Lilburne,
No. We haven't even gotten to any deductions yet. Again (1) you don't know what deductions mean (2) don't know what axioms mean (3) are simply avoiding this on purpose. I am using "Intro. to Logic" books. This is all very basic 101 logic. That quote isn't even close to discussing what an 'axiom' is. All Rothbard would be saying in that quote is Hoppe by using axioms then uses a deductive method to come to certain conclusions. But Hoppe's argumentation ethics starts with the axioms that are pre-supposed by each person in the argument before any deduction need be even made. Plenty of literature on this at the Mises Institute.
wilderness: Hume really screwed up philosophy.
Hume really screwed up philosophy.
I do not think that Hume and Mises are irreconcilable, of which I tried to lay the groundwork in one of my recent threads.
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
Lilburne:If so, Lilburne, Mises, and I are "natural law theorists". Cool.
For maybe nearly a year Lilburne has attacked life, liberty, and private property in this forum. People have left and some people Lilburne has banned because they all saw the same thing!!
Lilburne may have not done this on purpose. I'm not saying he did. But this is exactly what some of those people thought.
I have never banned anyone for ideological reasons. If that were my modus operandi, how do you explain my deliberately letting you, the most vocal proponent of natural rights here, back into the forums when I absolutely didn't have to?
I still want the answer to this:
wilderness: wilderness: Why do I need to suggest to people anything? So you are saying that the system that you support makes no suggestions to other people?
wilderness: Why do I need to suggest to people anything?
Why do I need to suggest to people anything?
So you are saying that the system that you support makes no suggestions to other people?
I. Ryan: wilderness: Hume really screwed up philosophy. I do not think that Hume and Mises are irreconcilable, of which I tried to lay the groundwork in one of my recent threads.
Lilburne:I have never banned anyone for ideological reasons.
I know. I want to make this very clear. YOU ARE RIGHT. I am not saying you did.
I said 'that's what they thought you were doing'. I have thought that's what you are doing. All natural law theorists that I know of have been thinking you are philosophically attacking 'life, liberty, and private property'. It's why they became so feverish, agitated, and down-right 'mad as hell'.
Do you get it now? This is EXACTLY what is going on in the forum with everybody confronting you that are natural law theorists. We are trying to protect life, liberty, and private property and you have been perceived as a threat to the very life, liberty, and private property of some people. This is the truth.
Not only Rothbard but Kant, Karl Popper, (possibly Feynman too), and many, many others have a problem with Hume's skeptisism. It would mean the end to science if Hume's way was fully followed.
Does Mises ever understand natural law in the Aristotle-Thomist tradition?
He probably didn't understand the Dharmic process either. And he's no worse for it. Mystical clap-trap, the lot of it.
Hume's skepticism is irrelevant to the problem of morality. The problem with morality is that it is logically incoherent or meaningless.
Only individual values exist, and they only exist in relation to actual ideas about satisfaction individuals have. There is no 'good' or 'bad', there is no 'irrational' action. There is nothing in this world of purposeful action but power, will and logic and normatives have no place in any of these. They are nothing but a biological trick, evolutionarily generated delusions.
“Socialism is a fraud, a comedy, a phantom, a blackmail.” - Benito Mussolini"Toute nation a le gouvernemente qu'il mérite." - Joseph de Maistre
wilderness: Not only Rothbard but Kant, Karl Popper, and many, many others have a problem with Hume's skeptisism. It would mean the end to science if Hume's way was fully followed.
Not only Rothbard but Kant, Karl Popper, and many, many others have a problem with Hume's skeptisism. It would mean the end to science if Hume's way was fully followed.
Hume did not advocate that we should not use induction. Mises echoed this plenty of times:
Ludwig von Mises: The champions of mechanicalism do not bother about the still unsolved problems of the logical and epistemological basis of the principles of causality and imperfect induction. In their eyes these principles are sound because they work. The fact that experiments in the laboratory bring about the results predicted by the theories and that machines in the factories run in the way predicted by technology proves, they say, the soundness of the methods and findings of modern natural science. Granted that science cannot give us truth--and who knows what truth really means?--at any rate it is certain that it works in leading us to success.
