to discuss what this means, but fortunately it does not matter for our present purposes because it is easy to talk about machines that behave as if motivated by a purpose, and to leave open the question whether they actually are conscious."

Here, Dawkins is making similar insights to those of Hayek in "The Facts of the Social Sciences" and  John Searle in Minds, Brains, and Science.  But as we can see, after having made a number of important insights that point to a line of theoretical investigation, he turns away from any further steps in this direction, and heads back to the safety familiar concepts (machines).

He notes that the purposiveness we observe in nature is or may be only apparent, that when we make these observations, we impute our own subjective feelings, and that in the end, we each know of only one "survival machine" (one consciousness) by direct evidence.

After making these important insights, he then admits he doesn't know what it all adds up to, or points to, but that it doesn't matter, since his primary interest is in applying the concepts of consciousness to mechanical devices.

But what if the insights Dawkins makes in his passage imply that the attempt to understand extended nature in terms of consciousness categories must always result in an inconsistent, incoherent, or meaningless theory ?

Dawkins says in effect: "I don't know what these insights mean, but that doesn't matter, since we can talk about machines as if they are conscious."

But what if the insights mean we cannot talk (meaningfully) about machines as if they were conscious?

 

Dawkins skates right over this question. 

There is something subtle in his statement.  He says we can leave open the question of whether a machine "is" or "is not" conscious.  He phrases this as an "ontological" or "empirical" question that might in principle be answered by natural science.

But supposing consciousness is imputed to nature by the observing subject, how will the subject conduct an empirical or natural-scientific investigation to ascertain whether or not a machine or any other part of observed nature is conscious ?

In this case, mustn't the conscious subject have decided "a priori" whether or not it is possible to find "consciousness" amongst the objects of his own consciousness?  (whether or not it is possible to find consciousness out there amongst, or inside of, objects in nature)

If I believe there is consciousness "out there," then I will continue looking for it regardless of the empirical evidence.  Observable evidence of consciousness may be just around the corner.

On the other hand, if I believe there is something problematic with this idea, then I may take another approach besides empirical investigation.  Instead, I may try to investigate what it means to believe that the objects of my consciousness are themselves conscious.  This will be an investigation essentially different from that of trying to locate consciousness among the objects of my consciousness.  Instead of an empirical or natural-scientific investigation, I may conduct a logical or analytical investigation. 

In this type of investigation or approach, we might suppose that for the individual actor (individual consciousness) another actor or consciousness is or is not "present" and try to demonstrate the implications of this by logical analysis.  This is the same kind of analysis underlying the law of marginal utility, whereby we suppose that an actor comes into possession of an additional unit of supply.  The law of marginal utility is not based on observation or empirical studies, it is based on reflection upon the structure of, and the recurring patterns of, action.

But this kind of investigation is the kind that is almost always shied away from right at the point where the thinker in question has made important insights which could form the basis for further logical investigations into the structure of human action.

Schutz does the same thing.  In the first 97 pages of The Phenomenology of the Social World, he makes a number of important insights about the structure of human action.  Then on page 98 he writes the following:

"We must, then, leave unsolved the notoriously difficult problems which surround the constitution of the Thou within the subjectivity of private experience.  We are not going to be asking, therefore, how the Thou is constituted in an Ego, whether the concept of "human being" presupposes a transcendental ego in which the transcendental alter ego is already constituted, or how universally valid intersubjective knowledge is possible.  As important as these questions may be for epistemology and, therefore, for the social sciences, we may safely leave them aside in the present work."

Though it may be difficult for some to see, here Schutz is touching on the same issue that Dawkins is touching on.  This is the problem of how the secondary consciousness appears, or may be said to appear, or can have coherent meaning, from the point of view of the primary consciousness.  Schutz is basically saying: "I'm not even going to try to answer that."   This is what Dawkins is saying too.

But this is the problem that needs solving for logical-analytical social science (praxeology) to advance. 

If this problem isn't solved, then we are invariably lead to a theory which treats "other consciousnesses" as having a spatio-temporal existence.  This means treating consciousness as something that exists in the same way that ordinary objects exist; as something that has a spatial location.

And this means treating consciousness according to the method of treating spatially related objects: empirical science and its formal compliment: mathematics.

When we "naturalize" consciousness (consider consciousness as an aspect or attribute of nature), we thereby "place" consciousness in a spatial "location".

Husserl, in the important essay "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," brought our attention to the fact that our intellectual and scientific culture was attempting to "naturalize" consciousness:

"Characteristic of all forms of extreme and consistent naturalism, from popular naturalism to the most recent forms of sensation-monism and energism, is on the one hand the naturalizing of consciousness, including all intentionally immanent data of consciousness, and on the other the naturalizing of ideas and consequently of all absolute ideals and norms."

Today, we may call this "empiricism" or "positivism," but these are essentially the same thing: the idea that valid science only treats objects and processes that are publicly observable.

For social science to advance, the problem of other minds has to be solved by the same method that Menger, Mises, and Hayek were practicing when they were practicing theoretical exact science, praxeology, and the Pure Logic of Choice.  There will have to be a logical analysis of the structure of action that attempts to provide an understanding of how a secondary consciousness impacts the individual actor, in the very same way that the law of marginal utility provides an understanding of how coming into the possession of an additional unit of supply impacts the individual actor.

There will have to be a logical analysis of how another consciousness impacts the "satisfaction" or "dissatisfaction" of the actor, as opposed to an empirical-mathematical  analysis that attempts to treat another consciousness as an aspect of spatial nature (treating other consciousnesses as "empirico-realistic" objects spatially related in extended nature).

In my judgment, this means that the phenomenological strain of Austrian thought needs greater attention and recognition, as opposed to the "realistic" or "causal" strain.  Austrian social analysis needs to develop its phenomenological roots, not its "realistic" or "causal" roots.  What is needed is not a "realistic" treatment of consciousness (which would have to be based on observation), but instead a phenomenological analysis of consciousness.

This would be a Misesian approach.

"The scope of praxeology is the explication of the category of human action.  All that is needed for the deduction of all praxeological theorems is knowledge of the essence of human action.....The only way to a cognition of these theorems is logical analysis of our inherent knowledge of the category of action.  We must bethink ourselves and reflect upon the structure of human action.  Like logic and mathematics, praxeological knowledge is in us; it does not come from without." (HA, 3rd rev. p.64)

As Mises wrote:

"The importance of phenomenology for the solution of the epistemological problems of praxeology has not been noticed at all." (Money, Method, and the Market Process, p.19)

Arguably the most important epistemological problem of praxeology has to do with "the constitution of the Thou within the subjectivity of private experience."  (the problem of other minds)

As long as this problem remains theoretically inverted-----as long as we continue to conceive of other minds (as opposed to brains) as objects in extended space (e.g., "metaphoric intention"; the attempt to apply the categories of consciousness to objects of consciousness)-----we will continue to overlook the phenomenological solution to this age-old problem, and we will thus continue to relegate study of the realm of consciousness to natural science, empiricism, and mathematics.

 

Adam Knott:

But what if the insights Dawkins makes in his passage imply that the attempt to understand extended nature in terms of consciousness categories must always result in an inconsistent, incoherent, or meaningless theory?

Dawkins says in effect: "I don't know what these insights mean, but that doesn't matter, since we can talk about machines as if they are conscious."

But what if the insights mean we cannot talk (meaningfully) about machines as if they were conscious?

The only two choices are (a) to look at it from the perspective of causality or (b) to look at it from the perspective of teleology:

Ludwig von Mises:

There are for man only two principles available for a mental grasp of reality, namely, those of teleology and causality. What cannot be brought under either of these categories is absolutely hidden to the human mind. An event not open to an interpretation by one of these two principles is for man inconceivable and mysterious. Change can be conceived as the outcome either of the operation of mechanistic causality or of purposeful behavior; for the human mind there is no third way available.[11] It is true, as has already been mentioned, that teleology can be viewed as a variety of causality. But the establishment of this fact does not annul the essential differences between the two categories

So, if you doubt that it makes sense to look at it from the perspective of teleology, you have to question whether it makes sense to look at it from the other perspective, that of causality. Now, if we adopt the point of viem of pragmatics, which, I believe, is, like with induction, the only one available, we find that, for problems like this, teleology works and mere causality is sterile:

Ludwig von Mises:

But it is precisely when we accept this pragmatic point of view that the emptiness of the panphysicalist dogma becomes manifest. Science, as has been pointed out above, has not succeeded in solving the problems of the mind-body relations. The panphysicalists certainly cannot contend that the procedures they recommend have ever worked in the field of interhuman relations and of the social sciences. But it is beyond doubt that the principle according to which an Ego deals with every human being as if the other were a thinking and acting being like himself has evidenced its usefulness both in mundane life and in scientific research. It cannot be denied that it works.

It is beyond doubt that the practice of considering fellow men as beings who think and act as I, the Ego, do has turned out well; on the other hand the prospect seems hopeless of getting a similar pragmatic verification for the postulate requiring them to be treated in the same manner as the objects of the natural sciences. The epistemological problems raised by the comprehension of other people's behavior are no less intricate than those of causality and incomplete induction. It may be admitted that it is impossible to provide conclusive evidence for the propositions that my logic is the logic of all other people and by all means absolutely the only human logic and that the categories of my action are the categories of all other people's action and by all means absolutely the categories of all human action. However, the pragmatist must remember that these propositions work both in practice and in science, and the positivist must not overlook the fact that in addressing his fellow men he presupposes--tacitly and implicitly--the intersubjective validity of logic and thereby the reality of the realm of the alter Ego's thought and action, of his eminent human character.

[...]

If we do not transcend the realm of reason and experience, we cannot help acknowledging that our fellow men act. We are not free to disregard this fact for the sake of a fashionable prepossession and an arbitrary opinion. Daily experience proves not only that the sole suitable method for studying the conditions of our nonhuman environment is provided by the category of causality; it proves no less convincingly that our fellow men are acting beings as we ourselves are. For the comprehension of action there is but one scheme of interpretation and analysis available, namely, that provided by the cognition and analysis of our own purposeful behavior.

Now I know that, in the above, he is discussing analyzing the movements of other humans, not of animals or institutions, but I think that the same principle, that as pragmatics, applies. For, although we tend to assume that other people are conscious, interestingly, I do not think that whether or not we do so alters our theories, methods, or whatever. For I think that, like my belief that induction makes sense or that my mind mirrors a "reality", my belief that other people are conscious is just faith, faith which has no place in science; the only thing that science is able to establish in connection with these questions is that, if I, or we, assume that they make sense, my, or our, quests are more "successful", in other words, we see, to use the language of pragmatics, that it "works". So, just like induction, assuming that other people are conscious, and, more to the point, assuming that animals, or even institutions like states, are conscious, "works"; we may, like Dawkins pointed out, "leave open" the question of whether or not they are conscious, and, indeed, of whether or not posing that question even makes sense.

Adam Knott:

If this problem isn't solved, then we are invariably lead to a theory which treats "other consciousnesses" as having a spatio-temporal existence.  This means treating consciousness as something that exists in the same way that ordinary objects exist; as something that has a spatial location.

In this thread, as a part of my original post, I wrote:

I. Ryan:

Now it is not possible to "observe" the consciousness of other people, it is not possible to "see" choices, value, or any other thing like that; it is possible only to "observe" your own consciousness, form an idea of it, and then make the assumption that other people work in a similar way. (Our only reason why, our only "justification", of the "faith" that other people are conscious is, to use the language of pragmatics, because it "works", because, under that assumption, we are able to make sense of the movements of other people, but, not under it, we are not.) So the method of economics, to use the vocabulary of Hume, should be (a) to observe, experience, and create a systematic understanding of the workings of your internal world, which is "pure praxeology" is, and then (b) to assume that other people, in moving around, work in the same way, which is "applied praxeology" or, in most cases, "economics".

So, with that said, I do not understand why you are saying that my approach, or, for that matter, that of any other person using the categories of teleology to make sense of the movements of things in their external world, implies that they are "treat[ing] "other consciousnesses" as having a spatio-temporal existence". People assumed that "atoms" existed long before they ever proved that they did; the reason why they did that was that, in assuming that these structures existed, they were able to create a model which was able to predict the movements of things which they were able to observe very well, again, to use the language of pragmatics, because it "worked". So, what Dawkins is doing is similar; it does not matter whether or not he "proves" that they are "conscious"; what matters is that, in assuming that they are, he creates a model that "works". The other side of the coin, by the way, is what Mises is describing is this passage:

Ludwig von Mises:

The much discussed question whether physical objects can or cannot be conceived as existing independently of the mind is vain. For thousands of years the minds of physicians did not perceive germs and did not divine their existence. But the success or failure of their endeavors to preserve their patients' health and lives depended on the way germs influenced or did not influence the functioning of the patients' bodily organs. The germs were real because they conditioned the outcome of events either by interfering or by not interfering, either by being present in or by being absent from the field.

Also, it might even be unfair to imply that they are "treat[ing] "other consciousnesses" as" anything at all:

Richard Dawkins:

I am not philosopher enough to discuss what this means, but fortunately it does not matter for our present purposes because it is easy to talk about machines that behave as if motivated by a purpose, and to leave open the question whether they actually are conscious.

He is just saying this, "if I assume that they are conscious, whatever that means, I am able to understand their movements, and, if I assume that they are not, I am not, nothing more, nothing less".

Haha, who rated my thread at 1 star? Reveal yourself!

I. Ryan:

Thank you for your engagement.

I think I can demonstrate the issue using the passages you have provided here.

Consider the passage you provide from Mises:

"There are for man only two principles available for a mental grasp of reality, namely, those of teleology and causality. What cannot be brought under either of these categories is absolutely hidden to the human mind. An event not open to an interpretation by one of these two principles is for man inconceivable and mysterious. Change can be conceived as the outcome either of the operation of mechanistic causality or of purposeful behavior; for the human mind there is no third way available."

Now consider the following example which I have used in previous writings and posts:

A person walks into a park and sees a bronze statue.  As he nears the statue he realizes that it is a person who has painted himself bronze and is posing as a statue.  As he gets even closer, he realizes again that no, it is actually a bronze statue, not a person posing as a statue.

Now let's go back to Mises's passage.  Mises writes:

"An event not open to an interpretation by one of these two principles is for man inconceivable and mysterious."

By our very presuppositions, an event, or several events, have definitely happened.  In one event, the person changed from believing a statue was before him to believing another person (another consciousness) was before him.  In another event, the person changed from believing another person was before him (another consciousness) to believing a statue was before him.  So here we have a series of events.

And Mises is saying that for the interpretation of these events, there are only two possible approaches: causality or teleology.

Does this mean that we must conceive these events as due to either the actions of another person in the park or vicinity, or, due to a causal chain of events in, on, or around the statue or the person who sees the statue?

We have supposed an event.  There is nothing particularly unrealistic about this event.  It is a "real" event.   According to the passage you provided by Mises, there are only two principles available for a mental grasp of this event: causality and teleology.  Then, does this mean that another person with goals is responsible for this event?  (maybe another person somewhere in the park?)  Or does it mean that there was a causal chain of events happening to the statue or the observer that caused this event? (atomic or physical events happening in the park and around the statue or observer that caused this event?)

I don't think this is a fruitful application or interpretation of Mises's passage.    Instead of trying to apply teleology or causality to the "objectively conceived" event (on the assumption that something happened in "external" nature), we can try to apply these two approaches to the "subjective" event---the event that is occurring or has occurred for the individual subject; the individual actor.

Continuing, now Mises's passage will take on a different meaning:

"Change can be conceived as the outcome either of the operation of mechanistic causality or of purposeful behavior"

Now we are talking about the "subjective" event, the event that is occurring or has occurred for the individual subject; the individual actor.  And we have the principle that the change or event we have assumed in our example is the outcome of the operation of mechanistic causality or of purposeful behavior.

What is the obvious conclusion we must draw?    It is that if we do not consider the events or changes we have supposed, to be the result of mechanistic causality, we must consider them the result of, or as a function of, the purposeful behavior of the actor himself.

In other words, the purposeful behavior (teleology) that we will be relating to this supposed or posited subjective event, is the purposeful behavior of the actor himself, not the purposeful behavior of another actor or mind in nature.

We are relating the subjective event to the teleology (the purposefulness) of the actor himself.

