Im not sure what you are taking issue with. You outlined in your post exactly what we have been discussing. Where the responsiblity lies when someones life is taken? Are there circumstances in which some, part, or all of the responsiblitiy can be shifted or forgiven?
I asked the question because you have so far failed to grasp the whole concept of libertarian justice and show no signs of grasping it in the near future without a change in approach from trying to be the grunt's lawyer.
Im here asking questions. You dont want to answer for some reason. It should be simple to show where I have gone wrong. I am not trying to be anyones lawyer. The things I have tried to discuss here applies to more than just the "grunts".
Im here asking questions. You dont want to answer for some reason.
I don't see any question marks in the OP. What I see is finding every slippery slope and blurring of distinction to get around the common stock army grunt being culpable for anything. As for legal definitions, it should be obvious that the existing legal system is based on revenge and penalization rather than compensation and risk control. Murder, manslaughter and the like are nothing more than classifications by which to determine how much penalty to inflict upon the indicted.
I don't see any question marks in the OP.
You did not involve yourself in the conversation untill a few posts ago. Made some statements and I asked some questions in order to clarify your point. You decided to not clarify what you meant untill now.
it should be obvious that the existing legal system is based on revenge and penalization
It is.
rather than compensation and risk control.
Which would be what a libertarian legal system would be based on.
Murder, manslaughter and the like are nothing more than classifications by which to determine how much penalty to inflict upon the indicted.
Or in the case of libertarian legal system how much and what type of restitution would be due. A convicted murder in a libertarian society would most likely be segregated from the rest of society in additon to having to make restitution to the vicims family. Someone who falls asleep at the wheel of a car and kills a pedestrian would not be seen as a danger to be isolated, however would still owe restitution to his victim. If I am mistaken please explain why.
What I see is finding every slippery slope and blurring of distinction to get around the common stock army grunt being culpable for anything
I have not done this. I have drawn distinctions between differing situations. These circumstances should determine whether someone is guilty of outright murder. In which case they should be segregated from the general public in addition to owing restitution. Or are they acting under duress.
I am not talking about any specific war or time period. Only trying to establish a base line which we can examine different conflicts froma common point.
How does it feel to be an apologist for institutionalized murder?
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
I wouldnt know, I have done no such thing. If you believe I have I request that you show where I have justified states waging war.
What I have done is attempt to discuss differing circumstances that would apply differing levels of culpability for actions. Even in the paper you linked me in the other thread, passes are given to different agents of the state. These passes are based on the actions taken by those individuals, the damage done to others by those individuals, and their power over the state. These are circumstances. They were used to clear some of wrong doing and condemn others. For some reason most here would not like to use the same process when it comes to soldiers. It is much easier to just categorically condemn all soldiers as murderers.
There are some clear cut cases of murder. There are some clear cut cases of selfdefense. Most fall somewhere in between. I have tried to look at the individual actions and weigh them against individual circumstances. Or I could use smug one liners that appeal to an emotional response.
How did you know I was addressing you?
When someone breaks into my house, they generally don't have a right to self-defense. I also don't see where what is said in that paper "passes are given to different agents of the state." Please explain/cite.
Oh, I dont know.... just a hunch.
When someone breaks into my house, they generally don't have a right to self-defense.
Yes. How is it determined that they do not have the right to self defense? The circumstances. Which are he has broken into your house. How we determine if an action is just or not is the circumstances surrounding the action.
I also don't see where what is said in that paper "passes are given to different agents of the state." Please explain/cite.
From Page 23 of the PDF. Here
The point of this analogy is to blame the officers of the government, but not the common soldiers. Just as the Nuremberg trials went after the general and colonels, not the privates and corporals, the libertarian authorities will make a similar distinction with respect to the minions of the state. Well, then, who are the leaders of the modern state, or the officers, and who are the followers, or the common soldiers? There are no hard-andfast conclusions; there are gray areas; there is a continuum, perhaps, between guilt and innocence; there are complications. Nevertheless, through the clouds and fog, there are principles that can help us shed light on the issue.
The point of this analogy is to blame the officers of the government,
but not the common soldiers. Just as the Nuremberg trials went after the
general and colonels, not the privates and corporals, the libertarian authorities
will make a similar distinction with respect to the minions of the state.
Well, then, who are the leaders of the modern state, or the officers,
and who are the followers, or the common soldiers? There are no hard-andfast
conclusions; there are gray areas; there is a continuum, perhaps, between
guilt and innocence; there are complications. Nevertheless, through the
clouds and fog, there are principles that can help us shed light on the issue.
Here he explicitly addresses my point. Section 5c of the paper addresses the distinction between those who can be considered part of the ruling class and those who are subjects. How does he decide who is a member of the ruling class and who is not. Thier circumstances.
By and large, the military actions of the US and many other countries in recent history are equivalent to "breaking into a house" rather than as actions of self-defense. This is the circumstances for the Iraq war, Afghanistan, etc.
You are referring to the historical analogy he later applies only to those actions which would be just in a market economy (i.e. not murder). Keep reading.
Let us first divide governmental activities into two categories: those things that are intrinsically evil, and those which would occur even in a free society, but which are improperly taken over by the bureaucrats. In the first case, for example, it is wrong, plain wrong, to incarcerate people for engaging in prostitution, drug sales, paying wages below legal minima, or charging more than allowed by a rent control law. Everyone, everyone, directly involved in such viciousness, without exception, would be considered guilty of a rights violation, and punished appropriately by a libertarian court. This includes, but is probably not limited to, the police who capture such people, the wardens who jail them, the attorneys general who prosecute them, the judges and juries who find them guilty, etc. However, it would not include people only indirectly involved in such activities, such as those who sweep the floors in the court houses which find guilty such innocent (but actual) violators of these unjust laws, nor in the jails which later house them. Members of the coast guard and soldiers fighting in defensive wars would have nothing to fear from the libertarian court.16 Matters would be completely otherwise for those who have taken part in foreign wars of aggression, when there was no attack from them on the shores of the U.S. But members of the Federal Reserve System, that is, those from the professional "officer corps" and above certainly would, since there could be no such thing as a central bank in the pure free market.
