Rothbard vs. Hume?

I don't 'plead' anything. I don't recognize 'justification' as being coherent. I do as suits me, and all who do otherwise in regard for 'rights' or 'argumentation ethics' are spurious lunatics.

Liberté:

I do as suits me, and all who do otherwise in regard for 'rights' or 'argumentation ethics' are spurious lunatics.

all who do otherwise than suits you?

wilderness:

Now that it's the next day, I find it convincing to point out that a person who supports Hume would so easily ally with Liberte, ie. a Hitler supporter, which is another reason that the is-ought gap fails to provide any sense of civil justice.

Uh yeah, how does this make sense?  I wasn't aware agreeing with Hume or Liberte on a specific issue makes someone automatically Pro-Hitler.

all who do otherwise than suits you?

I treat them as I do any other obstacle - go around them if they are too strong, or annihilate them if I can.

Nitro, Wilderness is referring to where I said I would vote for Hitler on another thread. Nonetheless I am not pro-Hitler (I don't even know what it means to be 'pro' something devoid of context and options, this is praxeological nonsense) - But I would find voting for Adolf Hitler to be more entertaining than any other prospective candidates, except maybe Superman or Dr. Doom.

Liberté:

all who do otherwise than suits you?

I treat them as I do any other obstacle - go around them if they are too strong, or annihilate them if I can.

Nitro, Wilderness is referring to where I said I would vote for Hitler on another thread. Nonetheless I am not pro-Hitler (I don't even know what it means to be 'pro' something devoid of context and options, this is praxeological nonsense) - But I would find voting for Adolf Hitler to be more entertaining than any other prospective candidates, except maybe Superman or Dr. Doom.

If you don't advocate anything, why do you feel the need to state your opinion here? (I consider you a multi-account troll and am bewildered by the fact that you aren't banned yet.)

E. R. Olovetto:

Liberté:

all who do otherwise than suits you?

I treat them as I do any other obstacle - go around them if they are too strong, or annihilate them if I can.

Nitro, Wilderness is referring to where I said I would vote for Hitler on another thread. Nonetheless I am not pro-Hitler (I don't even know what it means to be 'pro' something devoid of context and options, this is praxeological nonsense) - But I would find voting for Adolf Hitler to be more entertaining than any other prospective candidates, except maybe Superman or Dr. Doom.

If you don't advocate anything, why do you feel the need to state your opinion here? (I consider you a multi-account troll and am bewildered by the fact that you aren't banned yet.)

 

I enjoy talking to some of the people that post here. The rest of  you, I don't care about.

Philosophy and sociology fascinate me. I just don't think either have any normative implications.

Liberté:

I do as suits me, and all who do otherwise in regard for 'rights' [...] are spurious lunatics.

Heeding "rights" is usually to "do as suits [you]". They are guidelines.

From "Human Action" by Ludwig von Mises, "Chapter VIII", section 1, "Human Cooperation":

Society is the outcome of conscious and purposeful behavior[...] The actions which have brought about social cooperation and daily bring it about anew do not aim at anything else than cooperation and coadjuvancy with others for the attainment of definite singular ends. The total complex of the mutual relations created by such concerted actions is called society. It substitutes collaboration for the--at least conceivable--isolated life of individuals. Society is division of labor and combination of labor. In his capacity as an acting animal man becomes a social animal.

[...]

Within the frame of social cooperation there can emerge between members of society feelings of sympathy and friendship and a sense of belonging together. These feelings are the source of man's most delightful and most sublime experiences. They are the most precious adornment of life; they lift the animal species man to the heights of a really human existence. However, they are not, as some have asserted, the agents that have brought about social relationships. They are fruits of social cooperation, they thrive only within its frame; they did not precede the establishment of social relations and are not the seed from which they spring.

The fundamental facts that brought about cooperation, society, and civilization and transformed the animal man into a human being are the facts that work performed under the division of labor is more productive than isolated work and that man's reason is capable of recognizing this truth. But for these facts men would have forever remained deadly foes of one another, irreconcilable rivals in their endeavors to secure a portion of the scarce supply of means of sustenance provided by nature. Each man would have been forced to view all other men as his enemies; his craving for the satisfaction of his own appetites would have brought him into an implacable conflict with all his neighbors. No sympathy could possibly develop under such a state of affairs.

Liberté:

all who do otherwise than suits you?

I treat them as I do any other obstacle - go around them if they are too strong, or annihilate them if I can.

Nitro, Wilderness is referring to where I said I would vote for Hitler on another thread. Nonetheless I am not pro-Hitler (I don't even know what it means to be 'pro' something devoid of context and options, this is praxeological nonsense) - But I would find voting for Adolf Hitler to be more entertaining than any other prospective candidates, except maybe Superman or Dr. Doom.

To be perfectly honest, the ignorance of the results of the Swiss study that analyzed how Hitler rose to power under normal voting behavior in this forum is astounding. 

He (or his party, at least) more or less did what every major political party in America has been doing for a century: pandering to populist, middle class worker appeal, & promising to make the best out of a bad situation created by the current or previous political party in power.

In many ways, I doubt many people actually knew what the hell would happen by voting National Socialist.  Ignorance is key in a democracy, & not every voter, not even back then, was fully competent of information on the NS party to be called Pro-Hitler. 

Obviously, some did, but a population's critical faculties might cease given the hyperinflation that occurred in Wiemar Germany. 

Hitler was an opportunist, above all else, and even though his party won, it was just barley.  Under normal conditions, it's doubtful he would even been given the light of day, let alone "critical listening" that didn't involve pointing & laughing.   

wilderness:

What do you mean by normative?

I mean what it normally means. Normative ethics involves arriving at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct.

wilderness:

I'll explain what it has to do with descriptive ethics, which E.R. provided a quote of pertaining to Hoppe which Rothbard was intellectually kin to.

Demonstrations, ie. argumentation, agreements, and bodily movements, involve ethics when the demonstration or act deals with two or more people, ie. the conduct towards another person.  That's basically ethics. 

Property is defined as the person and whatever they originally appropriate or homestead.  Human action, ie. again demonstrations such as argumentation, agreements, contracts, and bodily movements, are grounded in property because the human in human action is semantically property or in other words, scarcity.  To define a human as scarcity or property is a semantics issue so therefore wouldn't take away from the actual argument.  It's just a name, but a name that obviously provides meaning.  The meaning would stay even if the name didn't.