*****

To see what I'm trying to get at, consider the law of marginal utility.   The law of marginal utility does not refer to an "objective" event.  It refers to an event whereby an actor believes, or is of the opinion that, he has come into an additional unit of supply.  The value that an actor attaches to the units of his supply is a function not of his "objective" supply, and not of the purposefulness of another assumed actor, but a function of his subjective belief or opinion that another unit of supply is in, or has come into, his possession.  The logical correlate "value" is a correlate of the actor's subjective experience of a "supply".   The correlate "value" for an individual actor, is not conceived to result from the objective quality or state of things (the "actual" state of physical or tangible reality), nor from the purposefulness of another actor.  The correlate "value" is a conceived relation to the actor's subjective "supply." (the law of marginal utility refers not to an actor's supply as it "exists objectively" and not to an actor's supply as another person estimates or views it, but the actor's supply as he himself views it)

As Hayek writes:

"It is important to remember that the so-called "data," from which we set out in this sort of analysis, are....all facts given to the person in question, the things as they are known to (or believed by) him to exist, and not, strictly speaking, objective facts."  ("Economics and Knowledge")

Then we have a law of action:  Every time an actor comes into possession of a [unit of supply]---(this considered in the subjective sense)---this has X correlate or impact on the [value] he attaches to his supply or units thereof.

I.e, to the "event" that is coming into a unit of supply for the subject, (not an "objective" event, nor an event for him as seen by another), an inescapable correlate is attached, having to do with "value" for the subject.   The law is: when such and such happens to your supply, then such and such will happen to "your" value.  And this has no relation to physical processes or to the opinions and beliefs of another person.

*****

If you look back at the example whereby a person walks into a park, and changes back and forth from a subjective belief that another person (mind or consciousness) is before him, to a subjective belief that another person (mind or consciousness) is not before him, then, given what has just been noted regarding the law of marginal utility, a simple question emerges:

Are we to conceive that while there is a correlate in individual action that attaches to the individual's subjective belief that he has come into possession of a unit of supply, there is no correlate in individual action that attaches to his subjective belief that another consciousness is before him?

In other words, when one subjective event occurs, there is an inescapable "subjective" correlate to this event.  When an actor believes he is in possession of an additional unit of supply, there is a necessary consequence or logical implication to this event having to do with his subjective value or subjective valuing.  But yet when an actor believes another consciousness is before him, there is no necessary consequence or logical implication to this event??

****

In the passages you provide, Mises writes:

"For the comprehension of action there is but one scheme of interpretation and analysis available, namely, that provided by the cognition and analysis of our own purposeful behavior."

This is the same notion Mises expresses and which I quoted in the previous post:

"All that is needed for the deduction of all praxeological theorems is knowledge of the essence of human action....The only way to a cognition of these theorems is logical analysis of our inherent knowledge of the category of human action.  We must bethink ourselves and reflect upon the structure of human action.  Like logic and mathematics, praxeological knowledge is in us; it does not come from without."

According to Mises, the procedure of praxeology and economics is deductive reasoning based on reflection upon the nature and structure of action.  Specifically, deductive reasoning based on reflection upon the nature and structure of our own purposeful behavior and our own inherent knowledge of action.

This is the basis of the law of marginal utility.  The law of marginal utility is not based on observations of other people coming into supplies of various goods, nor is it based on the empirical science of physical processes.  It is based on an analysis of our own individual action whereby or wherein we realize that there is a "regularity" or a regular pattern (in our own action) that has to do with "supply" and "value" within our action.  We recognize a pattern recurs to the effect that the more of something we have, the less we tend to value it.  And economics and praxeology formulate this in more rigorous terms.

But again, the law does not refer to my "objective" supply (the physical volume or mass of things in proximity to my body), and it does not refer to my supply as others may believe it to be or estimate it.  It refers to my "subjective supply," my supply as I believe it to be.

The law of marginal utility, if we subscribe to Austrian economics, is scientific, and yet it states a relation of two "subjective" entities: the actor's (subjective) supply and a (subjective) value he attaches to his supply or units of his supply.

Thus, I cannot entirely agree with this statement:

"my belief that other people are conscious is just faith, faith which has no place in science"

To be accurate, the question I am concerned with is not whether a person believes that people in general, as a matter of speculation, are conscious.  The question I am concerned with is whether a person (an individual actor) believes that before him in the specific case is another consciousness.

Analogously, as an Austrian social theorist, I am not concerned with whether a person admits that in general he has supplies of things.   The question I am concerned with, and what forms the basis of the law of marginal utility, is whether in the specific case, a person believes he is in possession of an additional unit of supply.   If so, then the law of marginal utility applies.

If I believe that I have come into a unit of supply, then this is not a faith that has no place in science.  On the contrary, my belief that I have come into an additional unit of supply is the basis for possibly the most important social scientific law yet formulated.

Similarly, if I believe that another consciousness is before me, this is not a faith that has no place in science.  On the contrary, it is an "act" or "event" of my action which it is the task of praxeology to instruct upon with regard to its logical correlates, just as praxeology instructs on the logical correlates of my coming into an additional unit of supply (again, as this appears to me, not as it is "objectively" or as other people judge it)

That is, the "event" which is another consciousness appearing within my action (as I subjectively consider it or believe it), is just as much and just as little an "event" as that of my coming into a supply of a unit of something.  These events are not "objective" events of the natural sciences (or, we do not conceive them this way in praxeology), and they are not publicly observable events or events as other people may consider them (or, we do not conceive them this way in praxeology), rather, these events are events happening for the individual subject.  They are events considered from the point of view of strict methodological individualism and strict methodological subjectivism.

"Action is the search for improvement of conditions from the point of view of the personal value judgments of the individual concerned." (The Free Market and Its Enemies, p.14)  

Our analysis is conducted entirely from the point of view of the individual actor, and not from the point of view of "objective reality" or of another person or observer.

****

Regarding your question:

"I do not understand why you are saying that my approach, or, for that matter, that of any other person using the categories of teleology to make sense of the movements of things in their external world, implies that they are "treat[ing] "other consciousnesses" as having a spatio-temporal existence"."

What I'm driving at is the following:

Your previous post dealt with the idea of metaphoric intention.  Dawkins was applying metaphoric intention to machines, and you were speaking of metaphoric intention as it applies to the state.  In both cases, the idea is applying the concepts of consciousness (which we directly experience) to other entities where the scientific basis, or at least the epistemological basis, for doing so is open to question. 

Why do we revert to metaphoric intention in these cases?  Because there are social phenomena or human phenomena (phenomena of intention) for which we do not have an adequate scientific explanation.  We attempt to fill the gap in our comprehension of the phenomena of intentionality by reverting to what you described as metaphoric intention---applying the concept of intentionality beyond the scope of what we believe is its proper or scientific applicability.

We are forced to do this, I assume, because we see no other way to deal with these phenomena other than by resorting to:

1.  Physical causality (absent teleology)

2.  Metaphoric intentionality (where we apply teleology to entities or phenomena without a sound scientific or epistemological basis)

Physical causality is unsatisfactory since it eliminates the intentionality that we strongly intuit is operant.

Metaphoric intentionality is unsatisfactory since it attempts to impute intentionality to collectives (the state) or to physical or biological systems which are observable (and thus in the domain of what we consider legitimate science), but where the intentionality or consciousness is not observable, rendering these latter phenomena an "un-scientific" aspect or component of an otherwise scientific undertaking.

Thus, science is "stalled out" at this stage of analysis.  We have a formal/logical analysis of human intentionality (Austrian school social thought) that applies to the economic phenomenon (i.e, "market" phenomenon) of an individual coming into a supply of a unit of a good. (law of marginal utility)

But when we try to move beyond this, and when the objects of an actor's action are not units of supply, but other consciousnesses, we are at a loss for comprehension, because now we must either revert to physical science or the approach of metaphoric intention.

And what I'm arguing is that the reason science is stalled-out at this stage, is because we have not undertaken the same kind of analysis that Menger undertook with respect to an individual actor coming into an additional unit of supply.....to the case where the individual actor comes to have another consciousness before him.

That is, we have not considered the idea of analyzing human action with respect to the presence or absence of another consciousness within the acting reality of the individual actor.  We haven't searched for the logical correlate that may be implied by the event which is another consciousness entering the acting reality of the individual actor.  We have stopped our analysis after we formulated a law of action in terms of the individual actor coming into a supply of some economic good.   We considered the logical ramifications in individual action of coming into the supply of a unit, and then ceased further formal analysis of individual action, as if all that we need to know, and as if all the logical correlates we can establish, can be understood in terms of "units of a good" or "units of a supply."

In other words, and speaking loosely, we have not attempted to demonstrate the correlates in individual action, when the "unit of supply" that the actor comes into, is not some material or marketable object, but instead the consciousness of another actor.

We have mis-interpreted the meaning of praxeology as a formal analysis of human economic action, wherein we speak of "units of supply" or "units of a good" (terms and concepts developed by economics and catallactics as the study of market phenomena).  We have thus missed the essence of praxeology as the formal analysis of all aspects of human action, one aspect of which is obviously social action or social interaction---action directed toward another consciousness.  (when the object of my action is not a unit of supply, but instead another consciousness)

What I'm arguing is that our scientific understanding of intentionality is not advancing because every time we turn to the subject of other minds (other consciousnesses), we either conceive that another consciousness is some sort of physical process (Searle), or we conceive that another consciousness is an attribute of or in physical objects such as animals or humans (what Dawkins is dealing with).

We thus fail to consider the idea of analyzing another consciousness as an event or object of the individual actor's action. 

When it comes to economic or marketable units of supply, we conceive these as they exist subjectively for the individual actor, not as they are "in reality" or as other observers see it, and we establish, by formal analysis, the logical correlate or logical implications of the supposition that an actor obtains a unit of supply.

But when it comes to another consciousness, we abandon the attempt to consider another consciousness as it may appear subjectively for the individual actor, and we abandon any attempt to establish, by formal analysis, the logical correlate or logical implications of the supposition that  for the individual actor, another actor (consciousness, mind, etc.) has "come into view."

Thus, we are driven back, again and again, to providing explanations in terms of physical processes or in terms of metaphoric intention.

I will close here with an important passage written by Kirzner, at a time when he was under the direct influence of Mises. (and it seems all of Mises's students made their best insights when they were still under his instruction or in close contact with him)

"Economic theory has traditionally dealt with the phenomena of the market, prices, production, and monetary calculation.  In these spheres of human activity, theorists have developed constructions that help to explain the regularities these phenomena evince and bring to clear focus the tendencies for change in these phenomena consequent upon given autonomous changes in the data.  Writers on economics have striven to present precise definitions of the scope of this discipline.  From the point of view of praxeology, the earlier attempts suffered from their tendency to seek for the defining criteria in the nature of the specific affairs with which market phenomena are concerned.......The subject matter of economics came to be connected with the material things that are the objects of traffic in the market; it came to be linked peculiarily with the use of money in market transactions or with the specific social relationships that characterize the market system.  Where writers came closest to the recognition that these criteria were only accidental characteristics of the affairs upon which economic analysis could be brought to bear, where they were able to glimpse the congenerousness of the specifically economic type of analysis which the underlying actions of men, they were unable to follow this clue to the conclusion to which it pointed.  Precisely because those features in action that made it susceptible to economic analysis seemed common to all human activities, these writers were driven back to look for some other defining characteristic.  And this meant again the search for some arbitrary quality to justify selecting the particular slice of pie that made up economic theory; but it meant in addition the relegation yet further into the background of the true recipe of that larger pie from which their conception of economics was being arbitrarily hacked." (The Economic Point of View, p.182-183)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

As a follow up, I would like to provide a more succinct account of the above ideas.

 

If we assume that we, as individual actors, do not observe the consciousness of others, then the following general situation exists:

1.  The physical scientist, on the supposition that other consciousnesses exist in nature, looks for signs of their existence in the movements of particles and in physical-biological processes.

2.  The empirical social scientist, on the supposition that other consciousnesses exist in nature, looks for signs of their existence in the movements and sounds of other men and animals, as well as in things such as ink on paper (written words, prices, etc., which are interpreted as deriving from other minds).

What both these approaches have in common, is that they suppose that the consciousnesses or minds of others exist in spatial locations, and they search for the signs of those consciousnesses or minds also in spatial locations.

As these approaches interpret other minds as sub-systems or parts of spatial and physical nature, therefore they naturally seek for the implications of this also in spatial or physical nature.  As they consider other minds as belonging to the world of particles in fields of force interacting over time, then they seek for the "effects" or "consequences" or "implications" of this.....also in terms of particles in fields of force interacting over time.

And thus the physical scientist interprets various physical processes as resulting from, or as a sign of, other minds, and the empirical social scientist interprets bodily movements and ink on paper as resulting from, or as a sign of, other minds.

Since they suppose other minds to be parts of nature, they seek for the "correlate" of "implication" of this fact in nature (in the movements of objects in space).

The conceptual framework for this outlook is "longitude and latitude."    The conceptual framework for this outlook is the X and Y axis.  It is spatial location and the spatial relationship between one object and another.    If there is a consciousness at this place and time, we will see neuron firings at that place and time;  if there is a consciousness at this place and time, we will see x bodily movement or y ink marks on paper at that place and time. 

In this undertaking, we search for the meaning or consequence of our supposition of other consciousnesses, amongst the objects of our own consciousness.  We "place" (or attempt to place) or "locate" (or attempt to locate) other minds as part of extended nature, and then naturally seek for the implications of having done so also in extended nature. 

****

The conceptual framework in praxeology is not longitude and latitude, or the X and Y axis, or spatial location. Praxeology does not begin with a system of positional coordinates, nor with a classification of the physical characteristics of the objects of experience.

The conceptual framework in praxeology is a state experienced by an actor and a desire for a different state.  This binary system does not refer to the position of things in relation to other things.  Praxeology doesn't relate a thing to a thing, but rather a had thing to a want.

We can possibly phrase this conception of things in many ways.  But all of the ways of phrasing it will exhibit the same essential characteristics:

On the one hand there is an object of the actor's action, and on the other hand there is some "attitude" of the actor in relation to this object, which attitude is yet, not an object.

There is supply (object) and demand (attitude)

There is supply (object) and value (attitude)

There is means (object) and end or purpose (attitude)

There is the situation the actor is faced with (object) and his desire or striving or aiming for a different situation (attitude)

The fundamental concepts of praxeology do not refer to the relationship between objects, but instead express a kind of attitude which an actor has in relation to the object of his action.   This attitude is not an object.  Or, more accurately, if we conceive that the actor's attitude (demand, value, desire, striving, etc.) is an object, then we begin an empirical study, wherein we conceive both the object of the actor's action, and his attitude, as objects.  Then we begin to examine the relationship between objects, and we are led back to a physical-empirical inquiry....

As praxeology is not an empirical approach, therefore the attitude of the actor toward the object of his action cannot be conceived as itself an object.

(This is why Hulsmann is correct in asserting that praxeology or Austrian theory is concerned with the relationship between the seen and the unseen.  Praxeology is concerned with the relationship between two fundamentally different categories.)

A simple way to express this idea is to conceive that whereas empiricism is concerned with the relationship between 1 and 1 (two categorically identical objects), praxeology is concerned with the relationship between 1 and 0, where "0" is conceived as categorically fundamentally different than "1".  E.g., the difference between presence and non-presence, material and immaterial, perceptible and nonperceptible., etc...

From these considerations, it follows that within the discipline of praxeology, when we suppose that another consciousness is present for the individual actor, the presence of this other consciousness will be classified within the categories of praxeology (the categories of action, not the categories of physical science), and thus another consciousness will be conceived either as an object of the actor's action or an attitude of the actor.

For the individual actor, another consciousness will be either a "supply" or a "situation" or a "state" or a "means" (i.e, an object), or it will be a "demand" or a "value" or a "desire" or a "striving" or a "purpose" or an "end". (i.e, an attitude).

Regardless of what words we use, if the theory of action is comprised of action categories, and if we suppose that for the individual actor another consciousness "appears" or is "present," the presence of this other consciousness will be conceived according to the categories of action.

 

*****

The main point is that the categories of praxeology are different from those of natural or empirical science.  The categories of praxeology refer to relations in or of individual action.  And thus any supposed object or event, such as another consciousness, is assigned to one of these categories.  In praxeology, any object and any implication of that object (any consequence, result, implication, co-presence, accompaniment, etc...) is an object and implication within individual action.   What are considered "objective events" in the theory of nature and in empiricism, are, in praxeology, conceived as either objects of the actor's action (e.g., means), or an attitude of the actor (e.g., value, purpose, end, etc..).

"It is of primary importance to realize that parts of the external world become means only through the operation of the human mind and its offshoot, human action.  External objects are as such only phenomena of the physical universe and the subject matter of the natural sciences.  It is human meaning and action which transforms them into means.  Praxeology does not deal with the external world, but with man's conduct with regard to it.  Praxeological reality is not the physical universe, but man's conscious reaction to the given state of this universe.  Economics is not about things and tangible material objects; it is about men, their meanings and actions.  Goods, commodities, and wealth and all the other notions of conduct are not elements of nature; they are elements of human meaning and conduct.  He who wants to deal with them must not look at the external world; he must search for them in the meaning of acting man." (HA, 3rd rev. p.92)

 

 

 

 

Adam Knott:

Does this mean that we must conceive these events as due to either the actions of another person in the park or vicinity, or, due to a causal chain of events in, on, or around the statue or the person who sees the statue?

