Sam Armstrong:All property is mysticism. There is never anything observable in objects that make property rights so.
I knew we would get here eventually.
So anyhow, before I got totally bored with this topic for now, I was reading one last article from Kinsella.
And more than this. IP is not possible without legislation; legislation is not possible without the state. And conversely: with a state, you always get legislation; and legislation always leads to a proliferation of bad laws (see my Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society). What this means is that not only is your case against IP weakened if you do not adopt libertarian principles and reasoning to undergird it. But if you support the state at all–if you are not an anarcho-libertarian–then you do not really oppose IP. If the state exists, it will legislate, and it will probably enact IP laws, along with plenty of other bad laws. So, if you support the state, you really can’t complain about IP laws. As Ludwig von Mises pointed out, “No socialist author ever gave a thought to the possibility that the abstract entity which he wants to vest with unlimited power—whether it is called humanity, society, nation, state, or government—could act in a way of which he himself disapproves.” IP opponents must not oppose only the “worst excesses” of IP. They must oppose all IP, root and branch, on principled, pro-private property, grounds; and more than this: they must oppose the state itself, and legislation as a means of making law.
And more than this. IP is not possible without legislation; legislation is not possible without the state. And conversely: with a state, you always get legislation; and legislation always leads to a proliferation of bad laws (see my Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society).
What this means is that not only is your case against IP weakened if you do not adopt libertarian principles and reasoning to undergird it. But if you support the state at all–if you are not an anarcho-libertarian–then you do not really oppose IP. If the state exists, it will legislate, and it will probably enact IP laws, along with plenty of other bad laws. So, if you support the state, you really can’t complain about IP laws. As Ludwig von Mises pointed out, “No socialist author ever gave a thought to the possibility that the abstract entity which he wants to vest with unlimited power—whether it is called humanity, society, nation, state, or government—could act in a way of which he himself disapproves.”
IP opponents must not oppose only the “worst excesses” of IP. They must oppose all IP, root and branch, on principled, pro-private property, grounds; and more than this: they must oppose the state itself, and legislation as a means of making law.
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
How about the fact that there's a clear pattern on the book written by somebody? If the book suddenly got mulched and there was nothing recognizable about it being a book, then fine.
If you are saying that you own the matter of the book in a certain way as to make it so people are able to read it but not copy it, you have to assume that, between reading it and copying it, you have to mess with the arrangement of the matter of the book in different ways. But I already showed that, between those two activities, they do not have to mess with the arrangement in different ways.
If you are still trying to say that you own the book and not the pattern of it, you have to just acquiesce to the example with the television that you gave before, you have to say that you own it entirely and that, whether it is in the trash of not, it is yours. But that it clearly incompatible with selling it to people. For, once you sell it, you relinquish your complete 'rights' to it.
The only option left is saying that you should be able to 'own' the arrangemant. And, again, so you do not misunderstand me, I am not saying that, once you admit that it only makes sense to say that you are advocating that people should be able to own arrangements, your argument is revealed as ridiculous. Not at all. Instead, it would just get rid of the mysticism that surrounds this issue and make us be able to get past all of the definitions and actually ask whether it is expedient to do so.
I define 'IP' as being able to have monopolies on arrangements. Whether that is expedient is what we need to determine. And, by the way, I offered arguments skeptical to its expediency earlier, showing, I think, that the general argument for 'IP' is a general revolt against the market system because it implies that no one has incentives to do ever seek profits in any way because people will simply steal their idea and be able to destroy their profits it without having to deal with all of the research cost involved in figuring out how to do that. (That was a bad explanation; but, to see my point, refer back to some of my posts in this thread, especially my original post to hayekianxyz and the end of one of my posts to M1ThinkTank.)
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
My point is that I see no difference between that "incentive problem" and that of any other profit-seeking activity, which most people, including you, do not consider to be a problem. (I expand on my point more in my next post in which I respond to M1ThinkTank.)
OK, let me put it another way. You're quite correct that in an equilibrium position there is, by definition, no incentive for further profit opportunities. But the point I'm trying to make is that even in disequilibrium position, there will be fewer incentives to invest in R&D if one cannot capture the returns from doing so. It's a comparative point, a society in which individuals cannot capture returns from investment will see less investment. Economists such as Douglass North have pointed to the institutional change that was the extension of property rights to ideas as being a key cause in the industrial revolution.
As I said, it's analogous to the general case against socialism. When property is socialized, individuals can't reap what they sow, they don't internalize the returns from investment of any variety and as such will factor this into their decision making.
As I said, it is impossible to demarcate property in ideas
Attempts to rationally justify and demarcate any sort of property runs is problematic, as a lot of the useless quibbling around here is a testament to. To take but one example, what constitutes homesteading? Many people have tried to answer this question and no conclusive answer has really been given, homesteading may simply mean fencing off an area or it may mean literally "mixing ones labour with the ground", but the latter term is ambiguous. I don't see why property rights in ideas would be any different, changes in circumstances motivated institutional change which then further affects the incentives of individuals.
I suppose my problem is that I don't see how all property is really just social convention, much in the same way that property in ideas are.
"You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows"
Bob Dylan
"If you are still trying to say that you own the book and not the pattern of it, you have to just acquiesce to the example with the television that you gave before, you have to say that you own it entirely and that, whether it is in the trash of not, it is yours. But that it clearly incompatible with selling it to people. For, once you sell it, you relinquish your complete 'rights' to it."
I have shown you time and time again I don't have to sell you complete rights to it. I'm renting it to you for an indefinite time, on a one time payment. You have the right to carry it around, put it in your book case, read it, all provided you do not intend to copy it. I have every other right to it. That's it. If somebody picks up that rented and unpossessed piece of property, they don't necessarily own it. They only gain the rights to it which have been abandoned. That may or may not have been all of them. Now determining if that piece of material is owned can be made more difficult if it has been mulched. But not that hard if it was still a book.
