ClaytonB wrote: But it's not just that, it's more than that. Once a single illegal copy is made, then all other copiers of that illegal copy would no longer be violating your rights because you would have no rights in that illegal copy. I hardly think this is the position you are advocating, is it? Don't you mean 'once a single legal copy is made' ?
ClaytonB wrote: But it's not just that, it's more than that. Once a single illegal copy is made, then all other copiers of that illegal copy would no longer be violating your rights because you would have no rights in that illegal copy. I hardly think this is the position you are advocating, is it?
But it's not just that, it's more than that. Once a single illegal copy is made, then all other copiers of that illegal copy would no longer be violating your rights because you would have no rights in that illegal copy. I hardly think this is the position you are advocating, is it?
Don't you mean 'once a single legal copy is made' ?
No, I meant "illegal" - the point that Sam Armstrong was making is that he can sell me a book under contract not to use it to make a copy. We are well and good so far. Then, he sells you a book under contract not to make a copy. Still well and good. Then, he sells it to 10 million other people, all under contract not to make a copy. SA's idea is that none of us should make an illegal copy because we each agreed (contractually) not to. Ethically speaking, I think Sam Armstrong is technically right but the problem is that people often behave unethically and any one of us just might make an illegal copy - it's cheap and easy to do so without detection. And once that copy has been made, Sam Armstrong's conception of IP as "reserved rights" over physical media breaks down since he has no reserved rights in that illegally produced copy. That copy may be reproduced indefinitely without violating any of the author's rights, in SA's version of IP rights.
Kinsella has also pointed out that a contractual agreement between me (the buyer) and the author does not include third parties. While I may have agreed not to use the book to copy, no one else has so agreed and they may copy freely. So, if I loan a book to my friend, in copying the book, my friend has violated no contractual agreements or "reserved rights." The problems with meaningfully defining property rights in this way should be obvious.
Clayton -
To say that is to revolt against markets in all other parts of it, too. Markets tend to eradicate profits; yet people, for a reason, tend to still seek those profits. When you take your argument to its logical conclusion, the question is this, why do people ever try to seek profits; for they will just tend to get eradicated. For example, if I notice a gap between the supply and demand of oil in a region, as an oil producer, seller, or whatever, I will try to sell in that region to make huge profits. But, if I do that, other people will 'steal' my idea and start selling in that area and get rid of my profits. So why should I even bother? Why do people ever seek to improve their efficiency, considering the other manufacturers will just 'steal' their ideas and increase their own efficiency, too? The argument that you are using applies to every situation in which people are seeking profit; yet you, and other people, use it only with what copyrights, patents, and whatever already protect simply because those are the things that are possible to do that with. How would people enforce such things in situations in which people, as entrepreneurs, are seeing gaps in demand and trying to fill them just by shipping things to different locations or something?
My knowledge of economics is pretty weak; so try to bear with me and fill in what I am missing. But I think that this is a pretty important argument. I see no reason why your argument does not apply to any seeking of profit whatever; for markets always tend to try to remove profits. Again, why should any person employ their ideas to find opportunities to make profits if it is inevitable that other people will just follow along, 'steal' their ideas, and eradicate their huge profits without trying as hard? Why should any one want to be the first person to improve their efficiency if they can just wait for an other person to do that and then follow suit, without wasting all of their time and money doing research?
That's sort of an apples to oranges comparison. In one case, you are selling oil. In the other, you are selling your ideas. Your competitor can't just come in and magically reproduce large quantities of oil from thin air as they can with your ideas.
Further, a person who decides to write a book does not profit from his decision to write the book. The profits come from the ideas contained within the book. Likewise, oil producers don't earn money from their idea unless they act on it.
M1ThinkTank: In the other, you are selling your ideas.
In the other, you are selling your ideas.
It is not even possible to sell ideas.
M1ThinkTank: Your competitor can't just come in and magically reproduce large quantities of oil from thin air as they can with your ideas.
Your competitor can't just come in and magically reproduce large quantities of oil from thin air as they can with your ideas.
My idea was to sell in a certain region, not to conjour up a batch of oil.
M1ThinkTank: Further, a person who decides to write a book does not profit from his decision to write the book. The profits come from the ideas contained within the book. Likewise, oil producers don't earn money from their idea unless they act on it.
I am not sure what your point is there.
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
Are you serious? If I create a new invention, but I don't want to make the investments necessary to produce that invention, I couldn't sell the idea to a manufacturing company?
I know what your idea was. You want to sell oil in a certain region. An author wants to write a book about a particular topic. Neither party makes money by simply having an idea to do something, they need to actually act on their idea. It would be absurd if I could declare that I wanted to write a book about economics, and all people were outlawed from writing a book on that topic because I thought of it first.
My point is that having a whim to do something doesn't deserve copy protection. I explained that above.
What copyright law is focused on is the final product. In case one, you are selling oil. You don't need any special protection because oil can't be reproduced from thin air. In case two, you are selling your ideas that are contained within your book. While others can have similar ideas, you are protected from someone copying your work verbatim and profiting from it.
M1ThinkTank: Are you serious? If I create a new invention, but I don't want to make the investments necessary to produce that invention, I couldn't sell the idea to a manufacturing company?
Did you discover telepathy and not tell me about it? (I am not trying to be disrespectful; sarcasm is just the easiest way to make that point.)
M1ThinkTank: I know what your idea was. You want to sell oil in a certain region. An author wants to write a book about a particular topic. Neither party makes money by simply having an idea to do something, they need to actually act on their idea. It would be absurd if I could declare that I wanted to write a book about economics, and all people were outlawed from writing a book on that topic because I thought of it first. [...] My point is that having a whim to do something doesn't deserve copy protection. I explained that above.
[...]
I am not sure why that is relevant to my argument; I understand that.
M1ThinkTank: What copyright law is focused on is the final product. In case one, you are selling oil. You don't need any special protection because oil can't be reproduced from thin air. In case two, you are selling your ideas that are contained within your book. While others can have similar ideas, you are protected from someone copying your work verbatim and profiting from it.
I was presupposing that the oil already exists. If two companies each have 100 units of oil, that is not the only variable; they, as entrepreneurs, have to decide where to sell the oil. If the first company finds a gap in demand, they will sell in that area; but then, when the second company sees the huge profits that the first is making, they will, of course, 'steal' the idea, move in, and destroy the huge profits. So, what incentive does the first company have to do that? Because of the lack of laws giving them a monopoly, once they move in, other companies will just follow them. Why should they spend time researching where to sell things when they could just wait for the other companies to figure it out first? Finding things out like that costs money.
Did you discover telepathy or not tell me about it? (I am not trying to be disrespectful; sarcasm is just the easiest way to make that point.
No, I did not discover telepathy, nor do I see what that has to do with having an idea for a reasonable product. Someone I know invented something, and is working on selling their idea to a manufacturing company because they don't want to be involved with producing it themselves. I guess my relative is an outlier.
I am not sure why that is relevant to my argument. I understand that.
I thought it was relevant. You were comparing (1)someone having an idea about selling finished goods to (2) someone selling a finished good that is essentially their ideas. If I write the book I mentioned, and profits are high, other people can write books on the same topic. With copyright law, they just can't copy my work verbatim for profit.
As for the oil producer, if profits are high, competitors can enter into that market to try and sell oil. They can't buy one unit of the original producer's finished good and make milions of copies of it without absorbing the costs to create each unit of that finished good. When people copy a book to sell it, they avoid the full costs of creating that book; all of the creation costs are the creator's burden.