Let us first divide governmental activities into two categories: those things that are intrinsically evil, and those which would occur even in a free society, but which are improperly taken over by the bureaucrats. In the first case, for example, it is wrong, plain wrong, to incarcerate people for engaging in prostitution, drug sales, paying wages below legal minima, or charging more than allowed by a rent control law. Everyone, everyone, directly involved in such viciousness, without exception, would be considered guilty of a rights violation, and punished appropriately by a libertarian court. This includes, but is probably not limited to, the police who capture such people, the wardens who jail them, the attorneys general who prosecute them, the judges and juries who find them guilty, etc. However, it would not include people only indirectly involved in such activities, such as those who sweep the floors in the court houses which find guilty such innocent (but actual) violators of these unjust laws, nor in the jails which later house them.
Members of the coast guard and soldiers fighting in defensive wars would have nothing to fear from the libertarian court.16 Matters would be completely otherwise for those who have taken part in foreign wars of aggression, when there was no attack from them on the shores of the U.S. But members of the Federal Reserve System, that is, those from the professional "officer corps" and above certainly would, since there could be no such thing as a central bank in the pure free market.
Agreed, I have never contended otherwise. So why this is relevent I dont know. And the aggression on the part of the state is one of the circumstances surrounding the actions of individual soldiers. There are other circumstances that need to be considered.
Keep reading.
Ive read the whole thing.
A war of aggression is illegitimate. I have never said otherwise. However that does not mean that all participating in the war is equally culpible for the crimes commited during the execution of the war. Some are more guilty than others. Some are guilty of nothing. What I cited was not meant to clear all of the "grunts". If that is the way I presented it, I appologize. It was only meant to show that the paper clearly makes a case for drawing distinctions between participants in unjust state action and not convicting all agents for the crimes of the state. Which the passage you have cited continues to make the same case.
Indeed a murderer should fear a libertarian court. However, I am not making the assumption that all who participate in an unjust war are murderers. Not even all soldiers, or even all combat soldiers. Many would be. Some would not be. I also dont make the assumption that all who participate in just wars are only killing in self defense.
States don't aggress upon others, just like countries don't "have gold". This is a false organismic analogy. You did mention the actions of individual soldiers correctly, then we add the actions of those who administer the war and those who provide material support.
Think of it in relation to the analogy of breaking into a house. Person A breaks the window, goes inside, and kills the owner, but B was the one who hoisted A up to the window, and C directed their actions.
Surely some of these people kill others, and some of them kill none, but all of these people are guilty. There is more to a justifiable maximum punishment than "A killed B".
If you take Block's explanation of proportionality and put it more in context of Mises' praxeology, you get something more like this:
I haven't read this in a while, but here is Kinsella's paper on proportionality. He mentions that what is fit for the victim is not necessarily fit for the criminal, in terms of "turning back the hands of time". A violent rapist might not feel the same felt unease as his victim from a symmetrical set of events. When we're dealing with a homogenous good, such as an ounce of silver, it is easy to say that what was taken is the same as what must be replaced. In cases like murder, we're at a loss to describe, as a juror and historian with imperfect knowledge of the future, what adequate restitution for this loss of a life is. The best we can do is threaten to take the criminal's life in response. If some legal systems prefer to never follow through on the threat, but instead prefer to judge what the convicted would have bartered in exchange for his own life, the same principle is at work.
I honestly believe that many soldiers feel their actions are justified, in defense of nation or democracy. Believing that I am a secret agent, and seeing Russian spies all around, does not make it so. In both cases the killer intended to do what they've done. The only use for terms like "manslaughter" in contrast to "murder" is to say that only one "tooth" is owed. The second is thrown out on the basis of the transgressor's actions being accidental. There is no in between.
Basicly, your point of veiw is that there are only 3 possiblities categories for killing. Murder (the intentionally taking anothers life without justification), manslaughter (the accidental taking of anothers life without justification), or lastly self defense (the justified taking of anothers life). And by extension only 2 categories of punishment or restitution. Up to and beyond the killers life for murder, and something less than taking the killers life for manslaughter. Because all soldier engaged in a war of aggression puposely take the lives of others without justification they can only be murderers.
I want to make sure I understand your point of veiw before I go any further. Please clarify anything I may have misunderstood.
I also dont make the assumption that all who participate in just wars are only killing in self defense.
I also dont make the assumption that all who participate in just wars are only killing in self defense. Can you expand on this?
Deaths of innocents as a result of collateral damage (artillery fire at military targets that miss and hit civilian homes), Indescriminate killing of civilians (ie firebombings of population centers). It may be just for them to wage war, but it dosent give them free range to kill anyone on the other side of the battle lines.
I think we agree that mitigating circumstances can lessen, and in some cases eliminate, a soldiers responsiblity, while we disagree on how much those circumstances will mitigate.
When you put it like that yes. I certainly think there are degrees to it. Connected to the level of force or fraud it took to get somebody into participating in an unjust war.
I think we agree that mitigating circumstances can lessen, and in some cases eliminate, a soldiers responsiblity, while we disagree on how much those circumstances will mitigate. When you put it like that yes. I certainly think there are degrees to it. Connected to the level of force or fraud it took to get somebody into participating in an unjust war.
Lol, awesome. Glad to see I not completely out in left field.
Or in the case of libertarian legal system how much and what type of restitution would be due.
Those words are not defined appropriately for that.
Or in the case of libertarian legal system how much and what type of restitution would be due. Those words are not defined appropriately for that.
Murder and Manslaughter? What words are? Without the state a will the legal system use different words to describe differing situations?
Basicly, your point of veiw is that there are only 3 possiblities categories for killing. Murder (the intentionally taking anothers life without justification), manslaughter (the accidental taking of anothers life without justification), or lastly self defense (the justified taking of anothers life). And by extension only 2 categories of punishment or restitution. Up to and beyond the killers life for murder, and something less than taking the killers life for manslaughter. Because all soldier engaged in a war of aggression puposely take the lives of others without justification they can only be murderers. I want to make sure I understand your point of veiw before I go any further. Please clarify anything I may have misunderstood.
First of all, you need to understand that I am coming at this from the point of view that there are actions which, basically speaking, respect the property rights of others or do not respect them, similar to Reinach's pure theory of right. This approach is similar to, but possibly more complex, than that used in Austrian economics. The difficulty in reconstructing sets of concrete historical facts belongs to the discipline of juriprudence, or law in action. This incorporates all types of knowledge from other nomothetic disciplines such as geology, psychology, military strategy, etc. guided by whatever legal theory.
The legal theory, what you are asking about here, is entirely separate from individual actor's values, how far they choose to pursue a claim, or how certain a judge is of an individual actor's intentions or past actions. Since we are trapped in the present, we use Gedankenexperiment (thought experiments), to outline certain general sets of circumstances, to hold certain factors constant, and evaluate how another factor changes the hypothetical event in relation to the underlying axioms.