[...]

According to the passage you provided by Mises, there are only two principles available for a mental grasp of this event: causality and teleology.  Then, does this mean that another person with goals is responsible for this event?  (maybe another person somewhere in the park?) Or does it mean that there was a causal chain of events happening to the statue or the observer that caused this event? (atomic or physical events happening in the park and around the statue or observer that caused this event?)

When Mises says that me have "only two principles available for a mental grasp of reality, namely, those of teleology and causality", he is probably just talking about how we understand events in the external world, not also about how we understand those of the internal world. To explain what I am talking about,

From "The Philosophy of David Hume" by Norman Kemp Smith:

Causal action, Hume points out, exhibits its effects on three different levels: in the purely physical sphere, as in the action of one billiard ball on another; in the pyschophysical sphere, in the action of body on mind, and of mind on body, as when changes in the body give rise to sensations in the mind, and when volition in the mind gives rise to movements in the limbs of the body; and thirdly, in the psychical domain, when the mind operates on itself, as when at will it raises a new idea in the imagination, or when some one passion operates on another.[1] In all three cases, on all three levels, Hume is careful to point out, we can observe in any one instance only sequence in time, and on the repetition of similar instances at most only invariableness in the sequence. Nor, Hume argues, is the nature of necessitation any more evident in the mental than in the physical realm. Thus when 'at will' we move a limb, though the movement comes as a fulfilment of the volition, it is not on that account, for us, more than a se-quence of detached events. For what immediately follows upon the volition is not what is willed, the movement of the limb, but something not willed at all, viz. changes in the animal spirits, and in certain muscles and nerves.

From "The Philosophy of David Hume" by Norman Kemp Smith, quoting "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding" by David Hume:

Can there be a more certain proof, that the power, by which this whole operation is performed, so far from being directly and fully known by an inward sentiment or consciousness is, to the last degree, mysterious and unintelligible? Here the mind wills a certain event. Immediately another event, unknown to ourselves, and totally different from the one intended, is produced: This event produces another, equally unknown: till at last, through a long succession, the desired event is produced. But if the original power were felt, it must be known: were it known, its effect also must be known; since all power is relative to its effect. And vice versa, if the effect be not known, the power cannot be known nor felt. How indeed can we be conscious of a power to move our limbs, when we have no such power; but only that to move certain animal spirits, which, though they produce at last the motion of our limbs, yet operate in such a manner as is wholly beyond our comprehension?[...] That their motion follows the command of the will is a matter of common experience, like other natural events: But the power or energy by which this is effected, like that in other natural events, is unknown and inconceivable.

So 'necessary connections', that is, 'causal connections', exist (a) among objects of the external world, like a hammer on a nail, (b) among objects of the internal world, like an idea on an emotion, or (b) between objects of the external world and those of the internal, like, on one hand, the volition on the limbs, or, on the other hand, light on the senses.

But, when, like what Mises is trying to do, you are trying to figure out the 'causes' of what is happening in the external world, you have only two choices, that is, (α) how objects of the internal world effect those of the external, which is what he calls "teleology", and (ß) how those of the external effect others of the external, which is what he calls "causality".

So, regarding the statue, because it is of the external world, we have to either (a) interpret it as a body 'controlled' by a mind 'choosing' to change itself in such a way, 'causing', either directly, as in that the mind is of the body, or, indirectly, as in that the mind is of an other body influencing the one body, it to remain steady, because of, on one hand, its 'end in view', and, on the other hand, its 'ideas' regarding how to meet that 'end in view', or (b) interpret it as a body 'controlled' by the 'blind' movement of an other body; that is, we have to interpret it with the tools of the natural sciences, what he calls "causality", or with the tools of the 'social' sciences, like economics, what he calls "teleology". To what we pay attention, whether it is a 'hypothetical' 'consciousness' of the statue or any other thing or whether it is the 'blind' movement of other bodies, depends on our knowledge of 'causal connections'; if we often see that a body moving in a certain way in relations to an other body, like a man holding a button down, while looking at the statue, from about 100 meters away, coincides with the 'statue' not moving at all, we might, as our first thought, decide to look around us, focusing on what looks like it is about such a distance away, to see whether any person is around, holding a "button" down. But, of course, in our daily lives, or, at least, in mine, we do not usually see such an account accompanying the immobility of a statue; what generally keeps them immobile is the lack of any sort of interference. So we, or, at least, I, would not check for such persons, but would instead just assume that not interference is occurring, that nothing is 'causing' it to fall, that, what the 'cause' of it standing is, is that nothing is 'causing' it to fall. But that was probably not the most worthwhile, or fruitful, tangent to embark on. Anyway!

Adam Knott:

By our very presuppositions, an event, or several events, have definitely happened.  In one event, the person changed from believing a statue was before him to believing another person (another consciousness) was before him.  In another event, the person changed from believing another person was before him (another consciousness) to believing a statue was before him.  So here we have a series of events.

What I see here is just the universality of a definite set of associations. On one hand, we associate using the method of "teleology" with fruitfully 'interpreting' the movements, or lack of such, of fellow humans, and using the other, that of "causality", with not, but, on the other hand, we associate using the method of "causality" with fruitfully 'interpreting' the movements, or lack of such, of statues, and other 'inanimate' objects, and using the other, "teleology", with not. We, in this case, at least, simply all happen to share the same, strong association. The fact that you interpret that such a person would, when they "see" that it is "a bronze statue", immediately "see" an 'unconscious' being, and, when they "see" that it is "a person who has painted himself bronze and is posing as a statue", immediately now "see" a 'conscious' being, is just a testament to the power of our associations, which, by quoting Hume, I will attempt to explain more fully; the next two quotations are of Hume, about associations of ideas; the second is from his "A Treatise of Human Nature", his first book, and the second is from his "Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding", which he supposed to be a restatement of his "Book I" of "A Treatise of Human Nature", which is where I got the second quotation. You do not have to read all of it; in fact, if you feel like you understand what he is saying, you might want to just skip ahead to where I continue writing, after the quotations, and later decide whether or not to go back to them, for they are very long. Also, if you do not understand what he is saying, which might happen, ask me to clarify; it is often quite difficult to quote authors in such a way that they make sense in the context of what one is writing. Anyway, here we go:

From "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding" by David Hume, "Section III", "Of the Association of Ideas":

It is evident that there is a principle of connexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity. In our more serious thinking or discourse this is so observable that any particular thought, which breaks in upon the regular tract or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and rejected. And even in our wildest and most wandering reveries, nay in our very dreams, we shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was still a connexion upheld among the different ideas, which succeeded each other. Were the loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed, there would immediately be observed something which connected it in all its transitions. Or where this is wanting, the person who broke the thread of discourse might still inform you, that there had secretly revolved in his mind a succession of thought, which had gradually led him from the subject of conversation.[...

]Though it be too obvious to escape observation, that different ideas are connected together; I do not find that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of association; a subject, however, that seems worthy of curiosity. To me, there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, namely, Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause or Effect.

That these principles serve to connect ideas will not, I believe, be much doubted. [For a] picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original[, which is an example of "resemblance",] the mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry or discourse concerning the others[, which is an example of "contiguity in time or place",] and if we think of a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it[, which is an example of "cause and effect"].[...

]But that this enumeration is complete, and that there are no other principles of association except these, may be difficult to prove to the satisfaction of the reader, or even to a man's own satisfaction. All we can do, in such cases, is to run over several instances, and examine carefully the principle which binds the different thoughts to each other, never stopping till we render the principle as general as possible. The more instances we examine, and the more care we employ, the more assurance shall we acquire, that the enumeration, which we form from the whole, is complete and entire.

From "A Treatise of Human Nature" by David Hume, "Section IV", "Of the Connexion or Association of Ideas":

As all simple ideas may be separated by the imagination, and may be united again in what form it pleases, nothing wou'd be more unaccountable than the operations of that faculty, were it not guided by some universal principles, which render it, in some measure, uniform with itself in all times and places. Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone wou'd join them; and 'tis impossible the same simple ideas should fall regularly into complex ones (as they commonly do) without some bond of union among them, some associating quality, by which one idea naturally introduces another. This uniting principle among ideas is not to be consider'd as an inseparable connexion; for that has been already excluded from the imagination: nor yet are we to conclude, that without it the mind cannot join two ideas; for nothing is more free than that faculty: but we are only to regard it as a gentle force, which commonly prevails, and is the cause why, among other things, languages so nearly correspond to each other; nature in a manner pointing out to every one those simple ideas, which are most proper to be united into a complex one. The qualities, from which this association arises, and by which the mind is after this manner convey'd from one idea to another, are three, viz. Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect.

I believe it will not be very necessary to prove, that these qualities produce an association among ideas, and upon the appearance of one idea naturally introduce another. 'Tis plain, that in the course of our thinking, and in the constant revolution of our ideas, our imagination runs easily from one idea to any other that resembles it, and that this quality alone is to the fancy a sufficient bond and association. 'Tis likewise evident, that as the senses, in changing their objects, are necessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie contiguous to each other, the imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of thinking, and run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its objects. As to the connexion, that is made by the relation of cause and effect, we shall have occasion afterwards to examine it to the bottom, and therefore shall not at present insist upon it. 'Tis sufficient to observe, that there is no relation, which produces a stronger connexion in the fancy, and makes one idea more readily recall another, than the relation of cause and effect betwixt their objects.

That we may understand the full extent of these relations, we must consider, that two objects are connected together in the imagination, not only when the one is immediately resembling, contiguous to, or the cause of the other, but also when there is interposed betwixt them a third object, which bears to both of them any of these relations. This may be carried on to a great length; tho' at the same time we may observe, that each remove considerably weakens the relation. Cousins in the fourth degree are connected by causation, if I may be allowed to use that term; but not so closely as brothers, much less as child and parent. In general we may observe, that all the relations of blood depend upon cause and effect, and are esteemed near or remote, according to the number of connecting causes interpos'd betwixt the persons.

Of the three relations above-mention'd this of causation is the most extensive. Two objects may be consider'd as plac'd in this relation, as well when one is the cause of any of the actions or motions of the other, as when the former is the cause of the existence of the latter. For as that action or motion is nothing but the object itself, consider'd in a certain light, and as the object continues the same in all its different situations, 'tis easy to imagine how such an influence of objects upon one another may connect them in the imagination.

So, whether we want it to or not, ideas associated with impressions, that is, sensations, or even other ideas, suggest themselves to us, appear in our mind, whether we like it or not. So, when I say "table" to you, whatever you do, you probably will not be able to stop the picture of a table from appearing in your mind; indeed, that is what underlies the game that children often play by saying something like this, "do you want to play a game; OK, do not think of a purple elephant; ah, you thought of one, didn't you; I win, sorry"; and, indeed, that shows how important, influential, or whatever this principle is, that children get it without any sort of 'philosophical' thought going into the process.

Now, in a similar way, our associations 'make' us 'perceive' the consciousness of what we believe is "a person who has painted himself bronze and is posing as a statue" but not that of what we believe is just "a bronze statue" although such is not 'inherent' in them, such is just our associations.

Adam Knott:

I don't think this is a fruitful application or interpretation of Mises's passage.    Instead of trying to apply teleology or causality to the "objectively conceived" event (on the assumption that something happened in "external" nature), we can try to apply these two approaches to the "subjective" event---the event that is occurring or has occurred for the individual subject; the individual actor.

Continuing, now Mises's passage will take on a different meaning:

[...]

Now we are talking about the "subjective" event, the event that is occurring or has occurred for the individual subject; the individual actor.  And we have the principle that the change or event we have assumed in our example is the outcome of the operation of mechanistic causality or of purposeful behavior.

What is the obvious conclusion we must draw? It is that if we do not consider the events or changes we have supposed, to be the result of mechanistic causality, we must consider them the result of, or as a function of, the purposeful behavior of the actor himself.

In other words, the purposeful behavior (teleology) that we will be relating to this supposed or posited subjective event, is the purposeful behavior of the actor himself, not the purposeful behavior of another actor or mind in nature.

I am not quite sure what you are talking about there; but I venture to guess that what I am saying above is not exactly opposed to it; for I am discussing what is happening in the heads of the people viewing the event, not a sort of "objective" 'reality' of the situation. Indeed, that is what I was talking about when I said that "my belief that other people are conscious is just faith, faith which has no place in science"; I was trying to say that my belief 'in' the 'objective reality' of their consciousness is just faith, faith which we all have but which has no place in science, or philosophy, not that my application of the 'contents' of that belief have no place; indeed, that is what I was trying to explain, that it makes sense to assume that certain things are 'conscious' in science, not because we believe 'in' their 'objective reality', but because, to use the language of pragmatics, it 'works' to do so, it allows us to 'interpret' their movements in a way which allows us to predict their future movements.

Otherwise, if that does not solve it, I have no idea what you are trying to explain. For, as I showed above, what the the 'utility' of the two methods, "causality" and "teleology", are is to 'interpret' movements, or lacks of such, in the external world. So why should we not talk about what happened in "external nature"?

Adam Knott:

To see what I'm trying to get at, consider the law of marginal utility.   The law of marginal utility does not refer to an "objective" event.  It refers to an event whereby an actor believes, or is of the opinion that, he has come into an additional unit of supply.  The value that an actor attaches to the units of his supply is a function not of his "objective" supply, and not of the purposefulness of another assumed actor, but a function of his subjective belief or opinion that another unit of supply is in, or has come into, his possession.  The logical correlate "value" is a correlate of the actor's subjective experience of a "supply".   The correlate "value" for an individual actor, is not conceived to result from the objective quality or state of things (the "actual" state of physical or tangible reality), nor from the purposefulness of another actor.  The correlate "value" is a conceived relation to the actor's subjective "supply." (the law of marginal utility refers not to an actor's supply as it "exists objectively" and not to an actor's supply as another person estimates or views it, but the actor's supply as he himself views it)

As Hayek writes:

[...]

Then we have a law of action:  Every time an actor comes into possession of a [unit of supply]---(this considered in the subjective sense)---this has X correlate or impact on the [value] he attaches to his supply or units thereof.

I.e, to the "event" that is coming into a unit of supply for the subject, (not an "objective" event, nor an event for him as seen by another), an inescapable correlate is attached, having to do with "value" for the subject.   The law is: when such and such happens to your supply, then such and such will happen to "your" value.  And this has no relation to physical processes or to the opinions and beliefs of another person.

Indeed.

Adam Knott:

If you look back at the example whereby a person walks into a park, and changes back and forth from a subjective belief that another person (mind or consciousness) is before him, to a subjective belief that another person (mind or consciousness) is not before him, then, given what has just been noted regarding the law of marginal utility, a simple question emerges:

Are we to conceive that while there is a correlate in individual action that attaches to the individual's subjective belief that he has come into possession of a unit of supply, there is no correlate in individual action that attaches to his subjective belief that another consciousness is before him?

In other words, when one subjective event occurs, there is an inescapable "subjective" correlate to this event.  When an actor believes he is in possession of an additional unit of supply, there is a necessary consequence or logical implication to this event having to do with his subjective value or subjective valuing.  But yet when an actor believes another consciousness is before him, there is no necessary consequence or logical implication to this event??

Which is what I have been explaining in the beginnings of this post with my summoning of the idea of the "principles of assocation" of Hume.

Adam Knott:

According to Mises, the procedure of praxeology and economics is deductive reasoning based on reflection upon the nature and structure of action.  Specifically, deductive reasoning based on reflection upon the nature and structure of our own purposeful behavior and our own inherent knowledge of action.

This is the basis of the law of marginal utility.  The law of marginal utility is not based on observations of other people coming into supplies of various goods, nor is it based on the empirical science of physical processes.  It is based on an analysis of our own individual action whereby or wherein we realize that there is a "regularity" or a regular pattern (in our own action) that has to do with "supply" and "value" within our action.  We recognize a pattern recurs to the effect that the more of something we have, the less we tend to value it.  And economics and praxeology formulate this in more rigorous terms.

But again, the law does not refer to my "objective" supply (the physical volume or mass of things in proximity to my body), and it does not refer to my supply as others may believe it to be or estimate it.  It refers to my "subjective supply," my supply as I believe it to be.

The law of marginal utility, if we subscribe to Austrian economics, is scientific, and yet it states a relation of two "subjective" entities: the actor's (subjective) supply and a (subjective) value he attaches to his supply or units of his supply.

What that means is that, with "praxeology", we are able to develop a model of how to apply what we 'observe' of our own internal world to other things in the world, whether, as you have eschewed, they are 'conscious' in any sort of "objective" sense. But such an explataion is not able to tell us what sorts of things we should apply it to, which is what I was saying before, which, unless I misinterpreted you, you misinterpreted as me saying that we should pay attention to whether thing are 'really conscious' in the "objective" sense, while we are trying to develop the model.