So in one situation, the competitor pays only a fraction of the cost to produce each unit of a good for profit, while in the oil example, the producer must pay the full cost of producing each good. Copyright law levels the playing field, and protects the creator.
If two authors each have the time to write a book, that is not the only variable; they, as authors, have to decide what to write about. If the first author finds a gap in demand, they will write a book about that topic; but then, when the second author sees the huge profits that the first is making, they will, of course, 'steal' the idea to write about that topic, move in, and destroy the huge profits. Thanks to copyright law, the second author can't just buy one of the first author's books and make millions of copies of it, he must also invest his time to bear the costs of creating his own unique work, leveling the playing field.
As for why the first person should enter a market, the incentive is that they reap the huge upfront profits that you keep talking about. That's the reward. Even if someone comes in to try and imitate the oil producer, imitation will take longer than the couple of minutes required to copy a book. Also, the new competitor isn't coming in claiming to be the old competitor; they must generate their own brand power, as any new author would have to do.
If you don't mind, I'd like to take this opportunity to ask a question. Let's imagine that an author writes a book in a country without copyright laws, and he and the publishing company of his choice are able to sell enough copies of his first book to turn a profit. Now, other publishers are aware of this author's money-making potential, and they are prepared to make copies of any future books that this author writes in order to profit off of his popularity. How could the author make any reasonable money if his publishing company knew that any money paid to the author is a cost that their competitors would not have to match? Additionally, in the internet age, how could the publishing company compete if a website copied the book and posted it for all to see in order to generate advertising revenues? Given this threat, can they really afford to pay the author anything?
M1ThinkTank: No, I did not discover telepathy, nor do I see what that has to do with having an idea for a reasonable product. Someone I know invented something, and is working on selling their idea to a manufacturing company because they don't want to be involved with producing it themselves. I guess my relative is an outlier.
My point is that it is only possible to sell the medium, not the idea. It is important to understand that.
M1ThinkTank: You were comparing (1)someone having an idea about selling finished goods to (2) someone selling a finished good that is essentially their ideas.
You were comparing (1)someone having an idea about selling finished goods to (2) someone selling a finished good that is essentially their ideas.
No, I was comparing (a) "someone selling a finished good", which is oil, to (b) "someone selling a finished good", which are books.
M1ThinkTank: If I write the book I mentioned, and profits are high, other people can write books on the same topic. With copyright law, they just can't copy my work verbatim for profit.
If I write the book I mentioned, and profits are high, other people can write books on the same topic. With copyright law, they just can't copy my work verbatim for profit.
Sure.
M1ThinkTank: As for the oil producer, if profits are high, competitors can enter into that market to try and sell oil. They can't buy one unit of the original producer's finished good and make milions of copies of it without absorbing the costs to create each unit of that finished good. When people copy a book to sell it, they avoid the full costs of creating that book; all of the creation costs are the creator's burden.
Again, I was presupposing that both companies already had the oil that they wanted to sell.
M1ThinkTank: They can't buy one unit of the original producer's finished good and make milions of copies of it without absorbing the costs to create each unit of that finished good. When people copy a book to sell it, they avoid the full costs of creating that book; all of the creation costs are the creator's burden. So in one situation, the competitor pays only a fraction of the cost to produce each unit of a good for profit, while in the oil example, the producer must pay the full cost of producing each good.
They can't buy one unit of the original producer's finished good and make milions of copies of it without absorbing the costs to create each unit of that finished good. When people copy a book to sell it, they avoid the full costs of creating that book; all of the creation costs are the creator's burden.
So in one situation, the competitor pays only a fraction of the cost to produce each unit of a good for profit, while in the oil example, the producer must pay the full cost of producing each good.
No, they do not. Whether I have a copyright or not, the paper and other materials that I use to produce the books cost the same thing.
M1ThinkTank paraphrasing I. Ryan: If two authors each have the time to write a book, that is not the only variable; they, as authors, have to decide what to write about. If the first author finds a gap in demand, they will write a book about that topic; but then, when the second author sees the huge profits that the first is making, they will, of course, 'steal' the idea to write about that topic, move in, and destroy the huge profits. Thanks to copyright law, the second author can't just buy one of the first author's books and make millions of copies of it, he must also invest his time to bear the costs of creating his own unique work, leveling the playing field.
I am not sure what you are trying to explain there, sorry.
M1ThinkTank: As for why the first person should enter a market, the incentive is that they reap the huge upfront profits that you keep talking about. That's the reward. Even if someone comes in to try and imitate the oil producer, imitation will take longer than the couple of minutes required to copy a book. [...] If you don't mind, I'd like to take this opportunity to ask a question. Let's imagine that an author writes a book in a country without copyright laws, and he and the publishing company of his choice are able to sell enough copies of his first book to turn a profit. Now, other publishers are aware of this author's money-making potential, and they are prepared to make copies of any future books that this author writes in order to profit off of his popularity. How could the author make any reasonable money if his publishing company knew that any money paid to the author is a cost that their competitors would not have to match? Additionally, in the internet age, how could the publishing company compete if a website copied the book and posted it for all to see in order to generate advertising revenues? Given this threat, can they really afford to pay the author anything?
As for why the first person should enter a market, the incentive is that they reap the huge upfront profits that you keep talking about. That's the reward. Even if someone comes in to try and imitate the oil producer, imitation will take longer than the couple of minutes required to copy a book.
What about contracts? They could use contracts to make sure people do not copy them for a while. Or what about "theatre" type showings? They could release the book in libraries which do not allow you to take the books with you before they release it to the public. That is how Princeton is allowing people to read one of the unpublished works of Salinger without letting any one get a hold of it to copy and distribute.
M1ThinkTank: Also, the new competitor isn't coming in claiming to be the old competitor; they must generate their own brand power, as any new author would have to do.
Also, the new competitor isn't coming in claiming to be the old competitor; they must generate their own brand power, as any new author would have to do.
When did condone pretending to be the auther?
If you say so.
Then why are you so concerned about someone imitating the oil producer's decision to enter a market, if the sale of the good is the only thing in question? Authors also have to worry about others writing about their topic of choice, but this really has nothing to do with copyright law.
Either way, they had to bear the costs of obtaining/refining that oil. The cost doesn't go away whether it happened before or after the companies decided to enter the market. I presupposed that two authors both had time they wanted to use to write a book. That time has costs, just as the oil does.
It's basic math. I'll use books again. Let X be equal to the cost of writing and editing a book, including the costs of desiging cover art and other related costs. Let Y be the costs that you are talking about, the paper and materials used.
Cost for the first publisher = X + Y
Cost for the second publisher = Y
It's really hard to miss the obvious advantage that the second publisher has over the first publisher. Using your oil example, let F equal the fixed costs associated with obtaining and refining oil, and V equal the variable costs associated with the same.
Cost for the first oil company = F + V
Cost for the second company = F + V
As you can see, new competitors in your oil example don't have a cost advantage as they do in the case of the books. I don't see how that can be debated.
The two authors are in the same boat as the oil companies with regards to stealing an idea to enter a certain market. However, authors are at risk because, sans copyright laws, their work can be copied without the imitator paying cost X described above.
How are you going to enter into a contract with every potential copier? What would a potential copier have to gain by signing such a contract? Even if you made each purchaser sign an agreement that they would not copy the book, they could always hand the book to a friend for copying purposes because you can't contractually bind third parties without their consent.