The champions of mechanicalism do not bother about the still unsolved problems of the logical and epistemological basis of the principles of causality and imperfect induction. In their eyes these principles are sound because they work. The fact that experiments in the laboratory bring about the results predicted by the theories and that machines in the factories run in the way predicted by technology proves, they say, the soundness of the methods and findings of modern natural science. Granted that science cannot give us truth--and who knows what truth really means?--at any rate it is certain that it works in leading us to success.
Ludwig von Mises: The natural sciences too deal with past events. Every experience is an experience of something passed away; there is no experience of future happenings. But the experience to which the natural sciences owe all their success is the experience of the experiment in which the individual elements of change can be observed in isolation. The facts amassed in this way can be used for induction, a peculiar procedure of inference which has given pragmatic evidence of its expediency, although its satisfactory epistemological characterization is still an unsolved problem.
The natural sciences too deal with past events. Every experience is an experience of something passed away; there is no experience of future happenings. But the experience to which the natural sciences owe all their success is the experience of the experiment in which the individual elements of change can be observed in isolation. The facts amassed in this way can be used for induction, a peculiar procedure of inference which has given pragmatic evidence of its expediency, although its satisfactory epistemological characterization is still an unsolved problem.
I. Ryan,
I answered that here.
wilderness: Lilburne:I have never banned anyone for ideological reasons. I know. I want to make this very clear. YOU ARE RIGHT. I am not saying you did. I said 'that's what they thought you were doing'. I have thought that's what you are doing. All natural law theorists that I know of have been thinking you are philosophically attacking 'life, liberty, and private property'. It's why they became so feverish, agitated, and down-right 'mad as hell'. Do you get it now? This is EXACTLY what is going on in the forum with everybody confronting you that are natural law theorists. We are trying to protect life, liberty, and private property and you have been perceived as a threat to the very life, liberty, and private property of some people. This is the truth.
What is your opinion of godel's incompleteness in relation to this discussion, that any axiomatic system by definition must be either inconsistent and incomplete. Further that since we value consistency we are doomed to incompleteness, that is to say that there will always be things that are true given our axioms, but are unprovable. I think there might be some connection to that and the trouble that gets stirred up in these discussions.
Liberte,
If Mises or you don't understand something, then neither Mises nor you wouldn't really know if it was "Mystical clap-trap". Both Mises and you are an invalid sources.
wilderness: I. Ryan, I answered that here.
I answered that here:
I. Ryan: wilderness: At first no, cause it's presupposed. I have no idea what that means.
wilderness: At first no, cause it's presupposed.
At first no, cause it's presupposed.
I have no idea what that means.
twisted,
Godel's Incompleteness theorem only applies to mathematics. Not axioms of human nature which are certain.
It's perfectly possible to understand something is mystical when it is premised on the impossible. Such as moral imperatives.
I don't have to study the doctrines of Islam to know it is supernatural nonsense. Because it posits impossible entities.
wilderness: twisted, Godel's Incompleteness theorem only applies to mathematics. Not axioms of human nature which are certain.
I have heard that, that it wouldn't apply to our constitution for example. But does his proof necessitate simple math to be covered by your axioms?
wilderness:All natural law theorists that I know of have been thinking you are philosophically attacking 'life, liberty, and private property'. It's why they became so feverish, agitated, and down-right 'mad as hell'.
No, it's only a very vocal handful who, like you, come off the rails when natural law doctrine is questioned. Most are like nirgraham and are very capable of debating these matters without becoming "feverish, agitated, and down-right 'mad as hell'".
wilderness:Do you get it now? This is EXACTLY what is going on in the forum with everybody confronting you that are natural law theorists. We are trying to protect life, liberty, and private property and you have been perceived as a threat to the very life, liberty, and private property of some people. This is the truth.