To put these last two paragraphs together what we find is property is demonstrated by each individual either through argumentation or bodily movements, ie. human action.  The question of what is 'mine and thine' or what is 'person A's and person B's'.  That is what ethics describes.  How that is answered is based on the axiom property and property is an axiom as it is self-evident that ethics involves humans.  The conflict over scarcity or property is a conflict over humans.  The conflict (or no conflict depends on the context) over scarcity is also a conflict over what humans originally appropriate or homestead which leads into economic goods.  Ethics are descriptive in this sense, because this only describes the conflict over scarcity.  This assumes that there is conflict over scarcity, but a conflict that is resolved peaceful right off the bat or one that is resolved in violence.  In other words, it assumes that property will come into conflict with other property and how that conflict will be resolved is based on an ordinal value scale that all parties involved decide upon.  So far still descriptive ethics because I haven't answered who gets the property.  It is self-evident that logically person A and B, their starting points, first principles, thus, their axiom is property, in other words, they are individually property.  That's the definition.  Any conflicts that arise that involve person A and/or B therefore deal with property, ie. scarcity.

I actually agree with everything here. But, like you said, you haven't crossed the bridge between descriptive ethics and normative ethics. This, as Hume pointed out, cannot be done.

 

wilderness:

What do you mean by normative?

I mean what it normally means. Normative ethics involves arriving at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct.

wilderness:

I'll explain what it has to do with descriptive ethics, which E.R. provided a quote of pertaining to Hoppe which Rothbard was intellectually kin to.

Demonstrations, ie. argumentation, agreements, and bodily movements, involve ethics when the demonstration or act deals with two or more people, ie. the conduct towards another person.  That's basically ethics. 

Property is defined as the person and whatever they originally appropriate or homestead.  Human action, ie. again demonstrations such as argumentation, agreements, contracts, and bodily movements, are grounded in property because the human in human action is semantically property or in other words, scarcity.  To define a human as scarcity or property is a semantics issue so therefore wouldn't take away from the actual argument.  It's just a name, but a name that obviously provides meaning.  The meaning would stay even if the name didn't.

To put these last two paragraphs together what we find is property is demonstrated by each individual either through argumentation or bodily movements, ie. human action.  The question of what is 'mine and thine' or what is 'person A's and person B's'.  That is what ethics describes.  How that is answered is based on the axiom property and property is an axiom as it is self-evident that ethics involves humans.  The conflict over scarcity or property is a conflict over humans.  The conflict (or no conflict depends on the context) over scarcity is also a conflict over what humans originally appropriate or homestead which leads into economic goods.  Ethics are descriptive in this sense, because this only describes the conflict over scarcity.  This assumes that there is conflict over scarcity, but a conflict that is resolved peaceful right off the bat or one that is resolved in violence.  In other words, it assumes that property will come into conflict with other property and how that conflict will be resolved is based on an ordinal value scale that all parties involved decide upon.  So far still descriptive ethics because I haven't answered who gets the property.  It is self-evident that logically person A and B, their starting points, first principles, thus, their axiom is property, in other words, they are individually property.  That's the definition.  Any conflicts that arise that involve person A and/or B therefore deal with property, ie. scarcity.

I actually agree with everything here. But, like you said, you haven't crossed the bridge between descriptive ethics and normative ethics. This, as Hume pointed out, cannot be done.

wilderness:

Jesse:

I feel like you're sidestepping this question. If you can write it in premise/conclusion format, this would be helpful.

Axioms don't involve premise/conclusion formats.

But arguments do. To arrive at normative ethics from the axiom of human action, you need an argument. Thus far you have not provided one. The scarcity issue is a red herring.

 

Jesse:

I actually agree with everything here. But, like you said, you haven't crossed the bridge between descriptive ethics and normative ethics. This, as Hume pointed out, cannot be done.

I love how Hoppe emphasized this part of a collection of objections: [pg. 8]

(((It seems that if Hoppe's argument works, it will work for people who care about justifying their beliefs; for those that do not care, then the argument does not succeed.)))

Hoppe's note:

This is true—but this is enough.

 

 

Jesse:

I actually agree with everything here. But, like you said, you haven't crossed the bridge between descriptive ethics and normative ethics. This, as Hume pointed out, cannot be done.

I guess that's good to know from at least one person that has read Hume.

What would be an example of when the is-ought gap is crossed?  I mean don't people do it everyday when they tell each other what will be done with any particular scarce good?  Though that "telling" is an ordinal range that you mentioned as well between argumentation (principled chatting), negotiations that may lead to compromises, all the way to the other end of the scale that involves violence.  These actions by people everyday in the store or in a war are not crossing the is-ought gap?  These people are not telling each other what their choices are?

Please explain as you seem to be somebody that has actually taken the time to look into this from numerous angles with what so far appears to be objectively, ie. scientifically.

 

E. R. Olovetto:

(((It seems that if Hoppe's argument works, it will work for people who care about justifying their beliefs; for those that do not care, then the argument does not succeed.)))

My interpretation of Argumentation ethics just says its just not possible to argue for slavery rationally. People can still say things like "you should consent to slavery" or "Circles have 4 corners" but they'll be wrong before they can get any further in the argument.

wilderness:

What do you mean by normative?

I mean what it normally means. Normative ethics involves arriving at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct.

wilderness:

I'll explain what it has to do with descriptive ethics, which E.R. provided a quote of pertaining to Hoppe which Rothbard was intellectually kin to.

Demonstrations, ie. argumentation, agreements, and bodily movements, involve ethics when the demonstration or act deals with two or more people, ie. the conduct towards another person.  That's basically ethics. 

Property is defined as the person and whatever they originally appropriate or homestead.  Human action, ie. again demonstrations such as argumentation, agreements, contracts, and bodily movements, are grounded in property because the human in human action is semantically property or in other words, scarcity.  To define a human as scarcity or property is a semantics issue so therefore wouldn't take away from the actual argument.  It's just a name, but a name that obviously provides meaning.  The meaning would stay even if the name didn't.

To put these last two paragraphs together what we find is property is demonstrated by each individual either through argumentation or bodily movements, ie. human action.  The question of what is 'mine and thine' or what is 'person A's and person B's'.  That is what ethics describes.  How that is answered is based on the axiom property and property is an axiom as it is self-evident that ethics involves humans.  The conflict over scarcity or property is a conflict over humans.  The conflict (or no conflict depends on the context) over scarcity is also a conflict over what humans originally appropriate or homestead which leads into economic goods.  Ethics are descriptive in this sense, because this only describes the conflict over scarcity.  This assumes that there is conflict over scarcity, but a conflict that is resolved peaceful right off the bat or one that is resolved in violence.  In other words, it assumes that property will come into conflict with other property and how that conflict will be resolved is based on an ordinal value scale that all parties involved decide upon.  So far still descriptive ethics because I haven't answered who gets the property.  It is self-evident that logically person A and B, their starting points, first principles, thus, their axiom is property, in other words, they are individually property.  That's the definition.  Any conflicts that arise that involve person A and/or B therefore deal with property, ie. scarcity.