Adam Knott:

Thus, I cannot entirely agree with this statement:

I. Ryan:

my belief that other people are conscious is just faith, faith which has no place in science

To be accurate, the question I am concerned with is not whether a person believes that people in general, as a matter of speculation, are conscious.  The question I am concerned with is whether a person (an individual actor) believes that before him in the specific case is another consciousness.

Analogously, as an Austrian social theorist, I am not concerned with whether a person admits that in general he has supplies of things. The question I am concerned with, and what forms the basis of the law of marginal utility, is whether in the specific case, a person believes he is in possession of an additional unit of supply. If so, then the law of marginal utility applies.

If I believe that I have come into a unit of supply, then this is not a faith that has no place in science.  On the contrary, my belief that I have come into an additional unit of supply is the basis for possibly the most important social scientific law yet formulated.

Similarly, if I believe that another consciousness is before me, this is not a faith that has no place in science.  On the contrary, it is an "act" or "event" of my action which it is the task of praxeology to instruct upon with regard to its logical correlates, just as praxeology instructs on the logical correlates of my coming into an additional unit of supply (again, as this appears to me, not as it is "objectively" or as other people judge it)

That is, the "event" which is another consciousness appearing within my action (as I subjectively consider it or believe it), is just as much and just as little an "event" as that of my coming into a supply of a unit of something.  These events are not "objective" events of the natural sciences (or, we do not conceive them this way in praxeology), and they are not publicly observable events or events as other people may consider them (or, we do not conceive them this way in praxeology), rather, these events are events happening for the individual subject.  They are events considered from the point of view of strict methodological individualism and strict methodological subjectivism.

[...]

Our analysis is conducted entirely from the point of view of the individual actor, and not from the point of view of "objective reality" or of another person or observer.

So, at this point, I think that what is happening is that, when I was talking about 'applying' the model, you thought that I was talking about actually developing it. With 'marginal utility', you should be paying attention to what the person is thinking, not what is 'objectively' there. But, to apply your understanding, you have to actually find people in the world who think, or who 'appear' to be thinking, that they have a supply of things.

Adam Knott:

Regarding your question:

I. Ryan:

I do not understand why you are saying that my approach, or, for that matter, that of any other person using the categories of teleology to make sense of the movements of things in their external world, implies that they are "treat[ing] "other consciousnesses" as having a spatio-temporal existence".

What I'm driving at is the following:

Your previous post dealt with the idea of metaphoric intention.  Dawkins was applying metaphoric intention to machines, and you were speaking of metaphoric intention as it applies to the state.  In both cases, the idea is applying the concepts of consciousness (which we directly experience) to other entities where the scientific basis, or at least the epistemological basis, for doing so is open to question.

Now you appear to be reverting. Many times before what I quoted above, you talked about how we should, not be paying attention to 'objective reality', but should be paying attention to what the actor 'in question' is thinking. But, here, you are talking about whether applying the model to things in the external world makes sense or not, which is what I was mentioning and what you appeared to misintepret as talking about developing the model.

Adam Knott:

Why do we revert to metaphoric intention in these cases?  Because there are social phenomena or human phenomena (phenomena of intention) for which we do not have an adequate scientific explanation.  We attempt to fill the gap in our comprehension of the phenomena of intentionality by reverting to what you described as metaphoric intention---applying the concept of intentionality beyond the scope of what we believe is its proper or scientific applicability.

We are forced to do this, I assume, because we see no other way to deal with these phenomena other than by resorting to:

1.  Physical causality (absent teleology)

2.  Metaphoric intentionality (where we apply teleology to entities or phenomena without a sound scientific or epistemological basis)

Physical causality is unsatisfactory since it eliminates the intentionality that we strongly intuit is operant.

Metaphoric intentionality is unsatisfactory since it attempts to impute intentionality to collectives (the state) or to physical or biological systems which are observable (and thus in the domain of what we consider legitimate science), but where the intentionality or consciousness is not observable, rendering these latter phenomena an "un-scientific" aspect or component of an otherwise scientific undertaking.

Thus, science is "stalled out" at this stage of analysis.  We have a formal/logical analysis of human intentionality (Austrian school social thought) that applies to the economic phenomenon (i.e, "market" phenomenon) of an individual coming into a supply of a unit of a good. (law of marginal utility)

But when we try to move beyond this, and when the objects of an actor's action are not units of supply, but other consciousnesses, we are at a loss for comprehension, because now we must either revert to physical science or the approach of metaphoric intention.

Wait, why is "[m]etaphoric intentionality [...] unsatisfactory [just] since it attempts to impute intentionality to collectives (the state) or to physical or biological systems"? This appears like circular reasoning. You are basing much of your argument here on the fact that it should just be self-evident that we should not "impute intentionality" to such systems. You never made an attempt to prove that it makes no sense, that we should not do so.

(Remember that I am only talking about how well the 'model' of "intentionality" works, not whether it conforms to a sort of "objective reality". So my distinction between "literal intention" and "metaphoric intention" is superfluous and has no place in my explanation after I use it just to make certain aspects of what I am doing intuitive; I am not even saying that other humans, like, for example, you, are 'conscious' just like I am. I am just saying that it 'works' to assume that. Of course, outside science, I assume that people like you actually are 'conscious' and that genes are not and so does everyone else, which is why I used the distinction between "literal" and "metaphoric intention". But those are just vestiges of our unrigorous, common-sense thought, which have, as I said before, no real place in science, past introducing a person to it, past bridging the gap between common-sense and science as an introduction. So, with that said, you claim that it is unsatisfactory to impute intention to non-humans simply because they are not humans appears untenable. For I am making no argument regarding whether animals, institutions, or even other people are 'conscious'. I am merely questioning whether it 'works' better to do so than to not.)

Adam Knott:

And what I'm arguing is that the reason science is stalled-out at this stage, is because we have not undertaken the same kind of analysis that Menger undertook with respect to an individual actor coming into an additional unit of supply.....to the case where the individual actor comes to have another consciousness before him.

That is, we have not considered the idea of analyzing human action with respect to the presence or absence of another consciousness within the acting reality of the individual actor.  We haven't searched for the logical correlate that may be implied by the event which is another consciousness entering the acting reality of the individual actor.  We have stopped our analysis after we formulated a law of action in terms of the individual actor coming into a supply of some economic good.   We considered the logical ramifications in individual action of coming into the supply of a unit, and then ceased further formal analysis of individual action, as if all that we need to know, and as if all the logical correlates we can establish, can be understood in terms of "units of a good" or "units of a supply."

In other words, and speaking loosely, we have not attempted to demonstrate the correlates in individual action, when the "unit of supply" that the actor comes into, is not some material or marketable object, but instead the consciousness of another actor.

We have mis-interpreted the meaning of praxeology as a formal analysis of human economic action, wherein we speak of "units of supply" or "units of a good" (terms and concepts developed by economics and catallactics as the study of market phenomena).  We have thus missed the essence of praxeology as the formal analysis of all aspects of human action, one aspect of which is obviously social action or social interaction---action directed toward another consciousness.  (when the object of my action is not a unit of supply, but instead another consciousness)

What I'm arguing is that our scientific understanding of intentionality is not advancing because every time we turn to the subject of other minds (other consciousnesses), we either conceive that another consciousness is some sort of physical process (Searle), or we conceive that another consciousness is an attribute of or in physical objects such as animals or humans (what Dawkins is dealing with).

We thus fail to consider the idea of analyzing another consciousness as an event or object of the individual actor's action.

When it comes to economic or marketable units of supply, we conceive these as they exist subjectively for the individual actor, not as they are "in reality" or as other observers see it, and we establish, by formal analysis, the logical correlate or logical implications of the supposition that an actor obtains a unit of supply.

But when it comes to another consciousness, we abandon the attempt to consider another consciousness as it may appear subjectively for the individual actor, and we abandon any attempt to establish, by formal analysis, the logical correlate or logical implications of the supposition that  for the individual actor, another actor (consciousness, mind, etc.) has "come into view."

Thus, we are driven back, again and again, to providing explanations in terms of physical processes or in terms of metaphoric intention.

To be honest, this is intriguing. But I just have no idea what you are assuming will happen if we do that. But I guess that it would make no sense to ask you what would happen; for I assume that you have not yet traced out any of the implications of it. Also, I might be able to understand this better if I had a better understanding of the theory of marginal utility.

Adam Knott:

As a follow up, I would like to provide a more succinct account of the above ideas.

If we assume that we, as individual actors, do not observe the consciousness of others, then the following general situation exists:

1.  The physical scientist, on the supposition that other consciousnesses exist in nature, looks for signs of their existence in the movements of particles and in physical-biological processes.

2.  The empirical social scientist, on the supposition that other consciousnesses exist in nature, looks for signs of their existence in the movements and sounds of other men and animals, as well as in things such as ink on paper (written words, prices, etc., which are interpreted as deriving from other minds).

What both these approaches have in common, is that they suppose that the consciousnesses or minds of others exist in spatial locations, and they search for the signs of those consciousnesses or minds also in spatial locations.

As these approaches interpret other minds as sub-systems or parts of spatial and physical nature, therefore they naturally seek for the implications of this also in spatial or physical nature.  As they consider other minds as belonging to the world of particles in fields of force interacting over time, then they seek for the "effects" or "consequences" or "implications" of this.....also in terms of particles in fields of force interacting over time.

And thus the physical scientist interprets various physical processes as resulting from, or as a sign of, other minds, and the empirical social scientist interprets bodily movements and ink on paper as resulting from, or as a sign of, other minds.

Since they suppose other minds to be parts of nature, they seek for the "correlate" of "implication" of this fact in nature (in the movements of objects in space).

The conceptual framework for this outlook is "longitude and latitude."    The conceptual framework for this outlook is the X and Y axis.  It is spatial location and the spatial relationship between one object and another.    If there is a consciousness at this place and time, we will see neuron firings at that place and time;  if there is a consciousness at this place and time, we will see x bodily movement or y ink marks on paper at that place and time.

In this undertaking, we search for the meaning or consequence of our supposition of other consciousnesses, amongst the objects of our own consciousness.  We "place" (or attempt to place) or "locate" (or attempt to locate) other minds as part of extended nature, and then naturally seek for the implications of having done so also in extended nature

But, if our goal is to study the external world, it makes no sense to not talk about how things affect things in the external world.

Adam Knott:

The conceptual framework in praxeology is not longitude and latitude, or the X and Y axis, or spatial location. Praxeology does not begin with a system of positional coordinates, nor with a classification of the physical characteristics of the objects of experience.

The conceptual framework in praxeology is a state experienced by an actor and a desire for a different state.  This binary system does not refer to the position of things in relation to other things.  Praxeology doesn't relate a thing to a thing, but rather a had thing to a want.

We can possibly phrase this conception of things in many ways.  But all of the ways of phrasing it will exhibit the same essential characteristics:

On the one hand there is an object of the actor's action, and on the other hand there is some "attitude" of the actor in relation to this object, which attitude is yet, not an object.

There is supply (object) and demand (attitude)

There is supply (object) and value (attitude)

There is means (object) and end or purpose (attitude)

There is the situation the actor is faced with (object) and his desire or striving or aiming for a different situation (attitude)

The fundamental concepts of praxeology do not refer to the relationship between objects, but instead express a kind of attitude which an actor has in relation to the object of his action.   This attitude is not an object.  Or, more accurately, if we conceive that the actor's attitude (demand, value, desire, striving, etc.) is an object, then we begin an empirical study, wherein we conceive both the object of the actor's action, and his attitude, as objects.  Then we begin to examine the relationship between objects, and we are led back to a physical-empirical inquiry....

As praxeology is not an empirical approach, therefore the attitude of the actor toward the object of his action cannot be conceived as itself an object.

I am not sure what you are trying to explain there; but, if we want to 'apply' "praxeology" to the external world, we need to have "a system of positional coordinates" and "a classification of the physical characteristics of the objects of experience" to do so.

(I am just trying lay some of the groundwork really quickly.)

Now I will try to justify why it makes sense to assume that non-human animals, 'institutions', or whatever have 'intentions'. First, I want to just reflect on this quotation,

From "Human Action" by Ludwig von Mises, Chapter I, "Acting Man", Part 6, "The Alter Ego", "On the Serviceableness of Instincts", paragraph 4-5:

[...]As far as animal behavior goes beyond mere physiological processes like breathing and metabolism, it can only be investigated with the aid of the meaning-concepts developed by praxeology. The behaviorist approaches the object of his investigations with the human notions of purpose and success. He unwittingly applies to the subject matter of his studies the human concepts of serviceableness and perniciousness. He deceives himself in excluding all verbal reference to consciousness and aiming at ends. In fact his mind searches everywhere for ends and measures every attitude with the yardstick of a garbled notion of serviceableness. The science of human behavior--as far as it is not physiology--cannot abandon reference to meaning and purpose. It cannot learn anything from animal psychology and the observation of the unconscious reactions of newborn infants. It is, on the contrary, animal psychology and infant psychology which cannot renounce the aid afforded by the science of human action. Without praxeological categories we would be at a loss to conceive and to understand the behavior both of animals and of infants.

The observation of the instinctive behavior of animals fills man with astonishment and raises questions which nobody can answer satisfactorily. Yet the fact that animals and even plants react in a quasi-purposeful way is neither more nor less miraculous than that man thinks and acts, that in the inorganic universe those functional correspondences prevail which physics describes, and that in the organic universe biological processes occur. All this is miraculous in the sense that it is an ultimate given for our searching mind.

Now what we are studying are things still existing today, things that 'made it' to this point in time; and we are entitled to assume that what survives today does so because of a reason, because they were adjusted to their environment. Now, in 'eliminative' competitions, those in which the gain of one is the loss of the other, like, as Hoppe points out, exists among states with regard to their territory, we are entitled to assume that the 'strong' will 'stamp out' the weak, that, to survive, they have to employ strategies as effective or more effective than those of its 'competitors'.

So, for those reason, we are entitled to assume, for example, that any 'institution' existing today is structured in a way conducive to surviving based on what its past environment looked like, its 'past experiences' or 'memories'. So, in that way, we are able to create a model to predict its behavior; if we find that certain things, like taking control of the provision of education, help that cause, that is, to survive, we are able to understand why so many states have done that and why, if nothing changes, they will continue to do that.

From "Human Action" by Ludwig von Mises, Part 2, "Action Within the Framework of Society", "Chapter VIII", "Human Society", section 4, "The Ricardian Law of Association:

Neither history nor ethnology nor any other branch of knowledge can provide a description of the evolution which has led from the packs and flocks of mankind's nonhuman ancestors to the primitive, yet already highly differentiated, societal groups about which information is provided in excavations, in the most ancient documents of history, and in the reports of explorers and travelers who have met savage tribes. The task with which science is faced in respect of the origins of society can only consist in the demonstration of those factors which can and must result in association and its progressive intensification. Praxeology solves the problem. If and as far as labor under the division of labor is more productive than isolated labor, and if and as far as man is able to realize this fact, human action itself tends toward cooperation and association; man becomes a social being not in sacrificing his own concerns for the sake of a mythical Moloch, society, but in aiming at an improvement in his own welfare. Experience teaches that this condition--higher productivity achieved under the division of labor--is present because its cause--the inborn inequality of men and the inequality in the geographical distribution of the natural factors of production--is real. Thus we are in a position to comprehend the course of social evolution.

With that knowledge, we are, like in the above quotation, in a position to comprehend at least one of the aspects of the 'evolution' of 'institutions'.

Now, consider this quotation:

From this interview with Daniel Dennett:

If I could give a prize to the single best idea anybody's ever had, I'd give it to Darwin, ahead of Newton, ahead of Einstein, and everybody else. Why? Because Darwin's idea put together the two biggest worlds, the world of mechanism and material and physical causes on the one hand, the lifeless world of matter, and the world of meaning and purpose and goals [on the other hand]. And those had seemed really just an unbridgeable gap between them and he showed, no, he showed how meanings and purposes could arise out of physical law, out of the workings of, ultimately, inanimate nature. And that's just a stunning unification and opens up a tremendous vista for all inquiries[.]

Because 'literal intention' evolved just like any other thing, doesn't it make sense to wonder whether it is possible to find any 'signs' of 'literal intention' in the process of evolution? What drives evolution is the 'struggle for survival'; so it makes sense that applying 'metaphoric intention' to things like animals and 'institutions' 'works' if what 'intention' that we impute to it is of 'to survive'.

I. Ryan:

I probably need to clarify what I am arguing.

As I understand it, in the social sciences we are dealing with regularities or regular patterns.

For example, in your passage above:

"So, in that way, we are able to create a model to predict its behavior; if we find that certain things, like taking control of the provision of education, help that cause, that is, to survive,...."