Despite all your twisting of Mises' writings, my position on natural rights doctrine is the same as that of Ludwig von Mises. Here on the Ludwig von Mises Community Forums I would ask that you drop the intolerant, inquisitorial tone regarding my position.
I. Ryan:Hume did not advocate that we should not use induction. Mises echoed this plenty of times:
That's what Mises says, not Hume.
Source:
"The Friesian theories of deduction and of non-intuitive immediate knowledge make it possible to preserve the advances of Hume and Kant without falling back into Rationalism or heading for the Nihilism (so different from Hume's Skepticism), relativism, scientism, pragmatism, etc., so conspicuous in the 20th century. Later, Karl Popper proposed a special solution for the Problem in that science, by using falsification, does not need to worry about a positive justification of First Principles at all. This enables scientific progress to heedlessly continue, as it has, regardless of the status of any philosophical solution."
Hume philosophically attacked "First Principles" (axioms). Kant rebutted him. And that's been the debate but to what extent it is still on-going I don't know. Here's Barry Smith in which I find his position on this favorable:
"There are, familiarly, a range of distinct and competing accounts of the methodological underpinnings of Menger's work. These include Leibnizian, Kantian, Millian, and even Popperian readings; but they include also readings of an Aristotelian sort, and I have myself made a number of contributions in clarification and defence of the latter. Not only, I have argued, does the historical situation in which Menger found himself point to the inevitability of the Aristotelian reading; this reading fits also very naturally to the text of Menger's works.
Indeed, great difficulties may be set in the way of our attaining knowledge of essential structures of certain sorts, and of our transforming such knowledge into the organized form of a strict theory. Above all we may (as Hume showed) mistakenly suppose that we have grasped a law or structure for psychological reasons of habit. Our knowledge of structures or laws can nevertheless be exact. For the quality of exactness or strict universality is skew to that of infallibility. Episteme may be ruled out in certain circumstances, but true doxa (which is to say, `orthodoxy') may be nonetheless available."
wilderness: That's what Mises says, not Hume.
Where did Hume advocate that we should not use induction, despite its expediency?
Lilburne:No, it's only a very vocal handful who, like you, come off the rails when natural law doctrine is questioned. Most are like nirgraham and are very capable of debating these matters without becoming "mad as hell".
I am not "off the rails". When are you going to stop the emotional rhetoric? That's all you've done throughout this thread. Are you "off the rails"?
Lilburne:Despite all your twisting of Mises' writings, my position on natural rights doctrine is the same as that of Ludwig von Mises. Here on the Ludwig von Mises Community Forums I would ask that you drop the intolerant, inquisitorial tone regarding my position.
Then "drop" philosophically attacking life, liberty, and private property (natural rights). I haven't been "intolerant or inquisitorial" with you Lilburne. I would really like for you to stop the emotional rhetoric and stop pulling out and attempting to hide behind Mises quotes that say "non-sense" and "wishful thinking".
This is just another example of your posts of recent. Unproductive. Please address the meaningful substance like I. Ryan is. Esuric and I have already addressed this to you in the beginning of this thread.
- thank you.
I. Ryan:Where did Hume advocate that we should not use induction, despite its expediency?
What did you think of those quotes I provided? I don't know what you are asking pertains to what I'm trying to say. Those quotes of what I'm saying address my point.
wilderness: Hume philosophically attacked "First Principles" (axioms).
Hume philosophically attacked "First Principles" (axioms).
Where?
wilderness: Kant rebutted him.
Kant rebutted him.
wilderness: What did you think of those quotes I provided?
What did you think of those quotes I provided?
I did not get their relevance.
wilderness: I don't know what you are asking pertains to what I'm trying to say.
I don't know what you are asking pertains to what I'm trying to say.
You said this:
wilderness: It would mean the end to science if Hume's way was fully followed.
It would mean the end to science if Hume's way was fully followed.