I actually agree with everything here. But, like you said, you haven't crossed the bridge between descriptive ethics and normative ethics. This, as Hume pointed out, cannot be done.

wilderness:

Jesse:

I feel like you're sidestepping this question. If you can write it in premise/conclusion format, this would be helpful.

Axioms don't involve premise/conclusion formats.

But arguments do. To arrive at normative ethics from the axiom of human action, you need an argument. Thus far you have not provided one. The scarcity issue is a red herring.

wilderness:

Jesse:

It says nothing about how we should respond to this fact.

Nobody has said anybody should respond in any particular way as of this moment.  Unless of course, it became person, then the individual's that made this personal will provide their individual judgment of value.  That might be what's hanging you up.  Maybe not.

It is what's hanging me up. The 'should' question is a very important one — one that cannot be answered by appealing to the laws of economics.

wilderness:

Resolutions to scarcity problems are made during any particular exchange. 

Are you hinting that ethics is completely subjective?

wilderness:

Of course I'll try to say they ought not to do this to me

This is precisely what you cannot say. It begs the question "why not?" which, to answer, you would have to appeal to moral standard that applies to the both of you and judges your actions.

wilderness:

Jesse:

Maybe we should institute private property; maybe might should make right.

That's the only ordinal range of value that exists.  You draw out here an excellent point that I've been communicating in this thread.

Jesse:

You can't make a decision either way without appealing to an external standard.

Not necessarily.  Person A's decision happens in the intellect.  That's where decisions take place.  But those decisions are based not only on knowledge but also interpretations of empirical data (external standards).

Let me clarify: you cannot make a decision regarding whether right should make right, or whether property rights should be instituted. Yes, people will make this decision anyways just by interacting with each other; but at this point you cannot say that the decision ought to be made one way or the other.

wilderness:

Jesse:

You can't start an argument in the indicative mood and end in the imperative mood.

I don't know if I did.  Define those terms.

You sort of did... I'm not sure if you're trying to offer a subjective basis for ethics. I would argue against this position. All that I meant is that you cannot start out describing the facts of reality and end with any moral rules. It is logically impossible to derive the latter from the former.

 

 

 

Snowflake:

E. R. Olovetto:

(((It seems that if Hoppe's argument works, it will work for people who care about justifying their beliefs; for those that do not care, then the argument does not succeed.)))

My interpretation of Argumentation ethics just says its just not possible to argue for slavery rationally. People can still say things like "you should consent to slavery" or "Circles have 4 corners" but they'll be wrong before they can get any further in the argument.

Does this have something to do with how you are walking on one's grass and not violating their property rights? (your previously stated opinion.)

Jesse:

wilderness:

What do you mean by normative?

I mean what it normally means. Normative ethics involves arriving at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct.

The failure to distinguish between political philosophy & personal ethics makes this a strawman (fallacy) against the Libertarian / Rothbardian position and if you acknowledge that is not what you are trying to do, then it is a red herring. As such it's an invalid argument against an axiomatic-deductive rationalist objective ethics. Please try find a valid argument that doesn't do this. (Good luck).

"Normative ethics involves arriving at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. In a sense, it is a search for an ideal litmus test of proper behavior. The Golden Rule is a classic example of a normative principle: We should do to others what we would want others to do to us. Since I do not want my neighbor to steal my car, then it is wrong for me to steal her car. Since I would want people to feed me if I was starving, then I should help feed starving people. Using this same reasoning, I can theoretically determine whether any possible action is right or wrong. So, based on the Golden Rule, it would also be wrong for me to lie to, harass, victimize, assault, or kill others. The Golden Rule is an example of a normative theory that establishes a single principle against which we judge all actions. Other normative theories focus on a set of foundational principles, or a set of good character traits."

Do you have any that actually addresses the libertarian position? Eh? What a joke.

Jesse:

wilderness:

Axioms don't involve premise/conclusion formats.

But arguments do.

What arguments?  I gave you two axioms and a postulated scarcity as it is defined within both of those axioms.  I haven't argued anything to you beyond that.  I don't know exactly what you're looking for (which doesn't mean I don't know what a premise/conclusion is).

Jesse:

To arrive at normative ethics from the axiom of human action, you need an argument. Thus far you have not provided one.

Who said I'm "arriving" at anything you preconceive that I am arriving at.  I haven't provided one because I haven't and need not.

Jesse:

The scarcity issue is a red herring.

No.  It's not.  You need to provide an opposing argument to back up that red herring.  Property is scarcity.  Economic action and ethical conduct involves scarcity.  Read Rothbard and Hoppe.  To get you started.  Before you try to make a counter argument I suggest you provide one other than asking me to things for you like "provide an argument" or that somehow scarcity is a "red herring" yet I know it isn't and you don't provide me with any ideas as to why you think it is.  Give me some ideas as to why you are making these statements.   Something of substance that I can work with.  Don't demand arguments when it's not necessary for me to do that and so forth.

Sorry about the redundant posts.

wilderness:

What would be an example of when the is-ought gap is crossed?

The is-ought gap can never be crossed. It's a logical issue: a conclusion cannot contain any terms that are not present in the premises. An argument that starts merely by describing scarcity and economic laws cannot imply a conclusion with extra terms; whether it's an "ought," or anything else. The point of all of this is to show that ethics is a subject that needs to explored as a field of its own; with its own axioms, arguments, and conclusions. "Natural law" is useless because there are no ethical laws that are revealed by nature alone.

 

wilderness:

Jesse:

wilderness:

Axioms don't involve premise/conclusion formats.

But arguments do.

What arguments?  I gave you two axioms and a postulated scarcity as it is defined within both of those axioms.  I haven't argued anything to you beyond that.  I don't know exactly what you're looking for (which doesn't mean I don't know what a premise/conclusion is).