I have shown that handling the book is different if any other condition is met. e.g. the earthquake in Somalia, the right to handle the book at night vs. day, living in my house with the intention to paint it etc. Your intentions count as a condition. If that condition doesn't match up with the rights you homesteaded, you are in violation of the other owners rights.
hayekianxyz: Attempts to rationally justify and demarcate any sort of property runs is problematic, as a lot of the useless quibbling around here is a testament to. To take but one example, what constitutes homesteading? Many people have tried to answer this question and no conclusive answer has really been given, homesteading may simply mean fencing off an area or it may mean literally "mixing ones labour with the ground", but the latter term is ambiguous. I don't see why property rights in ideas would be any different, changes in circumstances motivated institutional change which then further affects the incentives of individuals.
Ah, but I tried to anticipate that response here:
I. Ryan: Now do not interpret what I am saying here as a general argument against 'IP'. I know that many other people make similar assertions and just end there, like that is all that they had to say to fend off any arguments. What I am instead advocating, in saying that, is that we make sure that we understand that to avoid speaking nonsense and muddling the issue. From what I have seen, many of the dumb errors that people make regarding this issue, not to say that you are making any of them, stem from pretending that it is possible to "own" ideas. To avoid speaking nonsense, we always need to talk of setting property 'rights' in classes of goods, which is really what 'IP' is. For example, when you have a copyright for a book that you wrote, what you "own" is any matter arranged in that certain way, not a specific "idea". Again, whether this is expedient or not is what we need to determine.
Now do not interpret what I am saying here as a general argument against 'IP'. I know that many other people make similar assertions and just end there, like that is all that they had to say to fend off any arguments. What I am instead advocating, in saying that, is that we make sure that we understand that to avoid speaking nonsense and muddling the issue. From what I have seen, many of the dumb errors that people make regarding this issue, not to say that you are making any of them, stem from pretending that it is possible to "own" ideas. To avoid speaking nonsense, we always need to talk of setting property 'rights' in classes of goods, which is really what 'IP' is. For example, when you have a copyright for a book that you wrote, what you "own" is any matter arranged in that certain way, not a specific "idea". Again, whether this is expedient or not is what we need to determine.
I expanded on that point here:
I. Ryan: The only option left is saying that you should be able to 'own' the arrangemant. And, again, so you do not misunderstand me, I am not saying that, once you admit that it only makes sense to say that you are advocating that people should be able to own arrangements, your argument is revealed as ridiculous. Not at all. Instead, it would just get rid of the mysticism that surrounds this issue and make us be able to get past all of the definitions and actually ask whether it is expedient to do so. I define 'IP' as being able to have monopolies on arrangements. [Again, w]hether that is expedient is what we need to determine.
I define 'IP' as being able to have monopolies on arrangements. [Again, w]hether that is expedient is what we need to determine.
To avoid speaking nonsense, we have to define our terms unambiguously.
hayekianxyz: As I said, it's analogous to the general case against socialism. When property is socialized, individuals can't reap what they sow, they don't internalize the returns from investment of any variety and as such will factor this into their decision making.
I responded to that here:
I. Ryan: If you understand what I am saying here, it will be easy to understand what was wrong with Stranger calling the anti-'IP' people "intellectual communists". What I am saying here is that it is not even possible to put ideas in a commune! The only way to do that is not somehow connect our internal worlds together through telepathy or something, which, clearly, we have yet to do!
If you understand what I am saying here, it will be easy to understand what was wrong with Stranger calling the anti-'IP' people "intellectual communists". What I am saying here is that it is not even possible to put ideas in a commune! The only way to do that is not somehow connect our internal worlds together through telepathy or something, which, clearly, we have yet to do!
Now that will probably not mean much to you. But, to be clear, anti-'IP' is not pro-socialism of ideas. For that is just nonsensical.
hayekianxyz: OK, let me put it another way. You're quite correct that in an equilibrium position there is, by definition, no incentive for further profit opportunities. But the point I'm trying to make is that even in disequilibrium position, there will be fewer incentives to invest in R&D if one cannot capture the returns from doing so. It's a comparative point, a society in which individuals cannot capture returns from investment will see less investment. Economists such as Douglass North have pointed to the institutional change that was the extension of property rights to ideas as being a key cause in the industrial revolution.
But you said this:
hayekianxyz: There are already advantages in being the first to innovate[...]
There are already advantages in being the first to innovate[...]
Why does that apply to finding certain profit opportunities but not others? If I interpret your response less strongly and see "there will be fewer incentives to invest in R&D if one cannot capture the returns from doing so" as "there will be fewer incentives to invest in R&D if one [...] capture[s fewer] returns from doing so", yes, I agree. But the problem with that is that it does not acknowledge the unseen. Sure, giving people monopolies if they do something gives them more incentives to do that. But that gives other people less opportunities to innovate, too, which is clearly an issue.