When you are speaking of predicting behavior, I interpret this as meaning that given or assuming some initial state X, we will attempt to predict a temporally later state Y. In your passage above for example, the state of affairs "the state taking control of the provision of education" (at a given time and place) might lead to (cause) a later state of affairs which we will try to predict (in your example this later state of affairs is "the state's survival").

As I interpret this, we are talking about an asserted regularity. That we can differentiate one thing "the state's taking control of education," and that when we identify this specific thing we may find that what follows is another specific thing; "the state's survival." We will try to "predict," based on our model, the state's survival (a later stage or state of affairs) based on the initial stage or state of affairs: the state's taking control of education.

We are asserting a regularity. The question is the nature of this regularity.

As Menger and Mises conceive things, there are two fundamental kinds of regularities; empirical and exact. Here is one account from Menger:

"An empirical law lacks the guarantee of absolute validity a priori, i.e., simply according to its methodological presuppositions. It states certain regularities in the succession and coexistence of phenomena which are by no means necessarily absolute." (Investigations, Book 1, chapter 5)

So as I understand you, you are describing a method for ascertaining empirical regularities, by supposing that intentionality (metaphoric or actual) is operant at a given time and place, which will lead to or cause some state of affairs at a later time and place. The model which you are referring to predicts the occurrence of a later event based on a prior event.

From what you have written, I interpret you as intending that the predictions are not absolutely certain (in Mises's terminology, not "apodictically certain") but rather predictions of things that might happen or might not happen.

By definition, at least as Menger and Mises conceive things, then we are not talking about praxeology.

Praxeology (Menger's theoretical exact science) only refers to what is necessary with regard to action (goal-directed activity, i.e, intention).

"The cognition of praxeology is conceptual cognition. It refers to what is necessary in human action. It is cognition of universals and categories." (HA, 3rd rev. p.51)

"Praxeological knowledge makes it possible to predict with apodictic certainty the outcome of various modes of acting." (p.117)

My argument is not that a person cannot suppose that various entities of his experience are conscious as he himself is, and on the basis of this, try to predict the future state of things. My argument is that there is a praxeological approach possible for dealing with the subject or phenomenon of other consciousnesses.

That approach would be to seek the logically necessary implications, in individual action, of the supposition that another consciousness is an object of the actor's action.

This is not an empirical approach, but a praxeological approach, the one Hayek refers to as the Pure Logic of Choice. It is based not on what is "actually" out there in "reality," but based on data that we suppose are objects of the individual's action as he understands or sees things, regardless of whether these things are "actually" true (in "objective reality") and regardless of what observers of this person believe to be true.

"It is important to remember that the so-called "data," from which we set out in this sort of analysis, are....all facts given to the person in question, the things as they are known to (or believed by) him to exist, and not strictly speaking, objective facts." (Hayek, "Economics and Knowledge")

The laws of praxeology are not based on "objective" facts. They are based on the facts of the individual's action. This in the following sense:

"If we define an object in terms of a person's attitude toward it, it follows, of course, that the definition of the object implies a statement about the attitude of the person toward the thing. When we say that a person possesses food or money, or that he utters a word, we imply that he knows that the first can be eaten, that the second can be used to buy something with, and that the third can be understood..." (Hayek, "The Facts of the Social Sciences")

And thus, praxeology, the Pure Logic of Choice, and Menger's theoretical exact science are, as Hayek writes:

"....the system of tautologies---those series of propositions which are necessarily true because they are merely transformations of the assumptions from which we start..." ("Economics and Knowledge")

Thus in praxeology, we would proceed not on the assumption that another consciousness or another intention is a part of nature, and try to predict the causal effects of this initial state of nature on a later state of nature. Rather, we would proceed on the assumption that another consciousness or another intention is an object of an actor's action, and try to conceive the logical implications of this supposition, in the same way Hayek is indicating when we assume that the object of an actor's action is food, a word, or money.

In this sort of analysis, which is praxeology, exact science, or the Pure Logic of Choice, what we try to do is understand the implications of action under various assumed circumstances. As Hayek writes:

"From the fact that whenever we interpret human action as in any sense purposive or meaningful.....we have to define both the objects of human activity and the different kinds of actions themselves, not in physical terms but in terms of the opinions or intentions of the acting persons, there follow some very important consequences; namely, nothing less than that we can, from the concepts of the objects analytically conclude something about what the actions will be." ("The Facts of the Social Sciences")

What Hayek is saying is that we can derive necessary truths (exact laws, a priori propositions, etc...) in social science, by a method whereby we draw analytical conclusions based on the supposition of various objects of the individual's action. Hayek is saying that this is the source of the necessary truths that praxeology arrives at.

So what I am arguing is that the method of supposing a consciousness or an intention to be an attribute of physical nature, and then trying to predict a future state of nature based on this supposition, is essentially an empirical method. By it's very procedure and presuppositions, this method is an attempt to establish empirical laws, not laws that are guaranteed to be absolutely valid a priori, which is what praxeology is concerned with.

Further, I'm arguing that because the widespread belief persists, that the ONLY method of dealing with the problem of other minds is the empirical method, THIS is what is preventing praxeology or formal/analytical social science from advancing.

What I'm saying is this: If a person makes a conscious decision to choose the empirical as opposed to the praxeological approach in dealing with the subject of other minds, this is one thing. This is simply a choice to pursue one path of inquiry versus another.

But the implicit or explicit conclusion that the empirical approach is the ONLY possible approach to the subject of other minds (other intentions, other consciousnesses, etc...) is another thing. I'm addressing this latter notion that I believe is implicit in the approach you are outlining, and which notion has been explicitly claimed by other social thinkers. It is the same thing that Hayek asserted when he claimed that market theory is empirical not a priori. This assertion of Hayek, I will argue, is based on a mistaken premise, and touches on the issues you are dealing with in your approach. The idea that we can only treat the problem of other minds by means of spatio-temporal concepts resulting in or amounting to, an empirical approach.

As I've tried to demonstrate, this is a mistake, and this is what is preventing praxeology from progressing. We can arrive at a priori propositions, necessary truths, or exact laws, concerning other minds, by conceiving other minds (other intentions, other consciousnesses, etc.) as objects of the individual's action, and by drawing analytical conclusions from the supposition that another mind, consciousness, intention, etc., is an object of the individual's action.

This procedure is nothing new, and is not a new discovery. Because the law of marginal utility which forms the core insight of Austrian economics, is based on the analytical supposition that a new unit of supply has become the object of an individual's action. And from the passages of Hayek provided above, we can see that he sees this same procedure, and is applying it to the supposition that food, a word, or money, is the object of an individual's action.

So the idea that we proceed by supposing that another consciousness or intention or mind is the object of an individual's action is not new in principle. All that would be new is the precise way this might be done.

I am partly interpreting your proposal for an empirical approach to the problem of other minds as based on an implicit belief that the problem of other minds cannot be meaningfully solved by praxeology. My argument is that this implicit belief, or even this belief explicitly stated, is mistaken.

******

I would like to pose what I believe is an important question regarding the empirical approach to social phenomena generally. I think this question is important for anyone who believes that the empirical approach to social science can result in meaningful insights or knowledge about social phenomena.

When we speak of regularities in social science, we are speaking of a realm in which there are no known numerical constants. This is a point that Mises stresses over and over. This means that with respect to any asserted regularity, it will not be possible to assign a numerical probability to a predicted event.

If we are not going to claim that X event must necessarily happen (praxeology), and we are not going to claim that some event will occur with Z% regularity (a demonstrable numerical constant), then as an epistemological matter, what is the claimed assuredness or claimed confidence with which it is asserted event X will occur?

We can of course say X event "might" happen. But what is the epistemological basis for claiming anything more than this?

We can't say X "must" happen. That would be praxeology. We can't say X will happen with Z% probability. That would be the claim that a numerical constant has been discovered. Then what can we say beyond X "might" happen?

I'm not sure what third category is available to the propositions that empirical social science can make.

I believe the whole concept of empirical social science may be misguided, or at least operating under an exaggerated belief of what kind of results can be obtained by this approach.

On what epistemological basis can we, as practitioners of empirical social science, assert with regard to a given regularity, more than that event Y "might" follow event X ?

If, strictly speaking, this is all we can assert, then the entire notion of empirical social science may be misguided to the extent it is believed that more than this is being asserted or aimed for.

*****
I will close with three assertions:

1. The problem of other minds can be treated praxeologically. It is widely believed that the problem of other minds can be treated only empirically or by physical science.

2. The empirical approach to social science (the approach that seeks empirical, non-absolute laws of social phenomena) is based on an implicit or explicit belief that praxeological social science cannot treat the phenomena in question. This is a mistaken notion, since for any social phenomenon supposed, that phenomenon can be supposed as an object of individual action, thus providing the basis for drawing analytical, tautological conclusions which amount to necessary truths or a priori propositions.

3. Empirical social science is based on an exaggerated claim as to the possible meaning and significance of its results. Empirical social science can only claim, as a matter of principle, that event X "might" happen, a claim that can be asserted without the need for empirical study.

You gotta manually insert html to get linebreaks and paragraphs because the forum is broken for a little while.

Before I respond more fully, I want to try to clear up a few things.

Adam Knott:

By definition, at least as Menger and Mises conceive things, then we are not talking about praxeology.

[...]

So what I am arguing is that the method of supposing a consciousness or an intention to be an attribute of physical nature, and then trying to predict a future state of nature based on this supposition, is essentially an empirical method. By it's very procedure and presuppositions, this method is an attempt to establish empirical laws, not laws that are guaranteed to be absolutely valid a priori, which is what praxeology is concerned with.

[...]

Further, I'm arguing that because the widespread belief persists, that the ONLY method of dealing with the problem of other minds is the empirical method, THIS is what is preventing praxeology or formal/analytical social science from advancing.

We are not talking only about "pure praxeology", yes; we are talking about "applied praxeology". My contention, albeit, to an extent, tentative, is that "pure praxeology", the origin and method of which I explain here, especially between my first and second post, is the foundation of many fields that I call "applied praxeology", including evolutionary biology, economics, and other things.

Also, you responded only to my stronger claim, that it is a model that helps us predict things. What about my weaker claim, that "if we find that certain things, like taking control of the provision of education, help that cause, that is, to survive, we are able to understand why so many states have done that"? I might be wrong that my approach allows us to predict things. But what about whether it simply allows us to understand things; in that example, what if it just allows us to understand why states take control of the provision of education but does not allow us to predict anything?

Adam Knott:

My argument is not that a person cannot suppose that various entities of his experience are conscious as he himself is, and on the basis of this, try to predict the future state of things. My argument is that there is a praxeological approach possible for dealing with the subject or phenomenon of other consciousnesses.

That approach would be to seek the logically necessary implications, in individual action, of the supposition that another consciousness is an object of the actor's action.

[...]

Thus in praxeology, we would proceed not on the assumption that another consciousness or another intention is a part of nature, and try to predict the causal effects of this initial state of nature on a later state of nature. Rather, we would proceed on the assumption that another consciousness or another intention is an object of an actor's action, and try to conceive the logical implications of this supposition, in the same way Hayek is indicating when we assume that the object of an actor's action is food, a word, or money.

Do you have any idea what that would entail? An example of it would help.

Adam Knott:

What I'm saying is this: If a person makes a conscious decision to choose the empirical as opposed to the praxeological approach in dealing with the subject of other minds, this is one thing. This is simply a choice to pursue one path of inquiry versus another.

But the implicit or explicit conclusion that the empirical approach is the ONLY possible approach to the subject of other minds (other intentions, other consciousnesses, etc...) is another thing. I'm addressing this latter notion that I believe is implicit in the approach you are outlining, and which notion has been explicitly claimed by other social thinkers. It is the same thing that Hayek asserted when he claimed that market theory is empirical not a priori. This assertion of Hayek, I will argue, is based on a mistaken premise, and touches on the issues you are dealing with in your approach. The idea that we can only treat the problem of other minds by means of spatio-temporal concepts resulting in or amounting to, an empirical approach.

As I've tried to demonstrate, this is a mistake, and this is what is preventing praxeology from progressing. We can arrive at a priori propositions, necessary truths, or exact laws, concerning other minds, by conceiving other minds (other intentions, other consciousnesses, etc.) as objects of the individual's action, and by drawing analytical conclusions from the supposition that another mind, consciousness, intention, etc., is an object of the individual's action.

This procedure is nothing new, and is not a new discovery. Because the law of marginal utility which forms the core insight of Austrian economics, is based on the analytical supposition that a new unit of supply has become the object of an individual's action. And from the passages of Hayek provided above, we can see that he sees this same procedure, and is applying it to the supposition that food, a word, or money, is the object of an individual's action.

So the idea that we proceed by supposing that another consciousness or intention or mind is the object of an individual's action is not new in principle. All that would be new is the precise way this might be done.

I am partly interpreting your proposal for an empirical approach to the problem of other minds as based on an implicit belief that the problem of other minds cannot be meaningfully solved by praxeology. My argument is that this implicit belief, or even this belief explicitly stated, is mistaken.

You have just stated that it might be possible and gave an analogy, the one concerning marginal utility. But you have not shown me why it might be possible.

I Ryan:

I would like to answer just one of your questions above, because I think it illustrates something important:

"Also, you responded only to my stronger claim, that it is a model that helps us predict things. What about my weaker claim, that "if we find that certain things, like taking control of the provision of education, help that cause, that is, to survive, we are able to understand why so many states have done that"? I might be wrong that my approach allows us to predict things. But what about whether it simply allows us to understand things; in that example, what if it just allows us to understand why states take control of the provision of education but does not allow us to predict anything?"

Your weaker claim, were it to be made consistent and with the terms rigorously defined, is what I am claming is the essence of praxeological analysis.  I will try to demonstrate what I mean.

Going back to the idea of regularity and the relationship between two nonidentical events, here is Mises:

"The starting point of experimental knowledge is the cognition that an A is uniformly followed by a B.  The utilization of this knowledge either for the production of B or for the avoidance of the emergence of B is called action.  The primary objective of action is either to bring about B or to prevent its happening." (UF p.20)

We are always going to be talking about two or more nonidentical events and their relationships.

In your stronger claim, we are conceiving those events something like this:

A (the state's taking control of education)  and   B (the state's survival)

The stronger claim is that we can or might, using a model (theory), predict the appearance or occurrence of B based on the appearance or occurrence of A.  This idea is subject to the criticism I tried to outline above in a previous post, when we conceive A and B as two "real" events happening in temporal succession.

Your weaker claim contains a fundamental change.  Now, one of the events referred to is "understanding."  I will interpret this as an event or entity similar to those you have mentioned previously as the subject matter of pure praxeology: values, intentions, purposes, means, satisfaction, choices, etc...

"Now it is not possible to "observe" the consciousness of other people, it is not possible to "see" choices, value, or any other thing like that; it is possible only to "observe" your own consciousness...."

When you write "understand" above, I'm interpreting you as meaning something similar.  It is not possible to "observe" the understanding of other people.

Then the question becomes, regarding the relationship between an event(s) we might suppose (A), and the event which is "understanding"(B) is the relationship between A and B one of temporal causation or one of logical implication?

If the relationship between A and B is causal and temporal in nature, where B has been observed to follow A, but were we cannot claim that B must necessarily follow A, I will argue that this is an "empirical relationship" and that we are conducting an empirical investigation.  If the relationship between A and B is one of logical implication and entailment, I will argue we are conducting a praxeological investigation.

In the latter, we are looking at how some supposed event A, has a logical or formal relationship to event B, when event B is considered a "choice," "value," "understanding," etc.  (i.e., when B is considered an "attitude aspect" of individual action).

****

I think you are touching on some important insights along these lines.  Consider a previous passage of yours:

"As my last point, how, then, do people find that their theories do not match their experience of the external world, which does happen? Well, that confused me for a while. But I think that I thought of a sufficient answer: The theories that these people explicitly develop are not really what they ultimately hold. They say that their theory is X but it is so flawed, non-intuitive, or non-commonsensical that, at a point, they are not even able to believe it themselves. So their implicit theories .....condition.... their experience of the external world and, while their explicit theories do not, they contradict that experience."

Here you make a distinction between an actor's explicit theory and an actor's implicit theory.  In my opinion you are conducting an implicit praxeological analysis.  Because you write:

"....their implicit theories (X) condition their experience of the external world (Y)...." 

First, you have drawn a distinction between an actor's explicit theory (the "objective" one that is written down somewhere and is publicly observable), and an actor's implicit theory.   I assume an actor's implicit theory is an entity similar in nature to his choice, value, intention, purpose, etc.  I.e., his implicit theory, like his choice, value, intention, purpose, etc., is not publicly observable.

Second, you have asserted a relationship between Y, the object of the actor's action (his experience of the external world), and X, his implicit theory (which is an unobservable aspect of his individual action, akin to a "choice," "value," "intention," "purpose," etc.).