Look, I'm trying to get you to support the claim of natural law: that normative ethics can be derived from the observations of nature alone. You have done a superb job of explaining how decisions are made given the constraints of scarcity, but this is not ethics. It is not normative ethics, as least. Do you understand the distinction? I want an argument that concludes, for example, "do not steal," using only axioms that are derived from observations of nature.

wilderness:

Jesse:

The scarcity issue is a red herring.

No.  It's not.  You need to provide an opposing argument to back up that red herring.  Property is scarcity.  Economic action and ethical conduct involves scarcity.  Read Rothbard and Hoppe.  To get you started.  Before you try to make a counter argument I suggest you provide one other than asking me to things for you like "provide an argument" or that somehow scarcity is a "red herring" yet I know it isn't and you don't provide me with any ideas as to why you think it is.  Give me some ideas as to why you are making these statements.   Something of substance that I can work with.  Don't demand arguments when it's not necessary for me to do that and so forth.

I've read some Rothbard and Hoppe, and I'm currently reading more. The reason why the scarcity issue is a red herring is because it cannot bridge the is/ought distinction, and you are treating it like it does. Do you understand why this a problem? I feel like I've said all I can about it. Remember, the goal is normative ethics. If you don't think that your theory ends in normative ethics, then that is all I'm trying to prove, and we agree.

 

Jesse:

wilderness:

Resolutions to scarcity problems are made during any particular exchange. 

Are you hinting that ethics is completely subjective?

Ethics are agent-relative.  They involve individual people.  But any of the scarce goods under question by some people are real.  In this possible world, Person A is real.  Product X is a real.  They both exist.  They are real.  What A does ethically is agent-relative and completely up to A.  How Product X is valued is completely up to a number of economic factors that include the judgments of value of potentially more than one person.  The price at the store isn't relativistic.  It is determined by a number of real factors of cost.  When Person A and B come to either a principled argument or fight over scarce-Person A or scarce-Person B or scarce-Product X, the factors of the value that A and B put into X are incorporated into how A and B will resolve their potential differences over X.  Or say scarce-Person B wants to simply take X but A wants X.  B punches scarce good called Person A.  The whole scenario involves scarcity from the people to the products no matter who or what is being either quarreled over or agreed upon.

Jesse:

wilderness:

Of course I'll try to say they ought not to do this to me

This is precisely what you cannot say. It begs the question "why not?" which, to answer, you would have to appeal to moral standard that applies to the both of you and judges your actions.

This is exactly why the is-ought gap is an armchair philosophy.  It's detached from the real world.  Person A comes to punch me.  But you say I can't say to them 'you ought to not do that' which implies I can't stop them from punching me let alone saying don't punch me.  If I'm a pacifist and don't do anything at all that's still human action.  Oh well.  I sit and let them punch me in the face.  Maybe they beat me to a bloody meat because the is-ought gap said that's all I can do.  That's ivory tower detached from the world of billions upon billions of valuations taking place in the market and between people and how they each decide to treat each other on a daily basis.  Don't believe me.  Go outside and be with other people and take note of all the standards people erect between each other on how they are to conduct their lives towards each other.  I'm not making this sh-t up.

Jesse:

Let me clarify: you cannot make a decision regarding whether right should make right, or whether property rights should be instituted. Yes, people will make this decision anyways just by interacting with each other; but at this point you cannot say that the decision ought to be made one way or the other.

Of course I can.  You know praxeology?  I value my private property and maintain it that way.  That's the way I think it should be.  Person B doesn't like that idea.  I could care less until person B begins to threat my property or comes close.  I found tonight that a robber broke into two houses near my mother in laws.  One house the robbers broke in and left while three people were inside but nobody knew they were even in the house.  The other house was empty of people so they stole and left.  My mother in law is concerned that they may come into her house.  She's an old lady.  Of course she's going to be scared and so would I.  She has a baseball bat by her bed and she's going to tell any robbers what they shouldn't be doing if they come near her that's for sure.  The robber's have a different value scale.  My mother in law and I have one that differs from the robber.  Logic is on my side but I don't need to justify anything to somebody trying to initiate physical aggression towards me.  If they will not listen to reason as this is my property.  I am a scarce good and I'm not just going to roll over and play dead well the is-ought gap according to you says I can't tell the robber breaking into my house what I think they ought to be doing.  That's why the is-ought gap is a mental abstraction detached from the rest of the world.  I don't know how that's not clear enough.

Jesse:

wilderness:

Jesse:

You can't start an argument in the indicative mood and end in the imperative mood.

I don't know if I did.  Define those terms.

You sort of did... I'm not sure if you're trying to offer a subjective basis for ethics. I would argue against this position. All that I meant is that you cannot start out describing the facts of reality and end with any moral rules. It is logically impossible to derive the latter from the former.

The fact of reality is I adhere to natural rights.  I respect what other people work for and the capital they acquire.  I respect people that are civil and respect me back.  I don't need to give any of my respect to somebody that tries to steal what I've took my time and energy to gather.  I don't need to respect anybody that tries to murder me.  It's logically implied by the axiom property that I am this property.  My logical argument is based on that.  If other people don't want to take the time to acknowledge what I value in life with is to not stand in people's way when they not initiating physical aggression.  To not get in the way of innocent people in other words.  To let people do what they will without causing them unnecessary harm.  It's common decency and common sense to the people that I usually meet with around here.  I value the facts of this life of mine which include a wife, a son, a dog, and this little plot of land that we use for gardens and other things.  I'm not initiating physical aggression against anybody and all the capital I've accumulated has been derived from contractual agreements.  My goal is peace because of the many things in life that I can enjoy when there is peace as opposed to hellish violence.

Did that help?

Conza88:

The failure to distinguish between political philosophy & personal ethics makes this a strawman (fallacy) against the Libertarian / Rothbardian position and if you acknowledge that is not what you are trying to do, then it is a red herring. As such it's an invalid argument against an axiomatic-deductive rationalist objective ethics. Please try find a valid argument that doesn't do this. (Good luck).

"Normative ethics involves arriving at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. In a sense, it is a search for an ideal litmus test of proper behavior. The Golden Rule is a classic example of a normative principle: We should do to others what we would want others to do to us. Since I do not want my neighbor to steal my car, then it is wrong for me to steal her car. Since I would want people to feed me if I was starving, then I should help feed starving people. Using this same reasoning, I can theoretically determine whether any possible action is right or wrong. So, based on the Golden Rule, it would also be wrong for me to lie to, harass, victimize, assault, or kill others. The Golden Rule is an example of a normative theory that establishes a single principle against which we judge all actions. Other normative theories focus on a set of foundational principles, or a set of good character traits."