I want you to substantiate that.
twistedbydsign99:I have heard that, that it wouldn't apply to our constitution for example. But does his proof necessitate simple math to be covered by your axioms?
I don't know how to fully answer that twisted. I've seen a paper floating around that discusses that.
I did find this post that was interesting from another thread.
There's more in that first source I provided but here's one quote:
source:In his earlier writings, in Latin, Kant had actually used the Latin expression principia prima, "First Principles." In the Critique of Pure Reason, we get an explicit discussion of principia only at the beginning of the "Transcendental Dialectic": The term 'principle' [Prinzips] is ambiguous, and commonly signifies any knowledge [Erkenntnis] which can be used as a principle [Prinzips], although in itself, and as regards its proper origin [Ursprung], it is no principle [Principium]. Every universal proposition, even one derived from experience, through induction [Induktion], can serve as major premise [Obersatz] in a syllogism; but it is not therefore itself a principle [Principium]. [Norman Kemp Smith translation, St Martin's Press, 1929, 1965, p.301, A 300] Here the difference between Kant's use of the German term and the Latin is, shall we say, lost in translation -- an entirely unnecessary loss, since the Latin term could have been used in English just as in German. Kant explains the drift in meaning of "principle," but instead of contrasting principium with principium primum, as in English we can contrast "principle" with "first principle," he contrasts German Prinzips with Latin Principium. By translating both the German term and the Latin one as "principle," Kemp Smith obscures the difference between a principle, in the modern sense, and a first principle. This may reveal that Kemp Smith actually isn't very sensitive or interested in either first principles or the Problem of First Principles. Indeed, Anglo-American philosophy, with its empiricist tendencies, has not been attracted to anything so un-empirical as first principles. The passage also displays a bit of evidence that Kant takes the derivation of universal propositions from experience through induction as unproblematic. He cannot have been unaware of the Problem of Induction, having read Hume, but had not worked out, as no one would until Karl Popper, that there is a solution.
The term 'principle' [Prinzips] is ambiguous, and commonly signifies any knowledge [Erkenntnis] which can be used as a principle [Prinzips], although in itself, and as regards its proper origin [Ursprung], it is no principle [Principium]. Every universal proposition, even one derived from experience, through induction [Induktion], can serve as major premise [Obersatz] in a syllogism; but it is not therefore itself a principle [Principium]. [Norman Kemp Smith translation, St Martin's Press, 1929, 1965, p.301, A 300]
Here the difference between Kant's use of the German term and the Latin is, shall we say, lost in translation -- an entirely unnecessary loss, since the Latin term could have been used in English just as in German. Kant explains the drift in meaning of "principle," but instead of contrasting principium with principium primum, as in English we can contrast "principle" with "first principle," he contrasts German Prinzips with Latin Principium. By translating both the German term and the Latin one as "principle," Kemp Smith obscures the difference between a principle, in the modern sense, and a first principle. This may reveal that Kemp Smith actually isn't very sensitive or interested in either first principles or the Problem of First Principles. Indeed, Anglo-American philosophy, with its empiricist tendencies, has not been attracted to anything so un-empirical as first principles.
The passage also displays a bit of evidence that Kant takes the derivation of universal propositions from experience through induction as unproblematic. He cannot have been unaware of the Problem of Induction, having read Hume, but had not worked out, as no one would until Karl Popper, that there is a solution.
It discusses how Kant rebutted Hume, the debate has been on-going with various philosphers rebutting Humean along the way including Austrian economics-philosophers, realist phenomenologists, Karl Popper, and what I think Fenyman was also addressing in that youtube. My research on this doesn't only include this one source.
wilderness: It discusses how Kant rebutted Hume, the debate has been on-going with various philosphers rebutting Humean along the way including Austrian economics-philosophers, realist phenomenologists, Karl Popper, and what I think Fenyman was also addressing in that youtube. My research on this doesn't only include this one source.
I want to know where, in the works of Hume, he attacked "first principles".
wilderness:It would mean the end to science if Hume's way was fully followed.