You have still not really responded to the point of my argument. I do not exactly blame you for that, though; for it is not very 'nuanced' or precise because of my weakness in economics. But I expand on my points here:
I. Ryan: Producers, whether of oil or books, need to (a) choose what, where, how, and when to sell their products, which, for books, includes the author choosing what marks to put on the pages, the producer choosing which author to publish, the graphic designer choosing what to make the cover, et cetera, and, for oil, includes where to sell the oil, what to price it at, et cetera, and (b) produce it, which, for books, includes using printing presses, paper, and other materials, and, for oil, includes retrieving it, refining it, and other things. What they ultimately sell is always a finished, physical product of the external world, which, in these examples, happen to be books and oil. Now the first producer, in either case, has to decide all of the first category and has to perform all of the second category. But the second producer, although he has to perform all of the second category, does not have to do all of the first category; for they are able to just copy the practices of the first producer. Now you may admit that it is not a different of category but it is a difference in degree; that is, you may tell me that you agree with what I am saying but that the cost of the things that the second producer is able to copy from the first is much higher in the case of books in comparison to that of oil. And, if you say that, we will be getting somewhere. For my point is just that the 'utilitarian' case for 'IP' applies to every single instance in which people are seeking profit; the only possible difference is what the difference is between the cost of the first category that the first producer has to pay and the cost of the first category that the second producer has to pay. It might be the case that, on one hand, deciding what marks to put on the page of a book, deciding what cover to put, and other things costs a lot more than, on the other hand, deciding where to sell the oil, how to transport it, and the other things.
Producers, whether of oil or books, need to (a) choose what, where, how, and when to sell their products, which, for books, includes the author choosing what marks to put on the pages, the producer choosing which author to publish, the graphic designer choosing what to make the cover, et cetera, and, for oil, includes where to sell the oil, what to price it at, et cetera, and (b) produce it, which, for books, includes using printing presses, paper, and other materials, and, for oil, includes retrieving it, refining it, and other things. What they ultimately sell is always a finished, physical product of the external world, which, in these examples, happen to be books and oil. Now the first producer, in either case, has to decide all of the first category and has to perform all of the second category. But the second producer, although he has to perform all of the second category, does not have to do all of the first category; for they are able to just copy the practices of the first producer.
Now you may admit that it is not a different of category but it is a difference in degree; that is, you may tell me that you agree with what I am saying but that the cost of the things that the second producer is able to copy from the first is much higher in the case of books in comparison to that of oil. And, if you say that, we will be getting somewhere. For my point is just that the 'utilitarian' case for 'IP' applies to every single instance in which people are seeking profit; the only possible difference is what the difference is between the cost of the first category that the first producer has to pay and the cost of the first category that the second producer has to pay. It might be the case that, on one hand, deciding what marks to put on the page of a book, deciding what cover to put, and other things costs a lot more than, on the other hand, deciding where to sell the oil, how to transport it, and the other things.
No one has showed me how the other profit opportunities differ from the ones that they want to protect with 'IP' laws. The fact is that, whether you are producing oil, books, or whatever, if a person creates something good and starts profiting, other people will follow suit and reduce their profits. With researching where to sell oil, people just say that they get "first mover" advantages and that it why it is OK. But, with books, they entirely forget about the "first mover" advantages and just talk of how they will have no incentive to make anything new.
hayekianxyz: I suppose my problem is that I don't see how all property is really just social convention, much in the same way that property in ideas are.
I am not sure what you mean by that.
Sam Armstrong: I have shown you time and time again I don't have to sell you complete rights to it. I'm renting it to you for an indefinite time, on a one time payment. You have the right to carry it around, put it in your book case, read it, all provided you do not intend to copy it. I have every other right to it. That's it.
I have shown you time and time again I don't have to sell you complete rights to it. I'm renting it to you for an indefinite time, on a one time payment. You have the right to carry it around, put it in your book case, read it, all provided you do not intend to copy it. I have every other right to it. That's it.
Sure, that makes sense if you sign a contract with them.
Sam Armstrong: I have shown that handling the book is different if any other condition is met. e.g. the earthquake in Somalia, the right to handle the book at night vs. day, living in my house with the intention to paint it etc. Your intentions count as a condition. If that condition doesn't match up with the rights you homesteaded, you are in violation of the other owners rights.
The handling of the book is not different; just the relationship that the person has with the contract is different; and, in this case, it is against what the contract says. So, sure, that makes sense if you sign a contract with them. But, to be clear, it has nothing to do with how they handle the book. For they may read it or copy it while messing with the arrangement of its matter in the same way.
Sam Armstrong: If somebody picks up that rented and unpossessed piece of property, they don't necessarily own it. They only gain the rights to it which have been abandoned. That may or may not have been all of them.
If somebody picks up that rented and unpossessed piece of property, they don't necessarily own it. They only gain the rights to it which have been abandoned. That may or may not have been all of them.
But you have no contract with the guy who picks it up. So the two things that I quoted above do not help prove that you somehow retain partial rights of a lost book.
Economists such as Douglass North have pointed to the institutional change that was the extension of property rights to ideas as being a key cause in the industrial revolution.
They were wrong. More than wrong. They had it backward.
Here is some Douglas North brilliance: "Laissez-faire is a bunch of baloney." http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A2xhmlpUKd8
This moron makes his living going to third world countries all the time and says that he has no idea how to improve standards of living there.
ClaytonB: OK but if you want to avoid the "property in patterns/ideas" issue, you have to actually show a causal chain of torts. If someone steals your Rolex, you can't just go out and grab the first Rolex off someone's wrist that happens to look like the one that was stolen from you. You have to show that it is the very Rolex that was yours. Similarly, you will have to show that a book you sold with "reserved rights" was, in fact, copied to produce the illegal copy and, in a chain, for each additional illegal copy. The evidence would have to be sufficient to stand in a court of law, just saying "It looks like my book" is not sufficient as it would not be for a Rolex. It is basically impossible that two people write the same book. Is that not good enough evidence that the chain that you are talking about exists?
ClaytonB: OK but if you want to avoid the "property in patterns/ideas" issue, you have to actually show a causal chain of torts. If someone steals your Rolex, you can't just go out and grab the first Rolex off someone's wrist that happens to look like the one that was stolen from you. You have to show that it is the very Rolex that was yours. Similarly, you will have to show that a book you sold with "reserved rights" was, in fact, copied to produce the illegal copy and, in a chain, for each additional illegal copy. The evidence would have to be sufficient to stand in a court of law, just saying "It looks like my book" is not sufficient as it would not be for a Rolex.