Do you have any that actually addresses the libertarian position? Eh? What a joke.

C'mon, man. You're not understanding what I'm saying. What I'm talking about has nothing to do with the distinction between political philosophy and personal ethics. I'm talking about natural law: a theory that Rothbard supported (and Mises did not). All I am trying to argue is that this theory does not (as far as I have seen) deal successfully with Hume's is/ought distinction. I cited the internet encyclopedia of philosophy (a credible source) to clear up the definition of normative ethics. There is nothing distinctly libertarian about normative ethics.

 

Jesse:

Look, I'm trying to get you to support the claim of natural law: that normative ethics can be derived from the observations of nature alone. You have done a superb job of explaining how decisions are made given the constraints of scarcity, but this is not ethics. It is not normative ethics, as least. Do you understand the distinction? I want an argument that concludes, for example, "do not steal," using only axioms that are derived from observations of nature.

I'm a little bit confused; maybe you can help me out:

What does normative ethics require? How is Wilderness's argument invalid? We know that (a) there is truth in the universe (insofar as there is order; that is, A cannot be both A and not A at the same time and in the same sense), (b) all phenomena is causally connected (there is a regularity in the concatenation and sequence of phenomena), and (c) there are certain unavoidable constraints (praxeology, scarcity, ect). We must employ certain means to achieve certain ends; that is, the subjective beliefs are entirely immaterial. A person who attempts to stop an inflation by elevating the rate of unemployment is a fool (we know that he must slow down or entirely stop monetary expansion). We also know that individuals, in the vast majority of cases, value their lives, property, prefer more to less, ect. From this, how can we not deduce what we should do (and therefore what we should not do)?

I've never understood the difference between utilitarianism, consequentialism, and natural law. That which yields the optimal result is the moral or correct action because of natural law.

Jesse:

I've read some Rothbard and Hoppe, and I'm currently reading more. The reason why the scarcity issue is a red herring is because it cannot bridge the is/ought distinction, and you are treating it like it does.

I also don't understand this objection. To me, the is/ought divide is entirely illusory. Ought naturally follows from is. I'm not really into philosophy because I feel like it's pure mysticism and nihilism, but I would really appreciate a response.

Jesse:

You're not understanding what I'm saying.

No, I believe I do.

Jesse:

What I'm talking about has nothing to do with the distinction between political philosophy and personal ethics.

It does considering your criticisms of Rothbard & natural law. I'm not sure you understand the position. 

Jesse:

I'm talking about natural law: a theory that Rothbard supported (and Mises did not).

What you need to be aware of is Mises had no criticisms of Rothbard's conception of natural law. See David Gordon for that. Let alone the points that Mises' definition of natural law he was critiquing was the Hobbesean version. Much like his definition / attack against anarchism was against the socialist variety. And much like his definition of democracy, is not what it is understood as today.

Jesse:

All I am trying to argue is that this theory does not (as far as I have seen) deal successfully with Hume's is/ought distinction.

What is the theory? It would be good if you could spell out your conception of it.

Jesse:

I cited the internet encyclopedia of philosophy (a credible source) to clear up the definition of normative ethics. There is nothing distinctly libertarian about normative ethics.

Were you not using that definition / concept as a basis against Rothbard's natural law? Because since the linked, really has not accurately portrayed anything about it, i.e differences, then you'll need a better one.

Jesse:

The is-ought gap can never be crossed. It's a logical issue: a conclusion cannot contain any terms that are not present in the premises. An argument that starts merely by describing scarcity and economic laws cannot imply a conclusion with extra terms;

Scarcity.  It's reality.  You really need to point out in more detail what you're objecting to here.

Jesse:

whether it's an "ought," or anything else. The point of all of this is to show that ethics is a subject that needs to explored as a field of its own; with its own axioms, arguments, and conclusions. "Natural law" is useless because there are no ethical laws that are revealed by nature alone.

You're backpeddling again.  Natural law according to all the natural law theorists I've ever read of the Aristotle-Thomist tradition which includes Rothbard and to an extent Hoppe, define natural to mean what is intellectually comprehended by reality.  So.  Given that in regards to ethics then natural law deals with ethical issues that are intellectually comprehended.  What this means is not only does the other person in the ethical relationship become apart of what the intellect is comprehending, but also how I feel, any knowledge patterns from memory or what is currently happening all come into play.  That is the complete context as to what particular ethical subject is being discovered by the intellect.  The intellect plays a significant role because that's where thought is.  Without thought being able to perceive what is happening then how will my mind know what's going on even if I feel a certain way, I will not know that in thought if I don't have a thought about how I feel.

Natural law has had it's own axioms for hundreds of years.  Rothbard was able to poignantly show that life and liberty converge as being the same as property.  John Locke defines property as being in ones person and any homesteadable scarce goods.  In an ethical relationship between two or more people is their own person (scarce good; property) that is involved.  The ethical circumstances are about these two or more people being property and sometimes in violence one or more may try to homestead or beat up or control or make them do what they feel like.

Who is right is answered by natural law.  It is the person who has first appropriated either their own self (which as a tautology having not only the definition of illogical circularity but also is descriptive of an axiom.  These are merely two different definitions by two different philosophical traditions).  The starting points or first principles are one of the things Aristotle was first to describe.  He said they can be known when the logic becomes circular but what is being logically described is none the less true.  It is only circular because Aristotle points out and he had logically shown this in his book "Aprior" that before an infinite regression happens there needs to be a starting point.  A place in which all logical deductions start from.  They are first principles or axioms.  The way to prove an axiom in human nature which makes them more certain than axioms in math or physics is the axioms are what Aristotle pointed out as being negative demonstrations.  You can't disprove property in ones person because if you tried to then you have to demonstrate your property in the attempt to refute it.  What you use in order to attempt to refute proves you can't refute it.  That's called negative demonstration.  It's why ethically speaking when somebody tries to take away the property/life of another they are demonstrating in action a refutation.  That's what's beautiful about action, that Mises eventually picks up on but Aristotle had already discussed, though not at the length that later philosophers would.  The logical refutation has taken action in the bodily demonstration of the aggressor.  They may end up killing a person in their act of refutation/action, but logically they have not refuted property/life because they used property/life in the act of refutation - their own.  Negative demonstration.  It's also called special pleading when somebody tries to argue for special treatment that they can do what they want to others but others can't do that back to them.  Special pleading is also a logical fallacy.

Esuric:

From this, how can we not deduce what we should do?