With this in mind and that we are talking about the intentions of one party, I would say that you are basically right about these three categories, except you missed one (and there is at least a 5th outside of what we are talking about). I suppose a person could be justified in killing someone, but not intend to ("accidental outlaw wrangling"?). Within what typically concerns me, this doesn't have much value; however, it brought to mind the military's use of the term "collateral damage" used to wash their hands of civilian blood.
Now you say:
And by extension only 2 categories of punishment or restitution. Up to and beyond the killers life for murder, and something less than taking the killers life for manslaughter. Because all soldier engaged in a war of aggression puposely take the lives of others without justification they can only be murderers.
I don't see how what you are saying is "by extension" or even could follow. I'll only give a superficial treatment of the whole process of punishment and restitution, unless you have specific questions.
Keep in mind Block's heuristic device of the revolver with 1000 chambers and the hypothetical life-transfer machine. Obviously, as a practical constraint, there will be no life-transfer machine any time soon, but if there was and you intend to kill me while not being justified in doing so, you owe me two lives right there and we aren't even done yet.
There is a very good reason for the primacy of punishment over restitution, but I want to go back to something basic and more broad than soldiers and murder. The result of a crime, generally, is some combination of "theft" and "destruction" (we're concerned here only with the "teeth"). Pure theft is just what it sounds like, you run away with my box of chocolate bars; pure destruction you eat them all; then as in many cases there is a combination of the two where you eat a couple before you get caught.
So while a victim of murder (the kin or heirs) is already faced with a total loss (the destruction of the deceased), they only stand to gain a measure of satisfaction from killing the murderer. They also have the right to imprison (quite literally "enslave") one who owes a life to recover restitution. How I've used "manslaughter" is 'one life', and "murder" thus 'two lives'. This is again only considering the two "teeth" from the first two bullet points above. So, this is inaccurate:
Up to and beyond the killers life for murder, and something less than taking the killers life for manslaughter.
The last part isn't stated correctly, but I will give you a chance to respond before going any further.
Because all soldier engaged in a war of aggression puposely take the lives of others without justification they can only be murderers.
Not all soldiers engaged in an unjust war kill people. All soldiers who kill innocent bystanders or troops/civilians acting in self defense are murderers, given the war is one started unjustly.
Let me finish by echoing the disclaimer in Block's paper. I don't advocate violence against anyone and am discussing this purely as part of a philosophical discussion.
The whole concept of "war" in the way people bizarrely arrange themselves under the mythology of statehood is rather foreign to libertarianism. As we've agreed before, the practical limitations in today's world make a "libertarian Nuremberg" seem rather distant, but it is possible. Now, I am sure that many take what I am saying as "anti-American" or whatever. I'm not a victim of war, but if I was I would likely prefer tangible remuneration rather than vengeance. I feel that I support the troops much more than a typical war protestor or war hawk. The victims of American aggression could be repaid. Military power could be used to protect from statism and troops could possibly be paid quite a bit more than they are now for such a high risk activity. We're always discussing a theoretical maximum punishment and forgiveness in the name of ending statism is something I would support.
And this proves he is an apologist for institutionalized murder?
I thought that was self evident. Seriously though, this is the third thread on this topic in a month. I think Southern might turn the corner. There is quite a lot of equivocation in this thread and I ignored most of it. Do you see what is wrong with what you were talking about with arbitrary 1st 2nd 3rd degree "murder" in light of what I just wrote. Once you leave legal theory to jurisprudence, such categorization is useful for practical purposes with legal codification but still has no place in theory.
Do you see what is wrong with what you were talking about with arbitrary 1st 2nd 3rd degree "murder" in light of what I just wrote.
The discussion here has been very broad (so it is natural that some mistakes will be made along the way) while both you an McKibbin only got stuck up on one detail only.
That was a side point. Nothing that I (or Southern IMO) have said here hinges on this being true.
If you want to generate a legal philosophy that works, what I said about degrees is true. There is no "3rd degree action" as a sensible term. Read some quotes from Mises:
Most of a man's daily behavior is simple routine. He performs [p. 47] certain acts without paying special attention to them. He does many things because he was trained in his childhood to do them, because other people behave in the same way, and because it is customary in his environment. He acquires habits, he develops automatic reactions. But he indulges in these habits only because he welcomes their effects. As soon as he discovers that the pursuit of the habitual way may hinder the attainment of ends considered as more desirable, he changes his attitude. A man brought up in an area in which the water is clean acquires the habit of heedlessly drinking, washing, and bathing. When he moves to a place in which the water is polluted by morbific germs, he will devote the most careful attention to procedures about which he never bothered before. He will watch himself permanently in order not to hurt himself by indulging unthinkingly in his traditional routine and his automatic reactions. The fact that an action is in the regular course of affairs performed spontaneously, as it were, does not mean that it is not due to a conscious volition and to a deliberate choice. Indulgence in a routine which possibly could be changed is action. Praxeology is not concerned with the changing content of acting, but with its pure form and its categorial structure. The study of the accidental and environmental features of human action is the task of history.
Most of a man's daily behavior is simple routine. He performs [p. 47] certain acts without paying special attention to them. He does many things because he was trained in his childhood to do them, because other people behave in the same way, and because it is customary in his environment. He acquires habits, he develops automatic reactions. But he indulges in these habits only because he welcomes their effects. As soon as he discovers that the pursuit of the habitual way may hinder the attainment of ends considered as more desirable, he changes his attitude. A man brought up in an area in which the water is clean acquires the habit of heedlessly drinking, washing, and bathing. When he moves to a place in which the water is polluted by morbific germs, he will devote the most careful attention to procedures about which he never bothered before. He will watch himself permanently in order not to hurt himself by indulging unthinkingly in his traditional routine and his automatic reactions. The fact that an action is in the regular course of affairs performed spontaneously, as it were, does not mean that it is not due to a conscious volition and to a deliberate choice. Indulgence in a routine which possibly could be changed is action.
Praxeology is not concerned with the changing content of acting, but with its pure form and its categorial structure. The study of the accidental and environmental features of human action is the task of history.
...