OK but if you want to avoid the "property in patterns/ideas" issue, you have to actually show a causal chain of torts. If someone steals your Rolex, you can't just go out and grab the first Rolex off someone's wrist that happens to look like the one that was stolen from you. You have to show that it is the very Rolex that was yours. Similarly, you will have to show that a book you sold with "reserved rights" was, in fact, copied to produce the illegal copy and, in a chain, for each additional illegal copy. The evidence would have to be sufficient to stand in a court of law, just saying "It looks like my book" is not sufficient as it would not be for a Rolex.
It is basically impossible that two people write the same book. Is that not good enough evidence that the chain that you are talking about exists?
But Sam Armstrong's argument is an attempt to make an end-run around appealing to authorship because that implies rights in patterns/ideas. You are saying that authorship ("See, the pattern of letters in the book I wrote is the same as the pattern of letters in this book whose copy I did not authorize") in itself is evidence of ownership. But that implies that patterns/ideas can be owned. That is a different subject from my argument with Sam Armstrong.
I think both you and Sam Armstrong are incorrect here. SA's argument implies that it's possible to write a contract that distinguishes between holding a book with intent only to read it and reading it with intent to copy it. But this is kind of silly. Maybe I have a photographic memory and I can retype the contents of the book after reading it at Waldenbooks (without purchasing, so no breach of contract). Or, maybe the type of information in the book is of an immediately useful variety, for example, stock tips or other such information which can be relayed (copied) without being mimeographed. The root problem is that "intent" is subjective so it is not possible to write a contract on that basis. Who's to say what the intent was?
However, I think you are also incorrect. You imply that it is not possible to form a contractual agreement not to engage in actions that do not result in an alteration of the material configuration of the physical world. I think this is incorrect. Consider a performance bond to fidelity. The prohibited actions are any sort of sexual contact with another person than the person's spouse. If the conditions of infidelity in the performance bond are objective then the bond would be enforceable. Violation of the bond would not be the result of changing the material configuration of the physical world but engaging in a certain action or actions which you have agreed not to engage in (for example, going out to dinner alone with a woman who is not your wife or holding her hand, etc.) If the cheated spouse can demonstrate with evidence that the agreed conditions of the bond have not been met, the bond can be awarded to the injured spouse.
Non-disclosure agreements could certainly be formed in a natural order legal system regarding the copying of books or any other media. Despite the ease of copying data in the modern world, corporations manage to keep very sensitive data private with all manner of NDAs. I can't see NDAs as being solely a creature of the State, even though MPAA/RIAA's leg-breaker-style IP certainly is.
Clayton -
Economists such as Douglass North have pointed to the institutional change that was the extension of property rights to ideas as being a key cause in the industrial revolution. They were wrong. More than wrong. They had it backward. Here is some Douglas North brilliance: "Laissez-faire is a bunch of baloney." http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A2xhmlpUKd8 This moron makes his living going to third world countries all the time and says that he has no idea how to improve standards of living there.
Boldrin and Levine's Against Intellectual Monopoly gives specific case studies of how IP hampered the Industrial Revolution (Watt's steam-engine patents, etc.) and how industries which have been largely unprotected by IP have, in fact, flourished because of it.
Hard to beat Boldrin & Levine, IMO.
The copied pattern is evidence that they violated my property rights, it isn't the actual property right. So it's usable in court, but it is based on the fact that they had to use my property. If they can prove that they didn't use my book in order to make the copy, then that's cool.
Sam Armstrong: I have shown you time and time again I don't have to sell you complete rights to it. I'm renting it to you for an indefinite time, on a one time payment. You have the right to carry it around, put it in your book case, read it, all provided you do not intend to copy it. I have every other right to it. That's it. Sure, that makes sense if you sign a contract with them.
No, it doesn't make sense if I signed a contract with them (because again, you can break contracts). It makes sense if I transfered rights over to them, but retained some of them for myself. If I sell somebody the right to live in my house, they can sell that right to someone else. There is no contract between me and this new third party, but they don't own the entire house just because they don't have a contract with me. They only own the right to live in the house.
If I sell Josh the right to live in my house provide his name is Jim, he can sell that right to anybody named Jim. But they still only have the right to live in the house provided their name is Jim. If Jim then changes his name to Perry, he no longer meets the condition of right to live in my house provided his name is Jim. He still owns that right though, so he can sell it to another person named Jim. And none of these 3rd parties have ever signed a contract with me.
Now if one of these guys abandon's their right to live in the house provide their name is Jim, Anybody else can then homestead that right, including me. If I don't and someone named Jim homesteads the right to live in the house provide their name is Jim, and changes his name to sam, they don't get to homestead the right to live in the house provided their name is Sam, because I still own that right.
But Sam Armstrong's argument is an attempt to make an end-run around appealing to authorship because that implies rights in patterns/ideas. You are saying that authorship ("See, the pattern of letters in the book I wrote is the same as the pattern of letters in this book whose copy I did not authorize") in itself is evidence of ownership. But that implies that patterns/ideas can be owned. That is a different subject from my argument with Sam Armstrong. The copied pattern is evidence that they violated my property rights, it isn't the actual property right. So it's usable in court, but it is based on the fact that they had to use my property. If they can prove that they didn't use my book in order to make the copy, then that's cool.
It is evidence that a book like yours was used but it is not necessarily evidence that the very book was used. The book in question could be a copy of a copy of your book. You can say, "well, that's the same thing, I owned the first illegal copy, too" but that's a circular argument since the very point in contention is whether or not a copy is proof of violation of the reserved rights.