All of these problems are simplified by copyright law. I'm not upset that I can't copy another author's work for my own gain, because I benefit if I can enjoy the same copy protections as he does.
M1ThinkTank: Then why are you so concerned about someone imitating the oil producer's decision to enter a market, if the sale of the good is the only thing in question? Authors also have to worry about others writing about their topic of choice, but this really has nothing to do with copyright law.
I am not concerned.
M1ThinkTank: It's basic math. I'll use books again. Let X be equal to the cost of writing and editing a book, including the costs of desiging cover art and other related costs. Let Y be the costs that you are talking about, the paper and materials used. Cost for the first publisher = X + Y Cost for the second publisher = Y It's really hard to miss the obvious advantage that the second publisher has over the first publisher. Using your oil example, let F equal the fixed costs associated with obtaining and refining oil, and V equal the variable costs associated with the same. Cost for the first oil company = F + V Cost for the second company = F + V
It will be convenient to use your example to show you what I am talking about.
Let X be the cost of deciding what to print, including the author deciding what marks to put on the page and the publisher deciding which author to publish. Let Y be the cost of printing it, including the paper and all of the other materials.
1. Cost to the first publisher = X + Y
2. Cost to the second publisher = (less than X) + Y
Let F be the cost of deciding where to sell, including trying to find gaps in demand and other things. Let V be the cost of selling it, including getting the oil, transporting it, and the other things.
1. Cost for the first oil company = F + V
2. Cost for the second company = (less than F) + V
ThinkTank: Using your oil example, let F equal the fixed costs associated with obtaining and refining oil, and V equal the variable costs associated with the same.
Using your oil example, let F equal the fixed costs associated with obtaining and refining oil, and V equal the variable costs associated with the same.
Where did the "fixed" and "variable" thing come from? From the beginning, I was talking about how it costs money to research where to sell, where gaps in demand are:
I. Ryan: If two companies each have 100 units of oil, that is not the only variable; they, as entrepreneurs, have to decide where to sell the oil. If the first company finds a gap in demand, they will sell in that area; but then, when the second company sees the huge profits that the first is making, they will, of course, 'steal' the idea, move in, and destroy the huge profits. So, what incentive does the first company have to do that? Because of the lack of laws giving them a monopoly, once they move in, other companies will just follow them. Why should they spend time researching where to sell things when they could just wait for the other companies to figure it out first? Finding things out like that costs money.
If two companies each have 100 units of oil, that is not the only variable; they, as entrepreneurs, have to decide where to sell the oil. If the first company finds a gap in demand, they will sell in that area; but then, when the second company sees the huge profits that the first is making, they will, of course, 'steal' the idea, move in, and destroy the huge profits. So, what incentive does the first company have to do that? Because of the lack of laws giving them a monopoly, once they move in, other companies will just follow them. Why should they spend time researching where to sell things when they could just wait for the other companies to figure it out first? Finding things out like that costs money.
Yet you neglected to even mention that in your example. Why?
M1ThinkTank: The two authors are in the same boat as the oil companies with regards to stealing an idea to enter a certain market. However, authors are at risk because, sans copyright laws, their work can be copied without the imitator paying cost X described above.
I am not contesting that. I am just saying that such "risk[s]" exist in all parts of the market to the extent that, if you support 'IP' laws, you should also support a myriad of other monopolies.
M1ThinkTank: How are you going to enter into a contract with every potential copier? What would a potential copier have to gain by signing such a contract? Even if you made each purchaser sign an agreement that they would not copy the book, they could always hand the book to a friend for copying purposes because you can't contractually bind third parties without their consent.
When did I contest any of that? Also, you ignored my other example, the one about the "theater".
It will be convenient to use your example to show you what I am talking about. Let X be the cost of deciding what to print, including the author deciding what marks to put on the page and the publisher deciding which author to publish. Let Y be the cost of printing it, including the paper and all of the other materials. 1. Cost to the first publisher = X + Y 2. Cost to the second publisher = (less than X) + Y Let F be the cost of deciding where to sell, including trying to find gaps in demand and other things. Let V be the cost of selling it, including getting the oil, transporting it, and the other things. 1. Cost for the first oil company = F + V 2. Cost for the second company = (less than F) + V Where did the "fixed" and "variable" thing come from? From the beginning, I was talking about how it costs money to research where to sell, where gaps in demand are:
Let me simplify my argument for clarity. Authors and oil companies both have costs associated with deciding which market to enter. Both could wait for competitors to choose markets first and then try to imitate those competitors. If they do so, they forgo the profits associated with being a first mover into a market. That is the reward for the risk of investing in research.
However, things change after a decision to enter a market has been made. In the author's case, a good is produced that can be easily reproduced at a fraction of the cost, not including any research costs. In the oil company's case, a good is produced that cannot be reproduced at any cost. Any company choosing to produce the good must bear the full cost of producing that good, regardless of when the good was produced in relation to when the company entered the market.
All those assumptions being true, the equations I presented earlier are correct. If we must include research, let R be research. Let all other variables be as I described my prior post in this thread:
First publisher's cost = R + X + Y
Second publisher's cost = Y (they do not pay any portion of X since all of X has already been done by another company)
First oil producer's cost = R + F + V
Second oil producer's cost = F + V
So the first publisher/producer both pay R, but they are rewarded with first mover profits if their research was correct. Once research is complete, the good must be produced/supplied. In the case of the publisher, only one has to pay the writing, editing, and design costs. If this is not true, please address it, since I've had to state it several times. In the case of the oil companies, they both must account for the full cost of each unit produced, including all fixed and variable costs. It doesn't matter when they acquire the oil, the cost is accounted for when it is sold (Accounting 101).
I've answered this, but I'll repeat it. The reward is first mover profits.
Unfortunately for authors, without copyright protections their good can easily be reproduced without the copier bearing any of the writing, editing, or design costs. All of these costs take place after research is done, yet the second publisher gets to avoid those costs along with the research costs.
Fortunately for oil companies, competitors that enter the market still have to bear the full costs of the goods they sell. After research costs are taken out, new competitors do not gain any other cost advantages. This is different from people copying books. Again, please refute this if it isn't true.
Please list these monopolies that I should also support according to your logic. Also, a copyright isn't much of a monopoly since substitute goods can be created. You might think author A's economics book is too expensive, but other authors can produce cheaper economics books. One of the main defining points of a monopoly is that no reasonable substitutes are available; otherwise, how could they become a monopoly?
When did I contest any of that? Also, you ignored my other example.
What? I stated that copyright law was needed. You asked why people couldn't use contracts instead. I explained how I thought it would be nearly impossible. Now you state that you never thought it was possible.
If that's the case, what was the point of your question? Also, what other example?
On a separate note, I'd like to address your idea of research. You say that the first firm is the only one that pays research costs. How does the second firm ever discover the first firm's profits if they don't invest in research?
"My handling of the book does not differ between the two cases."
I give you the right to handle the book during the day, but not at night. I have transfered a property right over to you. Do you have the right to handle it during the night?
Sam Armstrong: I give you the right to handle the book during the day, but not at night. I have transfered a property right over to you. Do you have the right to handle it during the night?
How would you even do something like that?
I say "I hereby transfer the right to handle this book during the day to I. Ryan". That's it.