The study of all the data of experience concerning human action is the scope of history. The historian collects and critically sifts all available documents. On the ground of this evidence he approaches his genuine task. It has been asserted that the task of history is to show how events actually happened, without imposing presuppositions and values (wertfrei, i.e., neutral with regard to all value judgments). The historian's report should be a faithful image of the past, an intellectual photograph, as it were, giving a complete and unbiased description of all facts. It should reproduce before our intellectual eye the past with all its features. Now, a real reproduction of the past would require a duplication not humanly possible. History is not an intellectual reproduction, but a condensed representation of the past in conceptual terms. The historian does not simply let the events speak for themselves. He arranges them from the aspect of the ideas underlying the formation of the general notions he uses in their presentation. He does not report facts as they happened, but only relevant facts. He does not approach [p. 48] the documents without presuppositions, but equipped with the whole apparatus of his age's scientific knowledge, that is, with all the teachings of contemporary logic, mathematics, praxeology, and natural science. It is obvious that the historian must not be biased by any prejudices and party tenets. Those writers who consider historical events as an arsenal of weapons for the conduct of their party feuds are not historians but propagandists and apologists. They are not eager to acquire knowledge but to justify the program of their parties. They are fighting for the dogmas of a metaphysical, religious, national, political or social doctrine. They usurp the name of history for their writings as a blind in order to deceive the credulous. A historian must first of all aim at cognition. He must free himself from any partiality. He must in this sense be neutral with regard to any value judgments. This postulate of Wertfreiheit can easily be satisfied in the field of the aprioristic sciences: logic, mathematics, and praxeology and in the field of the experimental natural sciences. It is logically not difficult to draw a sharp line between a scientific, unbiased treatment of these disciplines and a treatment distorted by superstition, preconceived ideas, and passion. It is much more difficult to comply with the requirement of valuational neutrality in history. For the subject matter of history, the concrete accidental and environmental content of human action, is value judgments and their projection into the reality of change. At every step of his activities the historian is concerned with value judgments. The value judgments of the men whose actions he reports are the substratum of his investigations.
The study of all the data of experience concerning human action is the scope of history. The historian collects and critically sifts all available documents. On the ground of this evidence he approaches his genuine task.
It has been asserted that the task of history is to show how events actually happened, without imposing presuppositions and values (wertfrei, i.e., neutral with regard to all value judgments). The historian's report should be a faithful image of the past, an intellectual photograph, as it were, giving a complete and unbiased description of all facts. It should reproduce before our intellectual eye the past with all its features.
Now, a real reproduction of the past would require a duplication not humanly possible. History is not an intellectual reproduction, but a condensed representation of the past in conceptual terms. The historian does not simply let the events speak for themselves. He arranges them from the aspect of the ideas underlying the formation of the general notions he uses in their presentation. He does not report facts as they happened, but only relevant facts. He does not approach [p. 48] the documents without presuppositions, but equipped with the whole apparatus of his age's scientific knowledge, that is, with all the teachings of contemporary logic, mathematics, praxeology, and natural science.
It is obvious that the historian must not be biased by any prejudices and party tenets. Those writers who consider historical events as an arsenal of weapons for the conduct of their party feuds are not historians but propagandists and apologists. They are not eager to acquire knowledge but to justify the program of their parties. They are fighting for the dogmas of a metaphysical, religious, national, political or social doctrine. They usurp the name of history for their writings as a blind in order to deceive the credulous. A historian must first of all aim at cognition. He must free himself from any partiality. He must in this sense be neutral with regard to any value judgments.
This postulate of Wertfreiheit can easily be satisfied in the field of the aprioristic sciences: logic, mathematics, and praxeology and in the field of the experimental natural sciences. It is logically not difficult to draw a sharp line between a scientific, unbiased treatment of these disciplines and a treatment distorted by superstition, preconceived ideas, and passion. It is much more difficult to comply with the requirement of valuational neutrality in history. For the subject matter of history, the concrete accidental and environmental content of human action, is value judgments and their projection into the reality of change. At every step of his activities the historian is concerned with value judgments. The value judgments of the men whose actions he reports are the substratum of his investigations.
...
In the real world acting man is faced with the fact that there are fellow men acting on their own behalf as he himself acts. The necessity to adjust his actions to other people's actions makes him a speculator for whom success and failure depend on his greater or lesser ability to understand the future. Every action is speculation. There is in the course of human events no stability and consequently no safety.
Action is preceded by thinking. Thinking is to deliberate beforehand over future action and to reflect afterwards upon past action. Thinking and acting are inseparable. Every action is always based on a definite idea about causal relations. He who thinks a causal relation thinks a theorem. Action without thinking, practice without theory are unimaginable. The reasoning may be faulty and the theory incorrect; but thinking and theorizing are not lacking in any action. On the other hand thinking is always thinking of a potential action. Even he who thinks of a pure theory assumes that the theory is correct, i.e., that action complying with its content would result in an effect to be expected from its teachings. It is of no relevance for logic whether such action is feasible or not. It is always the individual who thinks. Society does not think any more than it eats or drinks. The evolution of human reasoning from the naive thinking of primitive man to the more subtle thinking of modern science took place within society. However, thinking itself is always an achievement of individuals. There is joint action, but no joint thinking. There is only tradition which preserves thoughts and communicates them to others as a stimulus to their thinking. However, man has no means of appropriating the thoughts of his precursors other than to think them over again. Then, of course, he is in a position to proceed farther on the basis of his forerunners’ thoughts. The foremost vehicle of tradition is the word. Thinking is linked up with language and vice versa. Concepts are embodied in terms. Language is a tool of thinking as it is a tool of social action.
Action is preceded by thinking. Thinking is to deliberate beforehand over future action and to reflect afterwards upon past action. Thinking and acting are inseparable. Every action is always based on a definite idea about causal relations. He who thinks a causal relation thinks a theorem. Action without thinking, practice without theory are unimaginable. The reasoning may be faulty and the theory incorrect; but thinking and theorizing are not lacking in any action. On the other hand thinking is always thinking of a potential action. Even he who thinks of a pure theory assumes that the theory is correct, i.e., that action complying with its content would result in an effect to be expected from its teachings. It is of no relevance for logic whether such action is feasible or not.
It is always the individual who thinks. Society does not think any more than it eats or drinks. The evolution of human reasoning from the naive thinking of primitive man to the more subtle thinking of modern science took place within society. However, thinking itself is always an achievement of individuals. There is joint action, but no joint thinking. There is only tradition which preserves thoughts and communicates them to others as a stimulus to their thinking. However, man has no means of appropriating the thoughts of his precursors other than to think them over again. Then, of course, he is in a position to proceed farther on the basis of his forerunners’ thoughts. The foremost vehicle of tradition is the word. Thinking is linked up with language and vice versa. Concepts are embodied in terms. Language is a tool of thinking as it is a tool of social action.