Your argument might have some validity if xeroxing was the only way to copy things. A xerox is a bit like a photograph, it is a record of the state of the physical world at some time and place. So, you could use the xerox itself as evidence that your very book was copied but not by virtue of the pattern of letters on the page, rather, by virtue of the unique attributes of the book, i.e. the paper texture, page size and shape, the font used, spelling errors or other unique features of the very book you originally sold.
But xerox is not the only way to make a copy. A person might use OCR software and reprint from their computer. If so, the printed reproduction of the book is no longer a record of the state of the physical world at some time and place. It is a completely abstract copy of the pattern of letters in the book. So, such a reproduction of your book cannot be evidence that your reserved rights were violated without appealing to the contents of the book (pattern/idea).
Except it isn't an abstraction. It's in physical memory of a computer. I'd would own those registers (or what ever rights the person who put it in those registers had) in that computer for making an illegal copy on that computer using my original book.
For example. Let's bring in another party. Let's say he posted it on a google site or something. He has the right to use that under what ever conditions google has spelled out in their terms of service. If he uses my book to copy it to those servers, I now own his rights to use that server in what ever conditions google has spelled out. If he then further accesses that account, he's guilty of hacking, and infringing on my rights to that server.
Now let's say that there are no terms and conditions and that anybody can post anything up on some server. Do I own the server bits where anybody can post anything they want. Is that party who has that server responsible for it? Yes. Their server is doing something which is using my property in what ever registers that I own in order to copy it, and I own those registers because somebody used my book to copy it, just as if it were the paper of a xerox. Just as someone is responsible for a tree on their property falling on my car, so too are they responsible for using my property to copy the information on it. So I now have a property right in that server just as I would in a xerox of the original book. If the people who own it do anything other than erase it so that they can retake ownership of their server, they have violated my property right in that server. Cause remember, the cost of using my property to copy it is either a) immediate destruction of the copy, or failing that b) transfered ownership of the media the copy is on.
There is really only one way to get around this. Somebody reads the entire book and makes some sort of broadcast over the radio. Then somebody who had no premeditation with the person who broadcast it records it on a tape recorder and then transcribes that recording into a book. That is literally the only way that I can think of that a legit unauthorized copy of a book could come out.
There was illegal use of my property involved, but I can't stop people from hearing it just as you couldn't stop the person from looking at a poster board. I also can't stop them from recording what they hear. You could stop the person broadcasting it, but if you didn't get him in time, tough titties. Other than the fact that you can still take it to the guy who broadcast it over the radio.
When your theory is that contrived it is time to reassess.
It's only the theory of property rights. I'm taking them to their logical conclusions in certain situations.
ClaytonB: However, I think you are also incorrect. You imply that it is not possible to form a contractual agreement not to engage in actions that do not result in an alteration of the material configuration of the physical world. I think this is incorrect. Consider a performance bond to fidelity. The prohibited actions are any sort of sexual contact with another person than the person's spouse. If the conditions of infidelity in the performance bond are objective then the bond would be enforceable. Violation of the bond would not be the result of changing the material configuration of the physical world but engaging in a certain action or actions which you have agreed not to engage in (for example, going out to dinner alone with a woman who is not your wife or holding her hand, etc.) If the cheated spouse can demonstrate with evidence that the agreed conditions of the bond have not been met, the bond can be awarded to the injured spouse.
I never meant to imply that; but I will defend it anyway. If you try to make a contract with a person without the indication that you breached the contract being a change in the external world, that is just mysticism. With your example, that of course results in a change in the external world; that is, it implies that the relationship of your body, a thing of the external world, and the body of one other than your spouse, a thing of the external world, is of a certain type. If that were not true, how else would you enforce the contract? It would be silly, for example, to make a contract saying that you will pay me $1,000 at the time at which I have a certain sort of dream. For, as far as I know, it is impossible to verify what sorts of dreams people have. If I am wrong, just think of an other example of something completely private; and you will see what I mean.
(What I was saying to Sam Armstrong was that, if he is not talking about contracts, he is not talking about him owing certain classes of objects, and he believes that one of his lost books should be readable but not copyable, his only possibility is to talk about partially owning the matter of an object; but, as I showed earlier, the handling of a book does not necessarily differ between reading it and copying it. Also, by the way, I am not really sure whether it makes any sense to say that you partially own something, anyway. I was just trying to show him that the only way to hold his position is to advocate that people should be able to 'own' classes of goods. Notice the first few words of what you quoted: "If you are saying that you own the matter of the book in a certain way as to make it so people are able to read it but not copy it[...]". That is a pretty specific condition. Your response would have made more sense if I had started that with "If you are [pro-'IP']" or something like that.)
You've completely failed in this task. There are no "scarce ideas" same as there are no "square circles".
Sam Armstrong: No, it doesn't make sense if I signed a contract with them (because again, you can break contracts). It makes sense if I transfered rights over to them, but retained some of them for myself. If I sell somebody the right to live in my house, they can sell that right to someone else. There is no contract between me and this new third party, but they don't own the entire house just because they don't have a contract with me. They only own the right to live in the house. If I sell Josh the right to live in my house provide his name is Jim, he can sell that right to anybody named Jim. But they still only have the right to live in the house provided their name is Jim. If Jim then changes his name to Perry, he no longer meets the condition of right to live in my house provided his name is Jim. He still owns that right though, so he can sell it to another person named Jim. And none of these 3rd parties have ever signed a contract with me.
Sure, that makes sense if the first party has a contract with the second party and the second party has a contract with the third party. But, again, if a dude finds your book on the side of the road, he is not agreeing to any sort of contract with any one.