You also have to make him agree to spend resources to make sure that nobody gets a hold of the book and scans it ever, then be responsible if anyone does. Oh, and you, the IP king, has to provide sufficient proof of who breached this contract unless you are planning to sell the book to only one person. I think I will buy my books from reasonable people, and I do for the most part only buy books from mises.org. I've gotten pretty much everything else I want from a free book store or I can find it online.
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
M1ThinkTank: On a separate note, I'd like to address your idea of research. You say that the first firm is the only one that pays research costs. How does the second firm ever discover the first firm's profits if they don't invest in research?
Did you not notice that I put "(less than X)" and "(less than F)" instead of nothing?
M1ThinkTank: What? I stated that copyright law was needed. You asked why people couldn't use contracts instead. I explained how I thought it would be nearly impossible. Now you state that you never thought it was possible.
It just might slow it down; that was my point.
M1ThinkTank: Also, what other example?
Also, what other example?
This one:
I. Ryan: Or what about "theatre" type showings? They could release the book in libraries which do not allow you to take the books with you before they release it to the public. That is how Princeton is allowing people to read one of the unpublished works of Salinger without letting any one get a hold of it to copy and distribute.
Or what about "theatre" type showings? They could release the book in libraries which do not allow you to take the books with you before they release it to the public. That is how Princeton is allowing people to read one of the unpublished works of Salinger without letting any one get a hold of it to copy and distribute.
M1ThinkTank: Please list these monopolies that I should also support according to your logic.
Please list these monopolies that I should also support according to your logic.
I am in the process of doing that.
M1ThinkTank: Also, a copyright isn't much of a monopoly since substitute goods can be created. You might think author A's economics book is too expensive, but other authors can produce cheaper economics books. One of the main defining points of a monopoly is that no reasonable substitutes are available; otherwise, how could they become a monopoly?
Also, a copyright isn't much of a monopoly since substitute goods can be created. You might think author A's economics book is too expensive, but other authors can produce cheaper economics books. One of the main defining points of a monopoly is that no reasonable substitutes are available; otherwise, how could they become a monopoly?
We do not define monopoly like that in Austrian economics.
M1ThinkTank: Let me simplify my argument for clarity. Authors and oil companies both have costs associated with deciding which market to enter. Both could wait for competitors to choose markets first and then try to imitate those competitors. If they do so, they forgo the profits associated with being a first mover into a market. That is the reward for the risk of investing in research.
Yeah, exactly.
M1ThinkTank: However, things change after a decision to enter a market has been made. In the author's case, a good is produced that can be easily reproduced at a fraction of the cost, not including any research costs. In the oil company's case, a good is produced that cannot be reproduced at any cost. Any company choosing to produce the good must bear the full cost of producing that good, regardless of when the good was produced in relation to when the company entered the market.
What? Are you telling me that it always costs the second publisher less money to print books than the first?
M1ThinkTank: All those assumptions being true, the equations I presented earlier are correct. If we must include research, let R be research. Let all other variables be as I described my prior post in this thread: First publisher's cost = R + X + Y Second publisher's cost = Y (they do not pay any portion of X since all of X has already been done by another company) First oil producer's cost = R + F + V Second oil producer's cost = F + V So the first publisher/producer both pay R, but they are rewarded with first mover profits if their research was correct. Once research is complete, the good must be produced/supplied. In the case of the publisher, only one has to pay the writing, editing, and design costs. If this is not true, please address it, since I've had to state it several times. In the case of the oil companies, they both must account for the full cost of each unit produced, including all fixed and variable costs. It doesn't matter when they acquire the oil, the cost is accounted for when it is sold (Accounting 101).
Why are you making the distinction between "fixed" and "variable" costs? And why did you add "R" but keep "X"?
Sam Armstrong: I say "I hereby transfer the right to handle this book during the day to I. Ryan". That's it.
Heh, good luck enforcing that.
"You also have to make him agree to spend resources to make sure that nobody gets a hold of the book and scans it ever, then be responsible if anyone does. Oh, and you, the IP king, has to provide sufficient proof of who breached this contract unless you are planning to sell the book to only one person. I think I will buy my books from reasonable people, and I do for the most part only buy books from mises.org. I've gotten pretty much everything else I want from a free book store or I can find it online."
Nope, I don't. I haven't transfered him the right or anybody else the right to scan it, so, if anybody does, they've violated my right in the book. They are responsible for it, they have committed a violation of my rights.
Contracts MEAN NOTHING. I can create a contract saying "I will give you a dollar in two days" and then not give you the dollar. It was only a promise, not a transfer of property. Here is how I will actually owe you a dollar. "I hereby transfer to you the right to a dollar on condition that two days pass". There, now if two days pass, you have a claim to the dollar, and if I don't let you take it, I have violated your right to the dollar.
It doesn't matter if it was a haiku I created. Did I own the right to use that paper with the intent to copy it? If I did, then they have violated my right to that paper. Otherwise, tough titties for me. Well, let's look at this from a few different angles. Let's say you post a flyer on a public bulletin board. At the bottom is the notice "Copyright Sam Armstrong 2010 - ALL RIGHTS RESERVED." By broadcasting the contents of your flyer, I think you have automatically relinquished any rights you may have had to prevent or prohibit copying of that flyer. Your notice at the bottom of the page carries no more weight than if you had written, "I hereby own the firstborn child of all who read this piece of paper." If, on the other hand, you had laid the flyer on your kitchen table and I sneaked into your house with a hidden camera and snapped a picture of it, I think you have a reasonable basis from which to say I have violated your property rights. A piece of paper in your house is presumably private and I have no business sneaking around photographing things of yours without your permission. So, we have to distinguish right from the outset between broadcasting something versus keeping something on your own property or person or in your private effects. The latter comes with a presumption of privacy, the former does not. Most claimants of copyright want to have their cake and eat it, too. They want to broadcast content, while still claiming that it remains effectively private.
It doesn't matter if it was a haiku I created. Did I own the right to use that paper with the intent to copy it? If I did, then they have violated my right to that paper. Otherwise, tough titties for me.
Well, let's look at this from a few different angles.
Let's say you post a flyer on a public bulletin board. At the bottom is the notice "Copyright Sam Armstrong 2010 - ALL RIGHTS RESERVED." By broadcasting the contents of your flyer, I think you have automatically relinquished any rights you may have had to prevent or prohibit copying of that flyer. Your notice at the bottom of the page carries no more weight than if you had written, "I hereby own the firstborn child of all who read this piece of paper."
If, on the other hand, you had laid the flyer on your kitchen table and I sneaked into your house with a hidden camera and snapped a picture of it, I think you have a reasonable basis from which to say I have violated your property rights. A piece of paper in your house is presumably private and I have no business sneaking around photographing things of yours without your permission.
So, we have to distinguish right from the outset between broadcasting something versus keeping something on your own property or person or in your private effects. The latter comes with a presumption of privacy, the former does not.
Most claimants of copyright want to have their cake and eat it, too. They want to broadcast content, while still claiming that it remains effectively private.
Yeah I have no problem with saying I can copy something which is being broadcast to me, assuming it's not through cable tv or something which has rules against that. But certainly through an antenna.
But the argument is that it is an ownable right because it is a right in a physical object, not in an idea or a pattern. But it's not just that, it's more than that. Once a single illegal copy is made, then all other copiers of that illegal copy would no longer be violating your rights because you would have no rights in that illegal copy. I hardly think this is the position you are advocating, is it? Clayton
But the argument is that it is an ownable right because it is a right in a physical object, not in an idea or a pattern.