You can only deduce from these axioms ideas that are already contained within them. Praxeology, causality, and other economic laws convey truth about the nature of acting man. They have implications for how to obtain certain subjectively valued ends. But here is the key point: these laws do not, and cannot inform us what we ought to value. This is a Misesian insight. Suppose I wanted to get my boss's job: what route should I take? Is it ethical to do so by spreading vicious lies about him for the purpose of ruining his reputation? I assume that you would condemn such action, but how? Can you do so by only appealing only to economic and praxelolgical laws?

Esuric:

I've never understood the difference between utilitarianism, consequentialism, and natural law. That which yields the optimal result is the moral or correct action because of natural law.

I don't know what to say to this except study ethical theory. There is a vast difference between the schools of though. (By the way, utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism, and natural law is not necessarily non-utilitarian nor non-consequentialist)

Esuric:

Jesse:

I've read some Rothbard and Hoppe, and I'm currently reading more. The reason why the scarcity issue is a red herring is because it cannot bridge the is/ought distinction, and you are treating it like it does.

I also don't understand this objection. To me, the is/ought divide is entirely illusory. Ought naturally follows from is. I'm not really into philosophy because I feel like it's pure mysticism and nihilism, but I would really appreciate a response.

Ought does not follow from is. Maybe you should read Hume? He's pretty entertaining, even if you don't agree with him. I disagree with him on a lot of things, but on this, I side with him.

 

Jesse:

They have implications for how to obtain certain subjectively valued ends.

But desired ends are really objective, or do you deny that people value their lives, property, prefer more to less, maximize utility, ect?

Jesse:

But here is the key point: these laws do not, and cannot inform us what we ought to value.

It tells us what we ought to do.

Jesse:

Suppose I wanted to get my boss's job: what route should I take? Is it ethical to do so by spreading vicious lies about him for the purpose of ruining his reputation? I assume that you would condemn such action, but how? Can you do so by only appealing only to economic and praxelolgical laws?

First, your boss's job is not what you truly desire. In this case, you probably desire material wealth or the prestige associated with his position. Therefore, taking your boss's job is not really an end in itself but really a means towards an end. Second, I can't answer this hypothetical question; but that doesn't mean that this question cannot be answered at all. It is perfectly reasonable to assume that a fully rational individual could deduce the correct, and therefore moral, course of action.

Now, you could imagine theoretical situation which could seemingly invalidate my position. But what your doing there is essentially creating your own reality. It's no different from the socialists who say "what if a firm dumps toxic waste next to a school and avoids all negative consequences." This (may be a poor example) doesn't refute free market ideology; it just means that this person has created some kind of imaginary world where human beings don't act like human beings (such a condition cannot persist in a free society).

But my position/question is far broader in scope: the action which has the best end result, the highest total degree of utility, will be the action consistent with natural law, precisely because of (a), (b), and (c) [what I pointed out in my previous response].

Jesse:

I don't know what to say to this except study ethical theory. There is a vast difference between the schools of though. (By the way, utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism, and natural law is not necessarily non-utilitarian nor non-consequentialist)

Yes, I know this.

Jesse:

Maybe you should read Hume? He's pretty entertaining, even if you don't agree with him. I disagree with him on a lot of things, but on this, I side with him.

My point is that you're not really making your case. What you're saying is that the questions are so complicated at the micro level that natural law philosophy cannot be employed in any meaningful way (the fact that individuals have different experiences makes it seem as though they desire completely unique and subjective ends). This is probably correct.

Jesse:

Ought does not follow from is.

So there's an inflation which is destroying the purchasing power of real wages across the board (is). Individuals prefer more wealth to less, and inflation is making them poorer (is). Therefore, the authorities ought to slow down or entirely stop monetary expansion (ought). Why is this so unreasonable?

Jesse:

Look, I'm trying to get you to support the claim of natural law: that normative ethics can be derived from the observations of nature alone. You have done a superb job of explaining how decisions are made given the constraints of scarcity, but this is not ethics. It is not normative ethics, as least. Do you understand the distinction? I want an argument that concludes, for example, "do not steal," using only axioms that are derived from observations of nature.

I don't need to.  Cause either the aggressor performs a negative demonstration or special pleads.  You're barking up the wrong tree in thinking that logical deductions are necessary when it comes to the proposition "do not steal".  Axioms such as property, don't involve logical deductions.  They just are.  Property is.  It is self-evident.  Pick up an "Intro. to Logic" book that deals in traditional philosophy like the one Mises said any person should read before reading any other economic book.  It's by Cohen.  Propositions are not logically deducted either.  The premises are not logically deducted unless demonstrated in a deduction to imply a conclusion.  Many categorical propositions are not logically deducted but are assumed.  All sciences for thousands of years are founded on assumptions and categorical propositions that are not logically deducted.  Your putting too much weight on logical deductions when axioms don't need to be proven that way which makes axioms more certain.

Jesse:

I've read some Rothbard and Hoppe, and I'm currently reading more. The reason why the scarcity issue is a red herring is because it cannot bridge the is/ought distinction, and you are treating it like it does. Do you understand why this a problem? I feel like I've said all I can about it. Remember, the goal is normative ethics. If you don't think that your theory ends in normative ethics, then that is all I'm trying to prove, and we agree.

My theory isn't normative UNTIL the judgments of value are made in the real world.  What is so hard to understand about that?  There is a certain existence of facts in a situation between two or more people.  They devolve into an ethical battle.  They are applying what they think ought to be applied to the situation.  That's why it's a fight or an argument.  If they both agreed on what is, then they wouldn't be fighting or arguing.  They are both going to apply their own versions of what is into the ethical situation.  I start by intellectual considerations with the axiom property.  I consider scarcity within the world and look for peaceful resolutions.  Person B doesn't.  They have another form of what ought to be.  In our exchanges we come to certain terms.  I act my first principle.  I act my property.  Person B may not like my starting point.  They may not like that I exist.  They want to rid this property called wilderness.  Oh well.  The world isn't perfect and people are fallible.

I don't know what you're asking for.  But this being my property is my first principle.  It is my axiom.  I act my axiom.  It's called property.  It's called human action.  How much more do I need to demonstrate that it exists before you realize it is self-evident?

Esuric:

Jesse:

They have implications for how to obtain certain subjectively valued ends.

But desired ends are really objective, or do you deny that people value their lives, property, prefer more to less, maximize utility, ect?

Exactly.  I don't understand how people don't realize that.