I. Ryan:I want you to substantiate that.
source:Later, Karl Popper proposed a special solution for the Problem in that science, by using falsification, does not need to worry about a positive justification of First Principles at all. This enables scientific progress to heedlessly continue, as it has, regardless of the status of any philosophical solution.
Hume made "First Principles" (axioms) out to be 'skeptically acquired'. Axioms are of common sense. Hume philosophically attacks common sense. Popper came along to philosophically find a solution to this internal philosophical debate. You quoted Mises, but Mises didn't provide a philosophical argument that fully rebutted Hume. Karl Popper did. As it says above, "This enables scientific progress to heedlessly continue, as it has, regardless of the status of any philosophical solution".
There wasn't a philosophically solution and I'm not sure, as I've been saying, if there is one now either as the debate that started with Hume v. Kant, in which an extant philosopher Seifer not only calls Kant v. Hume but also calls the debate Thomism v. Scotists. Or what can be argued to be also called A-T tradition v. Misean skeptics.
wilderness: You quoted Mises, but Mises didn't provide a philosophical argument that fully rebutted Hume.
You quoted Mises, but Mises didn't provide a philosophical argument that fully rebutted Hume.
When did I say that I meant that quotation from Mises to "rebut" Hume?
wilderness: As it says above, "This enables scientific progress to heedlessly continue, as it has, regardless of the status of any philosophical solution".
As it says above, "This enables scientific progress to heedlessly continue, as it has, regardless of the status of any philosophical solution".
Hume never tried to stifle it. He never said that we should not use induction, despite its expediency.
wilderness: Hume made "First Principles" (axioms) out to be 'skeptically acquired'.
Hume made "First Principles" (axioms) out to be 'skeptically acquired'.
wilderness: There wasn't a[...] solution[.]
There wasn't a[...] solution[.]
A solution to what? The problem of induction?
I still want to know what you meant here:
I. Ryan: wilderness: I. Ryan, I answered that here. I answered that here: I. Ryan: wilderness: At first no, cause it's presupposed. I have no idea what that means.
I. Ryan:
source: Kant approaches the matter as he does because he is responding to Hume, and one of Hume's initial challenges is about the origin of "ideas." While the Problem of First Principles is about the justification of propositions, Hume's Empiricist approach goes back to asking about the legitimacy of the very concepts, of which the propositions are constituted, in the first place... Thus, Kant begins, like Hume, asking about the legitimacy of concepts. However, the traditional Problem has already insensibly been brought up; for in his critique of the concept of cause and effect, Hume did question the principle of causality, a proposition, and the way in which he expressed the defect of such a principle uncovered a point to Kant, which he dealt with back in the Introduction to the Critique... In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume made a distinction about how subject and predicate could be related: All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain [note: these are Locke's categories]. That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides, is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. That three times five is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence. Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. [Enquiries, Selby-Bigge edition, Oxford, 1902, 1972, pp.25-26] Both paragraphs warrant quoting in full. The first now would seem properly more a matter of embarrassment than anything else. Whatever Hume expected from intuition or demonstration, it would be hard to find a mathematician today who would agree that "the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence." If Hume's fame rests on this point, there would be little to recommend it. The second paragraph, however, redeems the impression by giving us a logical criterion to distinguish between truths that are "relations of ideas" and those that are "matters of fact": A matter of fact can be denied without contradiction.... For, indeed, outside of an axiomatized logic itself, the First Principles of Demonstration will be synthetic. However Kant can explain the truth of non-empirical synthetic propositions, i.e. those that are a priori instead of a posteriori, that will be his answer to the Problem of First Principles. Yet Hume himself is often poorly understood. While it is common to say that Hume denied the existence of synthetic a priori propositions, there is some question about whether he actually does. He says that the relationship of cause and effect is not discovered or known by any reasonings a priori, but that is not the same thing. A synthetic a priori proposition is not known from any reasonings. In fact, Hume does not see that the relationship of cause and effect is discovered or known from anything, since it is not justified by experience, in which there is no necessary connection between cause and effect, and there is in fact nothing in the cause to even suggest the effect, much less that the effect must follow. Hume's famous explanation was a psychological one, that we become accustomed to the association of certain events ("causes") with others ("effects"); but this, obviously, carries no weight whatsoever about the nature of things, which is what makes Hume, very properly, a Skeptic. At the same time, Hume had no doubts whatsoever of the necessity of cause and effect.