Clayton
But what I'm saying to this is that the illegal copy IS owned by the original copyrighter. And it happens as soon as they used the book to create the copy as part of the payment of breaking the original property rights in that book. When someone violates your rights, they owe you something, and it doesn't happen that they owe you something once a judge says they do, they owe it to you immediately. Part of what is owed is that copy. Now that copy's property rights are solely owned by the original creator, and the neither the copier nor anybody else have any rights to it. So if they use that copy to create another copy, they have still violated the original owner's rights, and would thus owe that copy of a copy too the original owner, and it would again, happen immediately.
"Heh, good luck enforcing that."
Agreed, but that doesn't mean I don't have the right to. I don't think my position is practical, just that I have the right to enforce.
Sam Armstrong: Agreed, but that doesn't mean I don't have the right to. I don't think my position is practical, just that I have the right to enforce.
I tend to think that, once we get out of the realm of practicality, all of these things break down.
An example is our faculty of taste. Its 'purpose' is to advise us as to what to eat; but it evolved under definite conditions in which only a certain set of objects were given to it as input to appraise. So, if you give it an object going beyond that set of objects, it is entirely unpredictable what it will do; it will no longer give you worthwhile advice; it will just give you a bunch of meaninglessness.
Analogously, property rights originated to solve certain problems. So, if you start to talk of things that it never took as input when it evolved, it is entirely unpredictable what will happen.
That was not very good of an explanation; but, if you want more information, I discussed things like that in one of my recent posts.
You'd have to make a contract similar to what I wrote above. Almost nobody would agree to hiring a full time security guard to watch the newest copy of Harry Potter, so it is basically irrelevant. As soon as someone gets a hold of information who hasn't explicitly agreed not to disseminate it, you have no right of enforcement.
If they got that information without participating in the violation of somebody's rights, you are correct. But part of the proof is the fact that a copy by scanning a book would have the exact same words all in the same order. That would count as evidence against them. They would literally have to prove that they have a photographic memory and could write down an entire book that they weren't intending to copy at the time they read it, or prove that they had a copy of the book which was not owned by somebody, or prove that they got it from a broadcast over the radio or something.
Um, no. The book-writer has no contract in any way with a 3rd party.
Even if I give you that, it doesn't make any sense. Did the second firm only decide to start researching at the instant the first firm entered the new market, which the second firm couldn't have been aware of if no research was being done? Chances are, the second firm would have to constantly be researching, along with the first firm, to find new profitable opportunities, or to find ways that competitors are gaining an edge.
What slows things down, the copyright law or the contracts?
Salinger has passed, and an unpublished work really doesn't have much to do with our discussion. We're talking about a writer trying to publish a book and earn a profit without someone copying him.
How convenient. I'd like to know what that definition is, because if substitute products can exist in a monopoly, then it isn't much of a monopoly.
Regardless, your conclusion was invalid because you're assuming that because I hold one belief, I must hold other beliefs as well. Package deal fallacy.
Really? How many times do I have to explain it? At this point I'll have to believe you're dodging the issue for lack of a response.
The first publisher pays the writers, editors, artists, and all other parties associated with creating the book. This is in addition to the costs of publishing the book. The second publisher doesn't have to pay writers, editors, artists, or any other parties associated with creating the book. They only pay the costs of publishing because they just copy the book as is. How can the first publisher compete against such a cost advantage? I insist that you address this point, otherwise I have no reason to continue the debate. I've said it several times already, and you have not even tried to refute it.
I made the distinction to show that oil companies have to bear all parts of the cost of their product, while copiers only had to one part of the costs. Copiers get an unfair advantage. I added R because it was a different variable than the variables I had originally defined. However, as I stated above, how can you say that the second firm pays less in research with certainty? How did they know when to start researching if they didn't begin until the first firm entered the new market?
No, see again you don't understand property rights. A contract is not necessary for me stop and punish you for throwing eggs at my house. It's not necessary for me to stop and punish you from touching my book and bringing it to a scanner and pressing the scan button. It's my book. Now if you don't want to only buy the rights to read the book without the intention of copying it, then feel free not to. But if you do buy those rights, you don't get to claim the other rights to the book that haven't been given to you, and neither does anybody else. The right to read the book with the intention of copying it are still held by the original owner. If you do that, You have violated his rights. No contract necessary.
Where do property rights stem from, if you know so much Sam? Are you now arguing that an idea or concept is a scarce thing?
Sam, M1ThinkTank --
Good work. There are some old threads on this subject which we seem to be revisiting here about once a month. Check them out:
I. Ryan, my argument isn't against profit seeking activity. In fact, my whole point is analogous to the more general case against socialism, without the correct institutional structure there simply aren't the necessary incentives to drive entrepreneurs into pursuing profit and loss opportunities and all that entails. In other words, private property in ideas is a necessary prerequisite for a market in them to operate. Now, let me quickly state that I'm not necessarily saying what we have now is perfect or that we can rationally design a system of intellectual property to maximise their production, just that abolishing them will lead to economic stagnation and a severe underproduction of "ideas" and knowledge. There are already large social gains that can't be captured by the originators of ideas, I can only see the abolition of IP as exacerbating this problem.
Again, why should any person employ their ideas to find opportunities to make profits if it is inevitable that other people will just follow along, 'steal' their ideas, and eradicate their huge profits without trying as hard? Why should any one want to be the first person to improve their efficiency if they can just wait for an other person to do that and then follow suit, without wasting all of their time and money doing research?
There are already advantages in being the first to innovate, but I think that IP might go a long way to solving exactly this problem.
"You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows"
Bob Dylan
Wow, congrats, Z has declared you the winner of this thread. None of you have been able to answer what I said was important. M1 strawmanned me and made a false claim about nirvana fallacy. That isn't the central point of IP advocates committing a category error, it just shows that what these state apologists advocate isn't compatible with freedom.
I can only see the abolition of IP as exacerbating this problem.
The bulk of human history contradicts this nonsense. Great works were created before IP laws.
Alright, well when a patented time machine is invented you can go back and live in the pre-IP world, I'm quite happy here in the world IP thanks. Besides, cool shit happened in the USSR too, doesn't really mean that abolishing other forms of property is such a good idea.
I'm quite happy here in the world IP thanks.
I know. Ignorance is bliss.
"Where do property rights stem from, if you know so much Sam? Are you now arguing that an idea or concept is a scarce thing?"
Jesus Christ dude. Have you not read a single word I've written. Or are you purposely Ignoring the conclusion I've laid out every time. The right to stop you from copying isn't based on the fact that I can stop you from writing in your book, in your house, with your pen. It is entirely based on the fact that You have to interact (read: touch, blow on, move the table the book is on in hopes that the next page flips over) So that you can copy the entire book. If you do any of those things while intending to copy it, YOU. HAVE. VIOLATED. RIGHTS. Why have you violated rights? Because I own the book, and have only given you the right to interact with the book while x condition is met. What is x condition you ask? That your mind is not currently in the state of intending to copy the book. That condition doesn't have to be spelled out in a contract, All that has to have happened is I have said "I hereby give you the right to interact with this book under the condition that you do not intend to copy it". Either that or you have stated "I hereby give you back the book on condition that anybody interacts with the book with the intent to copy it and I have not prevented it or destroyed it before it could be." So what happens if somebody interacts with it who intends to copy it? It's ownership is Immediately transfered back to the original owner, the person copying it is now violating the owners rights because he completely owns the book now, and the cost of violating his rights in this manner includes immediate destruction of that copy or failing that, ownership of the new copy goes to the originals owner.