Now, I had a hard time finding this section, and the previous parts are just food for thought, but this is the important part I wanted you to read [starting p.198]:
3. Calculative Action All the praxeological categories are eternal and unchangeable as they are uniquely determined by the logical structure of the human mind and by the natural conditions of man’s existence. Both in acting and in theorizing about acting, man can neither free himself from these categories nor go beyond them. A kind of acting categorially different from that determined by these categories is neither possible nor conceivable for man. Man can never comprehend something which would be neither action nor nonaction. There is no history of acting; there is no evolution which would lead from nonaction to action; there are no transitory stages between action and nonaction. There is only acting and nonacting. And for every concrete action all that is rigorously valid which is categorially established with regard to action in general. Every action can make use of ordinal numbers. For the application of cardinal numbers and for the arithmetical computation based on them special conditions are required. These conditions emerged in the historical evolution of the contractual society. Thus the way was opened for computation and calculation in the planning of future action and in establishing the effects achieved by past action. Cardinal numbers and their use in arithmetical operations are also eternal and immutable categories of the human mind. But their applicability to premeditation and the recording of action depends on certain conditions which were not given in the early state of human affairs, which appeared only later, and which could possibly disappear again. It was cognition of what is going on within a world in which action is computable and calculable that led men to the elaboration of the sciences of praxeology and economics. Economics is essentially a theory of that scope of action in which calculation is applied or can be applied if certain conditions are realized. No other distinction is of greater significance, both for human life and for the study of human action, than that between calculable action and noncalculable action. Modern civilization is above all characterized by the fact that it has elaborated a method which makes the use of arithmetic possible in a broad field of activities. This is what people have in mind when attributing to it the—not very expedient and often misleading—epithet of rationality.
3. Calculative Action
All the praxeological categories are eternal and unchangeable as they are uniquely determined by the logical structure of the human mind and by the natural conditions of man’s existence. Both in acting and in theorizing about acting, man can neither free himself from these categories nor go beyond them. A kind of acting categorially different from that determined by these categories is neither possible nor conceivable for man. Man can never comprehend something which would be neither action nor nonaction. There is no history of acting; there is no evolution which would lead from nonaction to action; there are no transitory stages between action and nonaction. There is only acting and nonacting. And for every concrete action all that is rigorously valid which is categorially established with regard to action in general.
Every action can make use of ordinal numbers. For the application of cardinal numbers and for the arithmetical computation based on them special conditions are required. These conditions emerged in the historical evolution of the contractual society. Thus the way was opened for computation and calculation in the planning of future action and in establishing the effects achieved by past action. Cardinal numbers and their use in arithmetical operations are also eternal and immutable categories of the human mind. But their applicability to premeditation and the recording of action depends on certain conditions which were not given in the early state of human affairs, which appeared only later, and which could possibly disappear again.
It was cognition of what is going on within a world in which action is computable and calculable that led men to the elaboration of the sciences of praxeology and economics. Economics is essentially a theory of that scope of action in which calculation is applied or can be applied if certain conditions are realized. No other distinction is of greater significance, both for human life and for the study of human action, than that between calculable action and noncalculable action. Modern civilization is above all characterized by the fact that it has elaborated a method which makes the use of arithmetic possible in a broad field of activities. This is what people have in mind when attributing to it the—not very expedient and often misleading—epithet of rationality.
So like I said, degrees of action have no place in what I was talking about. The constant focus on "mitigating factors" obscures this basic principle. I urge you to consider what I am saying as necessary to separate legal theory from law in practice. Before we consider all sorts of scenarios or want to apply them to real life scenarios, we need to understand basic categories of human action and social acts.
Is there something else you want me to address? I am going to look back over this thread, but please point it out. Once it is accepted that an act of killing is either intentional or not, we can consider the actions of two or more people; soldier and citizen, soldier and soldier, judge and citizen, etc.
A judge or juror is, in every case, faced with uncertainty in reconstructing historical facts. Even if we can say with apodeictic certainty that certain general categories of action are criminal (for example "initiating aggression") and, as a judge we've witnessed certain things with our own eyes, what another person's intentions, motivations, or values exactly were. The judge or victim as actor is faced with the same propensity for error as anyone else.
This refers to why law in action then will find codifying and gradiating useful. I might want to act in relation to a criminal to bring "first degree charges" with overwhelming video and forensic evidence, but with "lesser charges" either due to the wishes of the victim or my own uncertainty in reconstructing the facts or what my actions mean for myself.
Also see the end of my post here yesterday for related ideas.
I certainly appreciate you taking the time gather the selected passages. I know it take a good bit of time and effort.
From what I gather you are basicly saying that a person can only act or not act. There is no between. Because thought preceeds action, when someone acts it is with intent. So when we look at the act of killing it is either with intent or without intent. There is no inbetween. You either meant to kill or not. This is where you feel that Marko and I have gone astray. Claiming that there are acts that are somewhere between intentional and unintentional?
I hate to reduce all of you above post down to just this, but is this the basis of your and Caley's objection with the course of our discussion?
I guess that is a fairly good summary of a central point I was trying to make, yes.
Then beyond it, in reference to grey areas and continuum problems, we can recognize both an outside party's imperfect reconstruction of events, and soldiers uncertainty in their actions. Then we can consider problems like the wikileaks video or a soldier not being sure what they are targetting. Often though, this uncertainty won't excuse the actions as being in self-defense, because it happens in the context of an invasion.
I guess that is a fairly good summary of a central point I was trying to make, yes. Then beyond it, in reference to grey areas and continuum problems, we can recognize both an outside party's imperfect reconstruction of events, and soldiers uncertainty in their actions. Then we can consider problems like the wikileaks video or a soldier not being sure what they are targetting. Often though, this uncertainty won't excuse the actions as being in self-defense, because it happens in the context of an invasion.
Alright. I guess I can see where we might have led you to beleive that. But this is not what I, or I think marko meant. There is no doubt that all soldiers in war intentionally kill the enemy. I think that we took that for granted. I believe to put into the terms you have outlined, we were dissucssing, really, the thought component that preceeded the action. Why do the soldiers intend to kill. Then once that is determined, how much of the damage that they caused are they responsible for.
But this is not what I, or I think marko meant.
By what?