In other words, you have conducted a pure praxeological analysis of sorts, by asserting a relationship between the object of an actor's action (his experience of the external world) and some "attitude aspect" of his action (his "implicit theory").

Your praxeological analysis here is so acute, even if implicit, that you even decline to conceive the relationship between these two entities in terms of temporal succession and causation (empiricism, history).  Instead you use the more atemporal conjunctive "condition."   Doing so implies that the implicit theory the actor is working with is somehow or in some sense one and the same with his experience of the objects of his action.  What you have written is that the implicit theory with which one approaches the objects of one's actions is related to those objects not temporally or causally, but "constitutively."

Here is the relevant passage from Hayek:

"We thus always supplement what we actually see of another person's actions by projecting onto that person a system of classification of objects which we know, not from observing other people, but because it is in terms of these classes that we think ourselves." ("The Facts of the Social Sciences")

And from Mises:

"Complex phenomena in the production of which various causal chains are interlaced cannot test any theory.  Such phenomena, on the contrary, become intelligible only through an interpretation in terms of theories previously developed from other sources." (HA, 3rd rev. p.31)(emphasis added)

In other words, the social event that is occurring for an actor is a function of the (in your terms) the implicit theory the actor holds.

Hayek:

"If we wish, we could say that all these objects are defined not in terms of their "real" properties but in terms of the opinions people hold about them.  In short, in the social sciences the things are what people think they are.  Money is money, a word is a word, a cosmetic is a cosmetic, if and because somebody thinks they are." ("The Facts of the Social Sciences")

(Hayekians and market empiricists seem not to realize that this same principle applies to the social phenomena of "prices," "markets," "language," "law," "property," and all other social objects.  The principle Hayek enunciates is not limited to some small range of tangible objects.)

Searle:

"I am not saying that in order to have the institution of money people have to have that very word or some exact synonym in their vocabulary.  Rather, they must have certain thoughts and attitudes about something in order that it counts as money and these thoughts and attitudes are part of the very definition of money."  (Minds, Brains, and Science, p. 78)(emphasis added)

What Hayek and Searle are writing with respect to the actor's opinions, thoughts, and attitudes, is exactly what you are capturing with respect to an actor's implicit theory.....

The idea is that the actor's [idea, attitude, opinion, belief] X is related to the social object of an actor's action Y, not temporally or causally, but "constitutively."

As you write, the implicit theory of the actor, X, conditions (is what determines) his experience of the "external" social world, Y.

Or, what is occurring for the actor, Y, is a "function of" his implicit theory X.

(here we are talking about social phenomena, social events, etc..)

The idea is an atemporal relationship between an object of the actor's action, and some attitude or "attitude phenomenon" of the actor.

I'm arguing that this is the essence of praxeological analysis.  In Misesian praxeology, the means will generally be conceived as the object of the actor's action (what is at hand, what is utilized) [in your passage the actor's "experience of the external world"], and the end (purpose, intention, value judgment, etc.) will generally be conceived as the "attitude aspect" of the actor's action (what is not at hand or utilized, but rather something immaterial in nature) [in your passage the actor's "implicit theory"].

The commonality in all these is that in the theory of action, what is opposed to A, the "object" of an actor's action, as the conceived "other entity" B, (where A and B will be related by the theory), is not another "object" of a similar nature to A, but rather an entity of a fundamentally different nature from that of A.  In the theory of individual action (praxeology), "object" is conceived as something fundamentally different than "attitude."

In the terms of your passage above, in the theory of action, the actor's implicit theory (what I'm calling his "attitude", similar in nature to his "value," "choice," "intention," "purpose," etc,) is conceived as something fundamentally different from his experience of the external world (what I'm calling the object of his action---that which could be thought of as the physical things that appear for or to the actor).

But this difference is not one of spatial location.

To quote Hayek from "The Facts of the Social Sciences" again:

"The common attributes which the elements of any of these classes posses are not physical attributes but must be something else."

*****

In your weaker claim, where you relate some object of the actor's action to the actor's "understanding," and in the other passage, where you relate the actor's experience of the external world to his "implicit theory," you are undertaking the kind of analysis I assert is essence of praxeological analysis. 

This is an analysis that seeks to arrive at necessary truths or a priori propositions by uncovering the necessary relations of individual action:

"...the system of tautologies----those series of propositions which are necessarily true because they are merely transformations of the assumptions from which we start....   the concept of equilibrium itself and the methods which we employ in pure analysis have a clear meaning only when confined to the analysis of the action of a single person...."

"It is important to remember that the so-called "data," from which we set out in this sort of analysis, are...all facts given to the person in question, the things as they are known to (or believed by) him to exist, and not, strictly speaking, objective facts."

"...the data which form [ed] the starting-point for the tautological transformations of the Pure Logic of Choice.  There "data" mean [s] those facts, and only those facts, which [are] present in the mind of the acting person, and only this subjective interpretation of the term "datum" [makes] those propositions necessary truths."  (Hayek, "Economics and Knowledge")

*****

If I may state what I consider to be a difficulty with your analysis:

You are accepting as part of the foundation of your analysis, the distinction between internal and external.

This distinction is not necessary for social science.  What is important for social science is not the distinction between the positions of the objects of an actor's action, but rather the distinction between whether an object is attained or sought by an actor.

The foundational categories of praxeology are not those of position x versus position y, but those of satisfaction and desire.

Spatial position is part of the foundation of physics.   Want (purpose, intention, etc.) is part of the foundation of social science.

If we consider the simple definitions of action provided by Mises, they refer not to position, but to want and satisfaction:

"Man's aim is to substitute what he considers a better state of affairs for a less satisfactory one.  He strives for the substitution of a more satisfactory state of affairs in place of a less satisfactory state of affairs.  And in the satisfaction of this desire, he becomes happier than he was before." (The Free Market and its Enemies, p.14)

The primary concepts are satisfaction and desire.

As Hayek writes:

"...though all the social phenomena with which we can possibly deal may have physical attributes, they need not be physical facts for our purpose." ("The Facts of the Social Sciences")

The idea is that, while it is possible that every object of an actor's action may possibly be treated with respect to it's physical qualities (in which case we are doing physics), in social science what is important is whether a given object is an object of an actor's action, and whether or not he wants it to be an object of his action.  The position, magnitude, intensity, and duration, of any object or event may be studied.  But for social science what is important is not these attributes as they may be relate to themselves or each other, but rather the way any supposed attribute or phenomenon  relates to the wants of the individual actor.

My argument is that the distinction between external and internal is hindering further progress in praxeology by inadvertently introducing a contradictory or foreign premise into the very foundation of praxeology.

From this, we naturally think in terms of "internal thoughts" versus "exernal events," and thus we inadvertently conceive the objects of praxeological study as essentially "graphable" objects (objects that can be depicted in spatial relationships on graphs).

Praxeology doesn't approach thoughts and events with respect to their spatial relationships.  It approaches them with respect to whether they are present or sought by the individual concerned.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

@OP: I do think that some individuals understand the true essence of the State's power. These individuals, enjoying the advantage of not being deluded about the true nature and operation of the State tend to rise to the top. Those individuals who operate as State agents and seek to wield the State apparatus to the achievement of specific, private ends will excel those agents of State who are trapped within the same delusions as those they govern.

Clayton -

Adam Knott:

If I may state what I consider to be a difficulty with your analysis:

You are accepting as part of the foundation of your analysis, the distinction between internal and external.

This distinction is not necessary for social science.  What is important for social science is not the distinction between the positions of the objects of an actor's action, but rather the distinction between whether an object is attained or sought by an actor.

The foundational categories of praxeology are not those of position x versus position y, but those of satisfaction and desire.

Spatial position is part of the foundation of physics.   Want (purpose, intention, etc.) is part of the foundation of social science.

If we consider the simple definitions of action provided by Mises, they refer not to position, but to want and satisfaction:

"Man's aim is to substitute what he considers a better state of affairs for a less satisfactory one.  He strives for the substitution of a more satisfactory state of affairs in place of a less satisfactory state of affairs.  And in the satisfaction of this desire, he becomes happier than he was before." (The Free Market and its Enemies, p.14)

The primary concepts are satisfaction and desire.

As Hayek writes:

"...though all the social phenomena with which we can possibly deal may have physical attributes, they need not be physical facts for our purpose." ("The Facts of the Social Sciences")

The idea is that, while it is possible that every object of an actor's action may possibly be treated with respect to it's physical qualities (in which case we are doing physics), in social science what is important is whether a given object is an object of an actor's action, and whether or not he wants it to be an object of his action.  The position, magnitude, intensity, and duration, of any object or event may be studied.  But for social science what is important is not these attributes as they may be relate to themselves or each other, but rather the way any supposed attribute or phenomenon  relates to the wants of the individual actor.

My argument is that the distinction between external and internal is hindering further progress in praxeology by inadvertently introducing a contradictory or foreign premise into the very foundation of praxeology.

From this, we naturally think in terms of "internal thoughts" versus "exernal events," and thus we inadvertently conceive the objects of praxeological study as essentially "graphable" objects (objects that can be depicted in spatial relationships on graphs).

Praxeology doesn't approach thoughts and events with respect to their spatial relationships.  It approaches them with respect to whether they are present or sought by the individual concerned.

The distinction between "causality" and "teleology" relies on the distinction between the internal world and the external world. What you are saying implies that the distinction between "causality" and "teleology" is "not necessary for social science". Do you believe that? Also, my explanation of the method of pure praxeology relies on that distinction; indeed, the entire discussion in "Human Action", on methodology, relies on that distinction. So I have no idea how you plan to try to rid that distinction from "social science".

Plus I do not understand the reason why you want to discard it anyway. To say whether something is of the internal world or of the external world does not specify any sort of "spacial coordinates". Sure, if you conclude that it is of the external world, you are implying that it does have "spacial coordinates"; but you are not saying what they are. No relationship of position exists between objects of the internal world and those of the external world.

Adam Knott:

I would like to pose what I believe is an important question regarding the empirical approach to social phenomena generally. I think this question is important for anyone who believes that the empirical approach to social science can result in meaningful insights or knowledge about social phenomena.

When we speak of regularities in social science, we are speaking of a realm in which there are no known numerical constants. This is a point that Mises stresses over and over. This means that with respect to any asserted regularity, it will not be possible to assign a numerical probability to a predicted event.

If we are not going to claim that X event must necessarily happen (praxeology), and we are not going to claim that some event will occur with Z% regularity (a demonstrable numerical constant), then as an epistemological matter, what is the claimed assuredness or claimed confidence with which it is asserted event X will occur?

We can of course say X event "might" happen. But what is the epistemological basis for claiming anything more than this?

We can't say X "must" happen. That would be praxeology. We can't say X will happen with Z% probability. That would be the claim that a numerical constant has been discovered. Then what can we say beyond X "might" happen?

I'm not sure what third category is available to the propositions that empirical social science can make.

I believe the whole concept of empirical social science may be misguided, or at least operating under an exaggerated belief of what kind of results can be obtained by this approach.

On what epistemological basis can we, as practitioners of empirical social science, assert with regard to a given regularity, more than that event Y "might" follow event X ?

If, strictly speaking, this is all we can assert, then the entire notion of empirical social science may be misguided to the extent it is believed that more than this is being asserted or aimed for.

We say that, if A desires only Q and believes that only P produces only Q, A desires only P. But whether a person A exists is a question of our experience of the external world, an "empirical" question. So, although that proposition is "apodictically certain", its application to the external world is questionable. Do you think that it is possible to say that, based on that we see that people are doing P, a certain probability exists those people desire only Q and believe that only P produces only Q? If so, I think that a way to say more than "it might happen" but less than "it will happen" exists. But I have no idea whether that is possible. That is just my first thought; it might be worthless. You are posing a good question in what I quoted above; I will certainly continue to think about it.

"The distinction between "causality" and "teleology" relies on the distinction between the internal world and the external world. What you are saying implies that the distinction between "causality" and "teleology" is "not necessary for social science". Do you believe that? Also, my explanation of the method of pure praxeology relies on that distinction; indeed, the entire discussion in "Human Action", on methodology, relies on that distinction. So I have no idea how you plan to try to rid that distinction from "social science".

 

****

I Ryan:

I will argue that the distinction between causality and teleology is the distinction between natural science and social science, and that therefore, in the strict sense, it is a confusion to speak of causality in social science.

The distinction between causality and teleology is what defines the boundary between the realm of nature and the realm of purpose.  When we speak of purpose in the realm of nature, or when we speak of causality in the realm of purpose, we attempt to intermix two distinct conceptual schemes, and this is precisely where our theory breaks down.

When we attempt to conceive that the river "tries" to get downstream, or when we attempt to conceive that my purpose "causes" the que stick to strike the billiard ball, this is where our theory stalls. 

Mises mentions the distinction between internal and external, but there are two things I think need to be taken into account:

1.  Mises is still using some concepts that are incompatible with theoretical subjectivism, methodological individualism, and the formal approach to social science.  What he wrote about Menger and Bohm-Bawerk is true of himelf also:

"The writings of Menger and Bohm-Bawerk include propositions and concepts carried over from the objective theory of value and therefore utterly incompatible with the subjectivism of the modern school.  The problem arises not so much from the imperfections of the theory, because there can be no doubt about the fundamental ideas of their system, as from stylistic faults in the presentation of it, which do not detract from the thought, but only from the writings in which it was expounded.  It was not difficult for tose who came afterward to fiind the right way and to present the ideas of the masters in logically developed form.  But it may be conceded that it is not easy for everyone to avoid error here.  The great many who want to study the system, but who are not professional economists and turn only to the works of its masters, or who view subjectivist economics merely from the factional standpoint of its opponents, cannot help being led astray." (Epistemological Problems, p. 167-168)

Mises is unclear on some issues.  When this happens, then the student of Mises and of action has to decide how to interpret various passages.  As a rule, one will be presented with the choice either to extend theoretical subjectivism, methodological individualism, and formal analysis (the logic of action), or to cease further formal analysis of the logic of action and change over to an empirical-realist or causal-realist approach.  The latter is what most students of Mises chose to do when they couldn't see how praxeology could be extended to treat the phenomena they were interested in.  (Hayek regarding market processes, Kirzner regarding entrepreneurial discovery, and Rothbard regarding ethics.)

Here is a simple example where Mises presents two conflicting ideas, and where it is therefore necessary for the student of action to make his own decision about the concepts under discussion.  Mises writes:

"Man also shows preference in situations in which things and events are unavoidable or are believed to be so.  Thus a man may prefer sunshine to rain and may wish that the sun would dispell the clouds.  He who only wishes and hopes does not interfere actively with the course of events and with the shaping of his own destiny."

"To express wishes and hopes and to announce planned action may be forms of action in so far as they aim themselves at the realization of a certain purpose."

"Praxeology consequently does not distinguish between "active" or energetic and "passive" or indolent man.  The vigorous man industriously striving for the improvement of his conditions acts neither more nor less than the lethargic man who sluggishly takes things as they come.  For to do nothing and to be idle are also action, they too determine the course of events."

"Action is not only doing but no less omitting to do what possibly could be done."

(passages taken from Human Action, 3rd rev. ed. pages 12 & 13)

Here, Mises struggles somewhat with the question of whether simply wishing for something is or is not an action.  He seems to say that wishing for a sunny day is not action.  But on the other hand, he explicitly states that to express wishes and hopes may be forms of action.  He further states that to do nothing is action.

If we examine what Mises is writing in these passages, we will see that there is a problem.  Mises is saying that if I wish for sunshine (doing something) I am not acting, but if I do nothing I am acting.  How can that be?

What is happening is that Mises is mistakenly introducing as a theoretical criteria of action, a standard of reasonableness that an observer might apply as to the prospects for an observed person's success in action.

But this is obviously a concept foreign to Mises's entire system.  Action is not that goal-directed activity which, from the point of view of an observer or onlooker, has a reasonable chance of success.  A rain-dance is not stricken from the definition of action because from the point of view of an observer, such a dance has little or no chance of "causing" rain.  A rain-dance is action since we suppose my purpose in performing it is to bring about a state of rain.  The fact that my means may be judged ineffectual by an observer has nothing to do with whether what I am doing is an action.

"An action is called irrational....because the censor believes that the means employed were not fit to produce the immediate effect aimed at."

"That mortal men are not infallible and that they sometimes choose means which cannot bring about the ends sought is obvious."

"...an action unsuited to the end sought is still an action.  If we call such an unsuitable and inexpedient action irrational, we do not deprive it of its qualification as purposive activity and we do not at all invalidate the assertion that the only way to conceive it essentially and categorically is provided by praxeology."

"Economics [deals with].... homo agens as he really is, often weak, stupid, inconsiderate, and badly instructed."