You didn't answer either question, and the first is more important.
YOU. HAVE. VIOLATED. RIGHTS. Why have you violated rights? Because I own the book, and have only given you the right to interact with the book while x condition is met.
Sam wrote a book.
He sold it to A, B, C ... Y and all agreed to not copy the book.
Z (uninvolved 3rd party) copies the book when A ... Y aren't looking, or A ... Y think IP is bunk and knows that you can never prove which of the thousands of people you sold the book to already somehow let Z copy it.
So, attempting to stop copying legitimately will fail in many cases. There is, it seems, certain cases where it might be economically beneficial to undertake necessary means to control information, but the conventional CD/books don't work.
Then again, you could just admit that "what is right" doesn't matter to you and keep toeing the line.
Property rights stem from first possession or homesteading. What do you think they stem from?
I don't need to prove which copy it came from in order to own the copy. The strongest evidence that the book was used in order to copy it is the fact that every word in the copy is exactly the same. That's all the evidence I need to convince a judge that my book was indeed used in order to copy it. Now that I have evidence you used my book to copy it, you need some evidence to counter. So either a)prove that you got your copy legit such as through a radio broadcast if that ever even happened, or b) prove that you can read a book without intending to copy it, and then latter write it all down word for word.
So, you apparently accept the libertarian grundnorms but have still evaded my second question.
After all, a property right is simply the exclusive right to control a scarce resource.[4]
--
Stephan Kinsella: "What is it about tangible goods that makes them subjects for property rights? Why are tangible goods property? A little reflection will show that it is these goods’ scarcity — the fact that there can be conflict over these goods by multiple human actors. The very possibility of conflict over a resource renders it scarce, giving rise to the need for ethical rules to govern its use. Thus, the fundamental social and ethical function of property rights is to prevent interpersonal conflict over scarce resources. As Hoppe notes: "[O]nly because scarcity exists is there even a problem of formulating moral laws; insofar as goods are superabundant (“free” goods), no conflict over the use of goods is possible and no action-coordination is needed. Hence, it follows that any ethic, correctly conceived, must be formulated as a theory of property, i.e., a theory of the assignment of rights of exclusive control over scarce means. Because only then does it become possible to avoid otherwise inescapable and unresolvable conflict." Others who recognize the importance of scarcity in defining what property is include Plant, Hume, Palmer, Rothbard, and Tucker. Nature, then, contains things that are economically scarce. My use of such a thing conflicts with (excludes) your use of it, and vice-versa. The function of property rights is to prevent interpersonal conflict over scarce resources, by allocating exclusive ownership of resources to specified individuals (owners). To perform this function, property rights must be both visible and just. Clearly, in order for individuals to avoid using property owned by others, property borders and property rights must be objective (intersubjectively ascertainable); they must be visible. For this reason, property rights must be objective and unambiguous. In other words, “good fences make good neighbors ... it is clear, given the origin, justification, and function of property rights, that they are applicable only to scarce resources.
Stephan Kinsella:
"What is it about tangible goods that makes them subjects for property rights? Why are tangible goods property?
A little reflection will show that it is these goods’ scarcity — the fact that there can be conflict over these goods by multiple human actors. The very possibility of conflict over a resource renders it scarce, giving rise to the need for ethical rules to govern its use. Thus, the fundamental social and ethical function of property rights is to prevent interpersonal conflict over scarce resources.
As Hoppe notes:
"[O]nly because scarcity exists is there even a problem of formulating moral laws; insofar as goods are superabundant (“free” goods), no conflict over the use of goods is possible and no action-coordination is needed. Hence, it follows that any ethic, correctly conceived, must be formulated as a theory of property, i.e., a theory of the assignment of rights of exclusive control over scarce means. Because only then does it become possible to avoid otherwise inescapable and unresolvable conflict."
Others who recognize the importance of scarcity in defining what property is include Plant, Hume, Palmer, Rothbard, and Tucker. Nature, then, contains things that are economically scarce. My use of such a thing conflicts with (excludes) your use of it, and vice-versa. The function of property rights is to prevent interpersonal conflict over scarce resources, by allocating exclusive ownership of resources to specified individuals (owners). To perform this function, property rights must be both visible and just. Clearly, in order for individuals to avoid using property owned by others, property borders and property rights must be objective (intersubjectively ascertainable); they must be visible.
For this reason, property rights must be objective and unambiguous. In other words, “good fences make good neighbors ... it is clear, given the origin, justification, and function of property rights, that they are applicable only to scarce resources.
"ideas are not scarce. If I invent a technique for harvesting cotton, your harvesting cotton in this way would not take away the technique from me. I still have my technique (as well as my cotton). Your use does not exclude my use; we could both use my technique to harvest cotton. There is no economic scarcity, and no possibility of conflict over the use of a scarce resource. Thus, there is no need for exclusivity. Similarly, if you copy a book I have written, I still have the original (tangible) book, and I also still “have” the pattern of words that constitute the book. Thus, authored works are not scarce in the same sense that a piece of land or a car are scarce. If you take my car, I no longer have it. But if you “take” a book-pattern and use it to make your own physical book, I still have my own copy. The same holds true for inventions and, indeed, for any “pattern” or information one generates or has. As Thomas Jefferson — himself an inventor, as well as the first Patent Examiner in the U.S. — wrote, “He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.” Since use of another’s idea does not deprive him of its use, no conflict over its use is possible; ideas, therefore, are not candidates for property rights.
"ideas are not scarce. If I invent a technique for harvesting cotton, your harvesting cotton in this way would not take away the technique from me. I still have my technique (as well as my cotton). Your use does not exclude my use; we could both use my technique to harvest cotton. There is no economic scarcity, and no possibility of conflict over the use of a scarce resource. Thus, there is no need for exclusivity.
Similarly, if you copy a book I have written, I still have the original (tangible) book, and I also still “have” the pattern of words that constitute the book. Thus, authored works are not scarce in the same sense that a piece of land or a car are scarce. If you take my car, I no longer have it. But if you “take” a book-pattern and use it to make your own physical book, I still have my own copy. The same holds true for inventions and, indeed, for any “pattern” or information one generates or has. As Thomas Jefferson — himself an inventor, as well as the first Patent Examiner in the U.S. — wrote, “He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.”
Since use of another’s idea does not deprive him of its use, no conflict over its use is possible; ideas, therefore, are not candidates for property rights.
Stephan Kinsella: "Ideas are not naturally scarce. However, by recognizing a right in an ideal object, one creates scarcity where none existed before. As Arnold Plant explains: "It is a peculiarity of property rights in patents (and copyrights) that they do not arise out of the scarcity of the objects which become appropriated. They are not a consequence of scarcity. They are the deliberate creation of statute law, and, whereas in general the institution of private property makes for the preservation of scarce goods, tending . . . to lead us “to make the most of them,” property rights in patents and copyrights make possible the creation of a scarcity of the products appropriated which could not otherwise be maintained." Bouckaert also argues that natural scarcity is what gives rise to the need for property rules, and that IP laws create an artificial, unjustifiable scarcity. As he notes: "Natural scarcity is that which follows from the relation¬ship between man and nature. Scarcity is natural when it is possible to conceive of it before any human, institutional, contractual arrangement. Artificial scarcity, on the other hand, is the outcome of such arrangements. Artificial scarcity can hardly serve as a justification for the legal framework that causes that scarcity. Such an argument would be completely circular. On the contrary, artificial scarcity itself needs a justification." Thus, Bouckaert maintains that “only naturally scarce entities over which physical control is possible are candidates for” protection by real property rights. Only tangible, scarce resources are the possible object of interpersonal conflict, so it is only for them that property rules are applicable. Thus, patents and copyrights are unjustifiable monopolies granted by government legislation. It is not surprising that, as Palmer notes, “[m]onopoly privilege and censorship lie at the historical root of patent and copyright.” It is this monopoly privilege that creates an artificial scarcity where there was none before.