There is no doubt that all soldiers in war intentionally kill the enemy. I think that we took that for granted. I believe to put into the terms you have outlined, we were dissucssing, really, the thought component that preceeded the action. Why do the soldiers intend to kill.
What circumstances excuse killing when it is intentional? Obviously, you consider the status of who is killed. They could be a soldier defending a nation, a civilian, or an insurgent who, similarly to how one side might come to kill Arabs, came to kill Americans. In the last case it is on par with a duel, so no culpability between soldiers (but still possibly directors).
Again though, what circumstances excuse killing when it is intentional? Some thought component? I don't think nationalist or democratic fervor is a valid excuse.
Then once that is determined, how much of the damage that they caused are they responsible for.
This is rather vague. I don't see what you are saying are mitigating the criminal's actions.
That there was a grey area between intentional and unintentional action. I think we both assumed that any action taken was on purpose.
What circumstances excuse killing when it is intentional?
The most obvious would be self defense. Someone points a gun at you. You whip out your own and kill him. Your action was intentional but justified (totally excused).
Do we mean different things when we say excused? I am assuming that it means it is just. No wrong doing. And are you talking specificly about soldiers? I am currently speaking in general.
Are you saying that all intentional killing is criminal (unjust). I am assuming that intention killing can be just, unjust, or somewhere inbetween. Is this confusing the issue?
me:What circumstances excuse killing when it is intentional?
Southern:The most obvious would be self defense. Someone points a gun at you. You whip out your own and kill him. Your action was intentional but justified (totally excused).
This is fine. It applies when you are invading my home. It doesn't apply when you are invading my home.
In light of those engaged in a war of aggression being in the act of trespass, all rights to self-defense are ab initio void. Do you disagree with that?
Are you saying that all intentional killing is criminal (unjust)[?]
No, not in self-defense or in response to rights violations. Again, a trespasser with machine guns, tanks, etc. has no right to self-defense.
You don't even have to kill someone to end up dying for your actions. Keep in mind Block's heuristic device of the revolver with 1000 chambers, where one is faced with playing Russian roulette with a certain number of bullets equal to the threat they posed to a victim. This might be underestimated or dealt off in monetary remuneration in most cases, but it is what guides the theory. It would be arbitrary in most cases, but imagine an actual crime where the victim is faced with playing a 3/6 Russian roulette game.
I realised this the first time McKibbin brought it up. But it is barely worth spending time on. I only envoked them the one time. The circumstances I talk about do not hinge on "manslaughter" or "murder in the second degree" being meaningful terms.
The degrees I talked about are degrees of guilt not of action. They have to do with coercion (and with the distribution of war guilt). A slave who kills another slave in (or after) a gladiatorial fight has intentionally killed jet is innocent of murder and the guilt is reserved solely for whoever it was who forced him to fight. However if it can be determined that his opponent was forced to fight under terrible threats while the threat he was under was comparetively mild, then he is not completely innocent, since he shares in the portion of the murder guilt of his coercers. - It is this that was my point and that you should critique.
If we leave aside the aspect of war having to do with the civilians and with the war goals then combat can be likened to a gladitorial arena (or a grotesque play on Block's "murder park"). An arena that has both willing and unwilling participants. Now it is not a crime for an unwilling participant to kill any participant since he has the right to preserve his life. But it is a crime for a willing participant to kill an unwilling participant, he can not claim it was sport since his opponent did not acquiesce to be in the arena in the first place and he can not claim it was necessary to preserve his life since he did not have to enter the imperfect arena in the first place.
If we now introduce also the war goals we get the situation where one side fighting in the arena can be the agressor and the other side the defender. Now we must consider even the volunteers on the defending side unwilling participants since they were in fact put before a choice of either entering the arena and engaging in combat or enduring some form of injustice at the hands of the participants for the other side (both of the willing and of the unwilling).
So when we take into account that is possible that there be a war where both sides share in the war guilt then we must acknowledge that it is possible for a third type of combatants to exist. The unwilling-willing participants. Then what sort of an act is it for an unwilling/willing participant (a volunteer fighting on the side that is far less guilty) to kill a willing/unwilling participant (a volunteer fighting on the side that is far more guilty) and vice-versa? Is it sport, murder or something in between?
The breaking-into-a-house is a far too simple analogy to be very useful.
I think it sets some basic grounds for discussion. Do you agree that a trespasser's rights to self-defense are ab initio void? If you don't, the rest of the discussion is pointless.
A slave who kills another slave in (or after) a gladiatorial fight has intentionally killed jet is innocent of murder and the guilt is reserved solely for whoever it was who forced him to fight.
I've agreed with this much in the past. The slave-driver is at fault. (We're talking about illegitimate slavery here in the historical sense. Someone guilty of murder can be legitimately enslaved and put to the arena with people of similar juridical status.)
This is at odds with the reality of much of today's armies. The soldiers willingly conscript for payment. When we're talking about a draft, it is necessary to distinguish between current American law, which allows the choice between combat or "civil works", and other past drafts where objectors were imprisoned or sentenced to death.
So, I basically agree with the whole point. It's still irrelevant to whole armies of people who volunteer to serve in return for pay/college tuition.
If we leave aside the aspect of war having to do with the civilians and with the war goals then combat can be likened to a gladitorial arena (or a grotesque play on Block's "murder park"). An arena that has both willing and unwilling participants. Now it is not a crime for an unwilling participant to kill any participant since he has the right to preserve his life. But it is a crime for a willing participant to kill an unwilling participant, he can not claim it was sport since his opponent did not acquiesce to be in the arena in the first place and he can not claim it was necessary to preserve his life since he did not have to enter the imperfect arena in the first place. If we now introduce also the war goals we get the situation where one side fighting in the arena can be the agressor and the other side the defender. Now we must consider even the volunteers on the defending side unwilling participants since they were in fact put before a choice of either entering the arena and engaging in combat or enduring some form of injustice at the hands of the participants for the other side (both of the willing and of the unwilling).
This seems fine, but I can't think of a military engaged in a war of aggression which consists of any number of 'unwilling participants' off the top of my head. Can you? The volunteer who is defending is equivalent for this discussion to a civilian in defense.
I don't see how sides are "sharing in war guilt" in a 1-on-1 conflict. This is a problem stemming from the reification and personification of states. When a soldier is knowingly engaging in a feud or "total war" against not a specific enemy thought to be responsible for an unjust killing but a group of people (the enemy), initiating aggression makes them 100% willing. It is an interesting point to how we view engaging in war, but I think the problem dissolves when we return to using methodological individualism. Do you agree?