Thus, Kant begins, like Hume, asking about the legitimacy of concepts. However, the traditional Problem has already insensibly been brought up; for in his critique of the concept of cause and effect, Hume did question the principle of causality, a proposition, and the way in which he expressed the defect of such a principle uncovered a point to Kant, which he dealt with back in the Introduction to the Critique...
In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume made a distinction about how subject and predicate could be related:
All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain [note: these are Locke's categories]. That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides, is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. That three times five is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence. Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. [Enquiries, Selby-Bigge edition, Oxford, 1902, 1972, pp.25-26]
Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. [Enquiries, Selby-Bigge edition, Oxford, 1902, 1972, pp.25-26]
Both paragraphs warrant quoting in full. The first now would seem properly more a matter of embarrassment than anything else. Whatever Hume expected from intuition or demonstration, it would be hard to find a mathematician today who would agree that "the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence." If Hume's fame rests on this point, there would be little to recommend it. The second paragraph, however, redeems the impression by giving us a logical criterion to distinguish between truths that are "relations of ideas" and those that are "matters of fact": A matter of fact can be denied without contradiction....
For, indeed, outside of an axiomatized logic itself, the First Principles of Demonstration will be synthetic. However Kant can explain the truth of non-empirical synthetic propositions, i.e. those that are a priori instead of a posteriori, that will be his answer to the Problem of First Principles. Yet Hume himself is often poorly understood. While it is common to say that Hume denied the existence of synthetic a priori propositions, there is some question about whether he actually does. He says that the relationship of cause and effect is not discovered or known by any reasonings a priori, but that is not the same thing. A synthetic a priori proposition is not known from any reasonings. In fact, Hume does not see that the relationship of cause and effect is discovered or known from anything, since it is not justified by experience, in which there is no necessary connection between cause and effect, and there is in fact nothing in the cause to even suggest the effect, much less that the effect must follow. Hume's famous explanation was a psychological one, that we become accustomed to the association of certain events ("causes") with others ("effects"); but this, obviously, carries no weight whatsoever about the nature of things, which is what makes Hume, very properly, a Skeptic.
At the same time, Hume had no doubts whatsoever of the necessity of cause and effect.
Hume gives a psychological explanation and not a logical one. That's what makes him an academic skeptic. It's what pulls the term 'axiom' into a psychological explanation instead of being able to use philosophy to define 'axiom' namely the philosophical field of ontology, ie. realism. To only give a psychological explanation pulls the discussion out of the realm of science because it is Hume's psyche that determines this, not anything that can be verified in theory. Mises theory and history divide comes to mind on this point.
edit:
Here's Hume explaining cause and effect but leaving it to a psychological explanation instead of theory/ontology/philosophy. It's from the same book.
source:Thus, Hume says: Nor need we fear that this philosophy, while it endeavors to limit our enquiries to common life, should ever undermine the reasonings of common life, and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action, as well as speculation. Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever. Though we should conclude, for instance, as in the foregoing section, that, in all reasonings from experience, there is a step taken by the mind which is not supported by any argument or process of the understanding [i.e. from cause to effect]; there is no danger that these reasonings, on which almost all knowledge depends, will ever be affected by such a discovery. [ibid., p. 41]
Nor need we fear that this philosophy, while it endeavors to limit our enquiries to common life, should ever undermine the reasonings of common life, and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action, as well as speculation. Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever. Though we should conclude, for instance, as in the foregoing section, that, in all reasonings from experience, there is a step taken by the mind which is not supported by any argument or process of the understanding [i.e. from cause to effect]; there is no danger that these reasonings, on which almost all knowledge depends, will ever be affected by such a discovery. [ibid., p. 41]
1 - As to Mises rebutting Hume. I didn't say you quoted that in order for Mises to rebut Hume. I know that.