(Money Method, and the Market Process, page 24)(bold italics added)

An action is by definition a goal-directed activity.  It doesn't matter that an observer believes the observed person's means are ineffective.  And thus Mises's partial attempt on page 12 of Human Action to provide a standard or definition of action based on an observer's estimation of an observed actor's chance at causal success in attaining his end, must ulitmately be held as inconsistent with Mises's own system.  Wishing and hoping are actions since we suppose that my purpose in wishing or hoping is to bring about a state of affairs that does not exist for me currently.  Another person's opinion that my wishing or hoping are not effective ways to attain my ends does not invalidate the fact that I have chosen these means to attain my ends.

Thus, here is a simple example where Mises is stating something that is in conflict with his own system. 

 

2.   Here is a passage from Human Action that refers to the distinction between internal and external:

"Reason and experience show us two separate realms: the external world of physical, chemical, and physiological phenomena and the internal world of thought, feeling, valuation, and purposeful action.  No bridge connects---as far as we can see today---these two spheres.  Identical exerntal events result sometimes in different human responses, and different external events produce sometimes the same human responses.  We do not know why." (p.18)

 

The question is whether the reference to internal and external is to be interpreted as meaning the distinction between that which is located inside a person's head or skull as opposed to that which is located outside of a person's head or skull.

If the answer is yes, then this passage is obviously wrong, since reason and experience show us that inside a person's head and skull are physical, chemical, and physiological phenomena.  In fact, when we search in the location which is inside a person's head or skull, all we find are physical, chemical, and physiological phenomena.  This is the very basis for the attempt to explain consciousness in terms of physical science.  See John Searle's 14 page essay on biological naturalism:  http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/articles.html   So if we interpret internal and external in Mises's passage as referrinig to those things internal or external to our head or skull, then what Mises writes here is wrong on its face.

If the answer is no, then this raises the question as to the meaning of the internal/external distinction, and the question as to exactly what this distinction applies to in the theory of action.

The answer is to be found by interpreting the concepts internal/external as referring to an epistemological distinction, not a spatial distinction.

In Talcott Parson's book The Structure of Action, he writes about the theory of action, and when the concept of "external" arises in the context of the theory of action, Parsons makes this clarification in a footnote on page 46:

"Epistemologically, not spatially "external."  The external world is not "outside" the knowing subject in a spatial sense.  The subject-object relation is not a relation in space."

Given these two considerations, I think we can safely conclude that when Mises refers to the realm of purpose and the realm of physical processes, and uses the terms internal and external, we cannot meaningfully or consistently interpret him as meaning this in the spatial sense. 

We can easily re-write Mises's passage as:

"Reason and experience show us two separate realms: the.....world of physical, chemical, and physiological phenomena and the......world of thought, feeling, valuation, and purposeful action.  No bridge connects---as far as we can see today---these two spheres."

In leaving out reference to internal and external, we retain what is essential---the distinction between physical processes and human purpose----and we remove from the teleological theory the foreign concept of spatial location.

Thus, there is no basis for continuing to use the internal/external distinction.  This distinction is a carryover from the older, objective concepts and theories.

The theory of action does not contain a distinction between internal and external.  Those are concepts of spatial location and foundational concepts of physical science.  The theory of action is founded on the distinction between means and ends, and from these concepts, all physical distinctions and attributes are abstracted.

This is why Hayek, writing at the historical heigh of praxeological social science, writes:

"...though all the social phenomena with which we can possibly deal may have physical attributes, they need not be physical facts for our purpose.  That depends on how we shall find it convenient to classify them for the discussion of our problems."

"What I am arguing is that no physical properties can enter into the explicit definition of any of these classes, because the elements of these classes need not posess common physical attributes."("The Facts of the Social Sciences")

The theory of action begins with a subjective state (a state of affairs as understood by an individual subject), and a want on the part of the subject for a state different from the state he is confronted with. 

*******

 

Here is a definition of action from Mises, and it makes no reference to physical attributes. 

"Action is the search for improvement of conditions from the point of view of the personal value judgments of the individual concerned." (The Free Market and its Enemies, p.14)

The key concepts are:

search  (aiming, striving, wanting, etc.)

improvement (satisfaction, happiness, well-being, etc.)

value judgments (opinions, belief, etc.)

This is in keeping with Hayek's insight that:

"...whenever we interpret human action as in any sense purposive or meaningful, whether we do so in ordinary life or for the purpose of the social sciences, we have to define both the objects of human activity and the different kinds of actions themselves, not in physical terms but in terms of the opinions or intentions of the acting persons,..." ("The Facts of the Social Sciences")

Thus, Hoppe's Rothbardian conception of action is entirely incompatible with the Misesian/Hayekian conception of action:

"Acting is a cognitively guided adjustment of a phycial body in physical reality."  (Economic Science and the Austrian Method, p.70)

This is a prime example of how praxeology is misconceived and subtly and often inadvertently reconceived in physical terms.  This is a dead end.  Once this happens----once we embark on a process of making physical distinctions as the basis for a theory of action----we start conceiving things not from the point of view of an actor utilizing means to attain ends, but rather from the point of view of an observer, judging weather another person is or is not acting, and whether this other person will or will not attain the ends he seeks.  We have abandoned the analysis of the logic of action, and are now engaged in a confused empirical undertaking having to do with "observing" the actions of others.

Now, instead of a formal analysis of action in all its aspects (the Misesian program), we will be "judging" whether or not someone's "behavior" is an action.  We will have switched over to some kind of "ethical" program having to do with "correct" and "incorrect" behavior:

Actor A:  "I'm trying to do X."

Hoppean/Rothbardian observer B:  "No you're not.  I've been observing you, and you haven't guided your body in physical reality.  You have not justified to me that you are acting.

The theory of action is not based on physical distinctions or observations:

"The defining principle of such social phenomena set no physical limits whatever on what can count as the physical realization of them.  And this means that there can't be any systematic connections between the physical and the social or mental properties of the phenomenon.  The social features in question are determined in part by the attitudes we take toward them.  The attitudes we take toward them are not constrained by the physical features of the phenomena in question."  (Searle, Minds, Brains, & Science, p.78-79)

The theory of action as that is conceived by Mises entails a logical or formal analysis of action or goal-directed activity.  This analysis makes no reference to the physical attributes of the objects of human action:

"It is easily seen that all these concepts...refer not to some objective properties possessed by the things, or which the observer can find out about them, but to views which some other person holds about the things.  These objects cannot even be defined in physical terms, because there is no single physical property which any one member of a class must posess.  These concepts are also not merely abstractions of the kind we use in all physical sciences; they abstract from all the physical properties of things themselves.  They are all instances of what are sometimes called "teleological concepts.," that is, they can be defined only by indicating relations between three terms: a purpose, somebody who holds that purpose, and an object which that person things to be a suitable means for that purpose.  If we wish, we could say that all these objects are defined not in terms of their "real" properties but in terms of opinions people hold about them.  In short, in the social sciences the things are what people think they are.  Money is money, a word is a word, a cosmetic is a cosmetic, if and because somebody things they are." ("The Facts of the Social Sciences")

******

 

"Plus I do not understand the reason why you want to discard it anyway. [#1]To say whether something is of the internal world or of the external world does not specify any sort of "spacial coordinates". [#2] Sure, if you conclude that it is of the external world, you are implying that it does have "spacial coordinates"; but you are not saying what they are. [#3] No relationship of position exists between objects of the internal world and those of the external world."

 

#1. To say that something is of the external world or of the internal world, is to conceive it as "positioned" in space.  To the extent something can be positioned in space, is the extent to which it can be conceived in terms of the science of objects positioned in space.  I think social science asserts a contradiction in claiming that the objects of its studies are "internal" objects, and at the same time that these "internal" objects cannot be studied by the methods of the natural sciences.  Natural science cannot or does not study things when they are located inside something else ?

#2.  If one concludes that something A is of the external world, one implies that it is external to something else B.  In the science of action, that something else is the individual actor, since the individual actor is the subject of the science of action.  This implies that there are things spatially external to the actor that are the subject matter of one discipline, and things spatially internal to the actor that are the subject matter of another discipline. 

It won't be hard for physical scientists, empiricists, and positivists, to explode this conception of things, and argue the obvious, which is that the physical sciences study both "external" and "internal" things.

#3.  If we wanted, we could phrase Mises's passage above in the following way:

"Reason and experience show us two separate realms: the moving world of physical, chemical, and physiological phenomena and the still world of thought, feeling, valuation, and purposeful action.  No bridge connects---as far as we can see today---these two spheres.  Identical exerntal events result sometimes in different human responses, and different external events produce sometimes the same human responses.  We do not know why."

We could say this because every time we observe a physical, chemical, or physicological phenomenon, we will find that it is in motion relative to something.

On the other hand, no one has ever observed a value, feeling, purpose, intention, etc., and found it to move.   And thus we can refer to these things as being "still."

When someone challenges us and asks us why we are using the concepts of "motion" and "stillness" as founding concepts of social science, we could reply:

"To say something is moving or still does not specify any motion coordinates."

Or:

"Sure, to say something is of the world of motion implies that there are some sort of motion coordinates, but it doesn't say what they are."

Or:

"No relationship of motion exists between objects of the still world and those of the world of motion."

We can possibly make these arguments, and we can maintain them at all costs and regardless of all arguments to the contrary.

But the question is, why?

Why is it important to maintain a distinction between internal and external as the basis for social science?

I don't think a clear and consistent answer is possible.  And I think the insistence on physical distinctions such as this prevent us from extending praxeology.  When we introduce physical distinctions, we introduce the concepts of causality, empiricism, and positivism.  In social science, this then results in nonpraxeological approaches such as "empirical" market study (Hayek) and natural rights ethics study (Rothbard) and the argumentation ethics (Hoppe).  The praxeological investigation ends where the physical distinctions begin.

******

My argument would be the following:

The kind of analysis Menger, Mises, and Hayek were involved in under the various names theoretical exact science, praxeology, and the Pure Logic of Choice, is an analysis where, in theoretical opposition to the object of an actor's action is not another object, but instead some "attitude" of the actor in relation to the object.  This "attitude" goes by different names such as "value," "opinion," "intention," etc.

What all these "attitude" phenomena have in common is that they are immaterial in nature.  They are things we do not observe.

Opposed to the object of an actor's action in the theory of action, is not another object, but an immaterial "attitude" of some sort. 

When and if we try to conceive this attitude as itself an object (such as when we "position" it in space), we then begin to conceive the relations between objects (the object of an actor's action, and his attitude which we are trying to conceive as also an object).

The relationship between the various objects of our action is the most fundamental starting point of physical science.  This is not the starting point of praxeological analysis which is: the relationship between the object of our action and the attitude we take toward that object.

When causality is present, we are alterted that we are investigating the causal relations between objects---not the relation between the object of an actor's action and his want or desire----and have thus left the domain of social science.

When we think in terms of internal and external, we think in terms of a conceptual scheme designed to treat the positions of various objects in space.  We think in terms of natural science.  Then, what Mises writes comes into full effect:

"....the natural sciences do not know what the mind is and how it works and....their methods of research are not fit to deal with the problems dealt with by the sciences of human action." (UF, p.56)

 

I read part of your post Adam.  To recognize empirical data isn't positivism and doesn't lead to positivism.  Humans act in contact with empirical data.  Feelings are empirically grounded.  The product (eg. TV) a human acts upon in order to physically pick up, that product and biological nature of the human that is acting (picking up) is empirical.  The thought and evalutions that go into why a TV, perceptive inclination as to how to pick up, where to pick up, the thought that goes into that act is abstract in nature.  Human action is both abstract and empirically grounded.

You're slant is too 'guessing' and therefore 'mental'.  It doesn't connnect with the rest of the world to show how human action is also a demonstration in body.  Values and opinions of the abstract kind are also praxeologic (which is how you were putting it).  An axiom is empirically grounded and abstractly grounded.  Human action is not solely a mental exercise but is also what humans do physcially.  It is both.  That is the definition of an axiom as per any "Intro. to Logic" book I've ever read.  Same goes for propositions.

Some people live in New York

That is a proposition.  It is grounded in evidence:  there are some people that do live in a place called New York.  It is abstract because humans form these propositions using the intellect.  Proposition and axioms happen due to evidence and abstraction.

"But whether a person A exists is a question of our experience of the external world, an "empirical" question."

****

I don't agree with this.  This is a statement from the point of view of objective, or ontological, or metaphaphysical realism.  This approach to social phenomena is incompatible with the approach of theoretical subjectivism.

From the point of view of individual actor B, whether A is a "person" (an entity having a purpose) is a function of whether B believes that another mind or consciousness is before him "embodied" in A.

If we agree that B cannot "observe" the mind of A, how can we claim that the existence of person A (meaning, the existence of mind or consciousness A) is an empirical question?

In other words, how can we claim that another person's mind or consciousness is unobservable, and that it's existence is an empirical matter?

It would seem that either A's mind or consciousness is not observable, in which case it exists as an opinion or belief of B, or, the mind or consciousness of A is an empirical matter, in which case B can observe it.

To hold that A's mind is both unobservable and empirical for B would seem to be a proposition in need of explanation.

"Some people live in New York"

*****

Wilderness:

Thank you for your thoughts.

My point is the following:

Rather than an approach that seeks to establish as an objective fact, the ontological or real existence of New York, we can examine New York as an object of the individual subject's action.  Those are two separate approaches.  One is an objective approach, and one is a subjective approach. 

The subjective approach does not seek to establish the objective existence of New York, nor does it seek to deny the objective existence of New York.  The subjective approach examines that which is New York as an object of the individual's action. 

Thus, with regard to your statement:

"To recognize empirical data isn't positivism and doesn't lead to positivism."

The question I'm addressing is not whether an individual recognizes an empirical datum such as an object in front of him.  I'm addressing the theoretical treatment of that empirical datum.  I'm calling that datum an object. 

I'm saying if we suppose that an empirical datum is recognized by an individual (i.e.,some datum, object, event, etc. is present for him), one approach is to treat that object or empirical datum with respect to another object or empirical datum.  And another approach is to treat that object or empirical datum in relation to the wants of the individual who recognizes it (for whom it is present).

I'm calling the former approach (treating the relationship between objects) the empirical, positivist, naturalist, or physical approach.  This approach is "X is over here, and Y is over there" or "X is this much, and Y is that much", etc...

I'm calling the latter approach (treating the relationship between the datum of an actor's action and his wants) the praxeological approach and the subject matter of the social sciences.  This approach is "I want X" or "I do not want Y"

Regarding this latter approach:

"It is important to remember that the so-called "data," from which we set out in this sort of analysis, are.....all facts given to the person in question, the things as they are known to (or believed by) him to exist, and not, strictly speaking, objective facts." (Hayek, "Economics and Knowledge")

I'm not addressing New York as an object conceived by metaphysical realism.  I'm addressing New York conceived as an object of individual action, which means New York as it relates to the purpose or intention of a given or supposed acting individual.

 

 

 

>>From the point of view of individual actor B, whether A is a "person" (an entity having a purpose) is a function of whether Bbelieves that another mind or >>consciousness is before him "embodied" in A.

lets take the teleological approach/intentional stance a little further. Given what you say about B, as truth. B may think that there are experiments of investigation that he would call 'empirical' in nature as opposed to abstract cogitation that would help him best adjust his web of beliefs. It is no more a surprise to us that B should adopt this 'empirical' stance over the 'opposite'  than it would be surprising for a person to 'generally' put sufficient weight on the evidence of his eyes that objects of his desire are within reach, all the better for successfully reaching out and taking them.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X8aWBcPVPMo

p.s. this is neither question or criticism, its a point of view fleshed out a bit. (borrowing some Feynman wit)

1 - In realist philosophy what is subjective and objective are both in the realist philosophy.  In realism what is subjective is called agent-relative or agent-neutral.  What is objective is the same as asking "What exists?".  That's realism.  There is no split.  That's a false dichotomy.  My evalutions of the world concern knowing the evidence and how I will choose to participate with the known evidence.  There is a TV.  I choose to pick it up.  I need to know the empirical data to do that.  My choosing/desire also happens during the process of picking up the TV.

Adam Knott:

The subjective approach examines that which is New York as an object of the individual's action.

That's called realism.  It is subjective (agent-relative) and objective (object New York) at the same time.

2 - That quote of Hayek is how a realist would phrase it.

Adam Knott:

I'm not addressing New York as an object conceived by metaphysical realism.  I'm addressing New York conceived as an object of individual action, which means New York as it relates to the purpose or intention of a given or supposed acting individual.

I'm not sure what you mean.  Are saying in concern of who formulated the proposition?  Or do you mean the 'some people that live there'?

P.S. You're into Menger, correct?  Have you read any of Uskali Maki's or Barry Smith's works on him?  And are you aware that Menger was Aristotelian?  Also you appear to be influenced by Franz Brentano.  Have you read any of his works?  Realist phenomenology is related to all of this as well.