Sam Armstrong: Now if one of these guys abandon's their right to live in the house provide their name is Jim, Anybody else can then homestead that right, including me. If I don't and someone named Jim homesteads the right to live in the house provide their name is Jim, and changes his name to sam, they don't get to homestead the right to live in the house provided their name is Sam, because I still own that right.
Now you are just being silly.
Except it isn't an abstraction. It's in physical memory of a computer. I'd would own those registers (or what ever rights the person who put it in those registers had) in that computer for making an illegal copy on that computer using my original book. For example. Let's bring in another party. Let's say he posted it on a google site or something. He has the right to use that under what ever conditions google has spelled out in their terms of service. If he uses my book to copy it to those servers, I now own his rights to use that server in what ever conditions google has spelled out. If he then further accesses that account, he's guilty of hacking, and infringing on my rights to that server. Now let's say that there are no terms and conditions and that anybody can post anything up on some server. Do I own the server bits where anybody can post anything they want. Is that party who has that server responsible for it? Yes. Their server is doing something which is using my property in what ever registers that I own in order to copy it, and I own those registers because somebody used my book to copy it, just as if it were the paper of a xerox. Just as someone is responsible for a tree on their property falling on my car, so too are they responsible for using my property to copy the information on it. So I now have a property right in that server just as I would in a xerox of the original book. If the people who own it do anything other than erase it so that they can retake ownership of their server, they have violated my property right in that server. Cause remember, the cost of using my property to copy it is either a) immediate destruction of the copy, or failing that b) transfered ownership of the media the copy is on.
I think we're going in circles now. You have accurately described your theory of IP-as-reserved rights but that does nothing to counter my assertion that digital reproductions don't necessarily leave any evidence that your property rights have been violated other than the copied pattern. Since you disavow that the pattern itself is the property then finding a copy of the pattern of letters in your book somewhere is not, in itself, evidence that your property rights have been violated. After all, you could have given the manuscript of your book to a friend without any formal contractual agreement and he may have copied it and distributed it and you would simply be lying if you said that I violated your property rights by possessing and distributing that copy. If the courts ruled in your favor in such a case, they would be violating my property rights. You are presenting a completely one-sided view of the problem of establishing the case in fact in a court of law, as if, only the plaintiff need present his or her side of the story and that settles the matter. Unless you can prove with reasons and evidence that I most likely did violate your reserved rights, for you or the court to initiate force against me is an act of aggression.
There is really only one way to get around this. Somebody reads the entire book and makes some sort of broadcast over the radio. Then somebody who had no premeditation with the person who broadcast it records it on a tape recorder and then transcribes that recording into a book. That is literally the only way that I can think of that a legit unauthorized copy of a book could come out. There was illegal use of my property involved, but I can't stop people from hearing it just as you couldn't stop the person from looking at a poster board. I also can't stop them from recording what they hear. You could stop the person broadcasting it, but if you didn't get him in time, tough titties. Other than the fact that you can still take it to the guy who broadcast it over the radio.
I think your theories of law and property rights are ad hoc. You seem to be "shooting from the hip" here. While I agree that it is conceptually possible to define intellectual property as "reserved rights", you still have to deal with the problem of enforceability. Unenforceable rights are no rights at all.
Yes, if I just willy nilly gave him a copy of the book without any sort of rights reservation, he would be able to copy it. But assuming I have sufficient documentation that I never let out any such manuscript without reserving rights, that would, I suspect, be sufficient to lay the burden of proof on the opposing party to prove they indeed did not use my property in order to copy it. But that's not for me to decide so much as it is for judges to decide.
I think your theories of law and property rights are ad hoc. You seem to be "shooting from the hip" here. While I agree that it is conceptually possible to define intellectual property as "reserved rights", you still have to deal with the problem of enforceability. Unenforceable rights are no rights at all. Clayton -
My theory of rights is that I, as the person who owns a right can give the right or any particular portion to anybody else I please (assuming they accept it). It is not ad hoc, I'm just taking that statement and applying it to this particular situation. I've held that view long before I ever thought about intellectual property. The reason I defend reserved rights is not because I'm glad people can stop me from copying their property, it's because I want to defend that theory of rights.
Now my theory of how to actually enforce those things is much less rigid, and I leave that up to the market. I don't know exactly how to prove or disprove certain things and that's up to the free market courts, judges, and possible professional juries. So no, I don't have the problem of enforceability, that's entirely up to the invisible hand. But I have made suggestions as to how that might occur.
By the way, any court could be wrong, and enforcing their decisions would lead to rights violations. So there is never going to be no rights violations. It's just the amount of acceptable risk and certainty the courts have when making any case. Is it likely enough that somebody who has a book with the exact same letters in the same order as mine used my property to create it? Is suspect so, unless they give reason to think otherwise.
Property rights can only apply to scarce things. When you start creating pseudo-rights in non-scarce things it causes property rights conflicts.
Do you have a cord attached to you that somebody keeps pulling?
That doesn't fix your logical error. Not my problem man.
And you simply stating that you can't own non-scarce things over and over and over again doesn't make it so that I've been arguing you can.
My theory of rights is that I, as the person who owns a right can give the right or any particular portion to anybody else I please (assuming they accept it).
I think we look at rights slightly differently. I see rights as something that emerges from law (customary law, not statutory law). I don't think it makes sense to speak of "owning" a right, ownership is defined by rights (law).
It is not ad hoc, I'm just taking that statement and applying it to this particular situation. I've held that view long before I ever thought about intellectual property. The reason I defend reserved rights is not because I'm glad people can stop me from copying their property, it's because I want to defend that theory of rights.