2 - In philosophy this has been the debate. Kant v. Hume. Popper v. Hume. and others. Popper made it possible to maintain Humean skepticism out of the natural sciences. It's not that Hume himself would go and stop science. Science continued no matter what Hume said. It's the consequences of Hume's skepticism in which the "cause and effect" of experiences can not be fully known with reason and argument that within the philosophic circle the debate has been on-going. Again Fenyman's video. And all of the natural sciences, including what humans experience (human biology) science for a fact can know counter to Hume's skepticism. But since it was only Hume's psychological skepticism and not a philosophical argument by Hume (as the article mentions some people misunderstand), then Hume says axioms are 'iffy' but that's only Hume's pysche stating they are "iffy". There is no philosophical argument by Hume actually making a reasonable argument to support 'skepticism'. It's only psychologically supported - Hume's psyche. Which goes back to the quote I gave of Barry Smith in which he says paraphrasingly, 'ok hume, that's fine if you psychologically don't know for sure, but there are things external to the mind (experience) that can be known for sure' (Fenyman's video).
I still have no idea how Hume attacked "first principles".
Kelly Ross: The first now would seem properly more a matter of embarrassment than anything else. Whatever Hume expected from intuition or demonstration, it would be hard to find a mathematician today who would agree that "the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence." If Hume's fame rests on this point, there would be little to recommend it.
The first now would seem properly more a matter of embarrassment than anything else. Whatever Hume expected from intuition or demonstration, it would be hard to find a mathematician today who would agree that "the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence." If Hume's fame rests on this point, there would be little to recommend it.
Huh? How did those "demonstrated by Euclid" not "retain their certainty"?
Ok.
Hume attacked the concepts in propositions. He said they can't be known for sure, but only stated that psychologically, not philosophically. He was a skeptic.
Here are the formal terms in a proposition: Subject copula predicate.
Informal example: Mary (subject) is (copula) tall (predicate).
This is a cause-effect relationship in which the attributes of Mary are denoted by her being 'tall'. Being is the copula. Any form of 'is' is the copula in formal propositions. In this proposition the statement is one that says Mary is tall. Mary being tall. Mary exists tall. 'is', 'being', 'exists' all forms of being and when used in a formal proposition the term denoting 'being' is named copula.
Ok. So. These concepts provided in the proposition are of experience. They are not logically deducted. They are determined by evidence. There is such a person named Mary who is in fact tall. The concepts/terms of a proposition (Mary, is, tall) are not logically deducted. Axioms are not logically deducted. Axioms are first principles but not the terms in the proposition - yet - all of them come from non-logically deductive methods. Hume was skeptical psychologically about the concepts, terms, and axioms being true because they are not logically deducted. Hume wanted logical deductive proofs to ascertain if they are to be certain or not. Again though, Hume does not say 'don't use the concepts, terms, axioms' that later can be used in logical deductions. He doesn't doubt their use and practicality as mentioned in the quote I gave. All Hume does is psychologically state they may not be true which is why he is a skeptic. Him being a skeptic is not controversial and this is slightly a trivial point. Yet in philosophy it did make philosophers begin to wonder and be skeptical about the terms and axioms in and of themselves. Axioms are self-evident as Aristotle had shown. All these terms and axioms are grounded in evidential facts of the world. Hume psychologically questioned if the evidence is true or not, but gave no reasonable method, meaning, philosophical method that would find out if the evidence is true or not. That's why Popper called it a philosophic problem and maintained it out of the natural sciences. Hume's psyche made philosophy in and of itself appear to be a skeptical method instead of being able to show with certainity how things can be known in the world.
Did that help any?