Adam Knott:

I don't agree with this.  This is a statement from the point of view of objective, or ontological, or metaphaphysical realism.  This approach to social phenomena is incompatible with the approach of theoretical subjectivism.

From the point of view of individual actor B, whether A is a "person" (an entity having a purpose) is a function of whether B believes that another mind or consciousness is before him "embodied" in A.

If we agree that B cannot "observe" the mind of A, how can we claim that the existence of person A (meaning, the existence of mind or consciousness A) is an empirical question?

In other words, how can we claim that another person's mind or consciousness is unobservable, and that it's existence is an empirical matter?

It would seem that either A's mind or consciousness is not observable, in which case it exists as an opinion or belief of B, or, the mind or consciousness of A is an empirical matter, in which case B can observe it.

To hold that A's mind is both unobservable and empirical for B would seem to be a proposition in need of explanation.

Do you believe that it is possible to find causal connections between events of the internal world and events of the external world? If so, does it not make sense, if you establish that only an event A of the internal world leads to an event B of the external, to say that, whether other people experience the event A is an empirical fact? For you are able to say, if you see the event B in the external world, you 'know' that the event A happened in their internal world. But that does not mean that you have to wonder whether the event A 'really' happened or not or whether, more generally, they are conscious or not. For you could use it only as a model, in which, for example, if you also know that the event A leads to a different event C in the external world, you would, if you observed event B, be able to 'predict' that you will be able to observe the event C. Plus, if you deny that my first assumption, that we are able to find causal connections between events of the internal world and those of the external, you are basically denying that a science of economics is possible.

(Also, keep in mind that what I am saying in this post is very tentative. My understanding of the relationship between pure praxeology and applied praxeology is pretty weak, to say the least.)

enjoyable youtube nirgUK.

Yes the understanding of an axiom is in the realm of common sense.  Philosophy in some circles (not saying Adam just a general notion) has attacked common sense, Hume for one, and thereby disconnects common sense from the person.  It's what an analytical philosophical approach does.  It relegates understanding to 'mental' or analytical realms skeptical of evidential implications thereby detachess itself from the port hole of axioms (common sense).

"B may think that there are experiments of investigation that he would call 'empirical' in nature as opposed to abstract cogitation that would help him best adjust his web of beliefs."

*****

Nir:

As far as I can tell, we're in agreement.   This seems to fall within the general notion that an individual utilizes means he believes will attain his ends?

Feynman's The Character of Physical Law is one of my favorites.  : - )

 

I chose to emphasise arrears of agreement certainly :-)

we can go yet further and consider that 'realism' explains why adopting an 'empirical stance' yields benefits over 'empirical concerns' than other approaches, with the answer that there are objects behind the data/phenomena. 

Wilderness:

I'm not as much interested in trying to convince non-praxeologists to become praxeologists, as I am in trying to convince those interested in praxeology to make their ideas more consistent.  You have let it be known that you prefer an objective or realist approach.  I accept that.

Adam Knott:

The question is whether the reference to internal and external is to be interpreted as meaning the distinction between that which is located inside a person's head or skull as opposed to that which is located outside of a person's head or skull.

I did not intend to define it in that way.

Adam Knott:

We can easily re-write Mises's passage as:

Ludwig von Mises:

Reason and experience show us two separate realms: the[...] world of physical, chemical, and physiological phenomena and the[...] world of thought, feeling, valuation, and purposeful action.  No bridge connects---as far as we can see today---these two spheres.

In leaving out reference to internal and external, we retain what is essential---the distinction between physical processes and human purpose----and we remove from the teleological theory the foreign concept of spatial location.

In leaving out the words "internal" and "external", you do retain what is essential to that passage; but that is only because, in that passage, he (a) put the phrase "the external world" in apposition to the phrase "physical, chemical, and physiological phenomena" and (b) also put the phrase "the internal world" in apposition to "thought, feeling, valuation, and purposeful action". If I were to write that "we are forced to acquiesce to an indirect, roundabout, method", it would be accurate to say that, if we got rid of the word "roundabout", we would be retaining what is essential to my point; but it would not be very helpful; it would not imply that we should stop using the word "roundabout" and just stick to using the word "direct".

So what I am saying here is that he essentially defined the words "experience" as revealing to us "the external world", which means the "physical, chemical, and physiological phenomena" and "reason" as revealing to us "the internal world", which means "thought, feeling, valuation, and purposeful action". So, in conclusion, that you were able to remove his one side of each of his appositions proves only that, as I said, they were appositions.

Adam Knott:

I will argue that the distinction between causality and teleology is the distinction between natural science and social science, and that therefore, in the strict sense, it is a confusion to speak of causality in social science.

[...]

The theory of action does not contain a distinction between internal and external.  Those are concepts of spatial location and foundational concepts of physical science.  The theory of action is founded on the distinction between means and ends, and from these concepts, all physical distinctions and attributes are abstracted.

At first, I thought that those two passages were contradicting each other. But I changed my mind. When I was saying that the distinction between the "internal world" and the "external" world was essential, notice that, when we take into account what you believe is the point of the distinction between "causality" and "teleology", which you said was to demarcate certain realms of science, which is the starting point of any methodology, the only thing that I mentioned that it was essential to was methodology:

I. Ryan:

The distinction between "causality" and "teleology" relies on the distinction between the internal world and the external world. What you are saying implies that the distinction between "causality" and "teleology" is "not necessary for social science". Do you believe that? Also, my explanation of the method of pure praxeology relies on that distinction; indeed, the entire discussion in "Human Action", on methodology, relies on that distinction. So I have no idea how you plan to try to rid that distinction from "social science".

So, in my other thread, I was using the distinction between the "internal world" and the "external world" only to clarify what the method of praxeology is, what the foundation needs to be. Before you are able to interpret action, which is the external manifestation of internal events, you have to analyze your own internal world. So the subject matter of pure praxeology, as I said in that thread, is only the contents of the internal world. If you do not use that distinction, it is impossible to demarcate the starting point of praxelogy, which is pure praxeology.

Adam Knott:

#2.  If one concludes that something A is of the external world, one implies that it is external to something else B.

I disagree. Perhaps the terms "internal" and "external" are misleading. But I have yet to find something to replace them. I am not using "internal" and "external" to refer to any sort of spacial relationship between them. They have no spacial relationship.

Adam Knott:

Why is it important to maintain a distinction between internal and external as the basis for social science?

I guess that it is not really the basis of social science. It is just the basis of defining the method, I think.

Adam Knott:

When we attempt to conceive that the river "tries" to get downstream, or when we attempt to conceive that my purpose "causes" the que stick to strike the billiard ball, this is where our theory stalls.

Well, Mises defined "teleology" as "a variant of casuality". So, with that definition, it does make sense to talk of desires causing other desires or other things like that.

Ludwig von Mises:

[...]teleology can be called a variety of causal inquiry

"Do you believe that it is possible to find causal connections between events of the internal world and events of the external world?"

****

I. Ryan:

Your question here does not refer to purpose.  Your question is phrased entirely in physical terms: events happening inside of something and their relationship to events happening outside of something.

You are asking me whether I believe that there is some casual relationship between events happening inside a sphere, or box, or bag, and events happening outside of a sphere, box, or bag.

My answer is yes, I do believe this.

But I don't believe this has anything to do with human action.  I believe this has to do with physics.

Adam Knott:

Your question here does not refer to purpose.

Yes it does.

Adam Knott:

Your question is phrased entirely in physical terms[...]

It is not.

Adam Knott:

You are asking me whether I believe that there is some casual relationship between events happening inside a sphere, or box, or bag, and events happening outside of a sphere, box, or bag.

I am not.

Adam Knott:

I'm not as much interested in trying to convince non-praxeologists to become praxeologists, as I am in trying to convince those interested in praxeology to make their ideas more consistent.  You have let it be known that you prefer an objective or realist approach.  I accept that.

That's a perplexing bunch of statements, because praxeology is a realist approach.  I don't know why you arbitrarily excluded that.  Watch the youtube video again and take note of Feynman using the word "implies" which is a term of logic.

I am using the definitions of "internal world" and "external world" used by Hume:

David Hume:

Our internal impressions are our passions, emotions, desires and aversions; none of which, I believe, will ever be asserted to be the model, from which the idea of space is deriv'd.

David Hume:

A like reasoning will account for the idea of external existence. We may observe, that 'tis universally allow'd by philosophers, and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by those perceptions they occasion. To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this is nothing but to perceive.

Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are deriv'd from something antecedently present to the mind; it follows, that 'tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions. Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible: Let us chace our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have appear'd in that narrow compass. This is the universe of the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there produc'd.

The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, when suppos'd specifically different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects. Generally speaking we do not suppose them specifically different; but only attribute to them different relations, connexions and durations. But of this more fully hereafter.

David Hume:

Passions[, things of the internal world,] are connected with their objects and with one another; no less than external bodies[, that is, bodies of the external world,] are connected together.

"Before you are able to interpret action, which is the external manifestation of internal events, you have to analyze your own internal world. So the subject matter of pure praxeology, as I said in that thread, is only the contents of the internal world. If you do not use that distinction, it is impossible to demarcate the starting point of praxelogy, which is pure praxeology."

******

I Ryan:

The approach you are outlining is essentially a branch of physical science.

You provide the following defintion of action:

"...action, which is the external manifestation of internal events,.."

You have just defined action as an external manifestation of internal events.  You have removed the concept of purposiveness from the concept of action, and replaced it with a conception of two events, one happening inside something, and another event happening outside of something.

*****

"Before you are able to interpret action...."

I think what you are referring to here, is actor A observing the movements of B, believing them or interpreting them to be actions.

As Hayek writes:

"...in discussing what we regard as other people's conscious actions, we invariably interpret their action on the analogy of our own mind: that is, we group their actions, and the objects of their actions, into classes or categories which we know solely from the knowledge of our own mind. ....We thus always suppliment what we actually see of another person's action by projecting into that person a system of classification of objects which we know, not from observing other people, but because it is in terms of these classes that we think ourselves." ("The Facts of the Social Sciences")

As Schutz writes:

"For it is obvious that an action only has one subjective meaning: that of the actor himself.  It is X who gives subjective meaning to his action, and the only subjective meaning being given by F and S in this situation are the subjective meanings they are giving to their own actions, namely, their actions of observing X." (The Phenomenology of the Social World, p.32)

Praxeology is concerned with studying the logic of individual action.

In your example, we would need to make it explicit which action we are studying the logic of:

A's action in observing/interpreting B.   Or, B's action in doing what he is doing.

In your example it is not clear whose action we are referring to in order to illustrate the logic of individual action.

 

"...nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by those perceptions they occasion."

****

I will refer to this as Hume's "theory."

In Hume's theory as conceived in this passage, a distinction is made between the objects which are our perceptions and impressions, and the objects that become known to us only by those perceptions and impressions.

He seems to conceive two distinct groups of objects:  Perceptual objects and objects to which they refer (objects that become known through or by perceptual objects).

Question:

If these so-called external objects are not to be considered spatially external to the actor's perceptual impressions, in what sense are they separated or distinct from the actor's perceptual impressions?
 

I hate to correct I, Ryan and Richard Dawkins, but Evolution isn't about the species themselves actively adapting to new conditions, but rather the new conditions weeding out the particular adaptations. This is the key distinction between Evolution according to Darwin versus Evolution according to Lamarck. In Darwin's view, the environment is a filter by which only a certain set of species will 'pass' through without significant harm, where as a larger set will be wiped out (suddenly or slowly, it depends on fitness of the species). In Lamarck's view, the species actively interacts with its environment to fit into new roles (a girrafe has a long neck because its ancestors tried to stretch themselves up to reach the leaves on trees would be an example of this).

In genetics, the genes themselves don't seek out to survive, they merely replicate. In their replication, there will be those genes that will replicate better or worse in relation to the whole of the genome of an organism. This allows for fitness to be measured not as a raw quantity, but as a synergy between the genes. Thus, there is no need for Dawkins to pull a Lamarckian twist on the outcome. Nor does it require one to know how each gene influences another's expression. 

ladyattis:

I hate to correct I, Ryan and Richard Dawkins, but Evolution isn't about the species themselves actively adapting to new conditions, but rather the new conditions weeding out the particular adaptations. This is the key distinction between Evolution according to Darwin versus Evolution according to Lamarck. In Darwin's view, the environment is a filter by which only a certain set of species will 'pass' through without significant harm, where as a larger set will be wiped out (suddenly or slowly, it depends on fitness of the species). In Lamarck's view, the species actively interacts with its environment to fit into new roles (a girrafe has a long neck because its ancestors tried to stretch themselves up to reach the leaves on trees would be an example of this).

In genetics, the genes themselves don't seek out to survive, they merely replicate. In their replication, there will be those genes that will replicate better or worse in relation to the whole of the genome of an organism. This allows for fitness to be measured not as a raw quantity, but as a synergy between the genes. Thus, there is no need for Dawkins to pull a Lamarckian twist on the outcome. Nor does it require one to know how each gene influences another's expression. 

FWIW, I have to agree with the above. I've had some education on the subject of evolution when learning about evolutionary computation. (And when it comes to that topic, all you need to know is "Darwinian for the win, Lamarckian is malarkey.")

"What follows from those two conclusions is the implication that the states which are the 'fittest to survive', those which will tend to exist for long periods of time and propagate their techniques, are those which take control of their system of education and establish such a monopoly. For such a monopoly spreads exactly what they need to spread to survive, pro-statist propaganda."

Based on your theory, we should see municipal governments in United States annexing failed, adjacent municipal governments that are less capable of producing pro-statist propaganda and therefore have lesser survival value. That doesn't seem to be happening. Even defaulting states generally don't disappear; they continue surviving.

I think praxeology applied to the human beings running institutions provides a sufficient description. It is political careers facing destruction, not the destruction of institutions, that matters.

ladyattis,

Have you read any of Stephen Jay Gould's work?  He took on Darwin in a massive way.  He didn't refute Darwin's essential points but stripped away lot's of unverified and inconclusive Darwinian theory.  One major subject Gould changed with Niles Eldridge was "gradualism".  This is pretty old puncuated equilibrium stuff.  The fossil record doesn't show 'gradualism' for about 99% of all geological records yet for over 100 years paleontologists just assumed it was true.

Adam Knott:

You have removed the concept of purposiveness from the concept of action, and replaced it with a conception of two events, one happening inside something, and another event happening outside of something.

No, I did not; again, they are just metaphors, like the word "high" in "that is a high number".

Adam Knott:

You have just defined action as an external manifestation of internal events.

I should have said "the action of other people, of the external world" instead of just "action".

Adam Knott:

I think what you are referring to here, is actor A observing the movements of B, believing them or interpreting them to be actions.

I am, yes.

Adam Knott:

In your example, we would need to make it explicit which action we are studying the logic of:

A's action in observing/interpreting B.   Or, B's action in doing what he is doing.

In your example it is not clear whose action we are referring to in order to illustrate the logic of individual action.

Both, probably. For we have to presuppose that A is an actor to be able to suppose that A is able to interpret the movements of B as actions. Is that at all what you meant?

baxter:

Based on your theory, we should see municipal governments in United States annexing failed, adjacent municipal governments that are less capable of producing pro-statist propaganda and therefore have lesser survival value. That doesn't seem to be happening.

I am not sure why my theory implies that.

baxter:

Even defaulting states generally don't disappear; they continue surviving.

Because people support them.

baxter:

I think praxeology applied to the human beings running institutions provides a sufficient description. It is political careers facing destruction, not the destruction of institutions, that matters.

Hoppe often commences analyses like these; for example, listen to this lecture.

Adam Knott:

If these so-called external objects are not to be considered spatially external to the actor's perceptual impressions, in what sense are they separated or distinct from the actor's perceptual impressions?

He makes the distinction between his "external impressions" and his "internal impressions". He is not saying that they have any sort of physical relationship with each other, like the former are external to something and the latter are internal to something. He is just dividing his impressions into two categories.

Now the relevant question are these, on one hand, how do we determine what belongs to the former category and what to the latter, and, on the other hand, what is the point of dividing your impressions into those two categories?

Well, to answer the first one, the way that we determine which belongs to which is that, on one hand, internal impressions are 'private', other people around you do not have those same impressions at the same time, and, on the other hand, external impressions are 'public', other people around you do have those same impressions at the same time.

Now the second question is more difficult. Who cares about the division into the external world, that is, the 'public realm', and the internal world, that is, the 'private realm'? Well, I think that the answer is what I was trying to explain before. We do not see the private realms of other people; yet the events of those private realms determine their movements. So, to make sense of their movements, we have to first examine the workings of our private realm and understand how it determines our movements and then we are able to assume that other people have private realms which work in a similiar way to ours.

So I think that it might be helpful, to avoid confusion, to replace the phrase "external world" with "public realm" and the phrase "internal world" with "private realm".