That's commendable, I deplore the partisan tone of discussion pursued by some of the other posters here. Unflinching intellectual consistency is a rare bird.
Well, this is where our difference on rights becomes important. I think that the ability to force (as in, physical force, violence) others to respect one's rights is an integral part of the story of how rights emerge in the first place. There's no incentive for an overwhelmingly powerful party to go to court to resolve his disputes, he can simply kill anyone that gets in his way. Dead people, clearly, have no rights. People who are afraid of dying don't claim the rights they reasonably believe they have by virtue of being human beings because they prefer being alive with few rights to being dead (and having no rights).
This means that power imbalances matter to what rights can and will emerge.
Enforceability is a corollary to power. If I am impotent, I cannot enforce rights even if courts acknowledge those rights (again, I am speaking of natural order society, not the law-monopoly society we currently live in).
Whether intellectual property via reserved rights is a viable legal theory of rights in a natural order society will crucially depend on whether those rights could even be meaningfully enforced. So, enforceability matters.
E. R. Olovetto wrote the following post at 04-22-2010 12:20 AM:
"Property rights can only apply to scarce things. When you start creating pseudo-rights in non-scarce things it causes property rights conflicts."
Nope. Review economics.
Example:
I can own some surplus air or some surplus salt water. I just won't pay any attention to it, until it becomes scarce. No one else will either. But once scarce, my foresight in owning it was rewarded, as people will want to buy it from me for more than I value it.
"Now, would you like knowledge of when to sell a certain stock, based on unpublished research? Yes? Well then, this is scarce knowledge. Pay me for it, or I won't tell you."
And so on.
Review logic, and realize AB = ABC is the form of all contracts dealing with restricted disclosure. A is knowledge, B,...,Z are people, and C is a condtion. "I'll tell you A in exchange for Price 1, rather than what it is worth to me subjectively, say Price 2, Price 1 < Price 2. But if and only if C. You are only willing to pay Price 1, but I refuse to sell without C for anything less than Price 2, else I am less satisfied."
Step 1:
Suppose we allow everyone else to copy A through B, then B is a sucker. But if he is a sucker, he wouldn't make the contract. And A would be kept unknown from all people until whoever found it himself made use of it. Perhaps it is never made use of then.
That is, we get:
AB(D,E,F,...,Z) = ABC. B is a sucker to enter the agreement, because he pays and is bound, while everyone else gets A though him and yet is unbound.
Step 2:
For the contract to work, all people must not aid each other in circumventing it. This is implied in Leoni's thesis of harmony of claims or Hayek's thesis of functional but apparently "irrational" taboos.
Step 3:
Everyone wants A rather than not get A, so everyone agrees to BC = (D,E,F,...,Z)C.
And the contract works. Eventually, A gets around and is less scarce--it loses value and is no longer bought or sold.
Clayton is entirely right about enforcability being clearly important. But I argue that is handled through Hayekian customary rule.
So what if customary law figures out a way to enforce reserved rights? (I assume by customary law you mean things like tribal law, or private courts).
Well, this is where our difference on rights becomes important. I think that the ability to force (as in, physical force, violence) others to respect one's rights is an integral part of the story of how rights emerge in the first place. There's no incentive for an overwhelmingly powerful party to go to court to resolve his disputes, he can simply kill anyone that gets in his way. Dead people, clearly, have no rights. People who are afraid of dying don't claim the rights they reasonably believe they have by virtue of being human beings because they prefer being alive with few rights to being dead (and having no rights). This means that power imbalances matter to what rights can and will emerge. Enforceability is a corollary to power. If I am impotent, I cannot enforce rights even if courts acknowledge those rights (again, I am speaking of natural order society, not the law-monopoly society we currently live in). Whether intellectual property via reserved rights is a viable legal theory of rights in a natural order society will crucially depend on whether those rights could even be meaningfully enforced. So, enforceability matters.
I think that rights come from a basis of a goals and logic. Most people's basic goal is living, but conflicts will arise. Peaceful conflict resolution is one of the most important condition for the common goal of living to be achieved. In order to have a peaceful conflict resolution we must have some set of objective rules. But they must also be in line with the first objective, which is to live. The set of rules which fits both of those conditions the best is property rights. Those rules, if we are to meet the first two objectives must have absolutely no exceptions. For if any exception is made, any exception can be made. And that would be antithetical to the original objectives. The best way to achieve your original goals is to respect those rules in regards to other people unless the person gives you reason to think they have or are going to break them. If somebody has shown that their main goal isn't to live, but is to kill a whole bunch of people, well they no longer share the common basic goal of living, and they aren't part of the base condition which give people rights, at least not the same rights anyway.
In order to enforce those rights, I have to buy it (expend labor). How I do that and what options are available to do that is completely a function of markets just as it is with food. Enforcement of rights is a good. Having property rights is completely a socially normative rule which can be found through logic based on where people's base subjective goals meet. Where those rules are not enforced in a culture is one of two conditions, not sharing the same basic goal (e.g. my base goal is to enslave people for my subjective pleasure) or the result of being misinformed and making mistakes (e.g. thinking a state can actually advance that goal of living better than not having a state).
...
This isn't even a question of economics right now. I'm questioning your grasp on reality. Watch how I can repeat this idea ad infinitum.
Copying is not theft.
So, when you create this legal fiction of rights in non-scarce ideas, it creates a conflict in the real world of scarcity.
I have a claim to my creation of a book based on your pattern. You insist on owning a pattern and thus will aggress on me and my property.
See this cartoon if you still can't grasp this simple concept. We can argue whether your aggression is justified, but at least admit we are talking about the same thing.