I. Ryan:Huh? How did those "demonstrated by Euclid" not "retain their certainty"?
I assume this:
wikipedia:For over two thousand years, the adjective "Euclidean" was unnecessary because no other sort of geometry had been conceived. Euclid's axioms seemed so intuitively obvious that any theorem proved from them was deemed true in an absolute sense. Today, however, many other self-consistent non-Euclidean geometries are known, the first ones having been discovered in the early 19th century. An implication of Einstein's theory of general relativity is that Euclidean space is a good approximation to the properties of physical space only where the gravitational field is not too strong.
source
wilderness: I assume this: wikipedia: For over two thousand years, the adjective "Euclidean" was unnecessary because no other sort of geometry had been conceived. Euclid's axioms seemed so intuitively obvious that any theorem proved from them was deemed true in an absolute sense. Today, however, many other self-consistent non-Euclidean geometries are known, the first ones having been discovered in the early 19th century. An implication of Einstein's theory of general relativity is that Euclidean space is a good approximation to the properties of physical space only where the gravitational field is not too strong.
wikipedia: For over two thousand years, the adjective "Euclidean" was unnecessary because no other sort of geometry had been conceived. Euclid's axioms seemed so intuitively obvious that any theorem proved from them was deemed true in an absolute sense. Today, however, many other self-consistent non-Euclidean geometries are known, the first ones having been discovered in the early 19th century. An implication of Einstein's theory of general relativity is that Euclidean space is a good approximation to the properties of physical space only where the gravitational field is not too strong.
For over two thousand years, the adjective "Euclidean" was unnecessary because no other sort of geometry had been conceived. Euclid's axioms seemed so intuitively obvious that any theorem proved from them was deemed true in an absolute sense. Today, however, many other self-consistent non-Euclidean geometries are known, the first ones having been discovered in the early 19th century. An implication of Einstein's theory of general relativity is that Euclidean space is a good approximation to the properties of physical space only where the gravitational field is not too strong.
What happened was that people started to question (a) whether the axioms that he used conformed to reality and (b) whether they were the only option. But what Hume said was not even relevant to that. He was just saying that the relations among the ideas would remain certain, not whether people would always agree that it conforms to the structure of space of the external world.
I. Ryan:What happened was that people started to question (a) whether the axioms that he used conformed to reality and (b) whether they were the only option. But what Hume said was not even relevant to that. He was just saying that the relations among the ideas would remain certain, not whether people would always agree that it conforms to the structure of space of the external world.
Hume:Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.
Hume was 'forever certain'. That some people questioned what Euclid did, wasn't due to Hume. I see you're saying that in accord to Euclid relation of ideas those ideas are certain. I agree. But nobody now says only Euclidian relations of ideas are certain. There are others, that thereby show that Euclidian ideas were not certain. The interpretation by Euclid wasn't certain. The ideas are certain, but the interpretation of reality wasn't.
I don't think the source was saying much more than that. It was a simple declarative statement that Euclid isn't forever certain. The main point, as the source notes, is the next paragraph.
wilderness: I see you're saying that in accord to Euclid relation of ideas those ideas are certain. I agree.
I see you're saying that in accord to Euclid relation of ideas those ideas are certain. I agree.
That is what I was saying, yes. But that is also what Hume was saying.
wilderness: The ideas are certain, but the interpretation of reality wasn't.
The ideas are certain, but the interpretation of reality wasn't.
Yes, but that is Hume was only asserting the former, not also the latter.
Yes but this is a side issue. The source said in that same paragraph:
source:The second paragraph, however, redeems the impression by giving us a logical criterion to distinguish between truths that are "relations of ideas" and those that are "matters of fact":
By understanding the second paragraph then the first paragraph is "redeem(ed)". The author of that article seemed to be only saying if you don't understand 'relation of ideas' then it would seem Hume was only embarrassing himself. But the author points out that the second paragraph "redeems" the understanding that one might have of the first.
There isn't an argument here.