"Ideas are not naturally scarce. However, by recognizing a right in an ideal object, one creates scarcity where none existed before.
As Arnold Plant explains:
"It is a peculiarity of property rights in patents (and copyrights) that they do not arise out of the scarcity of the objects which become appropriated. They are not a consequence of scarcity. They are the deliberate creation of statute law, and, whereas in general the institution of private property makes for the preservation of scarce goods, tending . . . to lead us “to make the most of them,” property rights in patents and copyrights make possible the creation of a scarcity of the products appropriated which could not otherwise be maintained."
Bouckaert also argues that natural scarcity is what gives rise to the need for property rules, and that IP laws create an artificial, unjustifiable scarcity.
As he notes:
"Natural scarcity is that which follows from the relation¬ship between man and nature. Scarcity is natural when it is possible to conceive of it before any human, institutional, contractual arrangement. Artificial scarcity, on the other hand, is the outcome of such arrangements. Artificial scarcity can hardly serve as a justification for the legal framework that causes that scarcity. Such an argument would be completely circular. On the contrary, artificial scarcity itself needs a justification."
Thus, Bouckaert maintains that “only naturally scarce entities over which physical control is possible are candidates for” protection by real property rights.
Only tangible, scarce resources are the possible object of interpersonal conflict, so it is only for them that property rules are applicable. Thus, patents and copyrights are unjustifiable monopolies granted by government legislation. It is not surprising that, as Palmer notes, “[m]onopoly privilege and censorship lie at the historical root of patent and copyright.” It is this monopoly privilege that creates an artificial scarcity where there was none before.
Stephan Kinsella: "Let us recall that IP rights give to pattern-creators partial rights of control—ownership—over the tangible property of everyone else. The pattern-creator has partial ownership of others’ property, by virtue of his IP right, because he can prohibit them from performing certain actions with their own property. IP rights change the status quo by redistributing property from individuals of one class (tangible-property owners) to individuals of another (authors and inventors). Prima facie, therefore, IP law trespasses against or “takes” the property of tangible property owners, by transferring partial ownership to authors and inventors. It is this invasion and redistribution of property that must be justified in order for IP rights to be valid. because the only way to recognize ideal rights, in our real, scarce world, is to allocate rights in tangible goods. For me to have an effective patent right — a right in an idea or pattern, not in a scarce resource — means that I have some control over everyone else’s scarce resources. For example, by inventing a new technique for digging a well, the inventor can prevent all others in the world from digging wells in this manner, even on their own property. There is, in fact, no reason why merely innovating gives the innovator partial ownership of property that others already own. "
"Let us recall that IP rights give to pattern-creators partial rights of control—ownership—over the tangible property of everyone else. The pattern-creator has partial ownership of others’ property, by virtue of his IP right, because he can prohibit them from performing certain actions with their own property.
IP rights change the status quo by redistributing property from individuals of one class (tangible-property owners) to individuals of another (authors and inventors). Prima facie, therefore, IP law trespasses against or “takes” the property of tangible property owners, by transferring partial ownership to authors and inventors. It is this invasion and redistribution of property that must be justified in order for IP rights to be valid.
because the only way to recognize ideal rights, in our real, scarce world, is to allocate rights in tangible goods. For me to have an effective patent right — a right in an idea or pattern, not in a scarce resource — means that I have some control over everyone else’s scarce resources.
For example, by inventing a new technique for digging a well, the inventor can prevent all others in the world from digging wells in this manner, even on their own property.
There is, in fact, no reason why merely innovating gives the innovator partial ownership of property that others already own. "
source
So, you are either a statist/IP-thug, living in la-la-land and honestly believe that scarcity exists in ideas, or must admit you are wrong.
hayekianxyz: There are already advantages in being the first to innovate[...]
There are already advantages in being the first to innovate[...]
Indeed.
hayekianxyz: I. Ryan, my argument isn't against profit seeking activity.
I. Ryan, my argument isn't against profit seeking activity.
I know; I was just presenting what I considered the implications of your argument, not a restatement of only what you presented explicitly.
hayekianxyz: In fact, my whole point is analogous to the more general case against socialism, without the correct institutional structure there simply aren't the necessary incentives to drive entrepreneurs into pursuing profit and loss opportunities and all that entails. [...] but I think that IP might go a long way to solving exactly this problem.
In fact, my whole point is analogous to the more general case against socialism, without the correct institutional structure there simply aren't the necessary incentives to drive entrepreneurs into pursuing profit and loss opportunities and all that entails. [...] but I think that IP might go a long way to solving exactly this problem.
My point is that I see no difference between that "incentive problem" and that of any other profit-seeking activity, which most people, including you, do not consider to be a problem. (I expand on my point more in my next post in which I respond to M1ThinkTank.)
hayekian: In other words, private property in ideas is a necessary prerequisite for a market in them to operate.
In other words, private property in ideas is a necessary prerequisite for a market in them to operate.
As I said, it is impossible to demarcate property in ideas. For they are of your internal world, in which you have no competition; only things of the external world are able to be property. Now do not interpret what I am saying here as a general argument against 'IP'. I know that many other people make similar assertions and just end there, like that is all that they had to say to fend off any arguments. What I am instead advocating, in saying that, is that we make sure that we understand that to avoid speaking nonsense and muddling the issue. From what I have seen, many of the dumb errors that people make regarding this issue, not to say that you are making any of them, stem from pretending that it is possible to "own" ideas. To avoid speaking nonsense, we always need to talk of setting property 'rights' in classes of goods, which is really what 'IP' is. For example, when you have a copyright for a book that you wrote, what you "own" is any matter arranged in that certain way, not a specific "idea". Again, whether this is expedient or not is what we need to determine.
If you understand what I am saying here, it will be easy to understand what was wrong with Stranger calling the anti-'IP' people "intellectual communists". What I am saying here is that it is not even possible to put ideas in a commune! The only way to do that is not somehow connect our internal worlds together through telepathy or something, which, clearly, we have yet to do!
hayekianxyz: Now, let me quickly state that I'm not necessarily saying what we have now is perfect or that we can rationally design a system of intellectual property to maximise their production, just that abolishing them will lead to economic stagnation and a severe underproduction of "ideas" and knowledge. There are already large social gains that can't be captured by the originators of ideas, I can only see the abolition of IP as exacerbating this problem.
Now, let me quickly state that I'm not necessarily saying what we have now is perfect or that we can rationally design a system of intellectual property to maximise their production, just that abolishing them will lead to economic stagnation and a severe underproduction of "ideas" and knowledge. There are already large social gains that can't be captured by the originators of ideas, I can only see the abolition of IP as exacerbating this problem.
If you do not mind, I would like to hear what you think would make more sense than our current system.
M1ThinkTank: Salinger has passed[.]
Salinger has passed[.]