But in a way I do.  They completely misunderstand where the line of subjectivity ends.  Some people think subjectivity is to become the whole of world.  Everything is not definable and nothing is real.  Subjectivity only means agent-relative in Misean terms or anybody elses that I've come across in the Austrian school.  It's one thing that Mises may not emphasize enough of but Carl Menger did. 

People will choose different ends but those ends are real/objective.  They are real and objective to the individual that uses means for those ends.  They are not illusory or nihilistic or non-existent.  Axioms are real and objective too.  The only subjective part is that people choose differently within a world that is real and has objects and truth-values.

Wilderness, we seem to be going around in circles. We're both repeating ourselves, which means that one (or both) of us isn't understanding the other. Is it okay if I try a new approach? I don't mean to ignore your previous post, but I don't think that responding to it will help anything at the moment.

Imagine that someone broke into your house and is in the process of stealing some of your property (as was the case with your mother-in-law). You confront him, and the both of you decide to have a philosophic discussion about ethics and property rights. You try to talk him out of stealing by explaining praxeology to him, and how people use means to obtain their subjectively-valued ends. You explain how private property best settles the disputes that arise over scarce resources, and whatever else you want to. He listens and understands, but then goes on to defend his actions this way: "wealth is my subjectively-valued end. Stealing your property is the means that I choose to acquire this. I agree that property rights exist, and society functions best when they are respected, but my decision to steal has nothing to do with society as a whole. The fact is, I personally benefit from stealing your property, and I see no reason to abstain from doing so." You tell him that it is illogical for him to consider himself as an exception to the property-rights rule, but he replies by saying it is illogical for you to expect him to do anything other than what he perceives to be in his self-interest. You try to persuade him that the long-run effects of his actions are not in his self-interest, but he remains firm in his commitment to the idea that stealing your property is what's best for him. In the end he walks out with your property.

Did he do anything wrong? He followed all of the advice available to him by economic theory. He did nothing illogical. To condemn his actions, you must appeal to something other than economic theory — to some kind of ethical law. In particular, to some kind of ethical law that does not have its basis merely in the economic laws that you enunciated.

Esuric:

Jesse:

Ought does not follow from is.

So there's an inflation which is destroying the purchasing power of real wages across the board (is). Individuals prefer more wealth to less, and inflation is making them poorer (is). Therefore, the authorities ought to slow down or entirely stop monetary expansion (ought). Why is this so unreasonable?

Thank you Esuric.  It's not Jesse in particular, but so many people come into this forum and this is what I've tried over and over again to argue against.  The is-ought gap is a mental abstraction.  It's fantasy world detached from reality.  It says nobody can find out what ought to happen.  Yet every single day and night all people come to the conclusions as to what they ought to do and sometimes what other people ought to do.  Sometimes people haggle over what ought to happen.  What's great about going into a store is the store sets a price that ought to be used.  Yet I can walk away and shop somewhere else.  A thief doesn't go for the price but simply takes it.  The thief is pointing out what the price ought to be - free.  How do I know this?  Not by psychos but because that's what the thief did.  They took a product for free (delineating any costs to go in and get out unscathed).

It's as you put it.  The is-ought gap seems to erect a reality for any individual person that erects it, then they except everybody else to adhere to it.  But nobody is and they won't either.  The forum has debunked it so many times, and so does the real world.  Sooner or later any given person will act in the real world and need to deal with everybody telling everybody what they ought to do.  Thank goodness most people I meet perform these encounters with each other in peaceful ways.  Woowho.

Jesse:

Wilderness, we seem to be going around in circles. We're both repeating ourselves, which means that one (or both) of us isn't understanding the other. Is it okay if I try a new approach? I don't mean to ignore your previous post, but I don't think that responding to it will help anything at the moment.

I'll have to pick this up tomorrow.  It's late here.  Good night.  And I'm all for a new approach.

cheers!

wilderness:

But in a way I do.  They completely misunderstand where the line of subjectivity ends.  Some people think subjectivity is to become the whole of world.  Everything is not definable and nothing is real.

This is why moral nihilism = nihilism. They think that they can invalidate natural law by pointing out specific and individual examples of immoral actions. But they fail to consider the natural and inevitable consequences of such actions. People will say, for example, we have a system of laws because there is no natural law; but in reality, we developed a system of laws precisely because of natural law. Then they'll point out the fact that different nations have different laws; but again, they fail to consider the fact that laws which deviate from the natural law (determined by exogenous variables, such as the laws of human action, scarcity, regularity in the sequence of phenomena, ect) are entirely untenable (not real laws). 

If society "A" outlaws private property it cannot last. This has nothing to do with subjectivity nor is it a hypothetical proposition. It is categorical and objectively true. It wouldn't matter if every member of that society agreed that private property is immoral; it is still an impossible condition. Subjective beliefs cannot override reality.

Esuric:

But desired ends are really objective, or do you deny that people value their lives, property, prefer more to less, maximize utility, ect?

Our final end is objective (the satisfaction of all desires), but the means (I referred to these as 'ends' in a different context) that we pursue this with are different, and subjective. Do you deny that people have different discomforts that they try to alleviate in different ways? What if someone is fully convinced that stealing, lying, or murdering is the best way to go about alleviating his discomforts? You can't condemn these actions by appealing only to economic principles.

Esuric:

It is perfectly reasonable to assume that a fully rational individual could deduce the correct, and therefore moral, course of action.

What? Do you realize that you just made an ethical assumption? You've just equated "correct" action with moral action. If by "correct" you mean the action that achieves the end aimed at, then what you're saying is that whatever action achieves the ends we want is moral. This is called hedonism. I hope you're comfortable with it.

Esuric:

My point is that you're not really making your case. What you're saying is that the questions are so complicated at the micro level that natural law philosophy cannot be employed in any meaningful way (the fact that individuals have different experiences makes it seem as though they desire completely unique and subjective ends). This is probably correct.

That's not quite what I'm saying. I'm saying that natural law is untenable insofar as it claims to be able to derived from the facts of nature alone. If the proponents of natural law realized that they made ethical assumptions, I would be much more sympathetic to it. But the fact remains that indicative statements do not imply imperative ones. I'm tired of repeating this.

Esuric:

So there's an inflation which is destroying the purchasing power of real wages across the board (is). Individuals prefer more wealth to less, and inflation is making them poorer (is). Therefore, the authorities ought to slow down or entirely stop monetary expansion (ought). Why is this so unreasonable?