You have been left behind in the dicussion. A war where one side is fully the agressor and the other is fully the non-agressor is only one of many kinds of wars we can have. It is a kind about which there scarcely need be words expended upon, since the judgements of the type we are trying to reach all but draw themselves out for us. I and OP have aside from thinkink about these sort of conflicts also tried to consider other, more complicated conflicts, that are can not be likened to a simple burglarly.
I've agreed with this much in the past. The slave-driver is at fault. This is at odds with the reality of much of today's armies. The soldiers willingly conscript for payment. When we're talking about a draft, it is necessary to distinguish between current American law, which allows the choice between combat or "civil works", and other past drafts where objectors were imprisoned or sentenced to death.
I am not interested in the reality of today's armies. I am interested in the principle.
Again, I am not talking about them.
The OP and I were trying to figure out all the possibilities while you are approaching everything as if only one scenario is being talked about.
This seems fine, but I can't think of a military engaged in a war of aggression which consists of any number of 'unwilling participants' off the top of my head. Can you?
I do not care if there are none. It is conceivable that such a category could exist thus it is relevant to the discussion as conceived by the OP. Also historical examples abound. Slovenes forcefully mobilised into WWII German army, Germans impressed into units of Hessians during American Revolution, Americans impressed onto British ships during the Napoleonic Wars...
The volunteer who is defending is equivalent for this discussion to a civilian in defense.
Correct. However what about volunteer who is defending and agressing at the same time? Against another volunteer who is also defending and agressing at the same time, but in a different proportion?
How about using that methodoligical individualism in order to break down the scenario I present then? I can not agree to anything, when you do not show any of what you claim. What "initiation of agression" are we talking about? And what do you mean by engaging a non-specific enemy? People charging at you with bayonnets are very specific people.
I am talking about a person who volunteers over grievances of which only one part is legitimate (since they relate to actual rights) while the other is not (since they relate to non-rights) and who fights to remove the cause of all of these grievances. So when he kills in combat it is non-agression to the extent that his grievances are legitimate, but agression to the extent his grievances are illegitimate (since rectifying grievances that do not relate to true rights will by necessity break rights of others).
You have been left behind in the dicussion.
Could you just answer the yes or no question clearly? Do you agree that a trespasser's rights to self-defense are ab initio void? If you don't, the rest of the discussion is pointless.
A war where one side is fully the agressor and the other is fully the non-agressor is only one of many kinds of wars we can have. It is a kind about which there scarcely need be words expended upon, since the judgements of the type we are trying to reach all but draw themselves out for us. I and OP have aside from thinkink about these sort of conflicts also tried to consider other, more complicated conflicts, that are can not be likened to a simple burglarly.
I'm ready to talk about specific wars if you just agree to the principle above. The problem, as an individual, one faces in deciding to become a cog in the state military complex is that they can't be sure that who they are after is guilty of any crime. Democracy has allowed the rise of what is called total war, versus traditional feuds or wars which were not as brutal. We now have the "War on Terror" for just one example of a war with no clear objective or enemy. It is a war of ideology, and as analysis has shown, democracy is at odds with human rights.
Posit that the US-Afghanistan War started as a legitimate war against Al-Qaeda for the 9-11 attacks. Bin Laden at least claimed responsibility for the plot. At some point though, military action shifted from the hunt for Osama to fighting native Taliban and the process of democratization and "nation building". That Osama might not be dead or fled from Afghanistan, doesn't mean that some percentage of the US military action is not legitimate. However, is the bulk of their action this task? I think not.
Some actions of soldiers might be said to be fully defensive measures and other actions fully aggressive measures. Individual certainty blurs the lines, but this is not what were talking about. A theory of rights looks beyond what one thinks is just to what actually is just.
I said: I've agreed with this much in the past. The slave-driver is at fault. (We're talking about illegitimate slavery here in the historical sense. Someone guilty of murder can be legitimately enslaved and put to the arena with people of similar juridical status.) This is at odds with the reality of much of today's armies. The soldiers willingly conscript for payment. When we're talking about a draft, it is necessary to distinguish between current American law, which allows the choice between combat or "civil works", and other past drafts where objectors were imprisoned or sentenced to death.
You said: I am not interested in the reality of today's armies. I am interested in the principle.
If I throw you and your family in the back of the van, drive you off, tie up your family at gunpoint and command you to go murder people, I am responsible for your crimes. My actions to coerce your future actions transfers moral responsibility.
There is certainly a history of slave soldiers. In a hypothetical future draft, if one is given the option to go kill or press government cheese in a factory, the only way to absolve onself of crimes of the army is to abstain from combat. If, as I mentioned in other historical examples, one is faced with a sufficient amount of uncertainty of long-term imprisonment or facing death for objecting to war, they've been essentially enslaved.
Again, I am not talking about them. The OP and I were trying to figure out all the possibilities while you are approaching everything as if only one scenario is being talked about.
I said I basically agreed with you. Thinking about your previous posts though, I would like this term to be qualified: "degrees of guilt". Besides being under the threat of coercion (drafted or enslaved), what mitigates guilt for actions we determine are unjust in their own right?
We can assign guilt to the dead forever. I am more concerned with the present and future, where this segment of the theory which we seemingly agree upon, is largely irrelevant.
me:The volunteer who is defending is equivalent for this discussion to a civilian in defense.
I don't see how this is possible. A judge could be unsure about the facts, or the soldiers could be uncertain about whether they are defending or aggressing. One still either is or is not justified in their actions. At best, a soldier is absolved of the one "tooth" associated with intentions.
me:I don't see how sides are "sharing in war guilt" in a 1-on-1 conflict. This is a problem stemming from the reification and personification of states. When a soldier is knowingly engaging in a feud or "total war" against not a specific enemy thought to be responsible for an unjust killing but a group of people (the enemy), initiating aggression makes them 100% willing. It is an interesting point to how we view engaging in war, but I think the problem dissolves when we return to using methodological individualism. Do you agree?
Marko:What "initiation of agression" are we talking about?
I know you know what this means. A soldier willingly sets out to kill a group of people he believes to be "the enemy".
Marko:How about using that methodoligical individualism in order to break down the scenario I present then?
Marko's scenario:So when we take into account that is possible that there be a war where both sides share in the war guilt then we must acknowledge that it is possible for a third type of combatants to exist. The unwilling-willing participants. Then what sort of an act is it for an unwilling/willing participant (a volunteer fighting on the side that is far less guilty) to kill a willing/unwilling participant (a volunteer fighting on the side that is far more guilty) and vice-versa? Is it sport, murder or something in between?