What I explained was true even before he died.
M1ThinkTank: [A]n unpublished work really doesn't have much to do with our discussion[.]
[A]n unpublished work really doesn't have much to do with our discussion[.]
Because it is not published, they are not able to use copyright protections. They want people to be able to read it; but they do not want any one to copy it. So they came up with a solution.
M1ThinkTank: How convenient. I'd like to know what that definition is, because if substitute products can exist in a monopoly, then it isn't much of a monopoly.
It is not convenient; it is just a definition. I do not understand it well enough to give you a good definition; so I suggest that you just look it up.
M1ThinkTank: What slows things down, the copyright law or the contracts?
The contracts.
M1ThinkTank: Regardless, your conclusion was invalid because you're assuming that because I hold one belief, I must hold other beliefs as well. Package deal fallacy.
Where did I do that?
M1ThinkTank: I added R because it was a different variable than the variables I had originally defined.
I added R because it was a different variable than the variables I had originally defined.
What you separated into "X" and "R", I put as one variable in my example, in which I described why I did that.
M1ThinkTank: Really? How many times do I have to explain it? At this point I'll have to believe you're dodging the issue for lack of a response.
Try to be respectful.
M1ThinkTank: The first publisher pays the writers, editors, artists, and all other parties associated with creating the book. This is in addition to the costs of publishing the book. The second publisher doesn't have to pay writers, editors, artists, or any other parties associated with creating the book. They only pay the costs of publishing because they just copy the book as is. How can the first publisher compete against such a cost advantage? I insist that you address this point, otherwise I have no reason to continue the debate. I've said it several times already, and you have not even tried to refute it.
Why should I try to refute what I already agreed was the truth several times?
M1ThinkTank: Even if I give you that[.]
Even if I give you that[.]
How is it even possible to not "give [me] that"?
M1ThinkTank: [I]t doesn't make any sense. Did the second firm only decide to start researching at the instant the first firm entered the new market, which the second firm couldn't have been aware of if no research was being done? Chances are, the second firm would have to constantly be researching, along with the first firm, to find new profitable opportunities, or to find ways that competitors are gaining an edge.
[I]t doesn't make any sense. Did the second firm only decide to start researching at the instant the first firm entered the new market, which the second firm couldn't have been aware of if no research was being done? Chances are, the second firm would have to constantly be researching, along with the first firm, to find new profitable opportunities, or to find ways that competitors are gaining an edge.
I did not imply that no research was being done. "Less than" does not mean nothing.
M1ThinkTank: However, as I stated above, how can you say that the second firm pays less in research with certainty? How did they know when to start researching if they didn't begin until the first firm entered the new market?
However, as I stated above, how can you say that the second firm pays less in research with certainty? How did they know when to start researching if they didn't begin until the first firm entered the new market?
It probably is easier to monitor where a producer sells their oil, what they price it at, and what their profits are than it is to figure out the first two things yourself and guess what your profits will be. In the same way, it probably also it easier to monitor what arrangement of marks a producer puts on the books that they sell than it is to figure that out yourself. I am not sayng anything controversial here. If it were just as difficult for the first producer to figure out what the do than the second, economic calculation would not be possible and the price system would not spread any knowledge.
M1ThinkTank: I made the distinction to show that oil companies have to bear all parts of the cost of their product[...]
I made the distinction to show that oil companies have to bear all parts of the cost of their product[...]
It was an arbitrary separation, along with the one between X and R.
M1ThinkTank: [...]while copiers only had to one part of the costs. Copiers get an unfair advantage.
[...]while copiers only had to one part of the costs. Copiers get an unfair advantage.
Because you did not try to respond to my example, I will post it again:
I. Ryan: Let X be the cost of deciding what to print, including the author deciding what marks to put on the page and the publisher deciding which author to publish. Let Y be the cost of printing it, including the paper and all of the other materials. 1. Cost to the first publisher = X + Y 2. Cost to the second publisher = (less than X) + Y Let F be the cost of deciding where to sell, including trying to find gaps in demand and other things. Let V be the cost of selling it, including getting the oil, transporting it, and the other things. 1. Cost for the first oil company = F + V 2. Cost for the second company = (less than F) + V
Producers, whether of oil or books, need to (a) choose what, where, how, and when to sell their products, which, for books, includes the author choosing what marks to put on the pages, the producer choosing which author to publish, the graphic designer choosing what to make the cover, et cetera, and, for oil, includes where to sell the oil, what to price it at, et cetera, and (b) produce it, which, for books, includes using printing presses, paper, and other materials, and, for oil, includes retrieving it, refining it, and other things. What they ultimately sell is always a finished, physical product of the external world, which, in these examples, happen to be books and oil. Now the first producer, in either case, has to decide all of the first category and has to perform all of the second category. But the second producer, although he has to perform all of the second category, does not have to do all of the second category; for they are able to just copy the practices of the first producer.
Now you may admit that it is not a different of category but it is a difference in degree; that is, you may tell me that you agree with what I am saying but that the cost of the things that the second producer is able to copy from the first is much higher in the case of books in comparison to that of oil. And, if you say that, we will be getting somewhere. For my point is just that the 'utilitarian' case for 'IP' applies to every single instance in which people are seeking profit; the only possible difference is what the difference is between the cost of the first category that the first producer has to pay and the cost of the first category that the second producer has to pay. It might be the case that, on one hand, deciding what marks to put on the page of a booking, deciding what cover to put, and other things costs a lot more than, on the other hand, deciding where to sell the oil, how to transport it, and the other things.
"So, you are either a statist/IP-thug, living in la-la-land and honestly believe that scarcity exists in ideas, or must admit you are wrong."
First of all I don't necessarily agree that property rights are ownership of scarce resources. I can own air for example. But I'm not arguing that I can own information, nor that it is a scarce resource. THAT SHOULD BE OBVIOUS BY NOW. Paper is scarce. Binded pieces of paper are even more scarce. I can own those things.
But continue to strawman my arguments, argue against things I've never even implied, post quotes from Kinsella which don't address any of my arguments etc.
I haven't read the Kinsella paper, but it seems to me that, whether or not you subscribe to the utilitarian benefits of IP, it remains that it requires a coercive state to enforce it. It's not simply an argument of "would we be better off with IP or without IP?" rather "would we be better off with IP and a coercive state to enforce or, or without both?" Absent the state, there would be no way to deal with the 3rd party copiers (other than societal ostracization or exclusionism, which doesn't seem likely.)
As others have suggested, the burden would be on the creators themselves to determine how to best market their talents without being able to rely on the state to suppress their competition. In some cases, like industrial processes, this may involve restricting the sale of the idea to a small number of customers, who would possibly agree to be held liable if they allowed a 3rd party to subsequently appropriate the idea (as pointed out, this approach quickly becomes unfeasable with mass distribution.)
For writers and artists, the end of IP could mean a shift in importance away from old content (royalties, etc.) and towards future content. These creators would quickly realize that their most marketable asset is no longer their past catalogue, but rather their future creative potential. This might mean that, without IP, instead of consumers patronizing a creator by buying their book or CD once it comes out, they will instead pay the artist BEFORE the artist produces the content. Since the benefits of a good book or piece of music are so diffuse, a popular, say, musician might set up a website and pledge to release his next album once he has received contributions totaling x dollars.
So in essence, if there exists sufficient demand for the creative talent of an individual, he will have plenty of means to profit from this talent even without the protection of IP.