Phriend: Hi friends, The idea of having a "legal copyright" seems to be crusaded against pretty heavily in libertarian circles. Could someone please explain this to me? It seems odd to me that I should just be able to copy someone else's music or writings -- and perhaps even profit by selling these things which I did not work to create! Why is copying so often considered to be acceptable in libertarian circles. I mean, if I copy Kid Rock's music, shouldn't Kid Rock get paid??
Hi friends,
The idea of having a "legal copyright" seems to be crusaded against pretty heavily in libertarian circles. Could someone please explain this to me? It seems odd to me that I should just be able to copy someone else's music or writings -- and perhaps even profit by selling these things which I did not work to create!
Why is copying so often considered to be acceptable in libertarian circles. I mean, if I copy Kid Rock's music, shouldn't Kid Rock get paid??
Because they are minarchists and therefore have to start a moral crusade to get the one size fits all answer to agree with their axioms. Thats my guess. If government was voluntary its a non issue.
E.R. Olovetto: "Property rights can only apply to scarce things. When you start creating pseudo-rights in non-scarce things it causes property rights conflicts." ... Nope. Review economics. This isn't even a question of economics right now. I'm questioning your grasp on reality. Watch how I can repeat this idea ad infinitum. Copying is not theft. Copying is not theft. Copying is not theft. Copying is not theft. Copying is not theft. Copying is not theft. Copying is not theft. Copying is not theft. So, when you create this legal fiction of rights in non-scarce ideas, it creates a conflict in the real world of scarcity. I have a claim to my creation of a book based on your pattern. You insist on owning a pattern and thus will aggress on me and my property. See this cartoon if you still can't grasp this simple concept. We can argue whether your aggression is justified, but at least admit we are talking about the same thing.
Please excuse me, but I must object: repetition is not a method of arguing. I can, in fact, own some saltwater. Merely it has value to me or anyone else and I will not pay attention to it until it is scarce.
"Copying is not theft" "Copying is not theft" "Copying is not theft" .... "Copying is not theft" = "Copying is not theft"K = "Copying is not theft"
Similarly,
"The box is blue" "The box is blue" "The box is blue" .... "The box is blue" = "The box is blue"
Of course, if the box is not blue, then saying "The box is blue" K times will not do any better at explaining the word than saying it once.
You had not answered any of my points. And the fact that you can repeat the above idea proves my point.
Take the concept "Copying is not theft". Suppose that you were especially aware and we were all unware of this. Why can we now repeat it without paying you anything?
"Copying is not theft" "all people" = "Copying is not theft" "all people" "can copy"
See; you merely disclosed it, and there was no contract. By default, if it was at all scarce, then now its not, and our condition is "can copy" since you said so.
It does not violate cutomary law to defend this sort of contract. It is a false exception. It is exactly in accordance with this customary law.
Let me try disclose something with a contract: "I will tell you what power supply I'd recommend to use, but only if you pay me one penny and don't tell anybody else."
Try to find that out voluntarily some other way just as easily?
You can drive to where I live, put up a ladder to my window, and try and see what I'm using, assuming of course that is what I would recommend. But is that really less costly?
You could, once you find out, share what I said and break the contract; but then no one would be willing to tell you anything except for a one time exchange that they'd find satisfactory right then and there, knowing that you'd or someone else would reveal the info. Five dollars instead of a penny, lets say.
Now, I doubt you or anyone else would pay five dollars. If they do, then no problem, but there are more things that can be exchanged for a penny than for five dollars...
Conclusion:
Unless BC = B(D,E,F,....,Z)C, AB = ABC, then a market problem, or a harmony of interests, is transformed into a strategic problem, or a conflict of interests.
what does an anecdote regarding specific performance have to do with intellectual property monopoly?
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Try plugging in an idea about how my specific power supply works.
All awareness is in some way specific. The reason 2 + 2 =4 is not specific is because it takes all of 1 millisecond to do the calculation youself and make it not scarce.
But a computer program that calculates pi to the trillionth decimal place has its answer published in a journal. This article costs 35 dollars, and you can only cite some parts.
Eventually no one needs to cite the article, since all parts have been cited. But by then, the journal received a couple hundred dollars or more, which might have been its owner's mental "reservation price".
It's like reservation wage. Want me to work for less, then partially share profits. Want me to work only for wage, then pay the minimum exchange for my hour of leisure.
http://mises.org/rothbard/ethics/nineteen.asp
If i pay you a dollar to tell me about a gas supply... and you don't tell me about the gas supply.
then what does justice demand?
Then you would tell everyone about the fraud. People would not make deals with me once they hear about this. Cutomary law.
Suppose you hear that the company that makes power supply X makes defective power supplies very often. Even if just a rumor, sales of the company take a hit. The company can only dispel the rumor by making good power supplies.
(Or, if rather than a dollar, you paid me a hundred million, you might just go and sue me in a court -- a private court in a free society backed by a PMC).
repetition is not a method of arguing.
I'm not even arguing because you are irrational. Much like Stranger derived his list of "fallacies" from faulty premises, you here commit the same category error.
What I was doing is repeating the experiment for you to observe.
perhapsthen you will tell people not to sell books to me because i am a known copier.... ok i have no problem with that. free speech.
alternatively if you bring a case, as you indicate above. you would seek restitution. similarly.... in a case where i copy a book you sold me under terms that i would never make a copy. restitution would be.... me returning to you your book (keeping whatever books i have that are 'copies') and you giving me the money i had paid in the original purchase.
Dear Olovetto,
So I am irrational because I do not agree with you?
So when I show your experiment is a false exception, you call me irrational?
That is very productive. Yes, very very productive.
X: "The box is blue." "The box is blue." "The box is blue."
Y: "The box is not blue. Here is why, Here is why, Here is why."
X: "The box is blue! "