I still don't see how this is possible. One willingly or unwillingly weilds an M-16. He knows in joining the army that he may be asked to invade foreign soil. In most cases, this mercenary is not a victim of a war of aggression himself (at least if we keep the focus on the US).
Marko:And what do you mean by engaging a non-specific enemy?
Even if he is a victim of war brutality or has a right to retaliate for the death of his father, he can't be sure that the people he is shooting at is directly responsible for past aggression. Let's call this soldier Joe. If there is evidence that Joe's father was killed by a man with red hair, does he have the right to kill anyone with red hair? I think not. Joe is not justified in engaging in a war of aggression against the Land of the Red-Haired.
People charging at you with bayonnets are very specific people.
Not really, but it doesn't matter because you are fighting a defensive war here.
This can be equated to a police officer working for a company who fights everything we can legitimately call a crime, but also terrorizes redheads. If you have a better example from present day wars, please cite it. I think things are more often more one-sided than you want to admit.
When he kills in combat, he is unsure if he is acting legitimately or not. When the facts are evaluated ex post facto, there is no degree of legitimacy in the categories of action, only in our certainty of where a person's individual actions fit to varying categories along a sequence of events.
It seems like the willingness to forgive, or empathy for those who wage aggressive wars and don't understand the basis of rights or are blinded by nationalist ideology or their leaders' pedagoguery, obscures the proper theory. It's okay to say, "Someone has clearly commited a crime but I won't act to punish them."
I am a gobsmacked that you need to ask me this. Here let me quote myself from another thread not three weeks ago:
Cause and effect. What causes this to become a warzone? It is an act of aggression on the part of the Americans. So they can not hide behind the excuse that it is a war zone. I can not intrude on someone's property and then claim self-defence.
I'm ready to talk about specific wars if you just agree to the principle above. The problem, as an individual, one faces in deciding to become a cog in the state military complex is that they can't be sure that who they are after is guilty of any crime. Democracy has allowed the rise of what is called total war, versus traditional feuds or wars which were not as brutal. We now have the "War on Terror" for just one example of a war with no clear objective or enemy. It is a war of ideology, and as analysis has shown, democracy is at odds with human rights. Posit that the US-Afghanistan War started as a legitimate war against Al-Qaeda for the 9-11 attacks. Bin Laden at least claimed responsibility for the plot. At some point though, military action shifted from the hunt for Osama to fighting native Taliban and the process of democratization and "nation building". That Osama might not be dead or fled from Afghanistan, doesn't mean that some percentage of the US military action is not legitimate. However, is the bulk of their action this task? I think not.
Afghanistan is naked aggression. I am sure we can think of a little bit more morally ambigious example. I provide one later on in the post.
Tell me something I don't know. Have you read the post where I said the "whys" are irrelevant? Have you noticed that I talked about "illegitimate grievances"? Obviously I don't hold that thinking you are in the right means that you are in the right.
Actually you confused me here. I have only been talking about degrees of guilt in combat killings. Thus the gladiatorial arena analogy and so forth, but I probably did not make this as clear as I could have.
Would you say that if two thieves simultaneously steal from each other and the first one steals 40 bucks and the second one 30, then the "guilt" of the first thief is really only 10 bucks? Then if you two soldiers who are both defending and aggressing against the other at the same time then if one kills the other it is murder to the extent that his aggressing was greater of the aggressing of the other.
That would be the potential second mitigating factor.
Consider a Russian, or a Jewish volunteer soldier in the WWII Red Army. He is defending against the Nazis and driving them into the ground as is his right. Jet at the same time he is also helping spread Communism into Germany and Poland and making "captive nations" out of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. He is at the same time defending and aggressing. Furthmore he is fighting people who are also both defending and aggressing (eg Latvians in German units...) but possibly in a different proportion.
Then consider a Latvian who in 1941 voluntarily enters a German formation of some type. He does so because he prefers German occupation over Soviet occupation. So while the initial fighting inside Latvia is taking place he is justified in fighting. As the fighting crosses the border into Russia he is no longer fully justified in fighting, but he is still somewhat justified in fighting since it is reasonable to believe that to ensure the Soviet occupation does not return the Soviet Union must be defeated, also he has the right to try to "get back" at the regime that had violated some of his rights in the 1940-41 period. However at the same time while he is somewhat justifiably fighting he is also shooting at the legitimate defenders of the people in Soviet Union, occupying Russian land and clearing the path for einsatzgruppen and potentialy Generalplan Ost.
So how do you deal with him?
So what? How does that in itself make him an aggressor?
In most cases, this mercenary is not a victim of a war of aggression himself (at least if we keep the focus on the US).?
My focus is not on the US. The first example I used in this topic was of Germans and British in Africa. My focus is on whatever the example I believe will the most closely illustrate what I am trying to say.
Nobody fights all red haired people. If you are fighting the enemy then what you are trying to do is prevent the war aims of the enemy from being realised. As long as those war aims are illegitimate and you only try to achieve this by fighting the people actively contributing to those war aims there is nothing wrong with fighting. If you would deem this an unspecific enemy or not I don't know, but it is not important anyway. The problem arises if the war aims of the enemy are largely legitimate or if you try to set back his war effort by harming even those are not engaged in advancing it (that is civilians).
I think things are more often more one-sided than you want to admit.
Stop questioning my sincerity. You've done it the second time now. Actually my guide generally speaking is Rothbard's observation that "Just because all sides share in the ultimate state-guilt does not mean that all sides are equally guilty. On the contrary, in virtually every war, one side is far more guilty than the other, and on one side must be pinned the basic responsibility for aggression, for a drive for conquest, etc." But at the same time I don't want to be dumbing down things here, since this is supposed to be a throughout discussion and since I am interested in a key to resolve all possibilities. You will note I conceded to Southern that even the Polish soldier defending against the Nazis in 1939 can be seen as guilty of some form of agression (small compared to that of a German soldier in the same battle) since by trying to defeat the Nazi invasion he helps prolong the rule of the Polish state over its unwilling German citizens.
This can be equated to a police officer working for a company who fights everything we can legitimately call a crime, but also terrorizes redheads.
I am not sure this works the same way. A policeman can do his job without terrorizing redheads. But a Red Army soldier could not exactly defeat Germany without capturing parts of East Europe for Stalin in the process. What would you say about this?