I'll demonstrate, using logic, why this is invalid. Here is what your argument looks like: P1: Inflation implies poorness P2: Individuals do not like poorness Conclusion: Authorities ought to get rid of inflation This argument is invalid; the conclusion is not guaranteed by the premises. It requires an additional premise, one (coincidentally!) containing an "ought" statement which connects the premises with the conclusion. Here is what it could look like: P1: Inflation implies poorness P2: Individuals do not like poorness P3: The authorities ought to get rid of the things that individuals don't like Conclusion: the Authorities ought to get rid of inflation Do you see why this argument is valid, whereas the prior on was not? This third premise is necessary, yet it is specifically what natural law proponents claim to not need. They think they can just point out enough facts, and an "ought" magically falls out of it. This is not so, an "ought" is required in the premises to begin with. These "oughts" are called ethical principles, and they are indispensable. I have a feeling that you will try to argue that the third premise is somehow implied by praxeology. It is not. Praxeology only tells us that individuals act to alleviate felt unease. Alleviating an unease may require keeping something that I 'don't like.' An ethical principle is an example of something that I 'don't like', but that i feel more unease if it I violate it. Therefore, ethics is consistent with praxeology, but it is not implied by it.

Jesse:

That's not quite what I'm saying. I'm saying that natural law is untenable insofar as it claims to be able to derived from the facts of nature alone.

Well I've repeated what natural law's definition is and I do that because I don't think you know what natural law is. Define the natural law you are talking about.

Esuric:

But they fail to consider the natural and inevitable consequences of such actions.

Exactly. Not necessarily you Jesse because I don't think you've really (1) grasped your own position (2) and have yet to realize what natural law is which is necessary in order to actually make a case against it, but it's the same as Mises' free market or socialism there is no middle way declaration. There's innocent people and there are aggressors. There is no middle way. It's a clear boundary. And the number of examples that I've seen in the forum from bubble gum shoppers to a guy in a cabin all try to subvert the delineation between innocent and aggressor. Why in the world some people want to break that line becomes more apparent to me everyday. It's the ivory tower trying to break away from the activities of the rest of the world where actions of A necessarily lead to B. The ivory tower is an intellectual exercise that leads to sympathetic propositions for the aggressor. How many times in history have armchair professors or philosophers come up with ideas that are impossible to implement in the real world, meaning, if tried leads to chaos and the goal is never attained. And on top of that gov'ts bring in such armchair philosophers to experiment on society and to try the impossible all in the name of modernity. I'm beginning to think that nihilism is the root of all the world's evils. Pray I'm wrong.

Jesse, Do you not think that Romans 1 provides a theological case for natural law? Also I do think that natural law is defensible logical grounds if one is a theist: 1. Nature is good 2. Natural law is derived from nature 3. Natural law is good 4. One ought to follow the good. 5. Thus one ought to follow natural law. Of the two premises 1 and 4, 4 is uncontroversial however 1 is not. It is though defensible: the most robust defence would rest on nature being created by a good God who if he created would make things good. Obviously it would only follow that it was good at the point of creation and you could argue it has been corrupted, ie sin, but it still retains its a lot of its original features and can be a bases for law.

Jesse:

Did he do anything wrong?

If you don't know.

Jesse:

He followed all of the advice available to him by economic theory.

No he didn't.

Jesse:

He did nothing illogical.

Yes he did. Special pleading, negative demonstration, and A is non-A to him. My actions of acquiring private property were peaceful and involved the free market. His were violent and didn't involve the free market. Civil society inevitable does not last and thus naturally degenerates into oblivion if everybody were robbers. The robber lifestyle is illogical to maintain human existence. Nobody has anything nor their own life, because everything is stolen but never possessed. It is certain death. If the robber wants certain death, if the robber was really being logical about such an end, then he or she will just let me defend my private property and shoot him or her on the spot. If they don't let me do that to them, then they contradict what they attempt to do. This assumes the robber will not let me take my stuff back (which is special pleading too) and the robber will only keep on stealing. Eventually life must go on. A starting point or first principle has to be demonstrated.

Jesse:

To condemn his actions, you must appeal to something other than economic theory — to some kind of ethical law.

I have in all my posts. Now go back through and answer all the questions in this post of yours. If you do not, then I can only conclude that you have no ideas to offer and are only using me to describe reality to you. Prove your philosophy actually works. 1 - Demonstrate how not defending private property works, ie. your philosophy. I have demonstrated how it works due to it the founding act of human existence. I have given you the starting point (axiom) that each person demonstrates in the world. I am not adding anything that isn't already taking place in the world. You appear to be trying to impose an artificial, ivory tower abstraction into a world which is impossible to actually take place due to the fact of scarcity. 2 - Please explain to me why my property, my scarce life, in other words, my existence is a red herring. That is a nihilistic, violent idea that I am not willing to accept as your true proposition. I am giving you the benefit of the doubt. I have considerably enjoyed this philosophical argument. I am fill with heartfelt gratitude towards you in the civility and thoughtfulness that you have given in this discourse.

wilderness:

My actions of acquiring private property were peaceful and involved the free market. His were violent and didn't involve the freemarket.

You robbed others from the enjoyment of the same good. Under threat of violence.

Physiocrat:

Jesse, Do you not think that Romans 1 provides a theological case for natural law? Also I do think that natural law is defensible logical grounds if one is a theist: 1. Nature is good 2. Natural law is derived from nature 3. Natural law is good 4. One ought to follow the good. 5. Thus one ought to follow natural law. Of the two premises 1 and 4, 4 is uncontroversial however 1 is not. It is though defensible: the most robust defence would rest on nature being created by a good God who if he created would make things good. Obviously it would only follow that it was good at the point of creation and you could argue it has been corrupted, ie sin, but it still retains its a lot of its original features and can be a bases for law.

I think that Divine law is a possible alternative to natural law. Do not confuse the two, they are separate things. If you appeal to scripture at all, you are not a natural rights theorist. People like Augustine and Aquinas were famous for trying to combine the two theories, but the fact remains that they are still two distinct theories. One theory posits that the rights of man are imputed by God, and the other theory posties that God does not need to be appealed to; the rights of man are apparent in his nature. Perhaps Augustine and Aquinas were successful in their attempt to combine the theories, but I am convinced that they would not have been if they only had the natural rights doctrine to work with.

Actually it was Aquinas who did theologically theorize God, but he also was one of the first to explicitly argue that natural law can be reasoned. The differences are only in first principles. Natural law theologians have their starting point, ie. axiom, being God. Other natural law theorists have their starting point, ie. axiom, being property. And these two are not mutually exclusive.